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ABSTRACT
ICwame Nkrumah remains a towering figure in African history. Inspired by 
Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent campaign of civil disobedience to achieve political 
ends, he led present-day Ghana to independence in 1957. Nkrumah made Ghana a 
beacon of hope for not only Ghanaians but also people of African descent throughout 
the world.
Perhaps no other African leader of the 1950s and 1960s personified the 
dreams, principles and aspirations of this era. At the centre of my analysis of 
Nkrumalfs political, social and economic thought will be his own writings. I begin 
my re-examination of Nkrumalfs life and thought by focusing on the political 
discourse and controversies surrounding him. The focus of Chapter 1 is his sojourn in 
America, where he pursued his academic studies. Chapter 2 examines his period of 
political activism in London between 1945 to 1947 under the ideological guidance of 
George Padmore. This prepared him for the leadership of the new political party he 
foimded, the Convention People’s Party, following his return to the Gold Coast in 
1947. In Chapter 3 ,1 focus on Nkrumalfs political performance, his relationship with 
the British colonial authorities in the period 1951 to 1957.
Chapter 4 scrutinises his position on the federalist argument presented by his 
political enemy, the National Liberation Movement. Chapter 5 looks at politics in the 
post-independence period whilst Nkrumalfs economic and cultural policies are the 
focus of Chapter 6. While in office, Nkrumah documented his thought in several 
publications, which will be examined in Chapter 7. His foreign policy aimed at 
furthering African unity will be critically assessed via the various institutional 
mechanisms he set up to achieve this objective in Chapter 8. After the coup, which 
deposed him in February 1966, Nkrumah continued to develop his political and
economic convictions and this is the focus of Chapter 9. The final chapter considers 
Nkrumalfs legacy in Ghana and on the wider Pan-African stage in contemporary 
Africa.
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INTRODUCTION
The Literature on Nkrumah
Fundamentally, I  do not believe in the great men theory o f history, but I  do think that 
so-called great men o f history merely personify the synthesis o f the tangled web o f the 
material and historical forces at play.
This thesis seeks to analyse the political and cultural thought of'Kwame
Nkrumah, one of twentieth-century Africa’s most important nationalist leaders.
Nkrumah’s historical reputation is shrouded in considerable ambivalence and
controversy. His performance as independent Ghana’s first leader and his policies on
the domestic, African and international stage have continued to generate lively debate
within African studies and in popular forums. African listeners to BBC Focus on
Africa reflected the popularity of Nkrumah in a poll in December 1999. Nkrumah was
voted as “Africa’s Man of the Millennium.” Charles Abugre suggests that Nkrumah’s
legacy is far from monolithic. He writes:
Dead politicians are different things to different people.
Both their good and their wrong define the goal posts 
and hence the playing fields upon which the survivors 
take their positions in society. Their good is usurped, 
their failures exhumed and magnified as appropriate and 
in accordance with creed. It is in the nature of humanity 
to review the past, for in doing so we not only define 
our own essence but also seek to learn lessons if we 
genuinely desire to do so.
Shakespeare wrote that “the evil that men do lives after them but the good is interred 
with their bones.” Of deceased political figures, Abdul-Raheem writes: “Politically, 
victims and beneficiaries remember both. It is the balance between the two [the good
1 K. Nkrumah in ‘Nkrumah’s Private Notes Containing Notes, Statements and Other Analytic 
Comments on Important Issues,’ National Archives o f  Ghana, [hereafter NAG]:SC21/10/1 A.
2 C. Abugre, ‘In Defence o f  Kwame Nkrumah, ’A frica World Review , November 1992 -  April 1993, 
pp. 11 -  13.
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and the bad achievements] that determines their place in the politics of memory, 
which, like all memories, is prone to being selective.” Even General J. A. Ankrah, 
who headed the Supreme Military Coimcil that took over Ghana after the 24 February 
1966 coup d’etat that toppled Nkrumah confirmed that his place in African history 
had been assured. In short, Nkrumah has been vilified and revered for both his failures 
and achievements by scholars and ordinary people alike.
In the 1950s Ghana and Kenya emerged as the two models of British 
decolonization on the African continent. The former was symbolic of the peaceful and 
constitutional route in the transfer of power and the latter of the more violent path. 
Both countries were constantly in the news and their nationalist leaders, Nkrumah and 
Jomo Kenyatta, became household names. Nkrumah became a disciple of Mahatma 
Gandhi’s non-violent strategy of “Satyagraha” (soul force), which he coined as 
“Positive Action.” This strategy was diametrically opposed to the armed struggle of 
the Mau Mau which Kenyatta was erroneously associated with. These antithetical 
decolonising strategies alarmed the British authorities. In the climate of Cold War 
suspicions and tensions, both leaders were suspected of being communists and using 
violence as an illegitimate method of agitation to achieve their political ends. Both 
leaders were imprisoned by the British and used the term “prison graduate” to 
consolidate their status as nationalist leaders.4
A broad literature on Ghana and Nkrumah emerged in the 1960s. Early 
scholarly writings included political histories of the country5 and a plethora of
3 T. Abdul-Raheem, ‘The Politics o f  Burial,’ Thursday Postcard , 20 October 2005.
4 A. Mazrui, Nkrumah ’s Legacy and A frica’s Triple Heritage Between Globalization and Counter 
Terrorism (Accra, 2004), p. 45.
5 D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (Oxford, 1970); D. Apter, Ghana in Transition (Princeton, 
1972) and ‘Ghana’ in J. S. Coleman & C. G. Rosberg Jr (eds), Political Parties and National 
Integration in Tropical Africa {London, 1970); M. F. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 
1919-1957 (London, 1960).
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biographical work,6 Other emphases have included the nature of the handover of 
power in Ghana;7 the emergence of political opposition to Nkrumalfs Convention 
People’s Party (CPP);8 the rise and nature of the one party state Nkrumah created in 
independent Ghana;9 and his economic policies from 1957 tol966.10
As Cooper maintains:
There is a particular poignancy to the history of Ghana 
because it was the pioneer. Kwame Nkrumah was more 
than a political leader; he was a prophet of 
independence, of anti-imperialism, of Pan-Africanism.
His oft-quoted phrase ‘Seek ye first the political 
kingdom’ was not just a call for Ghanaians to demand a 
voice in the affairs of state, but a plea for leaders and 
ordinary citizens to use power for a pmpose -  to 
transform a colonized society into a dynamic and 
prosperous land of opportunity.11
6 There are numerous biographies. Among them are D. Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: A Political 
Kingdom in the Third World (London, 1988); A. B. Assensoh, Kwame Nkrumah o f  Africa: His 
Formative Years and the Beginning o f  His Political Career (London, 1989); B. Timothy, Kwame 
Nkrumah From Cradle to Grave (London, 1981); B. Davidson, Black Star: A View o f  the Life and 
Times o f  Kwame Nkrumah (London, 1973); D. Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah (London, 1990); M. 
Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad 1935-1947  (Accra, 1996); J. Milne, Kwame Nkrumah: 
A Biography (London, 1999); Y. Smertin, Kwame Nkrumah (Moscow, 1987).
7 R. Crooks ‘Decolonization, the Colonial State and Chieftaincy in the Gold Coast’ African Affairs, vol. 
85, no. 338, 1986, pp.75-105; R. Rathbone, British Documents in the End o f  Empire: Ghana (London, 
1992).
8 J. Allman, The Qirills o f  the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana (Madison, 1993); 
P. Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians: The Politics o f  Regionalism in Northern Ghana (London, 1979); 
M. Owusu, Uses and Abuses o f  Political Power: A Case Study o f  Continuity and Change in the Politics 
o f  Ghana (Chicago, 1970). R. Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics o f  Chieftaincy in 
Ghana, 1951-1960 (London, 2000).
9 H. Bretton, The Rise and Fall o f  Kwame Nkrumah: A Study o f  Personal Rule in Africa (London, 
1966); T. Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy o f  An African Dictatorship (London, 1970); J.
Kraus, ‘Political Change, Conflict and Development in Ghana’ in P. Foster and A.R. Zolberg (eds), 
Ghana and the Ivo ty Coast: Perspectives on Modernization  (Chicago, 1971), pp.33-72.
10 D. Rimmer, Staying Poor: G hana’s Political Economy 1950-1990 (London, 1992); T. Killick, 
Development Economics in Action: A Study o f  Economic Policies in Ghana (London, 1978); R. H. 
Green, ‘Reflections on Economic Strategy, Structure, Implementation, and Necessity: Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast, 1957-67’ in P. Foster and A.R. Zolberg (eds), Ghana and the Ivo ty  Coast, Perspectives on 
Modernization (Chicago, 1971), pp.231-264; E. J. Berg ‘Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism: 
Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast’ in ibid, pp. 187-230; R, Genoud, 
Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana (London, 1969).
11 F. Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past o f  the Present (Cambridge, 2002), p. 161.
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Similarly, Amilcar Cabral, the Guinea-Bissau leader, characterised Nkrumah in his 
eulogy as “the strategist of genius in the struggle against classic colonialism.”12 
Hodgkin argues that Nkrumah5 s “radical Pan-Africanism had an influence on the 
attitudes and behaviour of a substantial body of people.”13 In terms of the positive 
impact of Nkrumah, the founding president of Namibia, Sam Nujoma maintains: 
“Ghana’s fight for freedom inspired and influenced us all, and the greatest 
contribution to our political awareness at that time came from the achievements of 
Ghana after its independence. It was from Ghana that we got the idea that we must do 
more than just petition the UN to bring about our own independence.”14 Kenneth 
Kaunda, who led Zambia to independence, claims, “Nkrumah inspired many people 
of Africa towards independence and was a great supporter of the liberation of 
southern Africa from apartheid and racism.”15 Nkrumah*s uncompromising 
announcement that “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless linked to the 
total liberation of the African continent” translated into moral, logistical and material 
support for dependent territories across the African continent. However, in the post­
independence period it led him to be the focus of opprobrium from neighbouring 
African leaders who considered his actions in aiding political dissidents as 
interference in the sovereignty of other states.
Nkrumah was central to the major debates and issues of the decolonization 
period of the 1950s and 1960s. Among these was the emergence of the modernisation 
paradigm, which assumed that newly independent states would seek to imitate 
European systems of governance, economic growth, and values in order to build
12 A. Cabral’s speech was delivered at the funeral commemoration o f Nkrumah in Guinea-Conakry in 
May 1972, cited in Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings o f  Amilcar Cabral (New York and 
London, 1979), p. 115.
13 T. Hodgkin, ‘Nkrumah’s Radicalism,’ Presence Africaine (Paris, 1973), p. 63.
14 New African, February 2006, p. 19.
15 Ibid, p. 13.
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cohesive nation-states.16 In attempting to forge national unity among disparate ethnic 
and religious groups, the belief was that these newly independent states would 
abandon tradition for “modernity.” Nugent claims “a general sense of optimism was 
also reflected in the writings of an emergent community of Africanist scholars” during 
this time.17 By the end of the 1970s, modernisation theories had long been discredited. 
The mood of optimism had dissipated and was transformed into “Afro-pessimism” 
during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. According to Daddieh, in the aftermath of 
independence:
a combination of charisma and efficacious leadership 
generated widespread popular support and legitimacy 
for the new leaders. However, legitimacy was highly 
contextualised in the sense that the mobilised masses 
developed an instrumentalist conception of political 
independence. They viewed it as a prelude to material 
progress and social welfare. In short, legitimacy was 
based on a fundamental African social compact in 
which the new political elites promised, at least 
implicitly, to produce less poverty and less inequality, 
in exchange for popular support.18
Implicit in Nkrumah’s famous dictum “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else 
shall be added mito you” was the promise of an economic paradise and accompanying 
riches for Ghanaian citizens of the newly independent state. It led Nkrumah in April 
1957 to accept Ivory Coast’s nationalist leader Houphouet-Boigny’s challenge as to 
which country would be more developed in ten years. The “West African wager” as it 
became known was part of the era’s focus on the efficacy of development strategies. 
Nkrumah moved further to the political left and Ivory Coast espoused commitment to 
a free market economy and reliance on French technical expertise and private 
investment.
16 P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence (London, 2004), pp.4-5.
17 Ibid, p. 8.
18 C.K. Daddieh, ‘Ethnicity, Conflict and the State in Contemporary West Africa’ in E.K. Akyeampong 
(ed) Themes in West A frica ’s H istoiy  (London, 2006), p. 266.
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Nkrumah lost his wager with Houphouet Boigny, failing to transform Ghana 
into an economic paradise.19 Whether this was on account of the socialist shift he 
made in 1961 is debateable. Yet, as Young argues, "the Nkrumah shift in 1961 
appeared part of a much broader movement in Africa” that was committed to creating
♦ * 9fia more egalitarian society on socialist lines in achieving material prosperity. Along 
with Friedland and Rosberg, he maintains that the ideological spectrum broadened 
during the first two decades of African independence and socialism became an 
attractive ideology to several African leaders.21 Similarly, Killick contends that
Nkrumah’s adoption of a socialist economic strategy was part of the general trend
• * 2 2towards development economics adopted by many developing countries at the time.
Green also subscribes to the view that Nkrumah’s socialist economic strategy 
was flawed by weak implementation but despite this it was a rational and prudent 
policy choice.23 Ghana under Nkrumah was one among what Friedland and Rosberg 
characterise as the "first wave” of socialist regimes in the 1960s.24 Countries in this 
“first wave” included Tanzania, Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. 
Collectively this broad group is characterised by Young as “populist socialism” or 
“African socialism” on account of the fact that a socialist perspective shaped -  or at 
least legitimated major policy decisions in these countries. As Young states, 
“despite the tendency of socialism to dominate ideological discourse, it was never in 
reality the most widespread guide to policy choice in the 1960s because nobody loved
19 C. Young, Ideology and Development (London, 1982), p. 1; Nugent, Africa Since Independence,
p .166.
Young, Ideology>, p. 1.
21 W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg, (eds) African Socialism  (Stanford, 1964).
22 T. Killick, Development Economics in Action A Study o f  Economic Policies in Ghana (London,
1978).
23 Green, ‘Reflections on Economic Strategy,’in Ghana and the Ivoiy Coast: Perspectives on 
Modernization (Chicago, 1971), pp.231-264.
24W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosberg (eds), African Socialism  (Stanford, 1964); see also Young, 
Ideology.
25 Ibid, see chapter 3.
capitalism, and “there was something shameful about openly espousing it.”26 Such a 
stance led some countries such as Malawi, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast to describe 
themselves as “pragmatic” as they remained uncomfortable with the term “capitalist.” 
Whilst some scholars such as Young and Metz place Nkrumah firmly in the 
“African socialism” school of thought, in 1966, in an article entitled “African
77Socialism” Nkrumah clearly distanced himself from this brand of socialism. Metz 
maintains that compared to Nyerere, Nkrumah’s theoretical position 011 socialism, 
adhered more closely to Marxist orthodoxy. Nkrumah subscribed to dialectical 
materialist analysis and believed that African society was a fusion of the traditional 
African way of life, Euro-Christian and Islamic influences. He did not urge a return to 
an idyllic traditional African society as his contemporary Nyerere did. The term 
“scientific socialism” was later adopted by several African countries in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, including Congo-Brazaville, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. Political 
labels aside, Young contends that “ideology alone will not explain relative success or 
failure in achieving the central goal of a better life for the citizenry.” Political 
effectiveness is equally important in policy implementation in order to achieve 
increased material prosperity.
It is the argument of this thesis that Nkrumah was profoundly motivated by an 
ideological vision of radical socio-economic development for both Ghana and a 
united Africa along socialist lines. As “ideology is not to be dismissed as simple, 
evanescent rhetoric” and since “few rulers are such philosophically inspired kings as 
to apply ideology alone to policy reason,” this thesis seeks to examine Nkrumah’s 
efforts to transform Ghana and Africa according to his radical vision. Whilst
26 Ibid, pp.2-3.
27 S. Metz, ‘In Lieu o f Orthodoxy: The Socialist Theories o f Nkrumah and Nyerere,’ Journal o f  
M odem  African Studies, 20, 3, 1982, pp.377-392.
28 Young, Ideology, p. 10.
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Nkrumah was ideologically motivated, he was also a pragmatist who was not bound 
to ideological dogmatism. Consequently his vision was 011 occasion in tension with 
flawed and misjudged policy decisions that appeared inconsistent with his ideological 
preference. As Young writes: “Such dissonance may be rationalised as either not truly 
inconsistent with ideology correctly understood or as a conscious and temporary 
departure from rectitude; it does not annul the worldview with which it is in 
tension.”29 Therefore, it is essential to study Nkrumah’s ideological vision of the 
world and how he sought to transform Ghana and Africa if we seek to understand 
Nkrumah as a nationalist and Pan-Africanist.
Another debate in the literature in which Nkrumah surfaces is in relation to the 
nature of the one-party authoritarian state and neo-patrimonialism that emerged with 
his government. Mohan, Fitch and Oppenheimer belong to the Marxian school of 
thought that have argued that Nkrumah’s CPP travelled the path of neo-colonial 
accommodation by inheriting Western parliamentary institutions and permitting 
Ghana’s future economic development to be inextricably tied to Western finance 
capital. In so doing Nkrumah enabled a Ghanaian petty bourgeoisie to dominate the 
party, state and wider society by their access to state resources for self-enrichment. 
They contend that no fundamental structural change took place in Ghana’s economy 
dining Nkrumah’s years in power. 30 At the time of the 1966 coup, the economy 
remained Western-orientated despite the intention of the Seven Year Plan (1964- 
1970) to increase economic trade with the Eastern bloc and the USSR, Instead, a 
stifling state bureaucracy emerged alongside an undemocratic party that no longer 
represented the interests of the majority of Ghanaians.
29 Ibid, p. 10.
30 J. Mohan, ‘Nkrumah and Nkrumaism’ in Socialist Register, 1967, pp.191-228; B. Fitch and M. 
Oppenheimer, Ghana: End o f  an Illusion (New York, 1966).
Contributing to the literature on personal rule in Africa are a number of 
writers.31 Mazrui characterised Nkrumah as “the Leninist Czar” and Marable referred
O '}
to him as “the Bonapartist ‘benefactor.’ They concur on the growing corruption and 
bureaucratisation within the Ghanaian state, along with the cult of personality, as 
factors that led to an increasing concentration of power in NkrumalTs hands. In 
addition they argue that Nkrumah, consciously or unconsciously, modelled himself on 
Lenin and Napoleon. In a far more trenchant critique, Pobee, Bretton, Omari and 
Lacouture depict Nkrumah as a tyrannical megalomaniac. Mazrui also concurs that 
“Kwame Nkrumah started as a democrat and ended his political career as a 
dictator.”34
Other analyses of Nkrumah and post-independence African politics focus on 
the nature of the state inherited at independence and how nationalist leaders re­
configured state-society relations. Young’s comparative work 011 the colonial state in 
Africa and elsewhere rests on the premise that the new nationalist leaders inherited 
the repressive structures of the colonial state. The “Bula Matari” complex impacted 
negatively and pervasively on the new post-independent African states.35 In short, 
after formal decolonization the African state continued to remain external to the 
citizen; African governments failed to engage their citizens in meaningful political 
participation; the state remained predatory and alien but in a new but equally 
repressive configuration wielded by new African elites. The state became an
31 R. Jeffries, ‘Ghana: The Political Economy o f Personal Rule,’ in D. O ’Brien, J. Dunn and R. 
Rathbone (eds\C on tem poraiy West African States (Cambridge, 1989); Omari, Kwame Nkrumah; 
Bretton, Rise and Fall.
32 A. Mazrui, ‘‘Nkrumah: The Leninist Czar’ in Transition 75/76 The Anniversary Issue Selections from  
Transition, 196 1-1976 , p. 106; M. Marable, African and Caribbean Politics From Kwame Nkrumah to 
Maurice Bishop (London, 1982), p. 138.
33 J. S. Pobee, Kwame Nkrumah and the Church in Ghana 1949-1966 (Accra, 1988); H. Bretton, The 
Rise and Fall; Omari, Kwame Nknimah; J. Lacouture, The Demi Gods (New York, 1970).
34 Mazrui, Nkrumah's Legacy, p. 54.
35 Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven & London, 1994), p.2. 
The term means “he who crushes rocks” and refers to the authoritarian model o f  state-society relations 
in which the colonial state was able to suppress all forms o f resistance to it.
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instrument by which African elites enriched themselves at the expense of the citizens 
and the latter saw their rights being increasingly eroded by a state that failed to 
produce the most basic of services. Instead the spoils of the state were distributed 
among those who considered themselves to be the “gatekeepers” of the state.36
Cooper argues that such patron-client relations were not peculiar to nationalist 
leaders but also colonial officials. However, the new African leaders “had trouble
* 0 7making the nation-state into a symbol that inspired loyalty.” Both Cooper and 
Mbembe examine the nature of the post-colonial state that emerged across the African 
continent. Cooper emphasizes that “Gatekeeper states are thus not “African” 
institutions, nor are they “European” impositions; they emerged out of a peculiar 
Euro-African history.”38 In the case of Ghana, Cooper maintains that “even when 
Nkrumah became leader of the Gold Coast in 1951, he was operating under serious 
constraints.”39 He was reliant on cocoa revenues to diversify the economy and was in 
search of much needed Western finance and technology to develop the country. The 
weaknesses of Nkrumah and many African leaders of this period, according to Cooper 
was how they conceived of unity and political dissent. He writes: “Gatekeeper states’ 
insistence on the unity of the people and the need for national discipline revealed the 
fragility of their all-or-nothing control; they left little room for seeing opposition as 
legitimate,” Neither did ordinary citizens have an opportunity to influence politics at 
the local level, for local government was given little autonomy. 40
As Bay art argues, “the politics of the belly” does not only produce patron- 
client relationships, for “corruption and predatoriness are not found exclusively
36 Cooper, Africa Since 1940] A. Mbembe, On The Postcolony, (Berkeley, 2001).
37Cooper, Africa Since 1940, p. 156.
38 Ibid, p. 160.
39Ibid, p. 161.
40 Ibid, p. 159.
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amongst the powerful.”41 The norms and modes of conduct exercised by the rich elite 
also permeate the thinking and conduct of their citizens — the little men and women — 
who also find unscrupulous means of taking their slice of the national cake. 
Moreover, since independence the struggle has not only been one for material survival 
but a share in democratic government. Therefore m post-mdependent Africa a 
conflict emerged in which the youth, women and urban workers sought to challenge 
the balance of power and redistribution of wealth in society.43 In Ghana, workers, 
supported by market women, challenged the Nkrumahist state in 1961 and by the end 
of NkrumalTs government much of the general population had become disillusioned 
with CPP rule.
Scholars such as Austin, Apter, Davidson and James initially wrote positively 
on the achievements of the CPP between 1948-1957.44 Austin’s disillusionment with 
Nkrumah commenced with the post-independence period in which he considered 
Nkrumah’s role as “an African Tsar” presiding over an intolerant nationalist party. 45 
For Austin, “the circumstances of the time,”46 together with the insensitivity and 
intransigence of the opposition “to act more prudently” were factors affecting the 
outcome of the developments during the 1957-1960 period 47
In 1964, Nkrumah transformed Ghana into a one-party state. Even prior to 
this, trade unions, women’s organisations and youth groups had become integral 
wings of his ruling CPP. In addition to this the independence of the judiciary was 
seriously undermined in 1963 when Nkrumah sacked the Chief Justice. Nkrumah also
41 J. F. Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics o f  the Belly (London, 1993), p. 238.
42 Ibid, p. 242.
43 Ibid, p. 241.
44 Austin, Politics in Ghana, Apter; Ghana in Transition; Davidson, Black Star; James, Nkrumah and  
the Ghana Revolution (Westport, 1977).
45 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p.42.
46 Ibid, p. 44.
47 Ibid, p. 47.
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encouraged a cult of personality that gave rise to acolytes in the form of 
“Nkrumaists.” The centralising machinery of the CPP state was all embracing. For 
Austin, “Single-party rule was achieved and defended not because the leaders 
believed it to be the price to be paid for securing the safety of the state but because it 
matched their own interpretation of the nationalist revolution to which they laid 
exclusive claim.”48 As leader of the nation, it was Nkrumah’s interpretation of the 
nationalist revolution that prevailed.
The Relevance of the Thesis
A central argument of this thesis is that although Nkrumah may be considered 
as establishing the template of single party rule and a bloated state bureaucracy, he 
was by no means the exception during this phase of Africa’s history. Thirty-four years 
since Nkrumah’s death, scholars are now more capable of soberly re-assessing 
Nkrumah’s performance within a broader context of the historical, political, economic 
and social trends of the period. One of the important legacies of the post-colonial 
state was the type of state structures it inherited from the colonial masters. As Cooper 
and Young contend, the post-colonial state followed in the footsteps of its 
predecessor, the colonial state, by collecting relatively little revenue from Africa’s 
urban classes and peasants.49 Mbembe argues that the colonial and post-colonial state 
claimed a total monopoly of politics. “Commandment” was premised on a regime of 
privileges and immunities for the ruling elite that excluded the majority.50 In 
Nkrumah’s Ghana, it was evident that those who had access to such privileges were 
members of the CPP. Nkrumah inherited the colonial state and failed to transform it
48 Ibid, p. 44.
49 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, p. 156; Young, The African Colonial State, p. 286.
50 Mbembe, On the Postcolony; see chapter 3.
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into a meaningful democratic institution in the lives of ordinary Ghanaian citizens. 
Rather the state was considered as an instrument of nepotism or self-enrichment.
A further argument of the thesis is that a fundamental influence on political, 
economic and social developments in Ghana between 1957-1966 was Nkrumah5 s own 
ideology; his conception of the world, his convictions and ambitions. The approach 
adopted is to critically examine Nkrumah’s ideas and beliefs as reflected in the body 
of his written work and numerous speeches. He is one of the few African heads of 
state who has left for posterity published work.
Nkrumah*s ideological perspective has not been seriously and sufficiently 
examined. With the exception of work such as that of Botwe- Asamoah, who tends to 
emphasize the cultural aspect of Nkrumah* s ideology, or of Killick, who is generally 
sympathetic to the ideological convictions that underpinned Nkrumah’s move towards 
“development economics,” or the rather abstract work of Afari-Gyan that fails to 
relate Nkrumah’s ideas to his performance in power -  a serious examination of 
Nkrumah’s political thought is lacking.51 A contextual approach that fuses a 
discussion of ideology, political performance, events, personality and agency into a 
single perspective is necessary in examining Nkrumah’s life. The contention of this 
thesis is that it is important to understand the role of political, social and cultural 
beliefs in the lives of political leaders. I argue that there is a relationship between 
ideas as they are conceptualised, lived and implemented. The thesis will focus on 
demonstrating a link between Nkrumah’s political, social and cultural thought and his 
performance as Ghana’s first leader and one of Africa’s most significant statesmen. 
Ideology is critical in understanding political figures and what motivates individuals
5* K. Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies: An African-Centred 
Paradigm fo r  the Second Phase o f  the African Revolution (London, 2004); Killick, Development 
Economics; K. Afari-Gyan, ‘NkrumalTs Ideology’ in K. Arhin (ed), The Life and Work o f  Kwame 
Nkrumah (Trenton, 1993),pp. 161-177.
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to act. Agyeman defines ideology as “a political belief system with a commitment 
either to sustain, modify, or overthrow the existing order.” Fundamental to 
Nkrumah’s ideological outlook was the concept of unity. Agyeman argues that “the 
richness of Nkrumah9 s thought lies precisely in the unity of his political, 
philosophical and sociological ideas.”53
The aim of this thesis is to understand Nkrumah as a complex character rather 
than as a one-dimensional, larger than life figure. Much of the scholarly writing has 
paid attention to Nkrumah as a shrewd political operator, a nationalist figure and 
politician but he remains an unpredictable character to define. Perhaps this is on 
account of the fact that he erected an almost impenetrable barrier around himself and 
maintained a jealously guarded separation between his public and private life. 
Nevertheless, there exists a human side to this political figure that has been 
marginalized in the literature. The ordinary interests, pasttimes and activities 
Nkrumah engaged in, contribute to a roundedness of character in addition to his 
weaknesses and strengths.
This thesis does not consider Nkrumah purely as a politician but as an 
intellectual. This work seeks to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Nkrumah on 
various levels: in contemporary Ghanaian affairs, 011 the African continent, as well as 
within the Diasporic African community.
In Ghana, domestic politics since NkrumalTs death in 1972 has seen the rise of a 
plethora of Nkrumaist parties, which have continued to remain divided as a result of 
bitter ideological feuds and personality differences. The current New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) is the intellectual heir of Dr. J. B. Danquah and Dr. K. A. Busia who were 
Nkrumah’s arch ideological opponents. At the continental level and at the level of
52 O. Agyeman, Nkrumah’s Ghana and East Africa (London and Toronto, 1992), p. 28.
53 D, K. Agyeman, ‘Social and Political Outlook’ in K. Arhin (edj The Life and Work o f  Kwame 
Nkrumah (Trenton, 1993), p. 147.
14
contemporary globalisation there has been a renewed interest in Pan-Africanism along 
with a re-assessment of Nkrumah. At an institutional level Nkrumah*s ideas of 
African unity have seen the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), which he helped found in 1963, into the African Union (AU) in 2001. 
Nkrumah was a passionate advocate of what he conceived of as “Continental Union 
Government for Africa” or in other words, the concept of a United States of Africa. 
He considered the USA as among the many models for the political unification of 
Africa and he relentlessly championed Pan-Africanism.54
Nkrumah’s political, social and cultural thought as contained in his writings 
and speeches reflects a coherent thought process. He wrote on a plethora of 
intellectual themes, such as decolonization, neo-colonialism, imperialism, political 
economy, African freedom and unity, history and African social and cultural 
philosophy. Some of his ideas evolved over time whilst certain convictions remained 
unchanged. For example, Nkrumah* s ideas on the nature of class struggle in Africa
r e
underwent a transformation after 1964, when he first published Consciencism. In 
this work he tends to downplay class conflict in Africa. However, after the coup of 
February 24 1966, overthrew his government, he published Class Struggle in Africa, 
in which he critiqued class conflict in Africa. He emphasized the role indigenous class 
forces had to play in Africa’s development and underdevelopment.56 Whilst his 
position with regard to the issue of class in Africa developed, his abhorrence of 
colonial racism and apartheid racism in southern Africa; his commitment to writing, 
speaking and mobilising for a radical socio-economic and political transformation of 
Africa were unaltered convictions.
54 K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London, 1963), p. 205.
55 K. Nkrumah, Consciencism, Philosophy & Ideology fo r  Decolonization (London, 1964).
56 K. Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (London, 1970).
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Nkrumah’s work, thought and policies continue to be relevant to a 
contemporary analysis of the African continent. His ideas belong to an intellectual 
canon of African political thought alongside Frantz Fanon, Sekou Toure, Leopold 
Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Amilcar Cabral.57 However, there were 
tensions in some of his ideas and contradictions in his policies that shall be explored 
in this thesis.
Methodology
Much of Nkrumah’s notes and files were destroyed in the February 1966 
coup.58 A substantial number of Nkrumah’s works published by Panaf remain for 
historical scrutiny. They are the first port of call for a serious study of the man and his 
convictions. In addition to the many works of Nkrumah, I draw on official material 
from the National Archives of Ghana, The National Archive of London and a number 
of private memoirs from individuals who worked with Nkrumah. Among the memoirs 
are those of Michael Dei-Anang, Kofi Batsa, Hyman Basner, Genoveva Kanu and 
Erica Powell.59
Other useful sources are a number of Ghanaian government newspapers as 
well as newspapers published by the Ghanaian opposition. I have also conducted 
interviews with individuals who worked alongside Nkrumah such as Kojo Botsio who
57 G. Mutsio and S. W. Rohio (eds), Readings in African Political Thought (London, 1975).
58 Interview with June Milne, 12 June 2001, London.
59 M. Dei-Anang was head o f the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS) that was set up in 1962 to pursue 
Nkrumah’s foreign policy. He wrote his memoir entitled The Administration o f  G hana’s  Foreign 
Relations, 1957-1965; A Personal Memoir (London 1975); Kofi Batsa was co-editor o f  the Nkrumah’s 
publication, The Spark which was founded in 1962; see his The Spark From Kwame Nkrumah to 
Limann (London, 1985); H. Basner was a white South African and former member o f  the Communist 
Party o f  South Africa who left his country to settle in Ghana from 1962-1966. He wrote his memoirs 
during this period. The Basner Papers  which are located at the Institute o f  Commonwealth Studies 
provide a personal reflection o f  his perceptions o f  Nkrumah and his time in Ghana; G. Kanu was a 
South African Coloured, believed to be a former girlfriend and mistress o f Nkrumah who wrote a 
memoir entitled Kwame Nkrumah the Man: A Friend’s Testimony (Delta o f  Nigeria, 1982); Powell was 
a British woman who served as Nkrumah’s secretary and wrote Private Secretary (Female) / Gold  
Const (London, 1984),
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was a student with Nkrumah at Lincoln University and was the country’s first 
Minister of Education and occupied a number of ministerial positions; K. P. S 
Juantuah, who also served in Nkrumah’s government, and Kofi Duku, who was 
Nkrumah5 s private secretary; Douglas Rogers, who was editor of the London based 
Pan-African magazine, Africa and the World; June Milne who was Nkrumah5 s literary 
executrix; and Ahmed Ben Bella, former leader of the FLN (the National Liberation 
Front) of Algeria. I also had the opportunity to interview both Gamal Nkrumah and 
Mrs Fathia Nkrumah.
The Dabu Gizenga Collection at the Moorland Spingarn Center at Howard 
University contains previously unpublished interviews with individuals who knew 
Nkrumah. Among them are interviews with his former London landlady Mrs Manley; 
and Dr Newton-Hill, a former tutor at Lincoln University who taught Nkrumah and 
Professor A. J. Ayer who also briefly taught Nkrumah whilst he was a student at the 
University College of London. The Conakry archive, which comprises Nkrumah5 s 
correspondence whilst he was in exile in Guinea is deposited at the Moorland- 
Spingarn Centre at Howard University and Milne’s important book Kwame Nkrumah: 
The Conakry Years, give insights into Nkrumah5 s thought processes during his final 
six year's.60 Nkrumah’s year's in exile would have been blank if it had not been for the 
loyalty and diligence of his literary executrix who travelled to Conakry on numerous 
occasions between 1985-86 to retrieve the correspondence.61
It appears that in exile and with advancing age, Nkrumah became even more 
revolutionary in his thinking. He appeared to come close to a Fanonist position on 
violent armed struggle as necessary for Africa’s radical socio-economic and political 
transformation. Whilst in Conakry, it seems Nkrumah became increasingly politically
60 J. Milne, KM>ame Nkrumah: The Conakiy Years His Life and Letters (London, 1990).
61 Letter dated, 1 February 1991, to author from June Milne.
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isolated although he continued to write and express his political opinions on global 
and African developments.
It is cliche to state that Nkrumah was a product of his time. However, he was 
part of a Cold War era in which the USSR and USA fought for influence on the global 
stage. A great deal of the literature and documents including those produced by the 
British Colonial Office reflect this Cold War prism in which the rest of the world was 
viewed. With the Cold War at an end and with Ghana's fiftieth anniversary of 
independence being celebrated in 2007, it is proper to re-assess the contribution of 
Nkrumah in a dispassionate manner and re-evaluate the relevance of his ideas to 
contemporary African politics.
The 1950s and 1960s saw some African leaders embracing socialist ideology 
but as Cooper points out “the national focus of African elites in the mid 1950s 
represented a shrinking of spatial perspectives.”62 It was both Leopold Senghor of 
Senegal and Nkrumah who sought to revive a broader perspective. Senghor advocated 
equality for Africans within the French Union. However, “Nkrumah* s hopes for a 
United States of Africa achieved little support from African leaders intent on
S'}
protecting the sovereignty they had so strenuously fought for.” During the 1960s 
proponents of African unity considered the prospect of various forms of supra­
national federations. However, lack of political will and increasing self-interest made 
the realisation of such perspectives unviable. Yet, there is no political figure on the 
African continent who waged the struggle for Pan-African unity with more 
indefatigable energy than Nkrumah. He was the embodiment of a specific historical 
era in Ghanaian and African history. Nkrumah’s words that begin this chapter 
demonstrates his understanding of the importance of individuals in making history.
62 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, p. 183.
63 Ibid, p. 184.
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However, as Marx stated: “Men make their own history. But they do not make it just 
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under given circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past.”
Thirty-four years since his death, the ideas and issues that Nkrumah lived for 
and wrote about continue to reverberate across the continent. In his controversial book 
Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage o f Imperialism Nkrumah denounced the rampaging 
nature of multi-national companies, Africa’s dependency on aid, debt and increasing 
poverty in the absence of greater economic and political integration. As Mazrui points 
out, Nkrumah’s book, like Lenin’s more famous Imperialism: The Last Stage o f 
Capitalism, identified the negative side of globalization.64 For Nkrumah, African 
unity was neither the dream nor fantasy that his detractors and enemies accused him 
of. He considered African unity as a precondition for the survival of Africa and 
Africans.
Presently, it seems that in order to arrest Africa’s increasing powerlessness in 
a harsh global economic environment, the OAU’s transformation into the AU in 2001 
which was attended by over 30 African heads of state, was a re-kindling of 
Nkrumah’s ambitions for a United States of Africa. Despite continuing differences of 
opinion on the meaning of unity and strategies to attain greater integration among 
African leaders, it appears that Nkrumah9 s economic, political and cultural thought 
continues to have a contemporary relevance to a new generation of politicians, 
scholars and African people around the world.
64 Mazrui, Nkrumah‘s Legacy, p. 2.
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CHAPTER 1
NKRUMAH’S INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES, 1927-1951
Gold Coast Student: 1927-1935
Nkrumah’s autobiography sheds light on the influences which shaped his thinking 
during his school days. However, his Autobiography must be read as a profoundly 
political document. It was written after he became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast in 
1951. He dictated his life experiences to his British secretary, Erica Powell, and it was 
first published in 1957, the same year as the country’s independence. It is therefore not a 
dispassionate account.
Although Nkrumah was born in 1909 in the small relatively poor village of 
Nkroful in the Nzima region of the south west of the Gold Coast, his mother was 
determined that he receive an education. It appears she had an early influence on his view 
of life and attitude towards education.1 Of Nkrumah’s father, little is known, except that 
according to Nkrumah, he was “a man of strong character” and polygamous.2
It was during his period in primary school that he came under the influence of a 
German Roman Catholic priest, George Fischer, who converted both mother and son to 
Catholicism and paid for Nkrumah’s primary education.3 Nkrumah wrote: "In those days 
I took my religion seriously and was very often to be found serving at Mass. As I grew 
older, however, the strict discipline of Roman Catholicism stifled me. It was not that I 
became any less religious but rather that I sought freedom in the worship of and
1 K, Nkrumah, The Autobiography ofKwame Nkrumah (London, 1973), p. 8.
2 Ibid, p. 5.
3 Ibid, p.9.
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communion with my God, for my God is a very personal God and can only be reached 
direct.”4
In his 1957 Autobiography, Nkrumah declared: “I am a non-denominational 
Christian and a Marxist Socialist and I have not found any contradiction between the 
two.”5 These apparently irreconcilable positions and his break with religion will be 
explored later in the thesis. However, between the ages of approximately six and 
seventeen, Roman Catholicism shaped his beliefs and conduct.
Around the age of seventeen, Francis Nkrumah, as he was known, was a pupil- 
teacher for one year at a school in Half-Assini and was noticed by the Principal of the 
Government Training College who visited the school in 1926.6 This opportunity became 
a life-changing one as he came into contact with Dr James Kwegyir Aggrey, assistant 
vice-principal of the Government Training College.7 Of Aggrey, Nkrumah wrote: “To 
me he seemed the most remarkable man that I had ever met and I had the deepest 
affection for him. He possessed intense vitality and enthusiasm and a most infectious 
laugh that seemed to bubble up from his heart, and he was a very great orator. It was 
through him that my nationalism was first aroused.”8
4 Ibid, pp.9-10.
5 Ibid, p. 10.
6 Nkrumah’s Christian name -  Francis -  was most likely bestowed on him during his baptism. Up until 
1945 his signature was ‘Francis Nwia Kofi Nkrumah.’ It is a name he used until some time around the 
formation o f  the West African National Secretariat (WANS) in 1946. The adoption o f ‘Kwame Nkrumah’ 
may represent a political conversion towards an African identity, particularly after his participation in the 
important Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945.
7 James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey was bom in 1875, in the Gold Coast and died in 1927 in New York. In 
1897 he was Secretary o f the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS), an organization made up o f  
members o f  the educated Gold Coast elite and the chiefs who campaigned against the introduction o f  the 
Land Bill. He spent 20 years in America and was Professor o f English Literature at Livingstone College, 
North Carolina from 1902-1920. He was invited to join the board o f the Phelps-Stokes Commission in 
1920, and traveled extensively around Africa and reported on the state o f educational facilities. See E. W. 
Smith, Aggrey o f  Africa: A Study in Black and White (London, 1929).
8 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 12.
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Although Nkrumah was not formally taught by Aggrey, he “drew much 
inspiration and encouragement from his Sunday evening sermons.”9 In fact in one of 
Nkrumah’s classes when the tutor continued to divide Africa’s ethnic groups, Nkrumah 
expressed his disapproval and interrupted with the words: “You’re wrong: Dr. Aggrey 
has told us that all Africans are one.” 10 According to Nkrumah, in discussions with 
students Aggrey would attack Marcus Garvey’s principle of “Africa for Africans.” 
Nkrumah agreed with Aggrey on cooperation between black and white people but had 
reservations. He argued: “I could not, even at that time, accept this idea of Aggrey’s as 
being practicable, for I maintained that such harmony can only exist when the black race 
is treated as equal to the white race; that only a free and independent people -  a people 
with a government of their own -  can claim equality, racial or otherwise, with another 
people.”11
This difference of opinion between Nkrumah and his mentor is important as it 
indicates the beginnings of independent intellectual growth on Nkrumah’s part. These 
were perhaps the embryonic forms of Nkrumah’s nationalist convictions. He believed in 
the oneness of African people. Yet, his belief in racial equality was based on the 
inalienable principles of freedom and self-determination for all peoples. He therefore 
went one step further than Aggrey in demanding political independence for African 
people. Nkrumah’s independence of thought remained with him throughout his life. It 
was integral to the development of what later became a pragmatic political outlook, 
which was not confined to rigid political theories.
9 ibid, p. 13.
10 Cited in K. King, ‘James E. K. Aggrey: Collaborator, Nationalist, Pan-African’, Canadian Journal o f  
African Studies, Vol. 3. (1969), p. 530.
11 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 12.
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Aggrey’s sudden death in 1927 affected Nkrumah deeply.12 Nevertheless, he 
continued with his studies at the Training College. Despite his serious academic attitude
t 3he also made time for amateur dramatics, Asafo dancing, sport and “tribal drumming.” 
Whilst at the Training College his withdrawal from Catholicism increased.14
His irregular attendance at Church was swiftly brought to the attention of the 
Bishop, who summoned him. Nkrumah explained himself but continued to adhere to his 
inner religious convictions. Thereafter he discontinued attending mass, but maintained a 
respectful hourly silence in the dormitory.15 At this early stage of Nkrumah’s life, his 
refusal to attend mass indicated a strong character rejecting conformity even under the 
pressure of established spiritual authority. He did not relent and his irregular attendance 
did not disqualify him from subsequently being elected Prefect. In this role he helped 
establish the Aggrey Students’ Society, founded in April 1928, in memory of the Vice- 
Principal.16 As a debating forum, the society was an important training ground through 
which Nkrumah and his colleagues acquired oratorical skills.
Nkrumah recorded his period at Achimota to be his “happiest” for it was a time 
during which he read at leisure and engaged in intellectual debate with colleagues.17 At 
the age of twenty, he was employed as a primary school teacher at a Catholic school at 
Elmina. A year later, in 1931, he was promoted head teacher of another Catholic school 
at Axim. During his spare time, he helped set up the Nzima Literature Society. It was 
through the Society that he met another individual, Mr. S. R. Wood, Secretary of the
12 Ibid, p. 13.
13 Ibid, p. 15.
14 Ibid., p. 15.
55 Ibid, p.15-16.
16 Ibid, p. 16; see also Smith, Aggrey o f  Africa, p. 287.
17 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 16.
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National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), who was to have a huge impact on 
his political thinking.18 According to Nkrumah it was Mr. S. R. Wood who introduced 
him to politics through their long discussions.19 Wood strongly encouraged him to travel 
to the USA to continue his studies at Lincoln University and wrote a letter of reference 
for him.
Encouragement to travel to the USA may have also come from Aggrey. 
According to Nkrumah, “It was because of my great admiration for Aggrey, both as a 
man and as a scholar, that I first formed the idea of furthering my studies in the United 
States of America.”20 It is also very likely that Nkrumah’s meetings with the Nigerian 
publisher Nnamdi Azikiwe further inspired him to travel to the USA to pursue his 
studies. “Zik,” as he was more popularly known, was a graduate of Lincoln University 
and a nationalist.
In 1930, Nkrumah moved from Axim to the Roman Catholic Seminary at 
Amissano near Elrnina. At St. Theresa Catholic seminary, Nkrumah “regained the 
religious fervor” to the extent of seriously considering becoming a member of the Jesuit 
order.21 What caused the strengthening of his religious convictions is intriguing. Yet this 
deep religious calling was in tension with “the old desire to be up and going, to further 
my education and to proceed to America in order to do this, got the better of me and I 
felt that the walls of the seminary would enclose me if I didn’t take action.”22
18 The NCBWA was set up by J. Casely-Hayford in March 1920. The organisation campaigned for united 
action among the people o f  British West Africa-Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Gold Coast and The Gambia, 
focusing on parity between Africans and Europeans in the Legislative Councils in the respective colonies; 
see R. July, The Origins o f  Modern African Thought (London, 1968), pp.445-446.
19 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 17.
20 Ibid, p. 13.
21 Ibid, p. 18.
22 Ibid, p. 18.
24
Nkrumah acknowledged that other significant influences on his nationalist 
thinking were the ideas expressed in The African Morning Post edited by Nnamdi 
Azikiwe.23 The Sierra Leonean agitator I. T. A. Wallace Johnson was a contributor to the 
paper and it was his famous article entitled ‘Has the African a God?’ In the 
Autobiography, Nkrumah maintained that this article served to arouse Gold Coast 
nationalism. In a defiant style the article asserted the right of Africans to determine their 
own destiny and denounced the hypocrisy of European civilization 24
Nkrumah’s determination to travel to the USA was realized with the assistance of 
a generous uncle in Lagos who funded his passage together with his own thrift in saving. 
In October 1935, the young Nkrumah traveled first to Britain in order to obtain an 
American visa. While in London he heard the news of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. He 
maintained: “My nationalism surged to the fore.”25 For many Africans and people of 
African descent, Ethiopia remained a point of pride and nationalistic sentiment, for along 
with Liberia it had been able to escape colonial rule. The Italian invasion spelt the end of 
this independence and anger was felt by Africans and people of African descent around 
the world 26
It is unknown whether Nkrumah attended any political meetings in London 
concerning the invasion of Ethiopia.27 Nevertheless, at this important juncture of his 
life he already possessed nationalist sentiments; he believed in freedom of African 
people. The fiery language and radical outlook of Zik’s newspaper and Wood impacted
23 African Morning Post, 15 May 1936; seeN . Azikiwe, My Odyssey (London, 1970)
24 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 19 for an extract o f the seditious article.
35 Ibid, p. 22.
26 See S. K. B. Asante, Pan-African Protest & the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1934-1941 (London, 1977)
27 M. Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad 1935-1947 (Accra, 1996), p.24.
25
deeply on him. His sojourn in the United States, which was to last for ten years, was to 
deepen his intellectual growth.
Student in America, 1935-1945
Sherwood’s study of Nkrumah’s student years in America is an important work shedding 
light on a formative period of his life. Careful research in Lincoln’s files, correspondence 
and interviews with individuals who taught Nkrumah or were his contemporaries offer 
rare glimpses into the world in which Nkrumah moved and was shaped by.
Of his undergraduate years from 1935 to 1939, Sherwood writes “Nkrumah was a 
good student.”28 At the age of 26, Nkrumah arrived at Lincoln University with “the 
equivalent of forty pounds in my pocket, a second-class teacher’s certificate and a letter 
of introduction from Mr. S. R. Wood.”29 In 1936 he had won second place in the Kappa 
Alpha Psi oratorical contest, speaking on ‘Africa, the burden of the Negro.’ Two years 
later he won the Robert Fleming Labaree Memorial Prize in Social Science in which he 
submitted an essay entitled ‘Imperialism: Its Politics, Social and Economic Aspects.’30 
He graduated in 1939 with a BA in economics and sociology.
According to Sherwood, interactions between Africans and AfricanAmericans on 
the Lincoln campus were strained on account of cultural differences.31 Outside of classes 
there was little interaction between the few Africans and the African American 
students.32 The cultural differences were manifested in the studiousness of the African
28 Ibid, p. 31.
29 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 24.
30 Ibid, p. 32.
31 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, pp.33-35.
32 Ibid, p.35. It was not until the beginning o f  1939 that Lincoln University registered another 15 African 
students, which The Lincoln University Bulletin o f Feb 1939 considered a “large contingent” in the 
Freshman class. These Africans planned “to pursue professional or graduate studies ... some [in] education,
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students and their determination to succeed was often perceived as an air of superiority 
by African-American students.33 At the beginning of 1939 Nkrumah was joined by fellow 
countrymen, Ako Adjei and K. A. B. Jones Quartey, along with other Africans including, 
Asuogo Udo Idiong and Abdul Karim Disn.
Academic staff who taught Nkrumah observed his personal conduct and 
intellectual abilities. Dean Grim, Nkrumah’s lecturer in general biology, recollected the 
young Francis as: “Gentlemanly; of above average intelligence, quick to defend what he 
felt was right. Quiet and courteous. Strongly individualist.”34 Dr Kuehner, registrar at 
Lincoln University remarked: “Good student with limitations in ability at points in higher 
level college work. Loved controversy. Quiet. Usually withheld his opinions except in 
debates (on the team). An eager questioner in class. Critical of any criticism of Great 
Britain, especially by a non-subject. Held strong views. (His concept of primitive man for 
example).”35
As Nkrumah's nationalist ideas were evolving during his early days at Lincoln, it 
is peculiar that he was “critical of any criticism of Great Britain.” No further explanation 
by Kuehner is posited. It is possible to surmise that Nkrumah was simultaneously anti­
colonial as well protective of the British motherland, particularly from students he felt 
had little understanding of British colonial rule. Had British colonial education inculcated 
a sense of loyalty in Africans -  and even in Nkrumah? Whatever the explanation, if one
some journalism, some law, and some medicine,” see NAG:SC21/122/2. According to the Lincoln 
University Bulletin o f  1939, “All together, ... at least 65 students from Africa have registered in the 
college and seminary o f  Lincoln University over a period o f  66 years”.
33 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 34.
34 NAG:SC21/2/74 -  this document is a letter to Dr. Horace Mann Bond, first black member o f the Board 
of Trustees o f  Lincoln University in 1929. He was later appointed President in 1945. The letter is from Mrs. 
Grace Jackson o f the Office o f the President o f Lincoln University and is dated Jan 11 1951. Dr. Bond 
requested references on Nkrumah’s character from his tutors.
35 Ibid, NAG-.SC21/2/74.
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accepts the truth of Dr. Kuehner’s observation, it reveals some of the contradictions and
complexities inherent in Nkrumah’s thinking at an early stage. One contemporary, an
African American by the name of Beverley Carter, described him as:
thoughtful, reflective and considerate. He was the most 
liked of the foreign students on campus. He mixed well in 
contrast to a number of others from Africa... He seemed to 
take a personal pleasure from reading the great 
philosophers... Nkrumah was talking about Pan- 
Africanism throughout his later years at Lincoln. He talked 
about the independence of the then African colonies in a 
way, which made many think of him as a dreamer.36
Nkrumah’s studiousness earned him the post of philosophy assistant to Dr. Foster 
in the autumn of 1939. During his vacation, he stayed in Harlem with fellow student 
Thomas Dosumu-Johnson and frequently visited the Harlem National Memorial 
Bookstore where he was allowed to read in the back room, as he could not afford to 
purchase the books. He also visited the Schomburg Collection in Harlem.37 Earlier, in 
1937, the Dean of Lincoln, Frank W. Wilson, wrote a letter of introduction to the Council 
on African Affairs (CAA) on Nkrumah’s behalf.38 Wilson refers to Nkrumah as “a 
person greatly concerned about the entire African situation.” 39 Nkrumah met the 
Secretary of the organization, Max Yergan.
36 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 53.
37 Ibid, p. 42.
38 Ralph Bunche, Alphaeus Hunton, Max Yergan and Paul Robeson, who served as its Chairman for 18 
years until it was banned for “un-American” activities in the McCarthy era o f the 1950s, established the 
CAA in January 1937. Many o f  the leading figures o f the organization were members o f  the Communist 
Party o f  the USA or communist sympathizers. The aim o f the organization was to “inform public opinion 
on what was happening to and in Africa”, writes Dorothy Hunton, in Alphaeus Hunton; The Unsung 
Valiant, no date, pp. 56-81.
39 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 43.
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A great amount of Nkrumah’s time as a student was spent reading on philosophy, 
political science and history.40 His voracious reading included the work of Kant, Hegel, 
Descartes, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud. Beverley Carter remarked that: “He was 
always well prepared but did not make fetish of studying. He seemed to take great 
personal pleasure from reading of the great philosophers and this was in many ways a 
form of relaxation for him.”41
Two undated essays reveal Nkrumah’s intellectual interest in philosophy. One is 
entitled ‘Is Man Naturally Moral?’ 42 and the other is entitled ‘The Philosophy of 
Property.’ 43 The former is a two-page examination of this question from the 
perspectives of Aristotle, Kant, Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Christian, anarchist and 
totalitarian perspectives. Nkrumah concluded by stating: “I subscribe to the theory that 
man is naturally amoral. That is he is non-moral by birth, incapable of being good or bad, 
but his capability of moral or immoral action is determined as he grows in reason and 
intelligence amidst the mores and customs of his society.”44
‘The Philosophy of Property’ examines the evolution of the concept of property 
from Hebrew, Hindu, Greek, Roman, and medieval perspectives. The Church and modern 
views, including those of Adam Smith and Locke, and the Marxist interpretation are also 
outlined. It is interesting that in regards to the view of property as advanced by the 
French socialist, Proudhon, Nkrumah shows he is in disagreement with the Marxist 
conception of ownership. He wrote, “I wholly believe in individual rights and
40 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 26. Nkrumah was also a member o f  the Philosophy Club at Lincoln 
University.
41 Dabu Gizenga Collection, 128-1, Folder 2, Moorland-Spingarn Center, Howard University, contains a 





ownership.45 Earlier in the same piece he wrote of “the idealism and impracticability of
communistic theories”. Moreover, he argued “communism seems to be unsuccessful in
societies where it has been tried, because its principles are at variance with human nature,
and even with the original nature of property itself.”46 Nkrumah did not define what he
considered to constitute “human nature” nor “the original nature of property itself.”
Apart from the question of the distribution of property in society, Nkrumah was
also preoccupied with the state of the African continent, A contemporary of Nkrumah at
Lincoln was Robert T. Freeman Jr, who stated that Nkrumah was committed to a United
States of Africa.47 Another classmate, Dr. J. Jeffrey Higgs characterized Nkrumah as a
“quiet, introspective, serious student, not particularly interested in socializing or engaging
in local politics; (he had no) particular interest in African American problems.”
The extent of Lincoln’s influence on Nkrumah is very difficult to determine.
One of his tutors, Dr. J. Newton-Hill, maintains:
Nkrumah did not always make it clear how the institution 
was affecting him. I think in many areas he seemed to be 
somewhat affable among his fellow students and among 
certain members of the faculty. But Nkrumah had his mind 
pretty well made up when he entered Lincoln University 
and 1 don’t think he changed his general point of view very 
much while he was there. So I would say the effect of the 
institution on him was somewhat minimal except for the 
educational aspect of the work 49
Another incident narrated by Newton-Hill involved the performance of a play at 
Lincoln, in which Nkrumah played the “reluctant part of a Nubian slave.” Furthermore,
45NAG:SC21/100, pp.4-5.
46 Ibid, p. 1.
47 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 34.
48 Ibid, p. 35.
49 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Kwame Nkrumah Taped Recordings 128-27, Tape T-19 with Dr. J. Newton- 
Hill, January 1974; Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn Center, Howard University.
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Newton-Hill claims: “I handed him the copy of the script and told him to read certain 
passages which I had previously selected. He read them with a complete lack of interest 
with a marked distaste, for in all those passages the Nubian slave was a rather despicable 
individual as presented in that play.” Yet, Nkrumah was not aware that his tutor was 
testing him. He was told to read the entire play and return to rehearsals the following day. 
Nkrumah was to learn that the Nubian slave led a mutiny on board a ship and freed all the 
slaves aboard. He then accepted the part.50 This incident appears to demonstrate 
Nkrumah’s profound sense of racial dignity and desire for leadership.
Aside from his academic work, which extensively absorbed his intellectual
energies, Nkrumah had relationships with a few women and involved himself in political
activities. During his period at Lincoln, the majority of students were male. However the
scarcity of friends is also attributable to Nkrumah’s single-minded political focus. He
made the important comment -  albeit retrospectively -  that he considered, women,
religion and money as forms of entrapment. He wrote:
Unfortunately, the fact that I enjoy women’s company has 
led to a great deal of misunderstanding from those who 
look at my life from outside. I have never wanted to 
become too entangled with a woman because I know that I 
would never be able to devote enough attention to her, that 
sooner or later whether she was married to me or not, she 
would begin to wander away from me. I was afraid too, that 
if I allowed a woman to play too important a part in my life 
I would gradually lose sight of my goal. Few people have 
been able to understand this attitude of mine.51
50 Ibid.
51 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 34.
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Beverley Carter, however, claims that “On the personal side, he was attractive to the 
opposite sex.”52
Nkrumah himself reveals in his Autobiography that whilst preaching in a Baptist 
Church in Philadelphia he was introduced to two sisters by the names of Portia and 
Romana. A “strong friendship” grew between the three of them.53 It was Poitia who 
became what he described as a “special friend.”54 However, it seems from his own 
account he was not entirely faithful to Portia as he was accused by Portia of “two-timing” 
her.55
Constantly plagued by financial worries, Nkrumah worked during vacations at 
sea on board the Shawnee, a ship of the Clyde Millory Line.56 However, he was fortunate 
that his studiousness earned him the support of individuals in prominent positions who 
assisted him financially. His conscientiousness was noted in a letter from the Dean of 
Lincoln University to the Dean of Graduate School of Art and Science, at Howard 
University, recommending Nkrumah apply for a scholarship in the Graduate School of 
Art and Science.57 In 1939 Nkrumah enrolled at the University of Pennsylvania, in 
Philadelphia, for the Master of Science degree in Education. Sherwood maintains: “He 
gained one credit, two A’s, seven B’s, one C and one D grade, and was awarded the 
degree in Feb 1941. This is quite an achievement for someone ‘carrying’ 12 to 14 hours
52 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Box 128-1, Folder 2, letter from Beverley Carter, Moorland-Spingarn Center, 
Howard University.
53 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 34.
54 Ibid, p. 34.
55 Ibid, p. 34.
56 Ibid, pp. 29-39; Nkrumah narrated his difficult times in finding employment in the US. Searching for 
employment in America during the 1930s was very difficult due to the economic depression, which led to a 
contraction in businesses employing staff in the manufacturing and shipbuilding industries. Prospects of 
securing employment improved over time but were particularly bleak for black people in a society still 
imbued with racial prejudice.
37 NAG:SC21/2/28 -  a letter from the Dean o f  Lincoln University to the Dean o f  Graduate School o f Arts 
& Science, Harvard University, dated Jan 9 1941.
32
at the Lincoln Seminary and four hours at Pennsylvania in the first semester of 1940, and 
10 in the second. One has also to bear in mind that he had to travel to Philadelphia from 
Lincoln until July 1941.”58
In January 1941 Nkrumah wrote to Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, the director of the 
Phelps Stokes Fund, seeking sixty dollars towards his fees at the University of 
Pennsylvania. He was successful in his application and in a letter of appreciation to Dr 
Jones wrote: “It is my pet ambition to carry on where my teacher and inspirer Dr 
Kwegyir Aggrey left off. My interest in you and Dr Aggrey is profound and 
immeasurable. Aggrey is dead and gone, but I am consoled in the fact that I can still have 
you as my guide in all things if you want to be so.”59
Towards the end of his undergraduate studies, Nkrumah expressed an interest in 
pursuing an MA in journalism at the University of Pennsylvania, but lacked the financial 
means to do so. Sherwood suggests that he accepted a place at the Lincoln University 
Theology Seminary in September 1939 in order to help resolve his financial difficulties. 
Nkrumah’s choices were also limited as the University of Pennsylvania did not offer 
journalism.60 At some stage during Nkrumah’s seminary course, it appears he became 
alienated from religion. Reverend Philip Miller who was at the time one of Nkrumah’s 
lecturers, commented on Nkrumah’s religious commitment: “...courteous, somewhat 
aloof ...very religious: he led prayer services and tended other religious facets 
conscientiously ... Over dogmatic on certain points of social anthropology ... He became
58 Ibid, p. 51.
59 NAG:SC21/3/7 — letter by Nkrumah to Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, dated January 29 1941.
60 Ibid, p. 49.
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deeply imbittered by some indeterminate cause late in his seminary course.5’61 The details 
and nature of this disillusionment remain unknown.
Whilst Sherwood claims “one would not wish to query Nkrumah’s sincerity” in 
his motivations for taking up the licentiate, she hints that they were largely financial. He 
received a small fee from the Church collection and was also eligible for reduced bus 
fares as a minister.62 It is indeed curious that whilst Nkrumah was brought up a Roman 
Catholic, he obtained his BA in Sacred Theology from a Presbyterian College and a 
licentiate from the Chester Presbytery. To add to this denominational confusion Nkrumah 
then went to preach at a Baptist Church in Washington.63 Interestingly, one congregation 
member interviewed by Sherwood recalls that much of what Nkrumah preached in his 
sermons focused on Africa.64 A seminary classmate of Nkrumah’s, Everett A. Hewlett, 
confirmed that Nkrumah was a serious student who immersed himself in books and that 
“He was a good speaker and the congregation enjoyed his talks.”65 Nkrumah’s skills in 
public speaking had improved since his participation in the Aggrey Student’s Society and 
his earlier experience as a teacher in the Gold Coast.
Nkrumah stated in his Autobiography that his intellectual influences during this 
period included Karl Marx, Lenin and Mazzini. However it was Philosophy and Opinions 
o f Marcus Garvey published in 1923 that deeply impacted on him.66 At this particular 
juncture, Garvey’s discourse of racial self-assertion considerably influenced Nkrumah. It
61 NAG :SC21/2/74.
62 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah , p.50.
63 Ibid, p. 51. Nkrumah’s non-allegiance to one denomination perhaps lends strength to his self-reference as 
a “non-denominational Christian”. Interestingly, Aggrey’s biographer, E. W. Smith wrote that Aggrey had 
no denominational loyalty, see Aggrey o f  Africa: A Study in Black and White, p. 242. It appears Nkrumah 
shared his mentor’s position.
64 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 51.
65 Ibid, p. 51.
66 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p.37.
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was expressed in a sense of racial pride in the young Nkrumah and optimism for the 
future of the African continent. Nkrumah was later to prove himself to be diametrically 
opposed to Garvey on the ideological question of European involvement in the 
development of Africa.67
Nkrumah’s early political outlook was also reflected in his involvement with the 
Association of African Students (AAS) in the USA and Canada in 1943.68 The A AS 
came into existence in January 1941 when a few students at Ohio State University 
devised a constitution. Founding members were Nigerians Ozuomba Mbadiwe, Nwafor 
Orizu, and the Sierra Leonean John Karefa-Smart. The organisation had 28 members. Its 
aims were to “interpret Africa to America;” “to acquaint our people at home with the 
facts of the rapidly changing international scene” 69 and to liaise with other bodies, such 
as the West African Student Union (WASU) in England in the struggle for freedom for 
colonial subjects. 70 It is untrue that Nkrumah was elected the Association’s first 
president. He wrote in his Autobiography: “At the first conference [of the AAS] I was 
elected President, a position I held until the day I left for England.”71 Nkrumah’s 
historical memory may be called into question here and his own self-importance may 
have dominated. In September 1941, the Nigerian Mbono Ojike was elected the first
67 In office, Nkrumah employed a number o f  European advisors within his government, which would have 
been anathema to Garvey’s political creed. In addition to this departure was Nkrumah’s preference for 
European girlfriends.
68NAG:SC21/1/106.
69 NAG:SC21/1/106 - th is  is the first issue o f The African Interpreter, vol. 1, n o .l, 1943, a publication o f  
the AAS. The slogan o f  the journal was “For Progress and Democracy,”
70 The Nigerian lawyer Ladipo Solanke, Sierra Leonean barrister Dr. Bankole Bright and the Gold Coast 
barrister, Dr. J. B. Danquah, set up the West African Students Union (WASU) in August 1925 in London. 
It campaigned for African independence from colonial rule by lobbying the British Colonial Office and 
through its myriad political activities. The organisation also met the accommodation and social needs o f  
African students in Britain. See H. Adi, West Africans in Britain 1 9 0 0 -  1960: Nationalism, Pan- 
Africanism and Communism (London, 1998).
71 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 35.
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President of the Association and in the following year, 1942, Nkrumah took over. The
79Nigerian Ibanga Akpabio succeeded him in 1943.
An important cultural and political activity Nkrumah participated in as a member 
of the AAS was the Aggrey Memorial Celebration held on November 26 1942 under the 
joint auspices of WASU and the AAS.73 This African funeral commemoration of Aggrey 
was held at Salisbury, North Carolina and caused an altercation between Nkrumah and 
Mr Johnson, Dean of the Lincoln Seminary.
Robert Kweku Gardiner, research scholar at the University of Oxford, represented 
WASU and Ako Adjei and Nkrumah represented the AAS. Other attendees included 
friends of Aggrey and of Africa: Dr Anson Phelps Stokes, President of the Phelps Stokes 
Funds; Dr. E. W. Smith, biographer of Aggrey and former President of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain. The Aggrey family were also present. After 
the unveiling of a monument by Mrs Aggrey, Nkrumah as president of the AAS 
performed “sacred prayers in the Fante language, three times in succession and then 
poured libation to the gods three times, each libation being preceded by a prayer.” 
Nkrumah “charged the spirit of Aggrey to leave the foreign soil in which it had been 
resting for years and go back home to Africa, to sleep with the spirits of his ancestors and 
have eternal rest.”74 Some four months later, Nkrumah received a stern letter from the 
Dean of the Lincoln Seminary, who sought to “question the expediency of what was done 
at Salisbury.” 75 The Dean wrote: “It was purely an Animistic service without Christian
72 The eight officers o f the AAS in 1942 are listed in The African Interpreter, NAG:SC21/1/106.
73 The Aggrey Commemoration is reported in The African Interpreter, NAG:SC21/5/l.
74 NAG:SC21/51/1.
75 See NAG:SC21/2/65 -  Mr Johnson’s letter to Nkrumah, which is dated April 3 1943.
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significance and indeed contradictory to Christian teaching. To pray to heathen gods and
to pour libations to them is directly forbidden in the Holy Scripture.”76
Johnson considered the “heathen ceremony” to be “an insult to the memory of a
Christian man.” Nkrumah’s reply to Johnson began with an apology for the delay in his
response. He wrote: “a letter of explanation will not do me justice. I am therefore trying
to find time to visit you at Lincoln in order to talk at length over the issue.”77 Nkrumah’s
response was brief:
You seem to have misunderstood me partially and you are 
right at that if all your reasons are coiled from the report in 
The African Interpreter. May I say however that to meet 
Christ on the highway of Christian ethics and principles by 
way of Christian salvation, and turn back, is a spiritual 
impossibility. The burden of my life is to live in such a way 
that I may become a living symbol of all that is best in 
Christianity and in the laws, customs and beliefs of my 
people. I am a Christian and will ever remain so but never a 
blind Christian.78
Nkrumah’s controversial position and disagreement with Johnson suggests his breaking 
with organized religion. It displayed strength of mind and his embrace of two systems of 
belief. Yet, he seemed to assure Johnson that he remained a Christian, but one who 
questioned his faith and sought to reconcile it with his Akan cultural beliefs.
Two other thorny intellectual issues confronted Nkrumah during the three years of 
the existence of the AAS: a disagreement over the extension of membership to non­
students, and “the internal conflict between the Nigerian and the Gold Coast elements”
76 NAG:SC21/2/65, Mr Johnson’s letter to Nkrumah dated April 3 1943.
77 NAG:SC21/2/65. Nkrumah’s response was dated April 24 1943 to Dr. Johnson’s letter dated April 3 
1943. We do not know whether Nkrumah was able to meet with Dr Johnson to further explain his position.
78 NAG:SC21/2/65 -  the document also contains Nkrumah’s response to Mr Johnson. Nkrumah ends his 
letter amicably wishing the Johnsons a happy Easter.
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over the question of territorial independence versus West African unity.79 On the first, it 
is interesting that Nkrumah insisted that African seamen who had travelled to America 
should be admitted into the AAS. His argument, as conveyed by a contemporary, Dr. 
Ikejiani, was that many of the seamen had abandoned their studies due to financial 
burdens. They sought employment with the aim of returning to study. Despite this, 
Sherwood appears to suspect Nkrumah’s motives for inclusion of the seamen into the 
organisation.80
Perhaps a different emphasis could be suggested. Whilst on the one hand 
Nkrumah sought to encourage seamen to join the Association, it appeared very unlikely 
he would win the majority of AAS members to the acceptance of the seamen. There was 
a majority of Nigerian students in the AAS who were likely to have sided with Mbadiwe 
and Orizu on grounds of ethnic loyalty and were against the seamen being accepted. 
Despite this, Nkrumah won due to the persuasiveness of his argument. According to Dr. 
Ikejiani:
Kwame genuinely wanted to extend a student association 
to include workers and that means all Africans in the 
United States. And he was right in saying that most of 
them came primarily as students but had fallen out 
because they had no money to continue then as students, 
and indeed, some of them did go back to colleges and 
universities to finish what they had come earlier to do.
However one looks at it now, one cannot escape the 
interpretation that it showed the political maturity of 
Kwame at that inchoate stage of his later political career.81
Nkrumah’s political skillfulness in winning this argument is significant for he was able to 
increase his potential power base within the AAS by bringing non-students into a hitherto
79 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 36.
80 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 93. See footnote 16.
81 Cited in Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p.94,
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student body. In addition to this, it can be argued that alongside Nkrumah’s political 
desire to win this dispute and undoubtedly to expand his support base within the AAS, his 
desire to extend the AAS membership to the seamen was consistent with an outlook on 
organizational theory that he was developing at this time. Nkrumah fervently believed in 
a participatory role for various social groups in the struggle for African self- 
determination. Likewise he believed all Africans should be admitted into the AAS -  both 
students and non-students alike. He outlined this inclusive organizational principle in a 
later dissertation. Lastly, Nkrumah may have been more inclined to be sympathetic to the 
plight of the seamen on account of his own personal financial hardships and experience at 
sea.
On the question of the political stance of the AAS on African independence, 
Nkrumah wrote in his Autobiography that there was a division between the Gold Coast 
students who supported West African unity and the Nigerian students who supported 
territorial independence. He stated: “The idea of West African unity, which, of course, I 
strongly supported, became the accepted philosophy of the African Students 
Association.”82 Sherwood questions Nkrumah’s assertion, as the Spring 1944 editorial of 
The Interpreter, advocated independence for each country. As Nigerians were opposed to 
West African unity and made up the majority of the organisation, such a claim makes 
Nkrumah’s assertion unlikely.83 We are uncertain of the authorship of many of the 
articles printed in the newsletter as editorials were unsigned.
Without question Nkrumah’s mental energies were focused on the elimination of 
imperialism on the African continent. According to Sherwood: “There was a clear
82 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 36.
83 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 94.
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difference in attitude between Nkrumah and Mbadiwe, Orizu and Ojike: Nkrumah 
concentrated his mind on Africa (except for his one year presidency of the AAS), 
whereas the others divided their attention between Africa and educating the American
Rd.public about their homeland, about which Americans were wholly ignorant.”
However, Nkrumah was also interested in the unity of people of African descent
and commonalities between Africans on the continent and Africans in the Diaspora. He
wrote that he was:
interested in two sociological schools of thought in the 
States, one represented by the Howard sociologist led by 
Prof. Fraser, and the other led by Dr. M. J. Herzkovits,
Professor of Anthropology at North-Western University.
The Howard school of thought maintained that the Negro in 
America had completely lost his cultural contact with 
Africa and the other school, represented by Herzkovits, 
maintained that there were still African survivals in the 
United States and that the Negro in America had in no way 
lost his cultural contact with the African continent. I 
supported, and still support, the later view and I went on 
one occasion to Howard University to defend it.85
Nkrumah’s position suggests, despite the uprooting experiences of slavery, he upheld a 
Pan-African perspective 011 the cultural and racial affinities between Africans born in the 
Diaspora and those born on the African continent. This was perhaps the formative stage 
in the development of Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist ideology in which he saw African 
people as one and part of continental Africa. Even before he left for the USA, Nkrumah 
considered all African people on the African continent as one people. In America it 
seems he extended his definition to include African Americans who had retained aspects 
of African culture despite the uprooting of slavery.
84 Ibid, p. 99.
85 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 36.
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In comparison to his contemporaries, Nkrumah published very little whilst in the 
USA. Of his writing, there is his message to the AAS, and two articles entitled 
‘Education and Nationalism’ and ‘The History of the Negro Church.’ In a message to the 
AAS Nkrumah called on his peers to “reflect upon their future and their destiny” as he 
considered that the African continent had reached a turning point at which her greatness 
had yet to be achieved.86 Nkrumah claimed that the war being fought by the Allied 
Powers sought to defend imperialism, similarly “the Axis Powers, on the other hand, are 
engaged in war to secure terrorities in order to consolidate and extend their own sphere of 
profits.”87 In Nkrumah’s opinion: “It is then our contention and feeling that if democracy, 
peace and order are to be achieved in these chaotic days of ours, then imperialism must 
be abolished throughout the world.”88 For Nkrumah, the war was allegedly being fought 
to preserve democracy and freedom “but half the world today is still in bondage, and 
slaves to the very nations supposedly fighting for that freedom!”89 His central thesis was 
that “Fascism must be defeated, but so must all other forms of exploitation and 
imperialism.”90
Nkrumah also wrote a column in The Lincolnian, the university newspaper, on 
“Negro history.” He wrote: “In introducing certain aspects of Negro history in the 
columns of The Lincolnian, I offer no apology. The mission of the Lincolnian University 
is the cause of Negro education is dynamic.”91 Furthermore, Nkrumah argued, “that a 
thorough knowledge of Negro history is indispensable” in the training of a future African
86 Written in the summer o f 1943.
87NAG:SC21/1/106, p .l.
88 Ibid, pp.2-3.
89 Ibid, p. 2.
90 Ibid, p. 7.
91 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Box 12S-5, Folder 76, The Lincolnian Vol. V.no.2. January 15 1938, p. 2, 
Moorland-Spingarn Center, Howard University.
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leadership for “a country or race without the knowledge of its past is tantamount to a ship 
without a pilot.” Such words echo Garvey’s dictum that “a people without knowledge of 
their history is like a tree without roots.”
Despite the prejudice and human suffering caused by imperialist wars, Nkrumah 
saw a “renascent African” questioning the status quo. He demanded “all non-African 
governments should, after the war, withdraw from the colonial areas which they now 
control -  even withdraw from the mandated areas however enlightened their policy may 
be.”92 Africans and people of African heritage should “assume the responsibility which 
is theirs in these momentous times.” He urged Africans to unite under nationalism “but 
not the nationalism of the competitive type” but founded on the principles of “unity,
• 93freedom, justice, democracy and independence for Africa.”
The address ‘Education and Nationalism in Africa’ opens with the lines: “Human 
history has been dominated by two things: the quest for bread and the quest for human 
rights. Today we hear the deep strong voice of Africa in this quest for human rights.”94 
Nkrumah gave a brief history of Christian education in West Africa, the prevailing forms 
of higher educational institutions and a critique of educational provision in the Gold 
Coast.
His criticisms of the colonial educational system resonated with those of his late 
mentor Aggrey. Aggrey had closely observed the educational debate among African 
Americans. The Tuskegee experiment at Hampton led by Booker T. Washington 
emphasized the industrial and agricultural training of African Americans. Washington’s
92 NAG:SC21/1/106, p.5.
93 Ibid, p.6.
94 NAG:SC2l/4/6, p. 1. This essay was submitted by Nkrumah as part o f his Master’s degree in Education 
and published in the University o f Pennsylvania’s journal, Educational Outlook in November 1943,
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arch opponent was the African American scholar W. E. B. DuBois, who considered such
an education maintained the perpetual subservience of African Americans as manual
laborers. Washington in turn criticized African Americans who sought to imitate white
schools and teach Greek and Latin as being elitist and impractical. Aggrey’s maxim was:
“Let Africans remain good Africans, and not become a poor imitation of Europeans.” He
urged the people of the Gold Coast to amalgamate the finest in Western culture and
education but retain their own cultural integrity. Moreover, it was whilst preaching in
North Carolina, that he became deeply aware of the importance of the acquisition of
agricultural skills and knowledge reflected in the accomplishments at the Institute.
Aggrey was impressed by what he saw there and sought to introduce a similar
programme to Africa.95 He believed strongly in the relevance of the educational system to
societal needs. Hence, as Aggrey’s protege, Nkrumah believed:
If education is life, then the weakness of the school 
system in Africa is evident. The activities of these schools 
should be made to relate to the life of the people so as to 
equip and fit them to meet their varied life demands. The 
old conception of education as being exclusively 
academic still dominates the colonial school program of 
Africa. Such anachronistic conceptions should give way 
to a new process of training and educating in life and 
current social, political, technical, and economic ideals 
now in vogue in progressive schools in America, China 
and Russia.96
Nkrumah saw the absence of the physical, natural and social sciences in the school 
curriculum as requiring correction, for “any system of education worth its salt should be 
made consistent with the changing needs of the community in which the individual
95 Smith, Aggrey o f  Africa, pp. 139-141.
96 NAG:SC21/4/6, p.5.
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personality finds expression.”97 Nkrumah argued that the failures of the British colonial 
educational system were to be seen elsewhere in the colonial world -  the East Indies, 
Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia and Burma. He argued that: “Any educational program 
which fails to furnish criteria for the judgment of social, political, economic and technical 
progress of the people it purports to serve has completely failed in its purpose, and has 
become an educational fraud.”98 Sherwood is therefore incorrect to write that “Nkrumah 
did not write a stem critique of the existing — in fact almost non-existent -  educational 
system in British West Africa” nor make “serious criticism” of the colonial educational
99system.
Using Marxist terminology, Nkrumah explained the nature of the contradiction 
between African and European value systems: “When two cultures meet there is bound to 
be a crisis -  a crisis which often results in the cultural dialectic synthesis of the two. 
Development is but the result of internal and external conflict relation. This struggle of 
opposites which causes development leads, at a certain point, to a revolutionary break, 
and to the emergence of a new thing -  a new culture, a new education, or a new national 
life.”100
To resolve this conflict, Nkrumah argued: “In the educational process of the 
African the best in the western culture should be combined with the best in African 
culture.” Yet, he did not demonstrate how this synthesis of cultures could be achieved. 
As Sherwood argues, neither did he define what he considered to be “the best” in African 
and Western culture nor detail how the colonial education system could be
97 NAG.-SC21/4/6, p.5.
98 Ibid, p.6.
"Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, pp. 102-103.
I00NAG:SC21/4/6, p. 7.
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transformed.101 In spite of this, the recipients of such education -  “a new class of 
educated Africans should demand the powers of self-determination and independence to 
determine the progress and advancement of their own country.” 102 This essay is, as 
Sherwood describes, a highly political statement in an educational journal. It ends with a
i mcall for an end to the ongoing war.
The ten»page essay entitled ‘The History of the Negro Church’ is an arid narrative 
outlining the growth of missionary activity from the onset of slavery and the subsequent 
rise of independent churches in the USA which can be dealt with briefly.104 It is not 
known when Nkrumah wrote this essay. Neither do we know what may have prompted 
him to write it; nor from where he obtained his sources. Nkrumah described how during 
slavery, missionaries discovered they were caught in the dilemma of saving heathen souls 
and yet denied the slave equality before God. “Neither the Baptists nor the Methodists 
were at first especially interested in the Negro,” he writes.105 Later, these denominations 
were to become part of the growing European movement in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century calling for the abolition of the slave trade and slavery.
Aside from these written publications, Nkrumah sought to climb the academic 
ladder. His application to Harvard University was rejected but he was successful in 
completing his Master’s Degree in Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania in 
January 1943. Subsequently, his attempts to obtain his PhD were met with failure and 
controversy. Nkrumah submitted to Prof. Morrow a dissertation entitled ‘The History










and Philosophy of Imperialism, With Special Reference to Africa.’106 It appears this work 
met with the disapproval of the University authorities. According to Sherwood: 
“Correspondence in the Lincoln Archives suggest that it was Nkrumah’s research topic 
and not the quality of his work that created the hiatus.”107 An opportunity was presented 
to Nkrumah to make amendments to the dissertation. Dean Williams wrote to Nkrumah 
in December 1944 proposing the alteration, but it appears Nkrumah declined. We can 
only conclude that Nkrumah refused to make the necessary changes to his thesis. The 
reasons for this can only be surmised. Perhaps for Nkrumah the insistence that he modify 
the contents was an intellectual compromise he was unwilling to accept.
In order to consider the intellectual preoccupations of Nkrumah as a post-graduate 
student, it is essential to examine the contents of The History and Philosophy’ along 
with a second manuscript ‘Mind and Thought in Primitive Society: A Study in Ethno- 
Philosophy with Special Reference to the Akan Peoples of the Gold Coast, West 
Africa.’ 108 The two papers appear to have been written around the same time and 
therefore present what Sherwood characterizes as “a conundrum.” 109 Whether the 
anthropological dissertation ‘Mind and Thought’ was a ploy to gain acceptance as a 
doctoral candidate in order to pursue Nkrumah’s preferred choice of topic is a question 
posed by Sherwood.110 We are left with no conclusions as to why Nkrumah apparently 
wrote two dissertations around the same time, nor why what he submitted was rejected.
106 NAG:SC21/1/109; hereafter referred to as ‘History and Philosophy o f Imperialism.’
107 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 64.
losNAG:SC21/l/108.
109 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 65.
110 Ibid, p.63.
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Nkrumah’s later book Towards Colonial Freedom111 contains much of the ideas 
and perspective reflected in his dissertation ‘History and Philosophy of Imperialism.' On 
page three of the dissertation, Nkrumah refers to the dissertation as “a pamphlet” which 
suggests that in 1942, not only was he intent to pursue the topic as a doctoral thesis but he 
also had thoughts of publishing the dissertation as a pamphlet.112 It indicates Nkrumah’s 
intention to disseminate his ideas to a wider audience apart from a narrow academic 
community.
Considering the political and social climate in which it was written -  a period 
when much of Africa remained under European colonial rule and in which Africans were 
considered politically and socially incapable of self-government, the dissertation is a bold 
polemical denunciation of imperialism. Nkrumah was forward thinking in his demand for 
colonial subjects to organize for their own emancipation. It is evident from examining 
this dissertation that Nkrumah viewed the world from a Marxist theoretical perspective 
which he applied to the relationship between the European colonial powers and Africa.
Nkrumah wrote in his introduction that the primary objective of colonial rule in 
Africa and elsewhere was the extraction of raw materials. The second objective was to 
utilize the colonies as a “dumping ground” for manufactured products. Nkrumah 
believed: “The basis of colonial territorial dependence is economic, but the basis of the 
solution of the problem is political. Hence, political revolution is an indispensable step 
toward securing economic emancipation. This point of view irrevocably calls for an
1 1 -Ialliance of all colonial territories and dependencies.” For Nkrumah, emancipation
111 K. Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom (London, 1947).
112 Ibid, p. 7. In this small book Nkrumah outlines the four regions o f Africa, which is also identically 
presented in his dissertation NAG:SC21/1/108, pp.6-7.
113 NAG:SC21/1/109, p.2.
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called for unity among colonial peoples transcending tribal differences and “colonial 
provincialism.” Colonial peoples were urged not to be deceived by terms such as 
“trusteeship” or “partnership” which he characterized as mere “camouflage” and as 
“misconceived.”114 He was convinced freedom had to be attained through “the complete 
revolutionary change of the colonial system.” He maintained: “The only thing left for 
colonial peoples to do is to wrest their freedom and independence from these colonial 
powers by the application of moral if need be, physical force.”115
It is possible that the university authorities viewed Nkrumah’s call to “physical 
force” as political incitement. Nkrumah argued that the destruction of colonialism “will 
necessitate a vital upheaval within the colonies.”116 This may be the reason why the 
authorities instructed him to make amendments to his dissertation to which he refused. 
He concluded his Introduction by stating: “The dynamic force needed for such an
upheaval must be generated through a united colonial revolutionary organization. Herein 
lies the theme of this pamphlet.”117
Thus integral to Nkrumah’s theoretical definition of political mobilization 
towards ending colonial rule was a vital role for all social groups in the struggle for 
national independence. No social component was to be excluded.118 He adopted the 
classic Leninist definition of revolutionary organization “consist(ing) chiefly of persons 
engaged in revolution as a profession.” The aim of the organisation “is to accomplish the 
speedy and successful overthrow of colonial oppression and exploitation.” In terms of
114 Ibid, p.2
1,5 NAG:SC21/1/109, p. 3.
116 Ibid, p.3.
1,7 NAG:SC21/1/109, p.3. This last line strongly suggests Nkrumah’s intentions o f publishing the work as a 
pamphlet, which he did through private funds after he arrived in London in 1945. It was entitled Towards 
Colonial Freedom.
118 Hence, Nkrumah’s belief in all social groups having a positive role to play in the struggle to obtain 
independence could account for his insistence on the seamen being accepted within the AAS.
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“the weapons of the organisation,” Nkrumah advocated “mass uprisings and mass 
demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, non-cooperation, and non­
confidence in administration. The practical application of any of these forms of 
resistance is worth a million petitions and delegations and editorials.”119 In summary, the 
contents of this polemical essay outlined Nkrumah’s political views 011 imperialism and 
colonialism, in addition to practical ideas towards their eradication. With historical 
hindsight it is therefore hardly surprising that the University authorities rejected the 
dissertation on account of its radical Marxist contents. In addition to this, the overall tone 
and style of the exposition was uncompromisingly direct.
The ideas contained in ‘Mind and Thought’ had been previously expounded upon 
by other distinguished West African writers such as James Africanus Beale Horton 
(1853-1883), John Mensah Sarbah (1864-1910), Dr. J. B. Danquah (1895-1965) and the 
colonial ethnographer, R.S. Rattray. Hence, the positions espoused in ‘Mind and 
Thought’ are hardly original.
The work is a defense of Akan culture in the form of an ethnological exposition 
of the beliefs, customs, and norms of the Akan peoples, Nkrumah’s central argument is 
that “primitive peoples are not possessed of an inherently lower mentality.”120 Adopting a 
comparative approach, he refuted European theorists such as Levy Bruhl and others who 
argued for the existence of a “primitive man.” Nkrumah’s hypothesis was to demonstrate 
“that the mental processes among Africans and European peoples are essentially the 
same” and “the view cannot be maintained that the different peoples of the world stand 
on different stages, and that civilized man has attained a higher place in mental
119 NAG:SC21/1/109, p. 22.
120 NAG:SC21/10/1, p. 158.
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organization than “primitive man.”121 In summary, Nkrumah argued from a position of
the equality of African and European cultural beliefs in ‘Mind and Thought.’
With regards to Nkrumah’s extra-curricular political activities, it appears he was
extremely busy. In December 1942 Nkrumah and Mbadiwe were invited as speakers at
the Philadelphia Pyramid Club. In the same year he joined the platform with the African
American Congressman, Adam Clayton Powell and others at a student conference at
Lincoln University on “The Status of the Negro in Fighting for Democracy.” Nkrumah
also worked with Claudia Jones, a leading member of the Communist Party of the United
States. In a letter to Jones, Nkrumah thanked her “for the courage, inspiration, and aid”
which he had received from her. He went on to write: “The future of Africa like the
future of all people throughout the world lives at stake today. Action now will remove the
122threat of oppressor and oppressed.”
In Pennsylvania in 1943 he gave an address to the Russian War Relief 
Committee Youth Division on the question “Is North Africa part of the United Nations? 
The Colonial Question Now and After.”123 He also spoke to schoolchildren of Douglass 
Junior High School in April 1943 on aspects of African culture and education. Indeed, the 
importance of culture was central to Nkrumah’s evolving social, political and economic 
worldview. As part of his talk to the school children he sang two traditional Akan songs 
in an endeavor to challenge the disparaging depictions of Africa in Western popular 
culture.124
121 Ibid, p. 158.
122 NAG:SC21/l/46; dated October 27 1942.
123 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, pp.78-79.
124 Ibid, p. 79.
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Sherwood writes that Nkrumah was a member of Marcus Garvey’s Universal 
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) 21st Division and attended Garveyite meetings 
in New York.125 Mr Hubert Whiteman, an African American who had been Nkrumah’s 
landlord in New York, claimed he took Nkrumah to the UNIA at 100 West 106th Street in 
New York.126 Whiteman remarked that it was a period in which Nkrumah advanced 
towards socialism as a political ideology. He maintained: “We used to discuss political 
systems... Nkrumah chose socialism as his guiding light. I used to warn him of what 
might happen when he went back with his fine education, but he said he would fight for 
his people. He discussed a United States of Africa, in which each state would be 
independent.”127
It was also during his time in America that Nkrumah attended meetings held by
political organizers across the political spectrum.128 It was through such gatherings that
Nkrumah became acquainted with the Trinidadian scholar and activist, C. L. R James.
James recollects that:
[I] got to know Nkrumah in the United States in 1943, and 
he and I and some of my friends were very close between 
1943 and 1945. We went down to Pennsylvania or to 
Lincoln to see him -  or he would come up to New York 
and spend a day or two with his friends and exchange ideas 
with us. Even in those years, Nkrumah was noted for his 
acute intelligence, his intellectual energy, the elegance of 
his person, the charm of his manners and his ability to 
establish easy relations with any company in which he 
found himself. We could observe that, behind his easy 
style, his primary concern was the independence and 
freedom of African people.129
125 Ibid, p.79.
126 Cited in Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p.79.
127 Ibid, Kwame Nkrumah, p.81.
128 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 36.
129 Cited in Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 82.
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In Washington, Nkrumah participated in a public lecture on “West Africa post war and 
the American Negro” at Howard University Memorial Chapel in February 1943. He also 
spoke on “Africa, the War and Post-War Status” in which he advocated the complete 
independence of colonial territories and a “Federated States of West Africa.”130 He took 
part in a New York conference organized by the CAA in April 1944. The Conference’ 
theme was “Africa -  New Perspectives.” It was attended by 200 black representatives and 
60 organizations.131 Nkrumah attended as representative of the AAS and not only remet 
Max Yergan, but also met Paul Robeson, Ralph Bunche, Alphaeus Hunton, and Amy 
Ashwood Garvey.132 Also present were K.A.B. Jones-Quartey, editor of the African 
Interpreter and others. The conference participants demanded the colonial powers end the 
practice of the colour bar in Africa, institute fair prices for African raw materials and that 
the United States ensure the political freedom of colonial peoples.
As Nkrumah spent ten years in the US, his experiences of racism impacted on 
his political views. In his Autobiography he claims he carried out research on six hundred 
African American families in Philadelphia, which exposed him to the racial tensions in 
America. However, he vividly recalled his “first experience of active racialism below the 
Mason-Dixon line” when he traveled by bus from Philadelphia to Washington and 
stopped for refreshment. He asked for a glass water from a white waiter and was referred 
to the “spittoon outside.” The incident left him “so shocked” but did not on the whole 
embitter him towards Europeans.
130 Ibid, p. 80.
531 Hunton, Unsung Valiant, p.56.
132 Nkrumah later shared the platform with Amy Ashwood Garvey at the October 1945 Manchester Pan- 
African Conference; he befriended Ralphe Bunche and Paul Robeson, who was later invited by Nkrumah to 
live in Ghana; Alphaeus Hunton was invited by Dr.W.E.B.Dubois to work on the Encyclopedia Africana in 
Ghana from 1962 -1966.
133 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 35.
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Conclusion
It is clear that as a student at the Training College, Nkrumah demonstrated the beginnings 
of independent intellectual growth in differing with Aggrey whom he greatly admired. 
Nkrumah believed that self determination of African people was a pre-condition for 
racial equality and harmony between black and white. In refusing to attend mass he 
demonstrated a strong non-conformist personality and an ability to break with 
expectation and convention yet he continued to retain the respect of his peers by being 
voted class prefect.
Overall his student days were the formative period of the development of his 
nationalist thinking which were shaped by Aggrey, Zik, Wallace Johnson, S. R. Wood, 
Kobina Sekyi and his voracious reading, particularly the work of Marcus Garvey. He 
pursued his philosophical interests and considered communism as “idealistic” and 
“impractical.” When he departed America for London, it seems doubtful that Lincoln 
University and the University of Pennsylvania had changed the ideas and ideals of 
Nkrumah. Instead he simply used the opportunity within the confines of these institutions 
to deepen his intellect and study the means to attain his political ambitions.
It appears he possessed an undogmatic Marxist outlook on the world, which 
centered on the political aspirations of African people organizing themselves towards the 
eradication of economic and political oppression at the hands of European colonial rule. 
His romantic streak is revealed in a letter he wrote in which he declared: “Every 
preparation that I am making here is for the interest of Africa. I have always dreamed of a 
United States of West Africa under African hegemony to be brought about through the
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aid of the United States Government and the Governments of Europe with interest in 
West Africa. This may sound utopian and impossible, nevertheless it has been my 
dream.” 134 It is unknown to whom Nkrumah wrote this handwritten letter but it is 
characteristic of his powerful idealism that remained with him throughout his life. The 
seven page letter is illegible in part and it is interesting that at this stage of his political 
development he believes that a politically united Africa could be brought about “through 
the aid” of the US and European governments. Several years later, with the 1965 
publication of his book Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage o f Imperialism, Nkrumah no 
longer upheld such a view. During his days at the Training College Nkrumah challenged 
a tutor who sought to divide Africans into many ethnic groups. The roots of his Pan- 
Africanist perspective lay in his identification with the Herzkovits school of thought that 
believed that African Americans had retained some aspects of African cultural identity 
despite physical separation from Africa as a consequence of slavery. Nkrumah spoke 
repeatedly on Pan-Africanism and believed in the necessity of unity amongst African 
people.
Nkrumah’s political thought was uncompromising and hinted towards 
radicalism. His dissertation entitled ‘The History and Philosophy of Imperialism, With 
Special Reference to Africa5 was a polemical piece of writing that advocated colonial 
people adopt “physical force.” This met with the disapproval of the University 
authorities.
Lastly, during this period of his student days, Nkrumah demonstrated very early 
in his life that he had a profound sense of racial dignity and a desire for leadership. He 
was developing skills as a political operator. The admission of seamen into the AAS, a
134 NAG:SC21/1/119, this is a 7-page letter written by Nkrumah and is undated.
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hitherto student body, was a political success but also importantly underpinned 
Nkrumah’s evolving political philosophy and organizational approach. He believed in a 
role for all social groups in mobilizing for change in society.
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CHAPTER 2
NKRUMAH THE ACTIVIST TO LEADER OF THE CPP, 1945-1951
Activism in London, 1945-1947
Nkrumah claimed he traveled to London “to study law and, at the same time, to complete 
my thesis for a doctorate in philosophy. As soon as I arrived in London, therefore, I 
enrolled at Grays Inn and arranged to attend lectures at the London School of 
Economics.”1 He departed for London in late May 1945 where he was met by George 
Padmore and Joe Appiah. Padmore was, according to Sherwood, “the London-based 
guru of colonial revolutionaries”2 and Joe Appiah, was a Ghanaian law student and 
active member of the London based West African Students Union (WASU). All three 
became political colleagues.3 Padmore was indeed a political magnet in black activist 
circles in London. As the vortex of imperial rule, the capital drew many African students 
who gradually became politicized by the organizational activities and views of Padmore 
and the desire to see their respective countries free from colonial rule. Padmore was 
“always neatly dressed with crease-Iines in his usually dark trousers and spotless white 
shirt under jacket and ties” writes Abrahams.4 He had an “iron will” and resolute political
1 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 42.
2 M. Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years 1945-47’ in D. Kill ingray,(ed), Africans in Britain 
(London, 1994), p. 187.
3 The relationship between Nkrumah and Appiah later turned hostile in the early 1950s and the two fell out 
politically. It is to be noted that in his Autobiography, p. 41, Nkrumah omits Appiah who accompanied 
Padmore when meeting him; see also Joe Appiah: The Autobiography O f an African Patriot, (London, 
1990).
4 P. Abrahams, The Coyaba Chronicles'. Reflections on the Black Experience in the Twentieth Centiuy 
(London, 2000), p. 37. Abrahams was a Coloured South African novelist and former member o f  the 
Communist Party . His memoirs are an intimate and penetrating account o f  his life in South Africa, 
including his involvement with black political and literary figures o f the 1950s and 1960s in London Pan- 
African circles. He later settled in Jamaica.
56
focus.5 According to Sherwood, it was C.L.R James who introduced Nkrumah to 
Padmore by way of a letter. Immediately after his arrival in London, his colleagues found 
him accommodation at the WASU hostel. He stayed there for a short while before 
moving into a house with his former colleague, Ako Adjei, at 25 Laurier Road, Tufnell 
Park in north London. He later moved to a room at 60 Burghley Road in north London. 
The address was in proximity to individuals who were to become some of his close 
political colleagues. Among them were Joe Appiah who lived in Primrose Hill Gardens in 
Hampstead and shared the house with Bankole Akpata, F. Kankam-Boadu and Afolabi 
Odebiyi.
Many African students living in London during the 1940s and 1950s 
experienced the colour bar.6 Several landlords had turned Nkrumah away before Mrs 
Florence Manley at Burghley Road, eventually accepted him. She maintains that many of 
her neighbors did not like the idea of a “coloured man” in her house. For six months to 
almost a year she was ostracized by her neighbors. Gradually her neighbors realized that 
her tenant “was a very nice man, very polite and everybody greeted him.”7
According to Appiah, Nkrumah spent many evenings visiting George Padmore 
and becoming engrossed in political discussions “lasting into the early hours of the 
morning in the company of such fighters as Jomo Kenyatta, Richard Wright, Ras 
Makonnen, Peter Koinange, Peter Abrahams, CLR James, Dudley Thompson, Yacub
5 Ibid, p. 37,
6 H. Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960: Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism (London, 
1998), pp.39-40, pp.54-55.
7 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Kwame Nkrumah, Box 128-27, Interview with Mrs Manley, June 28 1973; 
Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University.
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Osman.”8 Kojo Botsio also remarked that many African students were “avid students of 
what Padmore was preaching and visited Padmore’s house almost everyday.”9
In October 1945, Nkrumah registered as a PhD student at the London School of 
Economics (LSE); he expressed an interest in reading anthropology but appears to have 
withdrawn one term later. He registered a year later -  in October 1946 -  at University 
College London intending to read philosophy. His field of academic study was 
“Knowledge and Logical Positivism” and his supervisor was Professor A. J. Ayer.10
For all his grand academic intentions, Nkrumah was immediately engaged in 
intense political activity in the imperial capital. His doctoral aspirations were quickly 
abandoned. Ayer maintains: “His main concern was always with the liberation of 
Africa.”11
According to Nkrumah, however, lack of finances contributed to this abandoned 
project.12 Key figures who assisted in influencing him in this decision were undoubtedly 
his mentor, Padmore and others such as Ras Makonnen,13 who shared a flat with 
Padmore, and Peter Abrahams. In Makonnen’s view, the idea of Nkrumah pursuing a 
legal qualification was derided among their small circle of African and West Indian 
political activists. Nkrumah swiftly immersed himself in various political activities. 
“London was the critical point of contact where Pan-African, socialist and anti-colonial
8 Appiah, Autobiography, p. 159.
9 Interview with Kojo Botsio, August 18 1999, Accra.
10 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Box 128-5, Folder 77; Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard 
University.
11 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Box 128-27, Taped interview with Professor Ayer, June 30 1973; Moorland- 
Spingarn, Howard University.
12 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 49.
13 Ras Makonnen was born in British Guiana and was a committed Pan-Africanist. Peter Fryer refers to 
him as “a financial wizard;” his restaurant businesses financed the activities o f  the British based 
International African Service Bureau (IASB) which supported the struggles o f  colonial subjects and its 
journal Pan-Africa along with the famous Fifth Pan-African Congress, see P. Fryer, Staying Power A 
History o f  Black People in Britain (London, 1984), pp.33 8-339, and R. Makonnen, Pan-Africanism from  
Within (Oxford, 1973).
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ideas were shared and enlarged,” observed Abrahams.14 The WASU and Pan-African 
Federation (PAF) campaigned in support of the Nigerian mineworkers strike of July 
1945. A public rally in London was held on July 15 1945 in solidarity with the striking 
miners. 15 Also present at the rally were members from the Federation of Indian 
Associations in Britain, the Ceylon Students’ Association, and the Burma Association.16 
Nkrumah’s participation in the rally was his first organizational involvement in London 
political activism. More importantly, Nkrumah was to prove himself sufficiently 
organizationally reliable to be entrusted with the post of regional secretary of the PAF by 
Padmore. “[Nkrumah’s] name appears as Regional Secretary on the letterhead of the 
PAF’s Southern Regional Council,” indicating his support for the rally and striking 
Nigerian miners.17
In October 1945 Nkrumah was elected vice-president of WASU, a position he 
occupied for one year. It was the Central Committee of the PAF that decided on 
organizing the Fifth Pan-African Congress. Padmore, “the master planner, was in his 
element.”18 Abrahams suggests that the entire organization for the Congress was executed 
by Padmore in the head office of Makonnen’s restaurant in Manchester. In his new 
organizational role Nkrumah was given access to Padmore’s wide ranging political
14 Abrahams, Coyaba Chronicles, p. 36.
15 The Pan-African Federation was established in 1944 as an umbrella organisation comprising: the African 
Union (based in Glasgow), the Negro Association (based in Manchester), The Coloured Workers 
Association (London), the Association o f Students o f African Descent (Dublin), see Adi, West Africans in 
Britain, p. 125.
16 This solidarity grew out o f  the convening o f the Subject People’s Conference held on 10 June 1945 in 
London by the PAF, WASU and these groups. They addressed themselves as the “Provisional Committee 
o f  United Colonial People’s Federation”. The conference was enthused by the sympathetic position o f the 
UN towards colonial subjects and published a manifesto entitled T he Colonies & Peace’ that demanded 
universal suffrage in the colonies ; the end o f colonial rule and the colour bar.
17 H. Adi & M. Sherwood, The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited (London, 1995)p. 22.
18 Abrahams, Coyaba Chronicles, p. 45.
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contacts both within Britain and worldwide. He sent out letters of invitation to the 
Congress.
Much has been written about the historic Pan-African Congress held between 
13 and 21 October in Manchester.19 The Congress brought together over two hundred 
delegates from various political and social organizations and trade unions from Africa 
and the West Indies. They challenged the colonial powers to end colonial rule, demanded
onself-determination and “economic democracy” for ordinary people. It was presided 
over by the “Father of Pan-Africanism,” William Edward Burghardt Dubois and 
delegates heard reports 011 the colonial situation in the Caribbean, Africa, and discussion 
on the colour bar in Britain. Nkrumah was appointed rapporteur of two sessions 
discussing “Imperialism in North and West Africa” on 16 and 19 October. According to 
Kojo Botsio, Padmore and Nkrumah “were the driving force behind the Congress.”21
Sherwood concludes that Nkrumah’s participation in the Congress “had not
only given Nkrumah a high profile -  it also allowed him to meet political and trade union
00activists in the capacity of one of the recognized organizers of the Congress.” 
Moreover, the Congress was an important opportunity for Nkrumah to combine his 
political convictions with practical organizational experience.
Among the many resolutions drafted by the Congress participants, nowhere did 
“the Congress unanimously endorse the doctrine of African socialism based upon the
191. Geiss, The Pan-African Movement: A History o f  Pan-Africanism in America, Europe & Africa (New  
York, 1974); P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea & Movement, 1776-1991 (Washington, 
1994); H. Adi & M. Sherwood, The 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited (London, 1995).
20 See Chapter 4, ‘ Colonial and Coloured Unit A Programme o f Action’ by G. Padmore in The 1945 
Manchester Pan-African Congress Revisited, by H. Adi & M. Sherwood, pp. 51-125,
21 Interview with Kojo Botsio, August 18 1999, Accra.
22 Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years,’ p. 169.
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tactics of positive action without violence.”23 Moreover Nkrumah wrote: “As the 
preponderance of members attending the Congress were Africans, its ideology became 
African nationalism -  a revolt by African nationalism against colonialism, racialism and 
imperialism in Africa -  and it adopted Marxist socialism as its philosophy.”24 Nkrumah 
appears to have interpreted history backwards for there is 110 mention of “African 
socialism” in the Congress proceedings nor in the reminiscences of individuals such as 
Ghanaian F. R. Kankam-Boadu and Sierra Leonean Ernest Marke 25 who attended nor in 
coverage from the British press.26
Among the many resolutions the Congress called for the total elimination of 
colonial rule throughout the African continent; an end to forced labour, the wealth of the 
continent to be utilized by Africans; the democratic rights of Africans in South and East 
Africa to be upheld, as well as calling on Africans to organize themselves.27 The tone of 
the Congress was irrefutably anti-imperialist. There was a call for “nationalization of all 
basic industries vital to life and welfare of the community” and “public ownership of all 
public utilities” which may at the stretch of the imagination have been inferred to mean 
socialism. Whilst some of the key organizers of the Congress had Marxist views, there 
was no official adoption of what Nkrumah describes as “Marxist socialism” as the 
Congress’ philosophy.
23 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 43-44; G. Padmore’s The Gold Coast Revolution (London, 1953), p.61-63, 
also argues that there was support for Pan-African socialism. Yet, Padmore does not define this term.
24Nkrumah Autobiography, p. 44. B. D. G. Folson disputes that the 5* PAC adopted Marxist socialism as 
its philosophy, see ‘The Development o f Socialist Ideology in Ghana, 1949-1959 Part 1’ in Ghana Social 
Science Journal, V ol.1, No. 1, May 1971.
25 Adi & Sherwood, The 1945 Manchester Congress Revisited, pp.34-39 contains brief personal 
recollections from these two individuals.
26 Ibid, pp.43-46.
27 Ibid, pp. 102-116 contains the actual Congress Resolutions.
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Of the two major declarations endorsed by the Congress, ‘The Challenge to the 
Colonial Powers’ and ‘The Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World’, Nkrumah 
claims to have been the author of the latter.28 The anti-imperialist Sri Lankan activist, T. 
B. Subashinghe, a colleague of George Padmore and an attendee of the Congress 
believed that Padmore “had a big hand in drafting the resolutions presented to the 
Congress.”29 Hence, this evidence appears to refute Nkrumah’s claim to have been its 
author.
The brief declaration denounced imperialist exploitation and affirmed “the right 
of all colonial peoples to control their destiny.” Workers, farmers, intellectuals and the 
professional classes of the colonies throughout the world were “to awaken to their 
responsibilities.” It ends with the line: “Colonial and subject peoples of the world -  
unite!”30 The slogan suggests the influence of Marxist socialist philosophy on some 
congress participants. However, Folson argues: “Although several delegates, including 
Dr. DuBois and George Padmore, were committed socialists, the Congress cannot be said 
to have directed the minds of the future leaders of Africa to socialism.”31
Nkrumah’s participation in the Congress shaped his thinking prior to his return 
to the Gold Coast. His involvement had put him in contact with future African leaders 
such as Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone; Obafemi Awolowo, Jaja Wachuku and H. O. 
Davies of Nigeria; Garba-Jahumpa of the Gambia; Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya; Hastings 
Banda of Nyasaland and Peter Abrahams of South Africa.
28 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p.44.
29 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 171.
30 Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, p. 44.
31 B.D. G. Folson, ‘ The Development o f Socialist Ideology in Ghana’, in Ghana Social Science Journal, 
Parti: 1949-1959, Vol. l .N o .l  May 1971, p.2.
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Soon after the Congress Nkrumah set up the West African National Secretariat 
(WANS). It was made up of individuals such as Wallace Johnson, Bankole Akpata, Nii 
Odom Annan, Kwaw Swanzy, Koi Larbi, Kojo Botsio and Bankole Awoonor-Renner.
It was an organisation of which Makonnen became suspicious.33 Yet, the rationale 
justifying the establishment of WANS came out of the deliberations of the Fifth PAC and 
endorsement from the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) as well as the Sierra 
Leone branch of the West African Youth League.34 Among WANS’s many objectives 
were to follow up Congress resolutions “to maintain contact with, coordinate, educate 
and supply information on current matters to various political bodies, farmers 
organisations, cooperative societies, educational, cultural and other progressive 
organisations in West Africa with a view to realizing a West African front for a United 
West African National Independence.”35 The veteran trade union champion, I.T.A. 
Wallace Johnson, was elected Chair and Nkrumah general secretary.36
There are two controversial perceptions of Nkrumah’s involvement with 
WANS. Firstly, there is the view held by Makonnen and members of the Central 
Committee of the PAF who saw WANS and Nkrumah as too compromisingly close to the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)37 and the opinion held by Sherwood that the 
organisation was yet another vehicle for Nkrumah’s “self-aggrandizement.”
Makonnen’s evidence for his allegation appears to be based on the occasion he 
and a few other PAF members visited the London based WANS office based at 94 Grays
32 Interview with Kojo Botsio, August 18, 1999, Accra.
33 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 262.
34 See NAG:SC21/12/37 -  “Aims and Objectives o f the West African National Secretariat”.
35 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 170.
36 See NAG:SC21/12/37, p. 8.
37 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 262.
38 Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years’, p. 164.
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Inn Road 111 London. They “found copies of the Moscow magazine on colonial 
questions.” Furthermore, he writes, “not even a single copy of Pan-Africa or the other 
things we had been producing in Manchester” was present in the office.39 An incensed 
Makonnen returned to Manchester and reported the matter to the Central Committee. 
Nkrumah was summoned before some members of the Committee, including Jomo 
Kenyatta, Dr. Peter Milliard, Padmore and Makonnen himself. The position of the 
Committee was clear: Nkrumah’s close relationship with the communist movement was 
considered to be compromising the autonomy of the anti-colonial movement. Makonnen 
claims he played the role of Vishinsky during what he refers to as Nkrumah’s 
“prosecution.”40 As Nkrumah does not shed any light on this disagreement within the 
organisation nor his reaction to it, we have only Makonnen’s comments. An explanation 
for Nkrumah’s omission of this incident in his Autobiography is likely to be 
embarrassment. He could hardly reveal his involvement with communists at a time when 
the country was still in the process of negotiating its independence with the British 
colonial administration when he was writing his Autobiography. To have disclosed any 
association would most likely have impacted negatively on his party and negotiations for 
independence with the British. Makonnen observed it was “very embarrassing for him.”41 
The extent of communist influence on Nkrumah and WANS is uncertain.42 
Nkrumah was acquainted with communists in the US and in London, such as the Sierra 
Leonean, Bankole Awoonor-Renner. In addition, Emile Burns, a leading British
39 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, pp.262-263.
40 Ibid, p. 263. It is to be noted that Makonnen (and Padmore) were by then ardent anti-communists and 
therefore it is interesting Makonnen refers to himself as acting “the role o f  Vishinsky”, p. 263. In the 
famous show case trial o f the Bolshevik Nikolai Bukharin on March 2 1938, in Stalin’s Russia, Andrei 
Vishinsky was one o f  the presiding judges and prosecutors.
4t Ibid, p. 263.
42 Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years,’ p. 188.
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Communist was to remain Nkrumah’s life-long friend. Nkrumah attended lectures run by 
Burns for students from the colonies. Sherwood questions whether Communists had 
intentions of influencing the politics of WANS “as an entry into British West Africa.5’43 
She claims they fell short of achieving this goal -  if indeed they intended to. She 
attributes their failure to her belief that: “Nkrumah was probably too much of a
pragmatist and an opportunist in the best sense of that word, to be committed to any 
theory of political party. His idealism, his consuming passion was for freedom -  for all 
Africa, West Africa, or just the Gold Coast -  whichever could be attained the soonest 
under his leadership.”44 Though Nkrumah certainly associated with Communists, he 
never became a member of the CPGB 45
Sherwood implies Nkrumah neglected his responsibilities as secretary of PAF to 
establish WANS as a vehicle through which to promote his own ego. His personal 
ambition was at the root of his neglect of his duties at the PAF. She conjectures: “Did 
Nkrumah believe that the future he had cherished since his US days, of a free, 
independent and united West Africa, were more realizable within an organisation in 
which he held the most senior post? Did he perceive George Padmore as an obstacle to 
his own ambitions?”46
The formation of The Circle, a small inner secret group of members inside 
WANS who were obliged to pay personal loyalty to Nkrumah’s leadership appears to 
justify her argument. In Sherwood’s view: “on the evidence presently available, that 
Nkrumah’s ambition, so amply demonstrated in the Circle document, and his
43 Ibid, p. 189.
44 Ibid, p. 189.
45 Ibid, p. 181. See also G. Kanu, Nkrumah The Man: A Friend’s Testimony (Lagos, 1982), p. 15. In this 
much-neglected portrait of'Nkrumah Kanu writes that Nkrumah denied he was a communist.
46 Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years.’ p. 172.
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appreciation of the presence of a number of West Africans in London, communist, non­
communist or anti-Communist, but certainly pro-independence, led him to make his bid 
for West African leadership by setting up the Secretariat.”47
Nkrumah’s involvement in The Circle sheds light on his concept of political 
methods of organization, power and his personality. The motto of the group was “The 
Three S’s -  Service, Sacrifice and Suffering.” Its aims were to “commence revolutionary 
work in any part of the African continent” towards the ultimate goal of establishing a 
Union of African Socialist Republics. 48 Membership of The Circle cost seven guineas 
and according to Nkrumah extended “only to those who were believed or known to be 
genuinely working for West African unity and the destruction of colonialism.”49 Legum 
considers that: “The history of Dr. Nkrumah’s reliance on a vanguardist organization 
began with the formation of The Circle.”50 He argues that this particular organizational 
method was to remain with Nkrumah post independence.51 The notion of The Circle 
being composed of dedicated revolutionaries indicates the extent of Leninist ideological 
and organizational principles that influenced Nkrumah. The Circle can be considered a 
practical application of Leninist organizational methods towards Nkrumah’s long-term 
objective of a Union of African Socialist Republics. Who comprised its members and the 
precise selection criteria remained secret. But for those select members “the seventh law 
of The Circle” was to swear personal loyalty to its leader.52 For Legum this marks the 
origins of “the concept of Osagyefo, the great unvanquished warrior, [which was] already
47 Ibid, p. 188.
48 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 50; PR 0:C0964/24 Exhibit 35 is a copy o f  The Circle document.
49 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 50.
50 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation5 in W. H. Friedland & C. G. Rosberg (eds), 
African Socialism (Stanford, 1964), pp.131-160.
51 Ibid, p. 136.
52 PR0.-C0964/24 Exhibit 35. .
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firmly implanted.” 53 That the members did not pledge loyalty to the aims of the 
organization, or to each other, but to Nkrumah, shows the beginnings of Nkrumah’s 
desire for power and his demand for personal allegiance from individuals who were in 
agreement with his revolutionary political objectives. However, according to Kojo 
Botsio, The Circle never really had the opportunity to take off, as “soon after the 
establishment of The Circle, Kwame had an invitation to go to the Gold Coast.”54
Other evidence of what Sherwood considers to be Nkrumah’s “individualistic 
(if not self-aggrandizing) behavior” is illustrated in his procurement of funds to privately 
publish Towards Colonial Freedom (TCF) in 1947. 55 The Farleigh Press, which 
published the pamphlet, was owned by the CPGB.56 It suggests further evidence of 
Nkrumah’s involvement with Communist circles but there is no incontrovertible evidence 
that the CPGB funded the pamphlet.57
The bulk of the ideas contained in this small publication appear to be a 
duplication of those contained in his aforementioned 1942 undergraduate doctoral 
submission ‘The History and Philosophy of Imperialism With Special Reference to 
Africa.’ Therefore the writing of TCF spanned the period of his formative involvement in 
political activity whilst in the USA to his immersion in radical Pan-African activity in 
London. Legum describes the pamphlet as “a straightforward Marxist-Leninist tract 
against imperialism.”58 Nkrumah’s central argument was a call to the West African 
masses -  comprising the youth, labour and women, to mobilize through non-violent
53 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation’, p. 135.
54 Interview with Kojo Botsio, August 18 1999, Accra.
55 Sherwood, ‘Kwame Nkrumah: The London Years’, p. 178.
56 Sherwood, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 168.
57 In a letter to the author, June Milne, Kwame Nkrumah’s literary executrix informed me that funds to 
publish Towards Colonial Freedom  were from private sources. It is possible that a member(s) o f the CPGB 
privately funded the pamphlet.
58 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation,’ p. 135.
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methods in a national liberation movement for the establishment of national
independence and economic freedom. In short, Nkrumah saw political independence as a
prelude to economic freedom and it was a political goal Nkrumah never lost sight of.
Criticisms have been made of the work by Afari-Gyan. He argues that:
an assumption of inevitability underlines much of 
Nkrumah’s reasoning in the book. For example, he sees the 
emergence of an anti-imperialist colonial intelligentsia, the 
awakening of national consciousness among the colonized 
peoples, the emergence of a working class movement, and 
the growth of the national liberation movements as the 
inevitable results of colonialism and imperialism.
Following this line of reasoning through, he foresees the 
national solidarity of the colonial people’s against 
imperialism to be also inevitable.59
Other political activities, which consumed Nkrumah’s time and energy, 
included a meeting with African Deputies of the French Assembly. Among them were 
Apithy from Togo and Leopold Senghor from Senegal, who were interested in organizing 
a West African National Conference, which was scheduled to take place in Lagos, 
Nigeria, in October 1948,60 He also met with leftwing Labour politicians Arthur Creech 
Jones, Dr Rita Hinden and Fenner Brockway and attended anti-imperialist 
demonstrations and meetings in Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park in London.61 Nkrumah’s 
political association with these progressive Europeans is further evidence of his 
ideological departure from Garvey’s anti-European position.
Around September 1947, Nkrumah received a letter from Ako Adjei, who had 
returned to the Gold Coast. The letter invited Nkrumah to take up the post as general
59 K. Afari-Gyan, ‘The Political Ideas o f Kwame Nkrumah’, (PhD Thesis, 1974, University o f Ghana), p. 
83.
60 Nkrumah Autobiography, p. 49. This conference never took place,
61 Ibid, p. 49.
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secretary of the recently established political movement, the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC).62 The Executive Committee of the UGCC offered him a salary of 
one hundred pounds a month and use of a car.63 In order “to play for time” to discover 
“the real spirit, motives and aims of those who started this movement,” he wrote to Adjei 
informing him he was considering the offer. 64 Meanwhile, Nkrumah immersed himself 
in organisational activities for the proposed West African National Conference. Through 
lengthy discussions with Tony Maclean, a British extra mural lecturer at Oxford 
University who had spent some time in the Gold Coast, he actively sought to acquaint 
himself with the political climate in the Gold Coast. Initially, Nkrumah was ideologically 
opposed to a “movement backed almost entirely by reactionaries, middle class lawyers 
and merchants.”65 Subsequently another persuasive letter from Dr. J. B. Danquah, the 
“doyen of Gold Coast politics” and founding member of the UGCC reached Nkrumah. At 
this stage Nkrumah had sought advice from a number of individuals including his 
ideological mentor, Padmore and also Fenner Brockway, a leader of the British 
Independent Labour Party. He also called a meeting of the WANS. After much serious 
discussion, it was agreed that Nkrumah should accept the offer. He sent a formal written 
acceptance to Adjei and Danquah and soon after he received one hundred pounds 
travelling allowance from George Grant, President of the UGCC.66
Nkrumah left Britain on November 14 1947 with his WANS colleague, Kojo 
Botsio and experienced a rigorous questioning by the British authorities at Liverpool
62 The UGCC was set up in August 1947 by merchants and lawyers in the Gold Coast to fight for 
independence from the British.
53 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 50.
64 Ibid, p.50.
65 Ibid, p. 51.
65 PRO:C0964/24 -  Exhibit 56. Nkrumah’s letter dated 27 September 1947 confirmed his receipt o f  the 
hundred pounds cash from the Working Committee and his plans to leave London by boat via Amsterdam 
and Sierra Leone.
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docks. Leaving Botsio to travel ahead to the Gold Coast, Nkrumah made a detour to 
Freetown and Monrovia. His two-week stay in Freetown was preoccupied with political 
meetings with Sierra Leonean political leaders whom he claims he found very much 
divided.67 Nkrumah met privately with the leaders and maintains “we managed to come 
to some sort of agreement as to how the leaders in Sierra Leone could form a united front 
and work together for West African unity.”68
In Liberia, Nkrumah was unable to meet President Tubman who had traveled 
abroad. He observed the difference in the political climate between Sierra Leone and 
Liberia and did not detail the specific nature of his disappointment with the country 
heralded as “the symbol of African redemption.”69 He managed to discuss the proposed 
West African National Conference with several Liberian politicians before he left for the 
Gold Coast.
The earlier cross-examination by the Liverpool police had psychologically 
prepared Nkrumah for a similar interrogation by the port authorities of Takoradi. It 
appears Nkrumah’s reputation had preceded him, for the Ghanaian official prudently 
exhibited enthusiasm and surprise at meeting Nkrumah in person.70 The official 
“whispered softly: So you are Kwame Nkrumah!” which suggests a reputation of intrigue 
surrounded Nkrumah as a political figure before he entered the country. “Out of earshot 
of the other passengers and officials” the immigration officer who made it known that he 
had heard of him received Nkrumah warmly and assured him that his papers would be
67 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 53.
68 Ibid, p. 53.
69 Ibid, p. 53-54.
70 Ibid, p. 54.
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processed swiftly.71 The welcome to his native land by this African official after 12 years 
abroad was by no means a prediction of the struggles ahead in his new post as secretary 
of the UGCC.
The Ideology of the CPP and Nkrumah, 1949-1951
The UGCC initially comprised the wealthy and highly educated in Gold Coast society. It 
represented the “Ghanaian establishment,” constituting barristers, doctors and 
businessmen. The founding fathers were “big men” such as Francis A. Williams, Dr. J. B. 
Danquah, William Ofori Atta, Ashie Nikoe, John Ayew, R, S. Blay, J. W. de Graft 
Johnson and George Alfred Grant.
This infant body of a handful of men was greatly in need of an organizer to 
build the Convention and with Nkrumah’s appointment the social makeup of the 
movement changed considerably in a relatively short space of time. As professionals and 
businessmen the Convention leaders were far too busy to devote time and energy to the 
necessary task of building the movement. Hence, Nkrumah was hired with this clearly 
defined task. He formally assumed his appointment on December 29 1947.
The Convention leaders demanded an end to colonial rule; an end to the unfair 
colonial trading practices that damaged their business interests and more importantly, by 
virtue of their learning and status, they envisaged themselves replacing the British 
colonial administrators,72 In short, the Convention leaders believed in the political 
principle of freedom for all, but with themselves leading the future Gold Coast polity. 
Neither did the leaders re-examine this assumption as the movement garnered political
71 Ibid, p.54.
72 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 69.
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support from the local youth societies in the Colony and Ashanti towns; farmers, petty 
traders, drivers, artisans, schoolteachers, and clerks.73 Gradually due to the efforts of its 
energetic secretary, “a common front began to take shape: the youth societies became 
branches of the UGCC, and Danquah and Nkrumah began the task of knitting the 
multiplicity of local organizations into a broad national movement.”74
However, shortly after Nkrumah began his appointment as Secretary of the 
UGCC, the ex-servicemen’s demonstration and the boycott of European goods in Accra 
erupted in February 1948. Nkrumah, as part of the Big Six was held responsible and 
along with Obetsebi Lamptey, Ako Adjei, Ofori Atta, J. B. Danquah and Akuffo Addo 
were imprisoned by the British colonial authorities. Nkrumah was summoned before the 
Watson Commission, which was convened to look into the causes of the riots. Nkrumah’s 
interrogation before the Commission is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, Nkrumah 
denied he had ever been a member of the British Communist Party, though he openly 
admitted to subscribing to their views and that he had met with Palme Dutt, vice 
president of the organisation. Secondly, when Nkrumah was interrogated on his 
possession of a Communist Party card, he informed the commission that he was given it 
by the treasurer of the Party. His intention was to use it as a model for the design of a 
similar card for the UGCC, as he was impressed with its shape and size. Thirdly, when he 
was asked to account for his views since his arrival in the Gold Coast, Nkrumah argued 
that he began as a Pan-Africanist. He maintained: “Upon my arrival back to the Gold 
Coast I saw that the people were not in fact thinking of any West African idea of 
community but each one trying in his own way to get some sort of territorial position for
73 Ibid, p. 55. The Gold Coast was divided by the British colonial authorities into the following 
administrative entities: the Northern Territories, the Colony, Ashanti and British Togoland.
74 Ibid, p. 58.
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themselves and self-government position and I felt in order to do my work here I had to 
conform with that view.”75 Hence, Nkrumah considered territorial independence as a 
prelude to West African unity and appeared to adjust his view in order to prioritize 
national independence before greater regional integration.
Fourth, a copy of The Circle document was found in Nkrumah’s wallet on his 
arrest and 011 being questioned, he confessed that the document was “a private dream of 
my own.” It is untrue that he “never communicated the contents of the dream to anyone 
else.” He hoped for the creation of an African Socialist Republic. However, when he 
returned to the Gold Coast, he claims he departed from that dream. Lastly, it is evident 
that Nkrumah’s interrogators were highly paranoid about the infiltration of communist 
ideas into the colonies. Nkrumah dealt calmly with the relentless and pointed questions 
011 his contacts with communist party members, trade union officials and his political 
beliefs. In a firm manner he reiterated; “I have made it clear that I am a socialist, and a 
Marxist socialist. I have never made it clear that I am a communist. I hold their views, but 
not all of their views.”76 Overall, Nkrumah’s performance before the Watson 
Commission made public his political views, demonstrating his discretion to political 
colleagues and his success in revealing very little about the Circle whilst under pressure.
After his release from prison, Nkrumah set about organizing the young men of 
the Gold Coast. The formation of the Committee of Youth Organisations (CYO) in 
August 1948 was initially an integral part of the mother body, the UGCC. Its chairman 
was Komla Gbedemah and its secretary was Kojo Botsio. It was the CYO that later 
became the nucleus of the Convention People’s Party (CPP) on June 12 1949 when the




youth, representing the radical and progressive section of the UGCC, broke away from 
the parent body to form an independent political party.
What led to the split between the UGCC and the CYO were ideological 
differences encapsulated in the UGCC’s demand for “Self-Government in the shortest 
time possible” versus the CPP’s call for “Self-Government NOW!” These ideological 
differences were evident as far back as the beginnings of the relationship between 
Nkrumah and the UGCC. On first meeting their new employee, the Convention leaders 
questioned him on how he was to reconcile his allegiance to West African unity, as 
expressed in WANS - with the narrower aims of the UGCC. Politically astute, Nkrumah 
responded that he “believed in TERRITORIAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
solidarity.”77 It appears this response went some way to reassuring the gentlemen of the 
Committee. In addition to this, the men were equally uncomfortable with his use of the 
word “comrade.” Austin remarks: “This initial uneasiness was set aside later, and 
Danquah and Nkrumah campaigned together in the name of the Convention. But the 
Committee never quite overcame their ambivalence towards Nkrumah -  hoping to use 
him, needing to accept (ready also to deny) what he might do in their name but possessed 
of a growing fear of what he might do without them.”78
Beyond the political slogans of “Self-government within the shortest time 
possible” and “Self-Government NOW!” lay two antithetical political outlooks. They 
also represented opposing social forces. The gradualist approach of the UGCC’s “Self- 
government within the shortest time possible” broadly represented the chiefs, wealthy
77 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 54.
78Ibid, 55. Further actions Nkrumah pursued, often on his own initiative, earned him the disquiet o f  the 
Committee. Among these was his establishment o f the Ghana College in Cape Coast in July 1948 and in 
September o f  the same year, the establishment o f a daily newssheet, the Evening News.
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merchants and highly learned men of Gold Coast society comprising “an older-
70established, intelligentsia class.” They tended to be older in age, tolerant and 
accommodationist in their approach in comparison to the zeal and impatient radical 
outlook of the “verandah boys” or semi-educated “commoners” that made up the youthful 
and broad social base of the CPP.80 The chiefs, elders and the UGCC closely watched 
this educated commoner class. The Gold Coast elite viewed them as “malcontents” and 
“agitators.”
The wealthy lawyer Francis Awooner Williams, vice-president of the UGCC,
revealed the attitude of the Gold Coast establishment towards the commoner class.
Thomas Hodgkin met Williams in January 1950, during the time of the Positive Action
campaign that was launched by the CPP. Hodgkin wrote that Williams was “bitterly
opposed to the strike and complaining that the Government ought to use tear gas against
the strikers if need be. He was obviously a Girondin of the most property and class
81conscious kind: spoke in contemptuous language of the “mob” and the “rabble” etc.” 
The African American Richard Wright’s meeting with Dr. J. B. Danquah in the early 
1950s also sheds light on the attitude of the UGCC towards the semi-educated classes. 
Danquah was asked by Wright, why he did not try to win this political constituency to the 
side of the UGCC. Danquah responded with “a grimace saying: I don’t like this thing of 
the masses. There are only individuals for me.” Wright concluded: “Every word that I 
had uttered clashed with his deep-set convictions. And it suddenly flashed through me
79 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 14.
80 Ibid, pp. 13-17.
81 Thomas Hodgkin (1910-1982) was a British communist up until 1949 and first went to Nigeria,
Cameroon and the Gold Coast in 1947 to look into adult education in British West Africa, as part o f  the 
Oxford University Extra-Mural Studies. He wrote a series o f articles for West Africa and the Accra Evening 
News as well as his classic book Nationalism in Colonial Africa. He met Nkrumah in March 1951. His 
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that this man was not a politician and would never be one.” 82 To Wright, Danquah was of 
the “old school” who could not speak for the masses but could tell them what to do.
In short, underlying the ideological orientation of the UGCC, was a disdain, 
suspicion and fear of the potential of the “rabble” when harnessed. It was the CPP and 
Nkrumah that captured and represented these social forces. Nkrumah saw the masses as 
constituting a potential for transforming the country into a modern state. For him, the 
commoners were to become autonomous citizens, who were capable of making rational 
choices and forging a new political entity. The modem constituent Assembly was to be 
formed on the basis of citizens free from colonial domination with the objective of 
forming a new nation. Hence, the CPP affirmed the principle of one-man one vote. This 
extension of the franchise, equality and freedom for all was given legal backing and 
realization in 1951. The Coussey Committee set up in the aftermath of the report of the 
Watson Commission was mandated to look into constitutional proposals for the Gold 
Coast. It proposed the restriction of universal adult suffrage to “male and females of 25 
years and over ... who should have paid or contributed to the payments of rates paid levy 
or annual tax.”83
Kwesi Plange became one of the youngest CPP candidates. He was elected in a 
Cape Coast by-election in June 1950 just before his 25th birthday. He argued that the 
voting age should be lowered to 21 years of age. The unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council agreed that the age for electors only (but not for candidates) should 
be 21. Consequently Plange’s radical move, had it not been implemented would have
82 Wright, Black Power (London, 1954), p. 220.
83Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 110.
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disenfranchised the 21-24 age group in the municipal areas.84 Hence, the CPP stood for 
the expansion of democracy. Implicit within this rationale was the prospect of the ruled 
becoming the rulers. The verandah boys or semi-educated commoners appeared to be 
stating: “We have the right to represent ourselves.” The Ghanaian intelligentsia rejected 
the right of the crowd to represent itself behind the leadership of the CPP, for in doing so, 
the “rabble” and the CPP had usurped the “right” of the Gold Coast elite to govern over 
the “common man.” Part of the bitterness harbored by the UGCC leaders extended to this 
sentiment, as well as the fact that they had invited Nkrumah from London to build the 
movement. The leaders believed Nkrumah had politically betrayed them by breaking 
away to set up his own political party based on the CYO.
The rise of the “commoner’s party” or people’s party as the CPP became known 
was also attributable to the successful presentation of the party as the embodiment of the 
will of the people. It cast itself as a “mass party” with huge popularity. However, the 
ideological orientation of the CPP and Nkrumah during these early years was nebulous. It 
is difficult to describe the CPP and Nkrumah as subscribing to Marxist-Leninist ideas 
during this period, even if Nkrumah and other CPP leaders had earlier been under the 
influence of such ideas. If we examine the intellectual nuances of the CPP’s 1949 
constitution there was no explicit allegiance to socialism, nationalization of wealth or use 
of Marxist language. The constitution outlined the national aims and objectives of the 
Party, which were general in focus. For example, it stated it aspired “to work for a speedy 
reconstruction of a better Ghana (Gold Coast) in which the people and their chiefs shall 
have the right to live and govern themselves as free people.”85 Even in its early
84 Ibid, p. 110.
85 K. Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (London, 1973), p. 58.
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formation as the CYO the CPP aligned itself not only with the people but their chiefs. 
Later in the political struggle for independence the party became involved in a bitter 
struggle with the chiefs in the countryside despite its consistent denials that it did not 
seek to destroy the institution of chieftaincy.
In terms of its international perspective, the party committed itself “To work 
with other nationalist democratic and socialist movements in Africa and other continents” 
and “to support the demand for a West African Federation and of Pan-Africanism by 
promoting unity of action among the peoples of Africa and of African descent.”86 It could 
not be assumed that by “working with other nationalist democratic and socialist 
movements” the CPP was by association socialist in its orientation. Its Pan-African 
convictions in comparison to its socialist commitment were stronger and explicit - as 
Nkrumah, Botsio and others had been involved with the Fifth Pan-African Congress and 
the WASU. Despite this, the aspirations of the party were radical to the extent that it 
“wished to replace the existing leadership in the politics of the country with a more 
dynamic one” it sought to engage the common man in the politics of the country which 
was an anathema to the elitist UGCC and lastly “it sought to change the political system
* 87rather than seek accommodation within it,”
It was the publication of Nkrumah’s What I  Mean by Positive Action that 
heralded the beginnings of practical revolutionary politics.88 It was an exposition of 
Nkrumah’s adherence to peaceful, non-violent methods of political struggle, within a 
constitutional framework. The pamphlet took its ideological inspiration from Mahatma 
Gandhi. In Nkrumah’s private notebook, written in 1950, he wrote several paragraphs
86 ibid, p. 59.
87 Folson, ‘The Development o f  Socialist Ideology in Ghana’.
88 Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, p. 85.
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defining Gandhi’s moral and political vision. He claimed: “To Gandhi non-violence was 
much more than a weapon; it was part of a religious way of life which he called 
Satyagraha. The word Satyagraha is Sanskrit in origin -  a combination of saty (truth) and 
agraha (insistence).”89
Nkrumah believed in the moral correctness of non-violence, but did not uphold 
the religious steadfastness of Gandhi. He may have read the book Civil Disobedience 
Movement in India by the Indian author C.V. H. Rao for he cited a passage from this 
book in his private notebook. He agreed with Rao that the resolution of any conflict is 
affected by “the nature of the moral force and public sympathy generated by the 
righteousness of the cause for which the suffering is undergone and the extent of the 
moral reaction it has produced on the party against which it is directed.”90
Nkrumah’s purpose in writing the publication was to correct “erroneously and 
maliciously publicized” disabuse of the term Positive Action (PA) by forces he castigated 
as “provocateurs and stooges.”91 Nkrumah was called before the Ga State Council on 
October 20 1949 to explain the term, which in the minds of some individuals had 
acquired the meaning of violent disturbance. He rationalized that Positive Action was the 
strategy through which “the British Government can relinquish its authority and hand 
over the control of affairs, that is, the Government to the people of this country and their 
chiefs.”92 Nkrumah believed that there was one of two ways in which self-government 
would be obtained: via “moral pressure” as exemplified by Gandhi and the Indian people 
or through armed revolutionary action. He defined Positive Action as “the adoption of all
89 NAG:SC21/10/1 A ‘Gold Coast Notebook Nkrumah !s Private Notes Containing Notes, Statements and 
Other Analytic Comments on Important Issues. ’
90 C.V, H. Rao, cited in Revohttionaiy Path, by K. Nkrumah, p. 94.
91 Ibid, pp. 91-85.
92 Ibid, p. 93.
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legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the forces of imperialism in 
this country. The weapons of Positive Action are: 1. Legitimate political action 2. 
Newspapers and educational campaigns and 3. as a last resort, the constitutional 
application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute 
nonviolence.”93
The practical focus of Positive Action was important, for it alarmed not only the 
chiefs of the country, the intelligentsia and the British colonial administration, but it was 
directed to appeal to the bulk of the CPP’s political constituency. As Nkrumah wrote: 
“We must remember that because of the educational backwardness of the colonial 
countries, the majority of the people of this country cannot read. There is only one thing 
they can understand and that is Action.”94
He called for the “creation of widespread political consciousness and a sense of 
national self-interest. He made it clear that “Nation-wide Non-violent Sit-down-at-home 
Strikes, Boycotts, and Non-co-operation” would constitute a last resort,95 Nkrumah wrote 
to the British colonial governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, on December 15 1949, 
threatening that if the legitimate aspirations of the people represented by the Peoples 
Representative Assembly were not met, the CPP would embark upon Positive Action. It 
was followed by the Evening News front-page headline: “The Era of Positive Action 
Draws Nigh.” Sir Charles Arden-Clarke96 claimed that: “some at least of the party leaders 
would have preferred not to resort to ‘positive action’ but to await the result of the
93 Ibid, p. 93-94.
94 Ibid, p. 93.
95 Ibid, p. 95.
96 Arden-Clarke arrived in the Gold Coast in August 1949. He gave an address to a joint meeting o f  the 
Royal African Society and the Royal Empire Society on November 21 1957 in which he discussed his 
period in the Gold Coast. It is entitled: ‘Eight Years o f Transition in Ghana,’ African Affairs vol. 57, 
no.226, January 1958.
80
general election, of the outcome of which they were fairly confident. But they found 
themselves enmeshed in the coils of their own propaganda. The tail wagged the dog, and
07‘positive action’ was duly declared in January 1950.”
In contrast, Nkrumah suggests the decision to adopt PA by the CPP Executive 
Committee -  under the principle of democratic centralism -  was a unanimous one. It is 
interesting that Nkrumah’s Autobiography presented the episode of the decision and its 
implementation as an unwavering one, which differs starkly from the accounts given by 
both Sir Charles Arden-Clarke and Sir Reginald Saloway in 1957 and 1955 respectively. 
Nkrumah’s interpretation suggests that his recollection is not entirely accurate and that 
indecisiveness is a quality he did not wish to be associated with, for PA and 
indecisiveness is a contradiction in terms. Arden-Clarke indicated that there were
no
political differences in the CPP. Moreover, Sir Reginald Saloway reinforces his view.
Nkrumah told Saloway in a meeting between the two that he had the whole 
country behind him in support of Positive Action. After Saloway had addressed a CPP 
Executive Committee meeting urging members to adopt the constitutional path to 
political reform, Saloway claims: “Nkrumah publicly called off Positive Action.”99 In 
Nkrumah’s account, he claimed that “Positive Action had certainly not been abandoned” 
though he acknowledged “it was waning.”100 Despite this, it appears there were elements 
within the CPP calling for the continuation of Positive Action when it had in fact been 
called off. Saloway contends: “Nkrumah tried hard to get the TUC to call off the general 
strike but the TUC no longer had any control over the wild men. Dr. Danquah taunted
97 Ibid, p.32.
98 Sir Reginald Saloway was Colonial Secretary and Acting Governor o f  the Gold Coast; see his ‘The New  
Gold Coast,’ International Affairs, vol. XXXI, 1955.
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Nkrumah with having sold himself to the Colonial Secretary and thus infuriated the rank 
and file of the CPP who forced Nkrumah to retract. Even so, Positive Action and the 
general strike went off at half cock.”101
In short, it appears that there were radical elements within the CPP rank-and-file 
who were staunchly in favour of the continuation of Positive Action in order to force the 
government to move towards the creation of a Constituent Assembly. Whilst Nkrumah’s 
account is rather partial, he seems to have managed to placate the radical elements. 
Moreover, it appears that the CPP pursued a twin track strategy of condemning the new 
Coussey Constitution as “bogus and fraudulent” -  whilst simultaneously focusing on the 
forthcoming February general elections. In Austin’s account of these tumultuous days 
“there was a note of uncertainty about [Nkrumah’s] call to arms, and it was easy to 
understand why Nkrumah should hesitate.”102 Nkrumah was an astute politician, aware of 
the dangers of Positive Action escalating. He was also urged by more vociferous party 
followers to pursue militant action, for as he said in his pamphlet What I  Mean by 
Positive Action, “the majority of the people” of the country only understood action. 
Therefore, whilst Nkrumah had given intellectual expression to Positive Action on paper, 
he was to find that its practical implementation entailed a political risk to the desired 
outcome.
Meanwhile, Nkrumah and others were publicly tried and sentenced to gaol for 
their role in promoting an illegal strike by adopting Positive Action. With Nkrumah in 
James Fort prison, the political campaigning for the country’s first general election took 
place between the CPP, UGCC and the National Democratic Party (NDP).
101 R. Saloway, ‘The New Gold Coast’, p. 471.
102 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 88.
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Nkrumah spent a total of 14 months in prison. It seems it was sufficient time for
him to articulate his thoughts on capital punishment that was carried out at James Fort.
Nkrumah contemplated “whether prison punishments really did achieve their purpose in
reforming the criminal and whether capital punishment was a solution to murder
cases.”103 Nkrumah wrote:
Criminals, after all, are human beings. No man is born a 
criminal; society makes him so, and the only way to change 
things is to change the social conditions; it is only from the 
social standpoint that crime and punishment can be 
effectively approached. I have always been against the 
death penalty, even before I came so close to understanding 
what this meant during my prison life. I believe that it is a 
relic of barbarism and savagery and that it is inconsistent 
with decent morals and the teaching of Christian ethics.
The aim of punishment should be that of understanding and 
correction.1 4
For most of his 14 months incarceration he suffered “extreme boredom” but appeared to 
be mentally engaged 111 planning for the Party.105 He gave a number of written 
instructions to Party members on prison toilet paper.106 The letters do not shed any 
further light 011 Nkrumah’s intellectual thinking but they reveal his attitude to power as 
well as his pedantic preoccupation with developments within the party, which were not to 
his liking. He expressed that he was “rather very much worried about the present standard 
of the Evening News" which he considered “definitely below the mark.”107 He suggested 
a new format to the party paper which was to include new columns such as news
103 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 109.
104 Ibid, p. 109.
105 Ibid, p. 109.
106 It is remarkable that these penciled written letters on thin sheets o f toilet paper, which were smuggled 
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headlines, a Worker’s Forum, Public Opinion and a CPP Newsletter.108 As he considered 
the Evening News to be “the backbone of the party” Nkrumah proposed that G.K. 
Amegbe and Jimmy Markham run the paper under Gbedemah’s supervision. The then 
editor, K, Owuya Quashie was to be transferred to the party’s Central Office to organize 
the workers in the trade unions on a full time basis. Nkrumah was of the opinion that: 
“Every element in the country must be organized behind the party.” Nkrumah expressed 
concern at the arrival of the Labour Spokesman — another newspaper considered to be a 
competitor. Gbedemah was instructed to contact its editor and persuade him to become 
affiliated to the CPP for “anything set up outside the machinery of the Party is politically 
dangerous”, wrote Nkrumah.109 This instruction on Nkrumah’s part, suggests, he could 
not envision autonomous bodies within civil society acting independently -  even if in 
broad support of the Party’s aims. He went on to instruct Gbedemah that: “The Labour 
Spokesman must come under your supervision.”110
In another letter written between August 1-5 1950 addressed to Gbedemah, 
Nkrumah sought information about the progress of the party and the First Annual 
Delegates Conference scheduled for August 6-7. He advised Gbedemah not to make 
public the names of the candidates for the general election and the Assembly. Nkrumah 
considered “the action is very inopportune and very politically dangerous. Tactically the 
step is wrong and could lead to political and party confusion.” In his view: “The proper 
thing to do is a solid and impregnable organization and the cipipiification of the country. 
We must be sure that we have very town and village cipipified.”111 Nkrumah cautioned
108 NAG:SC21/8/23 -  this is an undated letter but written about the middle o f  June 1950.
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that until the party was certain of its organizational strength, it could then embark on 
selecting candidates. He insisted: “The loyalty of the candidates be vigorously tested. 
And no names should be made known until a month or so before the date of the general 
election.” The criteria for selection were an understanding of the Party’s programme and 
the candidate “must be made to swear an irrevocable loyalty to the party, and be made to 
swear allegiance to Kwame Nkrumah. They must be made to understand the theoretical 
foundation of our struggle.” 112
The argument that Nkrumah consciously aided the development of a cult of 
personality around himself is further evidenced by his insistence that members of the 
party swear an oath of loyalty to him. Richard Wright witnessed an oath swearing 
ceremony in a meeting of the Women’s Division of the CPP in 1952 when he visited the 
Gold Coast. Wright observed that when he “impulsively” requested a copy of the written 
oath, Nkrumah deliberately did not answer him and that on the return journey to 
Nkrumah’s house, Nkrumah “was poised, aloof, silent. Intuitively, I knew that he was 
thinking of my reaction to that oath-taking,” wrote Wright.113 He was perplexed by the 
oath the women had sworn but justified it in terms of “oaths was a common feature of 
their rituals.”114
Overall Nkrumah’s preoccupation while in prison was with the organization of 
the party in preparation for the general election and improvement of the party paper. 
Nkrumah’s prison letters and directives were authoritarian in tone. In a letter dated June 
17 1950, Nkrumah was scathing of the tone of the party paper of the same date. He 
wrote: “The scriptural quotations and tone of writing have made the Evenews look like
112NAG:SC21/8/23.
113 Wright, Black Power, pp.59-64.
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the organ of the Christian Council. Often Today’s Quotation has come from the scriptures 
instead of the quotations from political classics etc.”115 Nkrumah had a great fondness for 
political quotations. His notebook contained many from political thinkers, politicians and 
writers he admired.116 Nkrumah was also critical of the length of articles in the paper; that 
“several prominent and important columns have painfully disappeared from the dynamic 
E ven ew sPublic Opinion’ is gone! ‘Workers Forum’ is gone! ‘News Headlines’ seldom 
appears! On the other hand other papers have been adopting these titles ONE BY ONE.” 
Nkrumah insisted, “all these columns must be resuscitated WITHOUT DELAY.” He also 
proposed that “the Evenews should now display a photograph or cartoon etc 
EVERYDAY to serve as a new attracting feature: Let all classes of people be 
represented, e.g. political and trade union leaders, merchants, workers, etc, etc, etc.”117
As the leader of the party he was committed to his party’s interests, but his 
concern was also likely to have been partly affected by his own frustrations with his 
incarceration that prevented him from participating in the election. Nkrumah received 
22,780 votes out of a total of 23,122 in the Accra constituency where he stood. It was 
under the astute leadership of Gbedemah as campaign director general that an effective 
political machinery was established to confront the British colonial administration whilst 
Nkrumah was still in prison. Other influential leaders of the CPP campaign team were 
Nathaniel Welbeck, Archie Casely-Hayford, Krobo Edusei, Ako Adjei, Nii Kwabena 
Bonny, Madam Deede Aryeetey, Sophia Doku and Esi Allua.118
115 NAG:SC21/8/23.
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The party became the majority party within the new Legislative Assembly. A 
new Executive Council was constituted, although the CPP insisted on its presiding 
majority. Nkrumah was released from prison on February 12 1951 and on the following 
day invited to become the Gold Coast’s Leader of Government Business by Arden- 
Clarke. Four months later, on June 5 1951, Nkrumah and his long-time colleague, Kojo 
Botsio visited his Alma Mater, Lincoln University. He gave an address to an American 
audience. Not only did he take the opportunity to express his gratitude for the honorary 
degree of Doctor of Laws awarded him, but also Nkrumah briefly outlined the principles 
and policies of the CPP. He denied being a communist as his detractors had painted him. 
He insisted “self-government is only a means to an end -  the goal of economic and social 
upliftment for the people of the Gold Coast.” He also revered his hero - Garvey - in 
claiming: “There never was a better period for the “Back to Africa” movement of Marcus 
Garvey than today. Let Negro scientists and technicians and teachers flow in ever larger 
numbers to the Gold Coast to help build the new Gold Coast, yea, the new Ghana -  a 
New Africa.”119 Hence, Nkrumah’s Pan-African appeal to African Americans in the 
Diaspora to assist the Gold Coast widened the appeal of his country but also set in motion 
the notion of Ghana as a Mecca for Pan-Africanists.
He spoke of his government’s new Development Plan and appealed for 
American financial aid in the fields of science, technology and agricultural assistance. 
Nkrumah said: “Our immediate objectives in the development plan are the 
implementation of our educational plans, the construction of the Volta Scheme, the 
establishment of a cement factory and another for making pipes for water supply and iron 
bars for house construction.” Via his numerous appearances before the American press,
119NAG;SC21/12/38. This is the full text o f  Nkrumah’s speech at Lincoln University on 5 June 1951.
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and his audience with the Mayor of Philadelphia, he used the opportunity to appeal for
technical assistance. Moreover, he said: “the people of the Gold Coast have the right to
1 * * govern or misgovern themselves.” His speech gave an indication of the aspirations of
both the new government and its leader.
Conclusion
Nkrumah arrived in London with an emerging nationalist consciousness. He 
quickly became involved in political discourse whilst in London. He abandoned his 
academic studies in London and also became immersed in political activism. The Fifth 
PAC was a formative experience that furthered his practical organizational experience 
and extended his political contacts. He maintained links with communist individuals such 
as Emile Burns and Bankole Awooner-Renner. However, we do not know the extent of 
these contacts as he remained reticent about them when under interrogation by the 
Watson Commission. It is with the establishment of The Circle and whilst in prison that 
we begin to see the initial elements of Nkrumah’s personal ambition, authoritarian 
tendencies and intellectual commitment to a vanguardist notion of organisation emerge. 
Nkrumah’s demand for personal loyalty from a small secret group of Circle members and 
from candidates elected to participate in the 1951 election suggests the beginnings of a 
cult of personality that Nkrumah was instrumental in establishing.
He was intellectually committed to non-violent Gandhian principles of civil 
disobedience and coined the strategy Positive Action. This strategy soon reflected the 
ambiguities in Nkrumah’s political ideas. Whilst the TUC and rank and file of the party 
sought to continue strike action, Nkrumah negotiated with the British in order to achieve
120 ibid.
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his political objectives. He walked a political tightrope between radical action and 
compliance with the rules of constitutional parliamentary democracy in order to force the 
British to establish a Constituent Assembly.
Another aspect of Nkrumah’s political thought that is demonstrated during this 
period is his authoritarian concept of political power. He could not conceive of groups 
existing outside the control of the CPP which led him to instruct that the Labour 
Spokesman be affiliated to the CPP. Lastly, Nkrumah endorsed a Garveyite belief when
he returned to Lincoln University to receive an honorary degree and called upon African
Americans to return to Africa. This helped launch the country into a Pan-Africanist 
beacon for many African Americans.
After his visit to the United States of America, the political scene on the Gold
Coast altered significantly. According to Rathbone:
Political reality had become part of policy with ease, which 
was startling. Accommodating to political reality with 
apparent flexibility was the strength of both CPP and 
British politics in 1950 and 1951; and such accommodation 
and adaptation owed a great deal to two unusually gifted
statesmen, Nkrumah and Arden-Clarke, whose personal
relationship as it emerged over the following six years, 
were of considerable importance in the history of Ghana.121
The period of diarchy or partnership as the years 1951 to 1957 are known were not as 
smooth sailing as the CPP were later to present. The 1951 electoral victory had forced 
the British colonial state to reconsider a party it had earlier considered to be no more than 
a “rabble” -  as a serious political entity with popular support. Some elements within the 
British colonial administration continued to consider the chiefs the natural and rightful 
rulers to whom power should be transferred. The subsequent period was a politically
121 R. Rathbone, (ed) British Documents on the End o f  Empire Two Volumes (London, 1992), p. liv.
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turbulent one in Ghana’s history, as the CPP’s assertion to be the national party of the 
common man was challenged by a number of opposing political forces from the cocoa 
producing region of Ashanti; the Ga people of the Accra region; a secessionist movement 
of the Togoland Congress and from the North of the country. These politically 
disgruntled elements later formed the National Liberation Movement (NLM). How 
Nkrumah and the CPP responded to the emerging demand for a federal constitution by 
these political elements and how it managed to co-operate with the British colonial 




NKRUMAH AND THE DIARCHIC PARTNERSHIP, 1951-1954
The period after the CPP electoral victory of February 1951 was characterised 
by an intense struggle between newly emerging political forces. Opposition forces 
sought to challenge the CPP’s claim to be a national party representative of the Chiefs 
and the commoners of the Gold Coast. The period from 1951 to the attainment of 
independence in 1957 was one in which the CPP won two general elections of 1954 
and 1956. It sought to establish itself as a national party and acquired some measures 
of internal self-government in the administration of ministries.1
The beginning of shared government with the British colonial administration, 
signalled an end to the militancy of Positive Action and the beginning of what 
Nkrumah coined “Tactical Action.” Hence, the 1951-1957 period saw a power- 
sharing arrangement, often referred to as “diarchy.” According to Rathbone, “The 
diarchy pattern was evident even before the election [of February 1951], with CPP 
workers cooperating with officials in the field” to put in place electoral administrative 
processes and the registration of voters. 2 It was characterised by co-operation, 
adjustment and compromise between the British and the incumbent CPP government 
as well as a clear attempt by Nkrumah to consolidate his leadership over a party 
comprised of disparate social and political elements which by 1952 began to show 
evidence of fracture. Drah makes the important point that “Nkrumah’s Marxist- 
Leninist beliefs were muted in this period” whilst “his belief in ‘majority rule’ was
1 A major constraint o f  the Coussey constitution was the veto on policy retained by the Governor. In 
addition, finance, law and order and foreign relations remained decisively under British control until 
independence on 6 March 1957.
2 R. Rathbone, T h e  Transfer o f Power in Ghana, 1945 -1 9 5 7 / Unpublished thesis (University o f  
London, 1968), p.135.
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always manifest.”3 The overriding political objective of the CPP was to settle down to 
govern the country. Alongside this power-sharing arrangement, an intense power 
struggle in the Ashanti region and in Akyem Abuakwa in the south where there was 
deep-seated hostility towards the CPP emerged. During this pre-independence period, 
these tensions were often to erupt into political violence as the CPP and its chiefly 
opponents sought to win the hearts and minds of rural dwellers of the Gold Coast.4
What follows is a critical examination of NkrumalTs thought and practice in 
relation to his consolidation of the Party during this early phase of the anti-colonial 
struggle (1951-1957). It appears that during this period, urgent and practical political 
matters overrode the expansion and development of his philosophical concerns. 
Excluding his Autobiography, which was published in 1957, Nkrumah published very 
little during this time. The publication, I  Speak o f Freedom, which was published 
post-independence (in 1961), is the only other documentation elucidating his views 
on the period of Tactical Action. His later writings, particularly during his “exile” in 
Guinea-Conakry do not shed any further light on this phase of his political life.
We will focus on the question: how did Nkrumah* s intellectual development 
in America and London shape his political approach dining 1951 to 1957? It appeal's 
Nkrumah now focussed on the narrower aim of territorial independence before West 
African unity. The latter had preoccupied him during his days in America and 
London. He remained driven by implacable opposition to colonialism and 
imperialism. Though he still believed in an alliance of all colonial territories and 
dependencies, on his return to the Gold Coast, his observations required revision in 
his political thinking as he revealed to the Watson Commission. However, the
3 F. K. Drah, ‘Nkrumah and Constitutional Democracy: 1949-1966 Revisited’ in Research Review ,
N ew  Series Vol.8. Nos. 1 & 2 1992, Institute o f  African Studies, Ghana, p. 19.
4 R. Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chief: The Politics o f  Chieftaincy in Ghana 1951-60 (London, 2000), 
p. 37.
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demands for West African unity were not altogether abandoned during the 1951-1957 
period. Though domestic political affairs absorbed Nkrumah’s time and energy, he 
remained intellectually committed to the larger issue of African freedom and unity. 
However, the period 1951 to 1957 undoubtedly gave rise to a number of problems and 
issues between the new African ministers on the one hand and their expatriate 
counterparts in the British civil service on the other.
Tactical Action: Partnership with the British, 1951-1954
Nkrumah* s statement in which he declared his opposition to discrimination 
and anti-imperialism exposed that, unlike Marcus Garvey, he was able to carefully 
distinguish principle from race and colour. Nkrumah reiterated his opposition to 
imperialism and racism at a commemoration of the late Dr. Aggrey. The Evening 
News of May 31 1951 reported on Nkrumah’s visit to Anomabu, hometown of 
Aggrey. He sought to pay his respects to his mentor in front of Anomabu Castle 
where several chiefs had gathered for the occasion. He remarked: “My hatred against 
imperialists can never dwindle, but what I want everyone in this country to remember 
is that we are fighting against a system and not against any individual, race or 
colour.”5
This intellectual separation enabled Nkrumah to immediately establish an 
amicable working relationship with the Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, which 
lasted throughout the diarchic period. The success of the partnership was attributable 
not only to the cordial interpersonal relationship that emerged between these two men 
but their pragmatism and political acumen.6 Both recognised the constraints they were
5 Nkrumah, I  Speak o f  Freedom  (London, 1961), p. 24.
6 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 113.
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under and remained focussed on ultimate political objectives. Arden-Clarke also 
referred to a “close, friendly” and “not unfruitful partnership with Nkrumah.”7
Nkrumah acknowledged in the Autobiography that he did his best to prevent 
conflicts escalating between his ministers and British civil servants, for his greatest 
fear was that “this might result in the breakdown of the Government and possibly the 
suspension of the Coussey Constitution.” 8
In his address to CPP Assemblymen at the Arena in early February 1951 (prior 
to the first Legislative Assembly meeting on February 20 1951), Nkrumah 
demonstrated that he had not lost sight of the political objectives of the party. The 
purpose of the meeting was to warn Assemblymen of “the dangers and difficulties 
that lay ahead of them when they took their seats in the Assembly.”9 Nkrumah’s 
belief in lighting from within and without was integral to his political strategy. This 
strategy contributed to the ambiguity of the CPP’s new policy of Tactical Action. The 
language of Tactical Action enabled him to sound hard-hitting when necessary and to 
adopt accommodating language when appropriate.
At this early transitional stage of self-government Nkrumah made an attempt 
to check personal aggrandisement within the party, To this end, an agreement was 
reached among CPP Executive Council members that they would not live in the 
luxurious ministerial bungalows that had been built and would live simple lives.10
Nkrumah’s account of the adjustment from “Positive Action” to “Tactical 
Action ” in his Autobiography as a “smooth”11 transition was intended to justify a 
change in strategy from vehement opposition to British colonial rule, to a position in
7 C. Arden-Clarke, ‘Eight Years o f  Transition in Ghana,’ African Affairs, 57, 226, 1958, p.34.
8 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 122.
9 Ibid, p. 115.
10 Ibid, p. 117. These noble pledges were flagrantly broken when several CPP ministers and officials 
began to lead ostentatious and immodest lives as careerism emerged in the party as early as 1952.
11 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 125.
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which the CPP “had to serve a period of apprenticeship under official control” in 
order to achieve its political objectives.12 At the same time the party was not yet fully 
in control of itself.13 According to Rathbone: “Nkrumah retained the attractive 
activist fiction o f ‘Tactical Action,5 the successor to positive action, which suggested 
grudging cooperation coupled with overt anti-colonial resistance.”14 It was indeed an 
astute political strategy 011 Nkrumah’s part. It enabled him to carry the more radical 
elements of the CPP with his militant rhetoric and denunciation of the Coussey 
constitution as “bogus and fraudulent” and appear to be unbending. Yet, he 
simultaneously justified cooperating with the British colonial administration “as a 
stepping stone” to ‘Self-Government Now.’ 15
Integral to Nkrumah’s definition of Tactical Action was Africanisation -  a 
gradual policy of replacing the expatriate public service with Africans. He 
considered that Tactical Action was a policy that required “thought and tact.”16 Such 
a policy was essentially one of compromise, negotiation and pragmatism between 
Nkrumah, the CPP, Arden-Clarke and the expatriate civil service. Nkrumah’s 
position on Tactical Action officially characterised the accommodating disposition of 
the CPP Government, however, it also obscured what Arden-Clarke referred to as 
“an atmosphere of perpetual crisis” in the early years of the implementation of the 
Coussey constitution,17
Both men did not foresee the problems the transition period would throw 
up.18 On the one hand, the Governor had to placate a “markedly restive and militant” 
British civil service whilst Nkrumah also had to appease the impetuous elements in
12 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 153.
13 Ibid, p. 153.
14 Rathbone, British Documents Part I, p. lvii.
15 Nkrumah, I  Speak o f  Freedom, p. 23.
16 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 123.
17 Arden-Clarke, ‘Eight Years o f  Transition in Ghana5, p. 35.
18 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 154.
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his party.19 Nkrumah sought compliance from a party comprised of conservative and 
more radical elements.20 Among the issues, which threw up much disagreement 
among CPP Assemblymen and the party rank and file, were the close relations 
between British District Officers and the chiefs. The District Officers were 
perceived as biased in their judgements on account of their sympathy towards the 
traditional rulers. Increasingly mutual suspicions between Nkrumah’s ministers and 
British civil servants also contributed to the atmosphere of distrust between the two 
sides. Nkrumah acknowledged that not “everything was plain sailing” during the 
period of Tactical Action. Chapter 13 of his Autobiography entitled “Tactical 
Action” does not elucidate the precise nature of the frictions between his 
inexperienced ministers and the British civil servants who were equally suspicious of 
their African counterparts 21
Nkrumah accepted the predicament that whilst the Gold Coast needed “an 
efficient administrative machine to give effect to government policy,” competent
99African personnel required to replace the expatriate staff were largely non-existent. 
Moreover, “in February 1952 the Governor informed his Ministers that the civil 
service was on the verge of total collapse.”23 The growing insecurity of tenure among 
many British civil servants and their disquiet at attacks made on them by the rank 
and file of the CPP led British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton to 
declare that British civil servants would be transferred to colonial territories which
19 Rathbone, ‘The Transfer o f Power5, p. 155.
20 Rathbone, British Documents Part /, p. lvii.
21 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 125; see Rathbone ‘The Transfer o f  Power,5 pp. 152-153.
22 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 124.
23 Rathbone, ‘The Transfer o f Power in Ghana5, p. 155.
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required their skills.24 This apparent ultimatum forced Nkrumah to attempt to arrest 
the situation.
Consequently the CPP government embarked on a policy of realism and 
pragmatism whereby “overseas officers could elect to serve if they wanted to” and 
compensation for loss of career was given whilst a programme of Africanisation was 
simultaneously implemented.2:1 It was a delicate balancing act that sought to retain 
as many officers as possible in a “freezing period of four years” to give the 
government “a breathing space.”26
Nkrumah also made clear in an address to the Assembly on July 8 1953 that
“while appreciating the need for accelerated Africanisation, Government do not
propose that this should be achieved at the expense of efficiency, or that promotion
in the service should be on the basis of colour. At the same time, changed conditions
• 01of service will be recognised by the introduction of a scheme for compensation.” 
Approval from the Parliamentary CPP and “wild men” of the party for this scheme 
was difficult for Nkrumah to obtain, for many associated the move towards 
independence with the automatic replacement of British civil servants with Africans. 
However, Bing remarks that Nkrumah and his ministers philosophically accepted the 
situation.28 The impact of the scheme led to a slow increase in the employment of 
senior African personnel. The total number of Africans in the public service in 1949 
was 171 and Europeans totalled 1,068. In 1951 the numbers of Africans increased to
24 Rathbone, British Documents Part I. Rathbone observes in footnote 77, p. ixxv that CPP ministers 
made efforts to persuade the rank and file o f  the party to cease verbal attacks on expatriate officials.
The change in titles o f  district commissioners to government agents and chief commissioners to 
regional officers was intended to stem the tide o f  attacks, but was ineffective.
25 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 123.
26 Ibid, p. 124.
27 Ibid, p. 124. See also ‘/I Statement on the Programme o f  Africanisation o f  the Public Service’ written 
in 1954.
28 G. Bing was a British socialist and was later appointed Attorney-General o f  Ghana by Nkrumah; see 
Reap the Whirlwind: An Account o f  Kwame Nknunah's Ghana from  1950 to 1966  (London, 1968), pp. 
182-183; Rathbone also points out that the Executive Council saw no alternative but to accept the 
conditions, ‘The Transfer o f  Power in Ghana’, p. 161.
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268 and 1, 043 for Europeans, and in 1954 to 916 and 1,490 respectively.29 In short, 
even though the number of Africans tripled, total numbers of Europeans also 
increased due to the overall expansion of the civil service.
Dissent from Within and Without
Two years after the birth of the Party, Nkrumah made imequivocal his position
on factionalism within the CPP. At the Second National Delegates Conference, held at
Ho in the Volta Region, Nkrumah presented the Party’s constitution. He declared:
We shall not tolerate factionalism in our Party. We shall 
expel from our ranks those individuals and those little 
caucuses who meet in their little holes and conspire 
against the backs of the Party. If they have any 
grievances against the Party let them come out in the 
open and defend their position. This, Comrades, is 
democratic centralism.30
Nkrumah’s attempt to stamp out factionalism very early in the party’s history was a 
means by which he sought to preserve miity within a party constituted by 
heterogeneous interests and social groups. However, it had little effect.
The CPP won the municipal elections of 1951 but it was by no means fully in 
charge of the country when the Legislative Assembly met on February 20 1951 for the 
first time. Nkrumah returned to the tumult of Gold Coast politics after his visit to his 
Alma Mater, Lincoln University in early June 1951. In August 1951 he introduced a 
controversial piece of legislation that was inextricably linked to his concept of state 
power. The philosophical rationale of the 1951 Local Government Ordinance 
represented the confrontation between popular democracy versus chiefly rule. It also 
embodied opposing notions of control over the wealth created by cocoa revenue. The
29 G old Coast: A Statement on the Programme o f  the Africanisation o f  the Public Service, printed by 
the Government Printing Dept Accra, 1954 in Dabu Gizenga Collection Box 128-4, Folder 329, 
Manuscript Division, MSRC, Howard University, Appendix 1. p. 12.
30 Cited in Apter, Ghana, p.273.
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chiefs who had long been encouraged by the British colonial authorities to consider 
themselves the natural rulers had their legitimacy challenged and vehemently 
“repudiated the government’s policy of controlling and managing stool lands through 
the new local government organisations.”31 In short the bill empowered the newly 
created democratic local councils to collect revenue from stool lands. The local
T9councils were to make an annual grant to the traditional bodies and state councils.
During the third reading of the passing of the bill, Dr. J. B. Danquah, 
Nkmmah’s arch ideological opponent, told the House in December 1951 that the bill 
was dangerous to the authority of chiefs in the country. Danquah wrote that “the bill 
was going to create confusion in Akim Abuakwa state, whose revenue formed one
TTfifth of the colony revenue as far as the Native Authority treasury were concerned.” 
Again, during the debate on the Gold Coast Marketing Board Ordinance of 1951, 
Danquah bitterly denounced the government’s control of stool lands through the new 
councils as “confiscation of property -  communism naked and unashamed” and 
hence a violation of individual and communal rights to the free enjoyment of 
property.34 He believed the funds of the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board 
(GCCMB) belonged to farmers, the majority of whom were in the Ashanti region 
and Akyem Abuakwa.
Conversely, Nkrumah and his government viewed cocoa revenue as national 
property to be fairly redistributed in the economic improvement of the entire country 
via central control. The Secretary for Finance, Mr Ohene Djan, made it clear during 
the Legislative Assembly debates in 1951 that the interests of cocoa farmers could not
31 Ninsin, ‘The Nkrumah Government and the Opposition on the Nation State: Unity Vs 
Fragmentation’ in K. Arhin (ed), The Life o f  Kwame Nkrumah (Trenton, 1993), p. 220.
32 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 31,
33 D aily Graphic December 4 1951.
34 Ninsin, ‘The Nkrumah Government and the Opposition,’ p. 220.
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be separated from that of the rest of the country.35 The bill, as Rathbone observes, 
was the first step in curbing chiefly rule. Chiefs in the Colony and in the Ashanti 
region had now effectively lost control of stool lands, which were now to be allocated 
by local councils. In addition to this, the new local councils had to reserve one third of 
the membership to traditional leaders; hence popular representation was reversing the 
long-held political power of the chiefs and giving way to the voice of the common 
man.36 This perceived interference in chiefly matters provided grounds for a rebellion, 
which later intensified into a more politically organised and credible opposition in the 
period 1954 -  1957.
Meanwhile, anti-CPP elements continued to attack Nkrumah for “kicking 
wildly against the original Coussey Constitution only to go to prison and suffer to 
return and accept a mutilated Coussey,”37 The central argument of the opposition was 
that by its volte-face, “the CPP preached SG [Self-Government] Now only to accept 
in practice “S G [Self-Government] in the Shortest Possible time.”38 As attacks from 
the opposition continued there also emerged internal political rifts within the CPP 
between 1951-52.
In a review of 1951, Bankole Timothy celebrated the achievements of the CPP 
as having “generated a sense of confidence in the country.” Timothy speculated that 
“the CPP will for some time at least, continue to dominate the political scene” on 
account of “an efficient propaganda machinery throughout the country” and “their 
political ideology ‘ S G Now’ appeals strongly to the masses and wins their full 
support and loyalty.”39 He wrote:
35 Ibid, p. 220.
36 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 32.
37 E.T. Mensah, ‘CPP Has Compromised5, Daily Graphic, 7 March 1951.
38 Ibid.
39 D aily Graphic, 29 December 1951.
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It would take an article in itself to discuss the political 
dissension that is seething in the CPP. There is a battle 
of political ideologies. The battle is made lively by the 
techniques of some CPP backbenchers for leadership 
in the front ranks of the party. But in spite of these 
differences, the Gold Coast is forging ahead in an 
admirable way.40
It appears that beneath the fa9 ade of organisational unity Nkrumah had imposed, 
strong political differences existed inside the Party. Timothy appears to have 
downplayed the political schisms residing in the party by omission of such 
“seething” issues. Nevertheless, by mid 1951 some party members were 
uncomfortable with internal irregularities and there were hints of imdemocratic 
tendencies within the Party. In August 1951, Kwesi Lamptey resigned from the party 
in protest at the slow rate of advance towards Self-Government. He had performed 
the important role of acting national vice-chairman in 1950 and ministerial secretary 
in February 1951.
In late December 1951, Mr E. S. Nartey, who was Eastern Regional 
Secretary, resigned his post in the party. In a letter to Nkrumah, Nartey did not 
disguise his distaste for autocracy, “I fear that the fate to which Mussolini and other 
Fascist leaders suffered from the masses whom they once led may befall me when 
the masses of the Gold Coast wake up from the delusion in which they are now.”41 
There were others who had equally forthright grievances. They attacked Nkrumah at 
the August 1951 CPP conference for not moving fast enough towards the objectives 
of immediate Self-Government and were expelled in April and May 1952.42
Nevertheless, the critics within the party were small in number “and although 
able to execute party feelings on one side or the other, had little weight behind
40 Ibid.
41 D aily Graphic, 29 December 1951, ‘Nartey Resigns CPP Post’.
42 Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 167-168.
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them.”43 In a letter to Nkrumah Padmore expressed his “alarm” at the resignation of 
Dzenkle Dzewu and others as they were part of the CPP leadership and therefore 
“responsible as anyone else for the formulation of broad Party policy.”44 Padmore’s 
private letters to Nkrumah during these early years of the CPP’s struggle for 
independence reveal him to be the principal strategist and ideological engineer in 
guiding Nkrumah and the CPP in matters of both political and socio-economic 
policy 45 Padmore urged Nkrumah to “exercise firmness” and “patience in explaining 
to those leading comrades who might not have grasped the whole political manoeuvre 
why things are not moving as rapidly as you would all like them to do at the 
moment.”46
Around the same time as the resignation of these CPP militants a small and 
insignificant opposition party came into existence. The CPP was unthreatened by the 
birth of the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) on May 4 1952 in Accra. Its formation 
effectively replaced the UGCC as the main opposition party, representing the interests 
of the established coastal urban elite. It was disparagingly referred to within CPP 
circles as the “Ghost Party.” Its main sources of support came from the Wenchi royal 
family, from where its leader. Professor K.A. Busia hailed, as well as from ex-CPP 
supporters such as Dzenkle Dzewu, Ashie Nikoe, Mate Kole, H.P. Nyemetei, Saki 
Scheck and Kwesi Lamptey. A few of the Cape Coast lawyer-merchant class also lent 
their weight to the GCP, but similar to the UGCC, the party became weakened by 
internal rifts among its leaders.47 Its political objective was to become “an effective 
opposition to the CPP government.” But to the CPP “its existence was probably an
43Ibid, pp. 167-168.
44 Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-41, Folder 14, Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn 
Research Center, Howard University; Padmore’s letter is dated 13 January 1952.
45 Padmore’s letters to Nkrumah extend from 1951 to 1956.
46 Ibid, letter dated 13 January 1952.
47 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 183.
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additional, though minor, help to the CPP leaders in their insistence on the need for 
vigilance and discipline.”48
A series of events arose which enabled Nkrumah to capture the initiative and 
gain an upper hand in dealing with disgruntled elements within the country and inside 
the CPP. Firstly, in April 1953 the government published a White Paper comprising 
the views of the territorial councils and political groups and secondly, on July 10 
Nkrumah delivered his famous “Motion of Destiny” speech in the Legislative 
Assembly.49 Nkrumah demanded Her Majesty’s Government introduce an Act of 
Independence for the Gold Coast to obtain self-government within the 
Commonwealth. Thirdly, in August 1953 Nkrumah merged the Gold Coast Trades 
Union Congress (GCTUC) and the Ghana Trades Union Congress. (GTUC).50 This 
act appears to have substantiated his ideological belief that “anything set up outside 
the machinery of the Party is politically dangerous.”51 The amalgamation of the two 
organisations “was designed by Nkrumah to produce a united Trade Union Congress 
under CPP control.”52 The forced merger temporarily obscured the three ideological 
positions within the labour movement.53 The CPP loyalists within the labour 
movement were led by Tachie-Menson and were committed to the principle of non­
affiliation to any trade union body. Seeking re-affiliation with the International 
Confederation of Free Trades Union (ICFTU) was the GCTUC, led by Larbi Odam. 
Finally, there was the left wing old Ghana Trades Union Congress led by Turkson 
Ocran.
48 Ibid, p. 183.
49 K. Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (London, 1973), pp. 100-115, for the full text o f  the speech.
50 After the Positive Action campaign o f January 1950 the old Trades Union Congress split into two 
factions: the Ghana Trades Union Congress supported by the CPP and the Gold Coast Trades Union 
Congress supported by the United Africa Employees Union.
51 NAG:SC21/8/23.
52 This was a view held by Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. See his letter dated 4 December 1953 to W.L. 
Gorell Barnes, Assistant Under Secretary o f State; Rathbone, British Documents P art II, p. 77.
53 The amalgamation did not last long and in 1955 the split re-emerged.
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In October 1953 a more serious event, occurring on the other side of the 
Atlantic gave rise to further alarm over communist penetration in the Gold Coast on 
the part of the British Colonial Office. In the context of the Cold War, the 1950s and 
1960s saw a heightening of ideological tensions and suspicions between the capitalist 
West led by the USA and the communist world led by the USSR. These conflicts 
embraced the colonial territories, as each superpower feared their non-involvement in 
colonial affairs would be an advantage to their opponent. The incident also enabled 
Nkrumah to strengthen his hand over the party. The suspension of the constitution of 
British Guiana on October 9 led to the dismissal of the democratically elected 
government led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) was 
declared by the British Government to be a communist party intending to foster 
strikes to undermine the economic stability of the colony. The British government 
sent military and naval forces to the South American country signalling the immediate 
assumption of direct rule. Several weeks later, another incident which aggravated the 
situation was the attendance by two CPP members -  Anthony Woode, member of the 
Legislative Assembly and Turkson Ocran, Secretary of the GTUC at the Third 
Congress of the World Federation of Trades Union (WFTU) in Vienna on October 22 
1953.
The two incidents were the subject of extensive discussion in the Gold Coast 
press and in the Colonial Office. The repercussions of the incidents were not lost on 
Nkrumah. The manner in which he handled the unfolding state of affairs made 
unequivocal his position on communism and demonstrated his political ruthlessness.
In a letter dated October 24 1953, Barnes requested an assessment of the 
extent of communist control within the trade union movement in the Gold Coast from
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Arden-Clarke.34 Barnes expressed fears of the spread of communism in the Gold 
Coast and that “the willingness of H.M.G to agree to further constitutional reforms 
has been based 011 the assumptions that there was no real Communist threat in the 
Gold Coast and that democratic parties would be the main rivals for office. The 
possibility of the emergence of a united Communist-led trade union movement make 
these assumptions questionable.” 55 He requested the Governor inform him of 
measures that the CPP government intended to adopt to confront “the communist 
problem.”56
Arden-Clarke’s response to Barnes revealed that Nkrumah had prudently 
heeded the precedent of British Guiana. The Governor wrote: “Nkrumah and other 
Ministers are becoming increasingly, if gradually, aware of the dangers attendant on 
communist infiltration and of the importance of building up confidence in the Gold
* • • 57Coast in the non-communist world. The lesson of British Guiana is being learnt.”
Despite Arden-Clarke's candid assessment of political developments on the 
ground, it appears the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttelton, 
remained un-reassured. Neither did Nkrumah’s stern warning that there would be no 
entanglement with foreign power politics reassure the confidence of the British 
Colonial Office. Nkrumah was intent 011 demonstrating that the CPP was not about to 
“jump from the British imperialist frying pan into the Moscow-ite Communistic fire,” 
as he conveyed to a group of students at the University College and the local branch 
of the United Nations in late October 195 3.58
54 Rathbone, British Documents 11, p. 76.
55 Ibid, p. 76.
56 Ibid, p. 76.
57 Ibid, p. 78.
58Nkrumah’s speech was reported in the Evening News, 30 October 1953, ‘Nkrumah’s Purge o f ‘Red 
Agents’ Means Defeat for Moscow and Malan’. The Colonial Office were very much aware o f  this 
speech, see British Documents Part //. p. 78, Sir Thomas Lloyd’s letter to Sir Charles Arden-Clarke.
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From Nkrumah’s position as leader of the party and the Gold Coast 
government, severe measures were necessary to stamp his authority on the party and 
to safeguard constitutional progress towards self-government. His speech to the 
Central Committee of the Party showed he was sensitive to the Cold War divisions of 
the world. He proclaimed: “In our forward march to independence, we as the people 
should remember that the struggle of a colonial people for Self-Government is by no 
means isolated from international politics.”59 Consequently, both Anthony Woode and 
Turkson Ocran were immediately expelled from the party.60 Following this action, in 
the Legislative Assembly on February 25 1954, Nkrumah made an important 
statement on the government’s attitude towards the employment of Communists in the 
Public Service by prohibiting Communists from taking posts in the army, police, 
labour, education and civil service.61 Furthermore, “these measures are being taken 
solely as a precaution and to protect the security of the Gold Coast and not on political 
grounds.”62 At the same time as the suspensions, Nkrumah and the CPP were “under 
considerable pressure from their extremists to abandon their present methods and 
make an immediate demand for independence.”63
Dangerous rumours had been circulating within the CPP rank and file that 
there was “an imperialist plot” to sabotage any further progress towards self- 
government in the Gold Coast. Popular CPP opinion viewed the Commission of 
Enquiry led by Mr Justice K. A. Korsah into the bribery scandal that led to the 
resignation of Mr J. A. Braimah in November 1953 as an attempt to besmirch the
59 Evening News, 24 October 1953, 'CPP Suspends Anthony Woode and Turkson Ocran Total 
Expulsion Intended’.
60 Their expulsions were printed in the Evening News, 24 October 1953.
61 NAG A D M 14/2/81; G old Coast Legislative Assembly Debates, pp.980-982.
62 G old  Coast Legislative Assembly Debates, 25 Feb 1954, pp.980-982. It is hard to imagine 
Nkrumah’s action being non-political.
63 Rathbone, British Documents Part 11, p. 8 1. This was expressed by Sir Arden-Clarke’s in a letter to 
Sir Thomas Lloyd dated 13 January 1954.
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CPP.64 Simultaneously, “recent events in Kenya, British Guiana and Uganda are 
quoted as examples of the imperialist government’s determination to keep the 
colonies in subjection,” wrote Arden-Clarke.65
It is important to address why Nkrumah carried out such actions in these
circumstances. According to Rathbone:
The adoption of these apparently draconian measures by 
the CPP dominated government was only partly 
intended to reassure the Conservative government in 
London. As importantly, these prohibitions provided the 
CPP with useful weapons in its struggle with 
independently minded left-wingers within the Party.66
Nkrumah’s crackdown 011 Leftist labour elements is revealing. As far back as 
1945 when he wrote Towards Colonial Freedom, he had conceived of the ideological 
necessity to organise a political movement of which labour was an integral 
component. His ideological mentor, Padmore congratulated him for “purging his 
party of irresponsible members, who, under communist inspiration are out to stir up 
tribal, religious and labour troubles on the eve of self-government.”67 In the opinion 
of Mr Kofi Duku “Nkrumah had to do that [i.e. order the expulsions] to save a given 
situation. It was sad because Turkson Ocran was a very good trade unionist. So was 
Tony Woode. But Nkrumah acted to save a very serious situation in the attaimnent of 
self-government.” 68
Nkrumah’s actions therefore enabled him and the CPP government to 
publicly distance themselves from communism. However, in spite of this stance the 
party made an official yet muted commitment to socialism during these early years.
64 Austin argues that throughout 1951-1952 rumours circulated o f  corruption and malpractice among 
CPP party officials. J. A Braimah was rumoured to have accepted 2000 pounds sterling from an 
Armenian contractor which the Korsah Commission later verified, Politics in Ghana, p. 163.
65 Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 81.
56 Ibid, p. 82.
67 Ashanti Sentinel, 3 November 1953. Padmore was virulently anti-communist as was Garvey.
68Mr Kofi Duku was Nkrumah’s political secretary from September 1948 to December 1954. He was 
75 years o f  age at the time o f  this interview with author on August 15 2002, Accra.
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At the August 1951 Second Annual conference held in Ho, among the party’s
national objectives were: “Self-Government Now and the development of (Gold
Coast) Ghana on the basis of Socialism” and “To establish a Socialist state in which
all men and women shall have equal opportunity and where there will be no capitalist
exploitation.”69 Despite this proclamation there was no subsequent explication of
how socialism would be achieved in practice. In its editorial of December 19 1953,
the Evening News stated:
Deeply ingrained in the hearts of the common people of 
this country is the basic ideological tenet of the CPP —
Socialism. They love it. They see in it the only hope of 
salvation for the man in the street, the perpetual toilers 
in the hierarchy of capitalist society.
Here was an implicit assumption that the CPP represented the socialist aspirations of 
the common people of the Gold Coast. In the accepted wisdom of the CPP leaders, 
the interests of the people were identical to those of the Party. The editorial ended 
with the rhetorical lines: “Long live Socialism! Long live the toiling masses!” Yet, 
neither the Party, the Evening News nor its leaders had clearly articulated what it 
referred to as “its basic ideological tenet.” Therefore it is questionable the extent to 
which ordinary people of the Gold Coast and the entire membership of the CPP 
(including the Central Committee), at this juncture of the country’s movement 
towards self-government, understood what socialism meant. In short, during this 
transitional phase of constitutional advance, the ideological doctrine of the Party was 
ill defined if not vague.
Other areas of tension during this period of Tactical Action existed in the area 
of reform of local government. The chiefs were at the crux of this system of reform. 
African ministers and many rural dwellers throughout the Gold Coast were critical of
69 Cited in Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 162.
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the British District Officers and their relationship with the chiefs. Yet, the 
relationship of diarchy was to have a profound impact on the local government level. 
Having begun with the reform of the Native Authorities in the Local Government 
Ordinance of August 1951, the Regional Officers and Government Agents perceived 
two problems. They considered the new government as attempting “to monopolise 
the local authorities for their own political interests and secondly that this seeming 
over-centralisation of CPP power stifled local representation.”70
Tensions mounted between civil servants who considered African ministers 
as interfering in local affairs and they voiced such concerns to Arden-Clarke. 
Similarly, CPP ministers and Nkrumah believed that their administration of the rural 
regions was vital, particularly as they were suspicious of the long established 
relationship between the traditional leaders and the expatriate administration and 
questioned the loyalty of the British civil servants. A way round this was the creation 
in 1952 of a special cadre of African executive officers who became agents of the 
Minister of Local Government. However, this action created another furore between 
Nkrumah and the Regional Officers. According to Nkrumah, the Commissioners 
“found it more difficult than most other expatriates to accept the new order of 
things.”71
Another battleground raged in the countryside between the chiefs and their 
subjects. The extraction of exorbitant taxes, the lack of impartiality by chiefs in the 
administration of justice through the native courts as well as unfair land sales, were 
the causes of conflicts between chiefs and rural people in the colony.72 “But far more 
frequently,” claims Rathbone “the root cause of dissent was quite simply the 
fissiparousness that characterised Alcan chieftaincy” which brought the yoimgmen of
70 Rathbone, T h e  Transfer o f  Power in Ghana’, pp.189-190.
71 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 126.
72 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 34.
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the countryside and chiefs into open confrontation.73 Exacerbating this conflict was 
the fact that some within the CPP leadership sought to win over the traditional rulers 
and their followers to the CPP camp. Moreover, problems that beset the local 
government reforms were the lack of agreement between the traditional bodies and 
the local councils over the allocation of stool land revenue. This led to an intractable 
conflict that prevailed between 1951 and 1954. On the one hand the CPP welcomed 
rural disorder because it could claim its support came from the discontented masses. 
Yet as Rathbone claims, “once involved in government, it had an increasing interest 
in rural order not least because so much of the national wealth was created in the 
coxmtry side.5,74
In mid 1953 national discussions took place on the position of chiefs within 
the new proposed constitution for the country. The Van Lare Report 75of the same 
year proposed “head chiefs should not take part in politics and should therefore seek 
no election to the Legislative Assembly.”76 This was yet another blow to chiefly 
authority. There were many accounts covering the growing disquiet of the Chiefs at 
what they considered as the destruction of the institution of chieftaincy.77 These 
viewpoints were also expressed in the national press as well as in the Legislative 
Assembly. The chiefs remained embittered as their power was being eroded.
73 Rathbone maintains that in the early 1950s chiefs were facing defiance from the youngmen following 
the 1950 general election and particularly after the introduction o f the local government reforms o f  
1951, This led to riots in the towns of Abompe, Asamama, Osiem, Osino and Pomase, scq Nkrumah 
and the Chiefs, p. 42.
74 Ibid, p. 69.
75 The brief o f the Commission chaired by W. B. Van Lare, was to examine and propose new electoral 
boundaries for the country. In doing so it aggrieved the chiefs and people o f  the small Aowin state in 
the Colony who begrudged their amalgamation with the larger state o f Amenfl, see Austin, Politics in 
Ghana, pp. 176-177.
76 Ashanti Sentinel October 27 1953 ‘Should Chiefs Enter the Assembly?’
77 See G old Coast Legislative Assembly D ebates, November 9 1953, pp. 192-195.
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Establishing an Economic Paradise
Another area of tension during this period of Tactical Action stemmed from a
perception of the CPP government’s economic policies held by the expatriate
business community. In his campaigns Nkrumah had promised voters that he would
establish an economic “paradise.”78 However, British mining interests in the country
were threatened by the attraction of workers to the CPP. Rabid anticommunism
upheld by the mine-owners led to deep distrust of CPP economic policies. The
British daily newspaper, the Daily Telegraph supported mine-owners suspicions of
the CPP despite a visit to the UK by Botsio and Gbedemah in September 1952.
These two leading CPP ministers sought to encourage British investors to remain in
the country but they were unsuccessful in allaying the latter’s fears.79 Aggravating
British economic insecurities were the prospects of the CPP extending invitations to
80the Dutch and West German financiers to the Gold Coast.
Under the diarchic government an area in which both the CPP and the British 
colonial administration were in agreement was the implementation of economic and 
social policies. These policies laid the embryonic basis of a welfare state. According 
to Mohan, that the “ideological father” of the CPP was George Padmore was clear, 
but “its economic parent was Arthur Lewis,” who was the West Indian London 
School of Economics (LSE) educated economist who advised Nkrumah’s 
government on economic matters during the early days of diarchy.81 In 1952, the ten- 
year economic plan was overhauled and a new 120 million pound sterling Five Year 
Development Plan was introduced. It was essentially a reformulation of previous
78 Cited in C. Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven & London, 1982), p. 152.
79 On March 1 1954 in the Legislative Assembly Nkrumah also publicly invited foreign investment into 
the country.
80 Rathbone points out that despite Nkrumah’s efforts the mining sector was never thoroughly 
reassured, ‘The Transfer o f Power in Ghana’ p. 182.
81 Mohan, ‘Nkrumah and Nkrumahism' in Socialist Register 1967, p. 195.
economic plans and was therefore, according to Rathbone “not really revolutionary.” 
82 Similarly, the Financial Secretary, R. P, Annitage expressed: “Ministers are, I 
think, determined to introduce new policies and new ideas but so far they have not
Q 'y
been able to suggest much that has not already been thought of or even started.” 
But more importantly “it was the CPP’s plan and was presented to the country as 
such.”84 The CPP government was committed to increasing the provision of schools, 
clinics, roads, housing, building a new harbour, as well as the construction of the 
Akosombo dam to provide a national electric power supply.
Rathbone observes: “Fiscal and general economic policy remained sound if 
more ambitious given the combination of political necessity — Nkrumah had to be 
seen to be dramatically 'delivering the goods’ -  and the increasing wealth of the 
country.”85 Unquestionably, revenue in the Gold Coast had grown steadily over the
o /
years to sustain the expansion of economic and social developments. Nevertheless, 
never far from colonial thinking was a belief that the economic fruits of liberal 
democratic capitalism were necessary to entice Africans away from Communism. 
This thinking was reflected in a memorandum submitted by the Labour MP, Sir. R. 
Acland to the British Secretary of State, Mr Griffiths, in April 1951. He posed: “Are 
we doing enough to make sure that there is established in the Gold Coast a sufficient 
economic foundation to sustain the democratic political experiment which is now in 
progress?”87 Acland commended what he considered “an extraordinary successful 
start” being made “in a most audacious experiment in social democracy” in the Gold
82 Rathbone, ‘The Transfer o f  Power in Ghana5, p. 176.
83 Ibid, p. 332.
84 Rathbone, ‘The Transfer o f Power in Ghana’, p. 176.
85Rathbone, British Documents Part I, p. lvii.
86 Ibid, pp.282-287.
87 Ibid, p. 307.
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• 0 0  tCoast that would be a “superior alternative to Communism.” Similarly, Nkrumah 
was aware that the political kingdom he promised the electorate had to be translated 
into economic benefits. Padmore’s correspondence with Nkrumah frequently insisted 
that Nkrumah achieve concrete results to win the hearts and minds of people to the 
party.89
As the master strategist, Padmore was successful in impressing upon 
Nkrumah the importance of the CPP being credited with concrete successes in 
housing and road construction. In a letter dated December 29 1951 Padmore advised 
Nkrumah to make some changes in appointments within the Cabinet. He proposed 
Gbedemah exchange ministries with Dr Koi “where [Ansah Koi] will be less an 
obstacle and a drawback/’90
Other important economic commitments of the Nkrumah government during 
these early years involved the Volta River Project. Whilst in 1951 the British 
government were stilt seriously reviewing their ability to provide the capital to fund 
the project, W. L. Gorell Barnes, a British official noted “the new African Ministers 
are extremely keen on the Volta River Project.”91 This was a project, which Nkrumah 
remained totally committed to from the start. He considered electrification as a 
fundamental goal of industrialisation and as a fulfilment of his electoral mandate of 
seeking first the fruits of the political kingdom from which material benefits would 
follow. Undoubtedly among the major considerations for the British were not only 
“the vast size of the project;” the projected capital expenditure of nearly 100 million 
pound sterling but the details of the agreement between the three parties (i.e. the 
Gold Coast government, the UK government and the West African Aluminium
88 Ibid, p. 307.
89 Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-41, Folder 14, Manuscript Division, Moorland -Spingam  
Research Center, Howard University, letter dated 13 January 1952.
90 Ibid.
91 Rathbone, British Documents Pari /, p. 301.
113
09Ltd). Nkrumah was prepared to receive foreign financial assistance to fulfil this 
economic ambition.
In addition to implementing industrial plans in order to modernise the Gold 
Coast economy, Nkrumah sensitively handled the matter of the swollen shoot disease 
despite the fact that “many CPP candidates had told their audiences that, if returned 
to power, the CPP would end the cutting-out of diseased trees.” 93 Nkrumah 
suspended the policy of compulsory cutting out which had caused considerable 
resentment among the farmers. Austin writes: “The new administration followed 
good colonial practice and appointed a local commission of inquiry to examine not 
only the effect of previous legislation but the actual methods used by the colonial 
government in its cutting-oul campaign.” 94 W. L. Gorell Barnes met the CPP 
Minister of Commerce. Industries and Mines, Mr Tommy Hutton Mills during a visit 
to the Gold Coast in late March 1951 and noted that in regards to the cocoa cutting 
out policy, ministers "are not altogether incapable of acting with responsibility and a 
certain amount of courage.”9'"4
Under Mr Justice Korsah, a Commission was set up to look into the matter of 
swollen shoot and eventually concurred with the need to cut down the diseased trees 
whilst recognising the depth of opposition to this policy. The CPP government 
accepted that if the policy continued it would lead to general unrest. The Cocoa 
Rehabilitation Department, which farmers had criticised was dismantled and a “New 
Deal for Cocoa” was introduced. The new policy emphasized voluntary cooperation 
of farmers in a cutting out programme that was part of the government’s seven-year 
plan. It entailed each farmer being paid “four shillings as a first payment for every
92 Ibid, p. 298.
93 Rathbone, ‘The Transfer of Power in Ghana’, p. 172.
94 Austin, Politics in Ghana. p. 159.
95 Rathbone, British Documents Pari L p. 304.
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living large tree cut out and two shillings a year for three years as a replanting 
payment.”96 The CPP government organised an eight-week campaign involving local 
party groups and the Agricultural Department to explain the need for cutting out up 
and down the country.
In June 1953 the CPP government published its proposals for constitutional
97reform, which advocated a single parliamentary chamber of 104 elected members. 
Significantly, the government had abandoned the proposal for a second chamber for 
the chiefs and the Legislative Assembly debated and approved the government’s 
proposals. This abandonment greatly disturbed the chiefs and subsequently became a 
source of considerable political tension. For many CPP members and the CPP 
government, the achievement o f self-government was almost within reach. They 
were politically confident and believed that they had entered the final stage of 
diarchy which was ultimately to realise the next step of full independence.
Towards the end of the year, Nkrumah convened an inter-territorial 
conference of West African nationalists. It took place between December 4-6 1953 in 
Kumasi. The idea of a West African nationalist Congress was largely Nkrumah’s 
brainchild and emanated from his belief in West African unity. The inter-territorial 
meeting was the ideological continuation of the Pan-African Congress tradition 
which Nkrumah had taken part in during his London days. The African Morning Post 
reported that: “The aim of the Congress is to advance the political, economic and 
social emancipation of all territories in West Africa and to lay the foundation for a 
federation of West African states and to foster West African unity and Pan- 
Africanism.” 98 Some 20 West African nationalists attended and discussed the 
common social and economic problems confronting the region. The editorial of the
96 Nkrumah, Autobiography-, p. 127.
97 Rathbone, British Documents Purl /, p. Ix.
98 African .Morning Post, 8 December 1953.
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African Morning Posi on December 11 1953 celebrated “the decision to establish a 
national secretariat with its headquarters in Accra” and that “almost all the speeches 
on this historic occasion were all centred on unity.”99 The newspaper lamented the 
absence of the opposition parties in the country who had castigated the conference as 
a “purely CPP affair.” 100
Whilst Nkrumah relentlessly advocated West African regional unity, the year 
1954 brought about increasing national disunity as a number of external and internal 
challenges to CPP rule emerged.
The Emergence of Ethnic and Regional Parties
In early 1954 the Muslim Association Party (MAP) was founded by Alfai Larden.101 
The party’s political stronghold lay in the “stranger” or “Zongo” areas of southern 
towns where predominantly Moslem communities were to be found. These minority 
communities felt that their interests were being neglected by the nationalist leaders. 
Described by Austin as “violently anti-CPP,” the party was supported by Muslim 
elders and chiefs who sought to promote and protect the particular interests of 
Muslims.102
Following on the heels of the MAP was another political party -  this time 
centred on the North of the country. The Northern People’s Party (NPP) was set up 
in February 1954.103 Despite the CPP’s presence in the North, Northerners did not 
entirely embrace the CPP.104 Reasons for this originated not only from “awareness of 
the low esteem which Southerners had for the North and Northerners” but widely
99 Ibid.
100 African Morning Post, 23 December 1953.
101 It was formerly known by the name The Muslim Association, see Austin Politics in Ghana, pp.188- 
189.
102 Ibid, p. 188.
103 Ibid, pp. 184-187; Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians gives a detailed examination o f  the conditions 
which gave rise to the NPP.
104 Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, p. 83.
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held beliefs among Northerners that independence should be delayed until the 
economically and socially deprived North had caught up with the South. 105 
Fundamental to the demands o f the new party was a demand for greater economic 
and social development for the Northern Territories.106 Its leaders were J. A. 
Braimah and S. D. Dombo. The chairman was M. Bawumia.
As the Gold Coast prepared for a second general election, scheduled for June 
15 1954, Nkrumah and his government confronted a political landscape in which 
they were challenged by several political parties: the Togoland Congress which 
sought reunification with French ruled Togo, the GCP, MAP and the NPP. To add to 
this undesirable state of affairs, in May of the same year, Nkrumah faced an internal 
revolt of 81 rebel CPP candidates who had put themselves up to stand against official 
candidates in the forthcoming election. He described his feelings towards this state of 
affairs as one of “disappointment and anger.”107 Why so many independents emerged 
at this time was only partly attributable to the re-division of the Gold Coast into 104 
electoral districts by the Van Lare Commission of October 1953. The delimitation of 
electoral boundaries regrouped many small states of the colony into a single 
constituency.108 The result was an increase of 66 constituencies over the number in 
1951 and consequently “the difficulty of selecting candidates divided the parties -  
the GCP and its allies as well as the CPP.”109 Compounding the matter and perhaps 
more importantly, was the dominance of local interests. A fierce quarrel developed
105 Ibid, p. 92.
106 Ibid, p. 92. Northern politicians and traditional leaders repeatedly sought to remind the British 
colonial government that as ''protected persons” who had entered into treaties with the British 
government, the latter had certain responsibilities towards the chiefs and peoples o f  the Northern 
Territories.
107 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 172.
108 Apart from the small Aowin state in the colony, which was upset by this outcome, the Asante too 
voiced their opposition in the Legislative Assembly in November 1953. They demanded that on 
account o f  the fact that they produced over half the country’s cocoa they deserved 30 seats in the new  
Legislature, see Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 176-178. The argument presented by the Asantes was a 
foretaste o f  a bitter political dispute o f  the near future.
109 Ibid, p. 210.
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between the CPP’s Central Committee and constituent branches over the selection of 
nominees. The CPP branch in Kumasi was a hotbed of defiance and Nkrumah visited 
the regional capital where lie made an appeal to the rebel candidates to stand 
down.110 It was on the advice of his mentor, Padmore, that he carried out the 
draconian measure of expulsion from the party of the entire 81 candidates. 111
In his Autobiography. Nkrumah expressed that he felt “rather as an 
executioner must do when he has to carry out his distasteful job because of duty and 
justice.”112 He was fully aware of the prospective ramifications of the “firm action” 
he had decided to pursue: it would drive the rebels into the embrace of the 
opposition.113
Another significant action pursued by Nkrumah during May 1954 was a 
calculated attempt to undermine the power of the Okyehene or king of the kingdom 
of Akyem Abuakwa, which was firmly anti-CPP. Nkrumah approved of the decision 
to relocate the native court system from the kingdom’s capital, Kibi to New Tafo. 
Rathbone observes that while the decision appears to have been made at the behest of 
the newly constituted and almost entirely CPP members of the local council because 
they feared injustice and intimidation from the king’s court, the decision was a 
politically charged one. It essentially divided the kingdom between those who were 
pro-CPP such as the divisional chief, Nana Kwabena Kena II in whose jurisdiction 
the court was now located, versus the incumbent Okyehene, Nana Ofori Atta II who 
was cousin to Aaron Ofori A tta.114 An alliance between Nana Kwabena Kena II and
110 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 172.
111 Kwame Nkrumah Papers. Box 154-41. Folders 13 and 14, Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingam  
Research Center, Howard University. This is a letter to Nkrumah from Padmore dated 10 May 1954.
112 Nkrumah, Autobiographv, p. 172.
113 Ibid, p. 172.
114 Aaron Ofori Atta was the son o f the late Okyenhene, Nana Sir Ofori Atta I who died in 1943. He 
was also the nephew o f  Dr, J. B. Danquah who was the half brother o f W illie Ofori Atta. Both were 
fierce opponents o f  the CPP. Danquah was defeated by his nephew in the 1954 general elections in
Aaron Ofori Atta developed that injured the pride of the Okyehene and his royal 
court. The partnership epitomised the grafting of national political rivalries to the 
local level, which in this instance were complicated by clan loyalties and perceived 
betrayals. Furthermore, as Rathbone argues, the alliance demonstrated the existence 
of two parallel systems and ideologies: chiefly power and modern democratic politics 
that were diametrically opposed to one another.115
Meanwhile the country's first elections to be held on the basis of universal 
franchise were, according to Arden-Clarke, “conducted in an orderly manner 
throughout the country.” 116 It was considered by both the CPP government and 
British colonial officials and within Whitehall as “the final electoral step before the 
attainment of full self government within the Commonwealth.” 117 The CPP launched 
its electoral campaign and as Arden-Clarke observed “a majority result in favour of 
the CPP was never seriously in doubt.” 118 The Party won 72 of the 104 seats. 
However, a closer analysis of the election result demonstrated that beneath what 
Nkrumah referred to as a “sweeping victory,” the CPP did not have the widespread 
support it alleged.119
In the first past the post system, the CPP won just over 55% of the 391, 817 
votes cast. The total adult population stood at 2, 376, 602 million out of which those 
registered to vote numbered 1, 255, 603 million. The opposition parties (totalling 7) 
had secured 44.6% of the vole .120 Therefore as Austin points out: “In aggregate 
throughout the country, there was a considerable anti-CPP vote. The extent of the
nationalist party’s success in terms o f seats exaggerated its strength at the polls, and
Akyem Abuakwa. This defeat added to the political betrayal, for Aaron Ofori Atta was Minister o f  
Local Government. See Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 62.
115 Ibid, p. 73.
116 Rathbone, British Documents Part //, p. 89.
117 Ibid, p. Ixi.
118 Rathbone, British Documents Pari 11, p. 89.
119 Nkrumah, I Speak o f  Freedom, p. 36.
120 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 238.
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when the election was looked at in terms of the actual votes cast the measure of the 
party’s victory was greatly reduced.” 121 Despite this fact, the 1954 Constitution 
signalled a victory of the commoners over the chiefs; for all the members of the 
Legislative Assembly were to be elected on the basis of one-man-one-vote. As Drali 
remarks: “It meant the disappearance of chiefly representation as such from the 
Legislature for good” as the chiefs had now lost their ex-officio membership of the 
Assembly.122
When the new Legislative Assembly convened on July 28 1954, Nkrumah 
made it publicly known his position on regional parties. He was opposed to such 
formations on political grounds and he therefore refused to recognise the NPP, which 
had won the second highest number of seats in the Legislative Assembly. In 
Nkrumah’s opinion “the Government did not consider it desirable to recognise as an 
official Opposition a party organised on the basis of a single region.”124 Nkrumah’s 
concept of a political party was based on a concept of national politics as opposed to 
political parties formed on a tribal basis.[2*
This view enraged the NPP who were determined to see S.D. Dombo 
recognised as Leader of the Opposition.126 The NPP consequently walked out of the 
Assembly and protested to the Governor who with the Speaker of the House did not 
concur with Nkrumah’s view. Nkrumah was forced to acquiesce. He refuted
121 Ibid, p. 243.
122 F. K. Drah, ‘Nkrumah and Constitutional Democracy: 1949-1966 Revisited’, p. 19.
123 The NPP won 12 seats in the new Assembly; see Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, p. 129 and 
Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 241.
124 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 177; see also British Documents Part IP, Arden-Clarke’s despatch to 
the Secretary o f State for Colonies in December 1954 observed that Nkrumah considered the NPP a 
tribal and not a national opposition, pp. 106-107.
125 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 177.
126 Ladouceur, Chiefs and the Politicians, p. 130.
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accusations that he did not want any opposition at all. In his estimation “They could
* 127not understand that I was fighting on a matter of principle.”
Soon after the election, two factors precipitated vociferous demands for a
federalist constitution; first, the failure of the opposition in the election itself and
second the introduction by K. A. Gbedemah, the Minister of Finance, of the Cocoa
Duty and Development (Amendment) Bill on August 10 1954. This bill deeply
inflamed the sentiments of the cocoa farmers, particularly in Ashanti. They already
had reason to be aggrieved over the colonial government’s treatment of swollen
shoot disease by the cutting out policy, which was continued by the CPP
government. In addition, malpractices of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) and the
Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) considerably angered the cocoa farmers. Many
128farmers perceived the CPC organisation as “an extension of Nkrumah’s party.”
The government’s justification of the Cocoa Duty and Development 
Ordinance was in anticipation that high prices for cocoa on the world market, which 
was enjoyed between 1951-1954, would not last. Therefore, in order to guarantee 
payment to farmers in leaner years, it would assure farmers a minimum producer 
price of 72 shillings per load of 601bs for a period of 4 years.129 Notwithstanding the 
economic arguments, there was a perception in the minds of many cocoa farmers that 
they had not been consulted in the decision to peg the new price. 130 In addition, they 
foresaw a serious loss of income to themselves.
Furthermore, in late August 1954 Nkrumah and his Cabinet became 
increasingly concerned over the proliferation of organisations established on a 
regional, tribal and religious basis and discussed a bill to prohibit such organisations.
127 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 177.
128 Allman, The Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 38.
129 K. A. Ninsin, ‘The Nkrumah Government and the Opposition on the Nation State: Unity Vs. 
Fragmentation’ in K. Arhin (ed). The Life and Work ofKwam e Nkrumah, p. 223.
130 Rathbone, British Documents. Part //, p. 98.
The significance of this measure revealed the extent of alarm existing within the 
Cabinet on this particular matter. With its recently acquired electoral majority, the 
CPP government was sufficiently confident -  at this juncture -  to seriously consider
1 0 1  #
pursuing draconian legislation to deal with its political enemies. As Austm 
maintains, “The Moslem Association Party, in particular, came under sharp attack, 
and there were demands in the newly elected Assembly, and the Evening News [of 19 
June 1954], that it be outlawed.”1 j2 It was Duwuona Hammond, a CPP member, who 
introduced the private members motion in the Assembly, urging the government to 
legislate against parties based on religion. The bill was passed by 72 votes against 
14.133 In addition to this bill the CPP used more subtle measures to weaken NPP 
support in the North throughout the year. These methods amounted to local attempts 
to erode the NPP’s support base by CPP activists aligning with locally aggrieved 
forces such as the Frafra and Kusasi in the Mamprussi District area.134
Conclusion
It is evident that the principles of freedom, equality and independence that shaped 
Nkrumah’s thinking during his days in America and London underpinned his 
political practice during the diarchic period. He remained staunchly committed to 
these principles and resolute in his struggle for political independence for the Gold 
Coast. However, he had no political strategy as a blueprint for securing 
independence. Yet, his political strategy towards achieving this political objective 
was characterised by considerable pragmatism.
131 The bill was later to become the Avoidance o f  Discrimination Act, which became law in December 
1957. The intention o f  the bill was to ban the formation o f sectional political associations and parties. 
See Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 67.
132 Austin, Politics in Ghana., p. 281.
133 Ibid, p. 281.
134 Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians, p. 123.
122
Nkrumah’s path of tactical action was one of ambiguity and tension. 
Nkrumah walked a political tightrope of irreconcilable demands: he had to satisfy 
CPP rank and file militant members whilst simultaneously adhering to the demands 
and problems thrown up by working with the British colonial administration. This 
was by no means easily achieved. Increasing internal dissent and careerism by CPP 
members challenged his control over the party. At the same time he sought to erode 
the power of the chiefs and extend CPP hegemony over the trade unions.
In terms of the ideological character and direction of the CPP, Legum argues 
that “the CPP was not originally a socialist party in the sense of being predominantly 
guided by socialist principles.” 1^  Rather social welfarism -  that is, a desire to 
improve the general well-being of citizens through employment, educational and 
social provision, underpinned the CPP’s economic and political orientation. 
Socialism remained only on paper for Nkrumah came into office without any clear 
idea of the economic strategy he might pursue in preference to that laid down by the 
British government in the Ten Year Development Plan. However, whilst Nkrumah 
did not have an economic blueprint, he greatly relied on the economic and political 
advice of his ideological mentor, Padmore. By mid 1954, the immediate 
consequences of NkrumalTs expulsion of the dissident CPP militants and the 
economic grievances generated by the pegging of the cocoa price in August led to 
the birth of a new and more formidable opposition party in September 1954. We now 
turn to the Nkrumah’s response to this political confrontation.
135 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation,’ p. 133.
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CHAPTER 4
NKRUMAH AND THE OPPOSITION, 1954-1957
Nkrumah and the Federalist Argument of the NLM
The tumultuous years of 1954 -  1957 saw a violent political confrontation 
between the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which was formed on 
September 19 1954, and the CPP government. The causes that gave rise to this 
movement were rooted in a complex emergence of material and regional interests in 
the country. The loss of As ante's historic hegemony over a country it once ruled, in 
addition to the fact that a large proportion of the country’s major exports (gold, 
timber and cocoa) originated in the Ashanti region fuelled Asante grievances.1 
Another factor contributing to the conflict in Ashanti was the 20 seats allocated to 
the region by the Van Lare Commission. Inflaming the discontent among the CPP in 
Ashanti was Nkrumah* s public expulsion of the 81 rebel CPP candidates at a mass 
rally in Kumasi at the Subin River Valley in May 1954. The site of the expulsion was 
significant, for the Central Committee of the CPP were well aware that the rebellion 
had come from the CPP Asante candidates and they therefore openly sought to teach 
them a lesson as well as make an example of them.
However, the critical factor that galvanized some elements in Ashanti to 
launch the 'Council for Higher Cocoa Prices’ was the CPP’s introduction of the 
Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill in August 1954. Among the 
organisers of the Council was ex-CPP member, E.Y. Baffoe.2 The chair of the
1 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 23.
2 E.Y. Baffoe had been the CPP’s regional propaganda secretary and a member o f  the CMB and 
director o f  the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC). When the party refused to consider his candidacy 
for the June 1954 general election, he and many other CPP members in Ashanti were greatly frustrated. 
Baffoe and others channelled their political frustrations and ambitions into the founding o f the NLM in 
September 1954 and its immediate growth. He and others brought sophisticated organisational skills 
they had acquired from the CPP to the NLM.
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Movement was Nana Bafuour Osei Alcoto who was senior linguist to the Asantehene 
and a major cocoa producer. Akoto read out the ‘Aims and Objects of the Liberation 
Movement* to a crowd of over 40,000 people on the inaugural day. In short, the 
Movement demanded that the price of cocoa be increased from 72 shillings to 150 
shillings and a federal constitution be introduced to the Gold Coast. It stated that the 
people and the Movement had no confidence in the government of Nkrumah and the 
CPP. It warned that the Gold Coast had to be saved from a CPP dictatorship.3
Defining itself as a “movement” rather than a “political party,” the NLM was 
supported by many of the youngmen of Ashanti -  the nkwankwaa; thousands of 
small-scale cocoa farmers and wealthy cocoa merchants; and the Asante Youth 
Association (AYA) who had turned against the CPP.4
In a politically charged atmosphere after the murder of E. Y. Baffoe (on 
October 9) 1954 by CPP member Twumasi Ankrah, Akoto appealed on October 12 
to the Kumasi State Council of traditional chiefs to lend its support to the Movement. 
After scrutinising the ‘Aims and Objects of the Movement*, the response from the 
Council was a resounding public endorsement of the NLM and promise of funds. 
The impact of Baffoe5s murder on the NLM was a huge increase in the rank and file 
membership of the organisation as well as the creation of a para-military wing, 
known as the NLM Action Groupers, the counterparts of the CPP Action Troupers.5 
Confrontations between the two which unfolded soon after the murder of Baffoe, led 
to growing instability and fatalities in the region by the end of the year.
In a private letter dated October 20 1954, Nkrumah. made a personal appeal to 
Asantehene Nana Prempeh II. Nkrumah enquired from the Asantehene whether he
3 See Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine for a list o f the NLM ’s political demands, p. 17.
4 Ibid, pp.28 - 4 9 .
5 Ibid, pp.56-64.
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intended to lend his support to the new movement. The Asantehene replied saying he 
was “above party politics.”6
On October 24 1954, a mere month after the formation of the organisation the 
NLM, it invited other opposition parties — the GCP, TC, NPP, MAP to attend a 
round-table conference in Kumasi on the prospects for federation. The NLM and its 
newfound allies gave their wholehearted support for a federal framework of 
government for the Gold Coast. They believed such a constitution would safeguard 
their regional and economic interests by devolving power to the regions as opposed 
to what they considered as the CPP’s authoritarian paradigm of political power. 
Federalism was considered the bulwark against the encroaching dictatorship of the 
CPP. Conversely, the Nkrumah led government, remained resolutely committed to 
upholding and defending the territorial integrity of the country under a centralised 
government despite its promises to consider regional councils.
Nkrumah considered the economic grievances of the Asantes to be 
unfounded, for in his opinion, such detractors did not consider the new hospital, and 
library, national bank and other constructions recently built in Kumasi.7 Furthermore, 
“the NLM did not seem to realise that the cocoa, which they felt so possessive about, 
would be worthless without the labour, which came mainly from the Northern 
Territories, and without the exportation which was carried out in the South.”8 For 
Nkrumah, cocoa was a national economic asset that was not the monopoly of one 
region, or one group of people; its economic wealth belonged to the entire nation. 
This was an uncompromising conviction he advocated throughout his life. Similarly 
his concept of government remained wedded to supreme legislative power remaining
6 Ibid, p. 67.
7 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 180.
8 Ibid, p. 180.
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at the centre and “was not broad enough to encompass the demand, within his own 
country, for Asante autonomy.”9
On the same day that the opposition political parties met on October 24, 
Nkrumah addressed a CPP rally in the Accra Arena and characterised the NLM as 
“another attempt by imperialists and reactionary agents to bring together some chiefs 
and disgruntled opposition politicians to undermine the popular* elected 
government.”10 Furthermore, he declared that the price of cocoa would not be raised; 
that the constitution had been ratified and independence was 011 course. The political 
impact of his words inflamed an already tense political situation.11 Then on 
December 30 1954, he made a conciliatory response in a broadcast to the nation. 
Nkrumah offered to “submit to the Legislative Assembly, as a Government measure, 
legislation providing for regional councils.”12 It was hoped that this measure would 
appease the NLM, but it was rejected outright.
Nkrumah was then prompted by the Governor to invite the NLM to a 
roundtable conference in Accra in the second week of December 1954. The purpose 
of the meeting was for “Nkrumah to explain his intention regarding further 
constitutional and administrative developments” and to discuss “what should be the
1 Tproper relationship between regional interests and central government.” When the 
Movement responded on 17 December, it made clear it wanted several assurances to 
be put in place, before such a conference took place. The demands of the NLM were 
that the government should adopt an open mind towards a federal constitution and 
that the NLM be given time to study the CPP’s intentions regarding further
9 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 191.
10 Ibid, p. 67.
11 Ibid, p. 67,
12 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 284.
13 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 70.
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constitutional and administrative developments. The NLM’s response led to an 
impasse.
Overall, as Austin observes: “The sudden formation of the NLM took 
everyone by surprise, including the CPP government which in the second half of 
1954 was thrown off balance.”14 The CPP had been “overtaken by events” like the 
colonial government had been by the riots of 1948.15 Austin argues that “the CPP 
was strangely slow in taking anything like the proper measure of the NLM” and 
appeared to bury its head in the sand.16 Moreover, by the end of the year, Nkrumah’s 
response to the NLM could be characterised as complex and contradictory; he had 
denounced the movement as the creation of imperialist stooges and had then 
attempted to woo them to a round-table conference to discuss political differences 
and failed in this endeavour.
Allman points out that initially, Nkrumah, his Cabinet and colonial officials 
“worked hand-in-hand in an attempt to quietly douse the flames of opposition in 
Asante.” 17 However, there was neither a political blueprint nor a prescribed strategy 
for Nkrumah on how to respond to the evolving constitutional crisis. In America 
Nkrumah gained experience in resolving political differences when as a member of 
the African Students Association and its president during the period 1942-1945 he 
sought to unite Ghanaians and Nigerians who were divided on the issues of what the 
objectives of the Association should be. He was also instrumental in getting the 
Association to accept non-students, seamen into the organisation. However, the 
emergence of regionalism and tribalism as represented in the Ashanti question was
14 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 281.
15 Ibid, p. 281.
15 Ibid, p. 281.
17 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 66.
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an issue Nkrumah was not prepared to compromise over on account of his strong 
political beliefs.
Despite this, “there was some consensus in Accra between colonial 
authorities and the CPP on how to respond to events in Asante. There must be 
reaction, but not over-action, quiet, reasoned negotiation, but minimal 
compromises.” 18 In short, Nkrumah and his government confronted a political 
predicament: should it ignore the NLM, the implications of such a position was loss 
of support in the Ashanti region; if it took action against the Movement, such action 
would acknowledge political problems and intervention by the Colonial Office which 
could jeopardise the transfer of power. Nkrumah’s initial stance was not only one of 
caution, in order not to foment an ungovernable situation existing in Kumasi, but one 
influenced by the Governor. Arden-Clarke’s telegram to the Secretary of State, 
Lennox-Boyd remarked that he had spoken to the Prime Minister and “the whole 
Cabinet on the need to govern by persuasion and consent, and not by coercion and 
force.”19 He was pleased that “there are indications that this lesson is being learnt.”20
By the end of 1954, violence in Kumasi had spread to surrounding areas and 
led to an uneasy existence between the CPP regional headquarters and the NLM 
party offices, which coincidentally functioned side by side in Ashanti New Town. As 
the violence in Ashanti had reached dangerous levels, tire Governor issued the Peace 
Preservation Ordinance on January 7 1955 two days after riots had occurred in the 
Kumasi Zongo area, leaving two NLM supporters dead, and several injured. The 
Ordinance forbade “the carrying of dangerous or offensive weapons including 
firearms, cutlasses, daggers and ammunition in any public place or in any vehicle
18 Ibid, p. 66.
19 Rathbone, British Documents, Part II, p. 98; this telegram is dated 18 November 1954.
20 Ibid.
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within 30 towns in Ashanti.”21 The day after the disturbances of January 5, the home
of the regional Chairman of the CPP was bombed and ‘'100 policemen from the
Elmina Mobile Police Reserve” were called into Kumasi to help curb the ongoing
22political tensions in the city between the CPP and NLM.
In early February 1955, the desertions of top-level CPP stalwarts, Joe Appiah, 
R.R. Amponsah and Victor Owusu to the NLM severely stung the CPP, particularly 
the defection of Joe Appiah.23 Allman contends that the Executive of the NLM 
unconditionally accepted the three men into the Movement. Immediately, they
24-played a central role in shaping the future policy and direction of the NLM.
In February, Nkrumah again issued another invitation to the leadership of the 
NLM and representatives of the Asanteman Council to discuss the problems of a 
federal and regional system of government. This invitation was also spurned. 
Significantly, during this month, the Brong chiefs brought a petition to the 
Legislative Assembly seeking government recognition for a separate Brong- 
Kyempim Council.25 As Austin maintains “there were innumerable local disputes 
within the Ashanti chiefdoms which could yield a rich harvest if properly cultivated
9 £\and turned to the advantage of the governing party.” Hence, NkrumalTs strategy in 
managing the crisis, which he perceived the NLM had created and his response to the 
NLM itself continued to be complex and contradictory. His twin strategy of 
conciliatory official overtures as well as a more covert plan to undermine the NLM
21 D aily Graphic, 4 January 1955.
22 Ibid.
23 Joe Appiah had met Nkrumah on his arrival in London in 1947 together with Padmore. Appiah had 
studied for the bar in London and the two became very close political colleagues. He became 
Nkrumah’s personal representative o f the CPP in London from 1952-1954. Appiah began to question 
the CPP’s policies after receiving a lengthy letter from Kwesi Plange, a member o f  the CPP’s Central 
Committee, on growing corruption within the party.
24 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, pp.88-95. Other defections followed: J.D. De Graft-Johnson, and A. 
R. Dennis.
25 Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 292-296 and Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine narrates the historical 
grievances o f  the Brongs, pp. 97-99.
26 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 286.
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in its own political heartland was deployed as an attempt to resolve the constitutional 
dispute.
Initially the CPP Central Committee disapproved of the dismembering of
27Ashanti in order to create a new entity in the western part of the region. Grievances 
harboured by the chief of Bechem and other chiefs extended as far back as 1935 
when the British had forced the Brong people to join the Ashanti Confederacy. In 
addition to this many Brongs felt discriminated against by the Ashantis. 
Exacerbating the wrath of the Asantes who were threatened by this demand, was the 
fact that it was being advocated by a CPP Asante member, Krobo Edusei.29 In March 
1955 Nkrumah announced to the Legislative Assembly that the government was 
considering the “possibility of setting up a Brong Kyempim traditional council.” 
Meanwhile, it was in Nkrumah’s interest to swiftly resolve the constitutional crisis in 
the country and therefore he “pushed for negotiations faithfully, responding promptly 
to all NLM replies.”31 However, “In contrast, the NLM was playing for time. The 
more protracted the discussions on negotiation, the longer it had to reinforce its 
ranks, consolidate its leadership, and develop its strategy.” Hence, on April 5 1955 
Nkrumah made another effort to break the political deadlock and motioned in the 
Assembly for a Select Committee to explore the question of a federal system of 
government and a second chamber for the country. The opposition once more 
rebuffed the government by walking out of the Assembly. According to Allman: 
“Nkrumah, perhaps as a goodwill gesture to encourage support for his committee,
raised the price of cocoa to 80 shillings per load in early May [1955], but it was
27 Ibid, p. 295; see Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 78.
28 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 294.
29 Krobo Edusei was a founder o f the Asante Youth Organisation whose support was essential to the 
CPP if  they were to obtain a footing in Ashanti. He had risen from a poor background as a debt 
collector o f  a provincial newspaper, claims Bing, see Reap the Whirlwind., p. 121.
30 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 295.
Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 77.
32 Ibid, p. 77.
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perceived as a feeble gesture. Opposition to the CPP, particularly in Asante, no
longer rested on the price of cocoa.”33
There were now vociferous demands for a federal structure of government for
the Gold Coast from the NLM and its allies. The motto of the Movement was “No
Federation, No Self-Government.” Accompanying their political demands was a
growing “resistance culture” on the streets of Ashanti. The NLM Action Groupers
and Asante women were in the forefront of this popular' defiance. It comprised an
escalation in direct action such as bombings, and assaults, leading to a “state of
terror” prevailing in Ashanti in May 1955.34 The popular* expression of the time was
“yate yen ho!” (we have separated ourselves) which reflected the NLM’s refusal to
recognise the government in Accra. The agitation for a federal state system had
erupted into full-scale rebellion, which brought the country almost to a civil war.
Nkrumah reacted by introducing Proclamation Eight on May 24 1955. The ruling
demanded all arms and munitions be surrendered to the Kumasi police. In addition to
this police reinforcements were sent to the region.
In the following month, on the sixth anniversary of the CPP, Nkrumah
delivered “a remarkable speech” aimed at reviving what Austin describes as “the
drooping spirits of party members.”35 Nkrumah used disparaging language when he
declared that the party was challenged by the violence of a “feudal tyranny” led by
“certain intellectual snobs, traitors and saboteurs.” He reiterated his belief in “a
strong and well organised Opposition Party in the country and in the Assembly.”36
Furthermore, he maintained:
the present political issue is a test as to whether 
parliamentary democracy will live and strive in this
33 Ibid, p. 96.
34 Ibid, see pp. 101-107 for an account o f  the nature o f this resistance culture.
35 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 299.
36 Ibid, p. 299.
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country 01* whether we shall revert to feudal tyranny and 
despotic rule. We must not forget that democracy means 
the rule of the majority, though it should be tempered 
by sweet reasonableness in the interests of the minority. 
In a parliamentary democracy legitimate constitutional 
opposition is a part of its fabric -  but not opposition that 
breeds and fosters violence.37
Finally, in a direct response to repeated accusations of Ms dictatorial 
tendencies, he responded thus: “If I were a dictator, the opposition would have no
*3 O
place to stand to make the noise they are making.” As leader of the party,
Nkrumah’s speech was intended to boost the morale of the rank and file as well as
the Central Committee. Nkrumah’s denunciation of the NLM was integral to his
continued ambivalent strategy of conciliation and attack on the NLM. It was noted
by Arden-Clarke who commented in a despatch to Lennox-Boyd that: “the tone and
content of his (the Prime Minister’s) and his colleagues speeches at CPP rallies are at
complete variance with his repeated statements to us in his series of invitations.”39
The Governor claimed:
It remains regrettably true that not only do Ministers 
appear unable or unwilling to control the behaviour and 
public utterances of their principal supporters, but they 
continue to speak with two voices: the voices and 
indeed the menaces which are heard at party rallies are 
not reconcilable with the promises of reasonable 
negotiation which come from ministerial offices or with 
the set pieces spoken on occasion in the Legislative 
Assembly.40
Arden-Clarke’s comments reveal the inconsistent behaviour and attitude of 
Nkrumah and his Ministers. However, the Governor also remarked that “the Prime 
Minister’s overtures were statesmanlike efforts and, taken by themselves, deserved
37 Ibid, pp.299-300.
38 Ibid, p. 300.
39 Rathbone, British Documents, Part II, p. 142. Despatch dated 29 July 1955.
40 Ibid.
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better success.” Similarly, R. J. Vile, a colonial office civil servant visited the Gold 
Coast in March 1955 and commented that Nkrumah believed that Ashanti only 
understood the language of force. It appears from this observation that Nkrumah 
preferred a more hard line response to the Ashanti problem. However, Vile wrote: 
“On my second interview with the Prime Minister he took a much more reasonable 
line. He fully understood that it was only too easy to provoke violence in Ashanti and 
that it was his clear duty to act peacefully and diplomatically.”41
The morale of the party was to plunge further when the CPP lost the Atwima 
Nwabiagya by-election on July 14 1955. The by-election came about as a result of 
the death of John Baidoo, a CPP member of the Legislative Assembly for Atwima 
Nwabiagya, a rural constituency near Kumasi. The NLM were initially in a political 
quandary as to whether to participate in the by-election -  as up until that point in 
time, their policy had been one of circumventing the government of Accra by
AOappealing directly to die colonial power in London. In the end, the NLM Executive 
decided to take up the electoral contest in order to challenge the CPP within the 
NLM’s own electoral heartland. However, as the NLM continued to view itself as a 
movement and not a political party, it decided not to put forward an NLM candidate 
but to support an independent. Interestingly, the individual the Movement supported 
was B. F. Kusi who had won the Atwima Nwabiagya seat in 1951 as a CPP member 
and later defected. In the 1954 general election, Kusi lost the seat to John Baidoo. 
With the latter’s death, the NLM had an opportunity to test its political strength in 
Asante 43
41 Ibid, p. 112.
42 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 109.
43 Ibid, p. 110.
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The result was a resounding victory to Kusi who seemed 3,988 votes to tire
CPP’s candidate, B. K. Kufuor, who won 1,758.44 “This result surprised the
government”, observed Arden-Clarke.45 For both the Colonial Office in London and
the colonial administration, the results of the by-election made imperative another
general election. Arden-Clarke sent a despatch to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Mr Lennox-Boyd, dated July 29 1955. The Governor expressed the
following view:
Until the impact of the Ashanti by-election had been felt 
there was a marked tendency to regard independence by 
December 1956 as “in the bag” ... I have now been able 
to bring it home to the Prime Minister and some of his 
colleagues that it is not just a matter of mechanics; that 
Her Majesty’s Government will require an assurance 
that there is a wide measure of agreement in the Gold 
Coast on the form of the constitution at the time when 
independence is granted; that the conditions at present 
prevailing do not provide that assurance and that there 
may in due course have to be a General Election before 
Her Majesty’s Government can be satisfied 46
The gravity of the political situation in the country now led to intervention by 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in July 1955 proposed that a 
constitutional advisor visit the Gold Coast to advise the government on 
recommendations for a federal framework of government.47 According to Allman 
“given the Secretary’s veiled threat of “repercussions” Nkrumah had little choice but 
to acquiesce to the proposals.”48 Meanwhile, on July 17 1955, the opposition parties 
published Proposals for a Federal Constitution for an Independent Cold Coast and 
Togoland.
44 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. i l l .
45 Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 143.
46 Ibid, p. 145.
47 Sir Frederick Bourne arrived in the countiy on September 26 1955 and completed his 
recommendations in a written report in December o f  the same year. Whilst he was sympathetic to the 
opposition’s demands, he favoured a unitary government with power remaining at the centre. 
Nevertheless, he also recommended the creation o f five regional assemblies with delegated powers.
48 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 115,
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On August 12 of the same year, Krobo Edusei introduced a motion to the
Assembly calling for an Amendment of the State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance of
1952 to allow a chief below the status of paramount chief to appeal to the Cabinet. It
was accepted on a vote of 58 to 13 votes and published on 22 October 1955 in The
Gold Coast Gazette. 49
Arden-Clarke commented that the Ordinance was to apply not only to
Ashanti but to the Northern Territories and Colony chiefs and the “principal
amendment proposed being one to vest in the Cabinet the powers, hitherto exercised
by the Governor in his discretion, of determining questions regarding the position of
Chiefs in customary law.”50 Arden-Clarke wrote:
I had flattered myself at one stage that I had persuaded 
the Government not to publish these Bills. But I was 
subsequently told that an incipient revolt by CPP 
backbenchers had only been averted by a hurried 
capitulation: in the Prime Minister’s own words he had 
to “publish or be damned.” Not for the first time, the tail 
had wagged the dog.51
It appears Nkrumah was beholden to a strong CPP backbench revolt. Yet his 
own account of the reasons, which brought about this Bill, does not confirm that of 
Arden-Clarke’s.52 The Governor also felt that the simultaneous resuscitation of the 
Government’s three-year-old White Paper on the Reform of the Native Courts was 
causing widespread "alarm” in the Northern Territories and “was interpreted as 
another deliberate move to divest the chiefs.” 53 Certainly, chiefly jurisdiction 
between 1954 and 1956, as Rathbone contends, was increasingly being eroded as the
49 Ibid, pp. 119 and 128.
50 Rathbone, British Document Part II, p. 226; despatch to Mr Lennox-Boyd. Ultimately the 
amendment to the State Council (Ashanti) Ordinance permitted those chiefs who had been destooled 
the right o f  appeal to the Governor and not to the Cabinet.
51 Ibid, p. 226.
52Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 181.
53 Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 226.
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CPP put in place pro-CPP individuals on the bodies of the newly established local 
courts,54 Altogether these measures were an attempt by Nkrumah on his part “to end 
the domination of the Native Courts by chiefs” and to retain the loyalty of destooled 
chiefs sympathetic to the CPP.55
According to Allman, Edusei’s proposal seemed to have been immediately 
overlooked by the NLM leadership who were absorbed in transforming the 
Movement into a political party rather than challenging CPP legislation.56 However, 
in late October 1955, Akoto cabled a strong condemnation of the Bill to the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. The Ashanti Regional Officer, A. C. Russell believed that 
the Ordinance was a dangerous provocation. All in all, the timing of these political 
proposals exacerbated the political tensions existing in the country. Arden-Clarke 
wrote that: “in a calmer political atmosphere none of these measures would have 
necessarily caused misgiving” and hence the timing in his opinion was ill 
considered.57
A month after the publication of the State Ordinance, Nkrumah experienced a 
personal attack. On November 10 1955 -  a week before the amendment was voted 
into law -  as Nkrumah was seated on the verandah of his house in Accra, with his 
secretary, Erica Powell, personal accountant and others, there was “a violent
fO
explosion, followed within seconds by another.” In the ensuing commotion 
Nkrumah immediately rushed to find his mother to ensure she was unhurt.59 Whilst 
the culprits were never found, the motive for the bomb explosion was perceived, by
54 Rathbone argues that by mid 1955 reform o f the native courts was far from being achieved on 
account o f  shortage o f  trained lawyers and low salaries. Therefore the traditional native court system  
was expedient due to its cheapness, see Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 55.
55 Ibid, p. 51.
56 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 121.
57 Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 226.
58 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 182.
59 Ibid, p. 182. See also the memoir o f Erica Powell, Private Secretary (Fem ale)/Gold Coast, (London, 
1984), pp.96-97.
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Nkrumah and others, to be the introduction of the Ashanti Ordinance.60 The incident 
was the first of several assassination attempts by the opposition to employ terror to 
achieve then political ends. In his Autobiography, Nkrumah expressed the view that 
“During these disturbances I always considered that the unhappy history of Ashanti, 
and the mystery regarding the Golden Stool, its symbol of feudal power, has made 
the acceptance and practice of democracy in that part of the country more difficult 
than elsewhere.”61
The political violence in the country continued with a dynamite explosion at 
the Central Market in Kumasi on November 17 1955 and the murder of Krobo 
Edusei’s sister the following month.62 By the end of the year “few vestiges remained 
of a CPP presence in Asante.”63 The CPP rank and file “became almost mutinous” at 
die news of the death of Edusei’s sister.64 In his Autobiography Nkrumah conveyed 
that he sought to restrain some sections of the party from pursuing vengeance. He 
stated:
I was not unsympathetic but I was convinced that severe 
discipline was the only thing that would assure our final 
victory. To strike back would have caused serious civil 
disturbance, probably even civil war, and this would 
have called for a state of emergency to be declared. This 
in turn would have invited intervention from Britain 
and, in the eyes of the world, there would be no doubt 
whatever that a country in a state of bordering civil war 
was hardly in a fit condition to take charge of its own 
affairs.65
As leader of the government and the party, Nkrumah was in a difficult 
position, for stability and order was imperative to the transfer of power. His control
60 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 126.
61 Nkrumah, Autobiography, pp. 182-183.
62 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 291.
63 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 128.
64 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 181.
65 Ibid, p. 181.
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over the more militant elements of the party seeking political retaliation on the streets 
of Ashanti was essential. Furthermore, Nkrumah continued: “In this transitional 
period we had not got full control of defence. If the police and the army had been in 
the hands of my Government, the revolt, disobedience and disregard of law, order 
and justice in Ashanti would never have happened.”65
Historical conjecture at what would have happened if the instruments of law 
and order had been in Nkrumah’s control leads us to believe that Nkrumah may have 
been inclined to have resorted to force. R. J. Vile visited the Gold Coast in March 
1955 and wrote in a memorandum: “After my first meeting with him the Prime
A 7Minister said that Ashanti only understood the use of force.” However, his hands 
were tied by the diarchic relationship. This seems to suggest that Nkrumah would not 
have demonstrated timidity in employing more draconian measures to deal with the 
Ashanti problem.
In his New Year message of 1956 and in an attempt to resolve the 
constitutional crisis, Nkrumah invited representatives of the NLM Executive, 
Asanteman Council and other opposition leaders to a round-table conference to 
discuss issues raised by the Bourne Report.68 The NLM and its allies met on January 
8 1956 to discuss Nkrumah’s invitation and issued certain conditions.69 Their 
intransigence continued despite Nkrumah’s second invitation. The Achimota round­
table conference went ahead on February 16 whilst the opposition boycotted the 
meeting. By mid March 1956 the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Lennox- 
Boyd was convinced that another general election had to be held in the light of the 
bitter political disagreement over the nature of the constitution the country should
66 Ibid, p. 181.
67 Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 112.
68 The opposition had also declined the invitation to meet with Sir Frederick Bourne in late 1955 on 
account o f  their outrage at the Assembly’s passage o f the State Council (Ashanti) Ordinance.
69 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 137.
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adopt on independence. Nkrumah and the CPP implacably objected to the idea of a 
third general election in the Gold Coast on several grounds. Nkrumah expressed his 
position thus:
Constitutionally and politically I did not see any 
necessity for going to a general election before 
independence. I assumed that the British Government 
would grant us self-government at the date we had in 
mind without having to plunge the country into a 
general election, because I feared that an election 
campaign might be used in some quarters to cause riot 
and bloodshed and general confusion in the country.70
In addition, Nkrumah believed that a third general election “would lead to
confusion and would tend to destroy the confidence that the people have in the
Government; it would completely ignore the developments of the past few years and
would set the clock back.”71 As the country had only recently conducted a general
election in June 1954, Nkrumah wrote: “I feel very strongly that to ignore the
established and confirmed will of the people of the Gold Coast for self-government
and to impose new conditions on them at this final stage would defeat the very
essence of parliamentary democracy.”72 It appears Nkrumah did not consider the
central issue to be a conflict over a federal constitutional framework versus a unitary
state. He wrote:
In my opinion the essential issue between the British 
Government and ours at the present time is tire fixing of 
a firm date for independence. Constitutionally I cannot 
accept another general election as a prerequisite to 
independence. By forcing it upon us the British 
Government will give the impression that they are 
condoning the anti-constitutional attitude of the NLM 
and will thereby undermine the fundamental principles 
of the British parliamentary system.73
70 Nkrumah, Autobiography, pp.204-205.
71 Ibid, p. 205.
72 Ibid, p. 205.
73Ibid, p. 205.
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On March 23 1956 Nkrumah sent Kojo Botsio to London to present his case 
against the holding of a third general election to the British government. Botsio 
returned in late March to inform Nkrumah that he was certain of the sincerity of 
Lennox-Boyd, however, “a general election is the only answer.” 74 Lennox-Boyd 
wrote to Nkrumah in early April, after having met Botsio and candidly expressed: 
“ ...as long as you and some of your Ministers seem unable to visit Ashanti I am 
bound to take notice of this and of its implication that there exists a determined 
opposition in at least one part of the Gold Coast which is not prepared to accept Gold 
Coast independence under your leadership.”75 Hence, “without some further test of 
public opinion,” Lennox-Boyd was of the view that a third general election in which 
the winning political party secured a “reasonable majority” was a prerequisite to 
independence.
Nkrumah’s response to Lennox-Boyd outlined three possible steps he could 
pursue. Firstly, Nkrumah could “make a unilateral declaration of independence.” 
Secondly, “to let the present constitution run its course and wait for the next regular 
general election in 1958.” Thirdly, “to hold a general election on the constitutional 
issue in the near future.”75 Nkrumah also expressed concern “that such an election 
might give rise to more violence in Ashanti” and was subsequently assured by the 
Governor “that if there should be violence during the election period, the British 
Government would not use this as an excuse to delay independence.”77 With this 
assurance from the Governor and Secretary of State for the Colonies that after the 
election the British government would be prepared to accept a motion calling for
74 Ibid, p. 207.
75 Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 253. Lennox-Boyd’s letter to Nkrumah is dated 4 April 
1956.
76 Ibid, p. 255. Nkrumah’s letter is dated 20 April 1956.
77 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 109.
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independence within the Commonwealth, Nkrumah relented on his original objection 
to a third general election.78
On May 11 1956 Lennox-Boyd announced to the British House of Commons 
that a general election would be held in the Gold Coast. Meanwhile, political 
tensions continued with a clash between twelve members of the CPP and the NLM at 
the village of Akaporiso. “Sticks, pick-axes and buckets were freely used. Ten people 
were understood to be injured, two seriously,” reported the Ashanti Times on May 29
1956. hi June “the political tension in Kumasi which appeared to be lessening had 
now taken a turn for the worse” with the death of NLM member, Kwabena Boamah 
who died of gunshot wounds as a result of a fight with CPP members at Asramanso 
Junction.79At a CPP rally on July 1 1956, attended by Gbedemah at the Prince of 
Wales Park in Kumasi, three explosions occurred in the neighbourhood. In short, it is 
in this prevailing unstable political environment that sixteen days later, the Gold 
Coast’s third general election was held.
From Electoral Triumph to Independence
On the eve of the Gold Coast’s third general election, the opposition were in a 
buoyant mood.80 So confident were the NLM, they sent a letter to the Governor in 
mid July 1956, informing him they expected to be called upon to form a new 
government let by Dr K.A. Busia.81
The five political competitors in the general elections were the CPP, the 
NLM, NPP, TC, and the MAP. The NLM did not hesitate to participate in the general 
election as “the unquestioned vanguard of political party opposition to Nkrumah’s
78 Nkrumah’s response to Lennox-Boyd dated 20 April 1956; Rathbone, British Documents Part II, p. 
256.
79 Ashanti Times 5 June 1956.
80 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 320.
81 Ibid, pp.319-320.
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CPP.”82 They were convinced electoral victory would secure them 53 seats at most.83 
The NLM were also certain they would gain at least 16 of the 21 seats in Ashanti.84 
However, as the NLM’s political constituency was largely based in the Ashanti 
region, it was imperative it extend its electoral appeal outside Ashanti and into the 
wider Colony. It was clear that within the NLM the Executive was unsure of dividing 
its energies to extend its appeal outside its regional boundaries.85 The Southerners on 
the NLM Executive, namely Kurankyi Taylor, M. K. Apaloo, and John and Nancy 
Tsiboe, pushed this particular* strategy and won. Austin observes that the strategy 
“proved doubly dangerous” as the establishment of branches in the south and 
recruitment of members required time, money and effort.
The CPP’s election strategy on the other hand, under Nkrumah’s close 
guidance, ensured that the debacle over independent candidates standing, as they did 
in 1954, did not occm* again.86 The CPP also utilised clan disputes among the Brong 
and Dagomba chiefs and in the non-Ewe constituencies to secure loyalty among 
traditional rulers to its advantage.87 Lastly, to emphasise its national character, the 
CPP nominated candidates in all the 99 constituencies.
During the run-up to the election, the main political contenders -  the CPP and
<jo
the NLM -  spelled out the political issues very clearly to the electorate. The NLM 
made “an eloquent well-mounted attack” against the CPP government.89 It pointed 
to the increase in corruption; self-enrichment on the part of the CPP; inefficiency in 
the housing ministry; little benefit returned to cocoa farmers as a result of the
82 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 147.
83 Ibid, p. 151; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 319.
84 For an in-depth analysis o f  the 1956 general election, see Austin, Politics in Ghana, Chapter VII, 
pp.316-362.
85 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 340.
86 Ibid, p. 320.
87 Ibid, p. 320.
88 Ibid, pp.323-337.
89 Ibid, p. 326.
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cutting-out policy and the encroaching dictatorship of the CPP. The NLM’s party 
document presented 26 reasons why a vote for the Movement would bring about a 
increase in living standards and an extension of social services under a federal form 
of government.
The election manifesto of the CPP, on the other hand, asked the voter to 
consider two questions: “(1) Do I want FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE NOW — 
THIS YEAR -  so that I and my children can enjoy life in a free and independent 
sovereign state of Ghana thereafter? (2) Do I want to revert to the days of 
imperialism, colonialism and tribal feudalism?”90
Each side also employed abusive language against its opponent.91 However, 
to ensure that law and order was maintained throughout the country during the 
electoral campaigning, “a police presence kept a watchful eye at all party rallies.”92 
Consequently, serious clashes between the two sides were avoided during polling 
day itself.
The CPP won 71 of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly. This translated 
into 398,141 votes against the non-CPP votes of 299,116. The CPP had seemed the 
“reasonable majority” demanded by Lennox-Boyd. Austin contends that though the 
CPP had won, it is important to consider that Nkrumah and his party had 
demonstrated a “stubborn resistance” to the very notion of a third general election, 
for fear that they may have been defeated.93
The NPP had expected to win 20 of the 26 constituencies in the North and 
had secured only 15 seats, whilst the CPP had gained 11 seats. In Ashanti the CPP 
had gained 8 seats while the NLM and the MAP had secured 12 and 1 respectively.
90 Ibid, p. 330.
91 Ibid, p,332 and 334.
92 Ibid, p. 337.
93 Ibid, p. 348.
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The NLM and its allies had miserably failed to gain any seats in the Colony, whilst 
the CPP had acquired 44 seats.94
There are a number of reasons to explain the NLM’s electoral failure in the 
south. Austin attributes the failure partly to the NLM’s divided electoral strategy. 
The impact of the decision to campaign both in its political stronghold and its 
attempt to gain a foothold in the south was disastrous. It only united the colony 
against the NLM (for there were fears and suspicions of an Ashanti invasion among 
southerners) but those within the NLM who were lukewarm towards the strategy 
now felt vindicated. Moreover, they felt that an undivided political focus would have 
seemed them an increase in seats in Ashanti.
Allman identifies the failure as lying in the indecisiveness of the NLM 
Executive: the NLM could not be a vanguard political party and a Movement 
simultaneously.95 Secondly, the Movement had failed “to capitalise on working class 
disillusionment with the CPP.”96
On surface appearance and on the principle of “first-past-the-post,” the CPP 
had achieved yet another electoral triumph. But “for every 4 voters who cast their
0*7vote for the CPP there were 3 who voted for alternative candidates.” Fortunately 
for the CPP, the UN’s May 1956 plebiscite in British administered Togoland where 
the voters were asked to choose between continued trusteeship and integration into 
the soon-to-be independent Gold Coast brought 58% in favour of union with the 
Gold Coast.98
94 For a critical assessment o f  the election results, see Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp.347-353.
95 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 153.
96 Ibid, p. 154.
97 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 348. Allman also points out “only 50% o f  the Gold Coast’s registered 
voters participated in the election (or 30% o f  the country’s adult population). Thus the CPP’s mandate 
was based on the electoral support o f  17% o f the adult population (or 28.5% o f  registered voters);” see 
Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 159.
98Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 217. This amounted to 93,095 votes for union and 67,492 in favour o f  
separation.
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However, immediately following the election the NLM tried to argue that the 
electoral outcome justified their demand for federation. In the following month, on 
August 3 1956 Nkrumah introduced a motion in the Legislative Assembly calling for 
independence. Despite the walkout by the opposition the motion was passed. The 
opposition continued to thwart the government of Accra by sending a delegation to 
London to meet with the Secretary of State on September 10 1956. They argued for 
constitutional safeguards in the form of regional assemblies; a second chamber for 
the chiefs; a decentralised police and the date for independence to be postponed until 
a royal commission could present a more acceptable constitutional framework for the 
country. The response of the Colonial Office was a blunt one: the opposition had to 
operate within the boundaries of the Legislative Assembly. Secretary of State, 
Lennox-Boyd was of the firm view that secession was not in the interests of the 
country.
In November 1956 the NLM and the NPP sent a joint resolution to the 
Secretary of State demanding separate independence for Ashanti and the Northern 
Territories." Yet, the voices calling for secession within the NLM were declining, as 
more moderate voices prevailed. Busia and the Asantehene now appeared to have 
climbed down from their earlier position on secession and sought to find a face- 
saving solution to the constitutional crisis.
The NLM demanded yet another meeting with the Secretary of State and 
Nkrumah decided to invite the Minister rather than allow the opposition the upper 
hand. Therefore in January 1957, Lennox-Boyd arrived in the country and a 
workable compromise was worked out under his supervision. The Proposed 
Constitution o f Ghana, which later that month became a White Paper, ensured many
99 Allman, Quills o f  the Porcupine, p. 169.
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of the NLM’s concerns were addressed; namely, regional assemblies and an 
agreement that an alteration to the constitution to increase the numbers of regions 
would seek a referendum in the affected region.
With a constitutional agreement that appeared to satisfy both sides, the CPP 
government speeded up its preparation for independence scheduled for March 6
1957. Plans forged ahead for the building of State House. A monumental arch was 
built in the capital bearing the words “Freedom and Justice.”
Barely two weeks before independence, Akoto informed the Chief Regional 
Officer, A. C. Russell that there would be no independence celebrations in 
Ashanti.100 Akoto was incensed at the proposed amendments to the Constitution that 
appeared in The Gold Coast Gazette, in which the Brong chiefs of Dormaa and 
Tekyiman could appeal to the Governor in constitutional matters rather than to the 
Asanteman Council. Akoto’s demand went unheeded by those elements inside the 
NLM who had now agreed to abide by the Constitution and consequently there was 
no violence during the independence celebrations.101
At midnight on March 6, the beginning of the celebrations occasioned the 
formal end of British rule, at a ceremony attend by an estimated crowd of a hundred 
thousand assembled on the Polo Groirnd in Accra. There were hundreds of 
dignitaries and officials present from many countries around the world to witness the 
birth of sub-Saharan Africa’s first independent nation-state. Notable among the 
guests were a number of African American leaders from America and the Caribbean. 
Among the delegation were figures Dr. Ralph Bunche, A. Philip Randolph, and 
Norman Manley from Jamaica. Dr. W. E. B. Dubois could not attend as his passport 
had been seized by the US State Department. This presence of Africans from the
100 Ibid, p. 181.
101 Ibid, p. 183.
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Diaspora was significant as many African Americans and West Indians considered
Nkrumah a kindred soul, having studied in the US, revered Marcus Garvey and as
102 • * *Walters maintains “shared the pain of American racism.” Also, in his visit to the 
US in 1951, Nkrumah had made a Pan-African call to African Americans to return to 
Africa to assist in the continent’s development. Once again he extended an invitation 
to Africa’s descendants to celebrate the birth of a new African nation.
The film footage of the historic occasion shows Nkrumah standing on a 
raised podium with three of his closest colleagues: Kojo Botsio, Minister of Trade 
and Labour, K.A. Gbedemah, Minister of Finance, and Archie Casely-Hayford, 
Minster of Communications, Krobo Edusei and N. A. Welbeck. All wore their 
“prison graduate” caps and the traditional Northern batakari. The choice of dress 
was ideologically significant, for the batakari was considered the archetypal dress of 
the common man, particularly the Northerner as opposed to the privileged Kente 
attire of the Asantehene and his royal court. Nkrumah and his ministers were sending 
out an unambiguous symbolic image and message of their allegiance to the common 
man of the newly independent nation-state.
Nkrumah’s address gave a glimpse of his vision for not only a new Ghana but 
a new Africa. He announced with great emotion: “From now on, today, we must 
change our attitudes, our minds! We must realise that from now on we are no more a 
colonial but a free and independent people! I am depending upon the millions of the 
country, the chiefs and the people to help me to reshape the destiny of this 
country.”103 Nkrumah warned that respect from the world would be earned through 
hard work. He declared: “We can prove to the world that when the African is given a
102 R. W. Walters, Pan-African ism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis o f  Modern Afrocentric 
Political Movements (Detroit, 1993), p. 97.
103 Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-14, Folder 21, Moorland-Spingarn Center, Howard University, 
‘Prime Minister’s Midnight Speech on the Eve o f Independence 6 March, 1957.’
148
chance he can show the world that he is somebody.” His continued reference to the
“African” placed Ghana, a small country of six million people, at the very centre of
the African stage. It was significant for it found resonance in the hearts and minds of
colonial subjects across the African continent and in African descendants in the
USA. In strident tone, Nkrumah stated:
Today, from now on, there is a new African in the 
world, and so that new African is ready to fight his own 
battles and show that after all the black man is capable 
of managing his own affairs. We are going to 
demonstrate to the world, to the other nations, young as 
we are, that we are prepared to lay our own 
foundation.104
The psychological confidence and self-esteem Nkrumah’s words stirred in 
African people in remaining colonial dependent territories in Africa and black 
people, particularly in the US and the Caribbean, cannot be overestimated. 
Nkrumah*s words at this particular historical juncture, inspired Africans across the 
world; gave hope to millions that what had been accomplished in a transformed Gold 
Coast, could be attained elsewhere.
The leader of a newly independent Ghana spoke of the need to “create our 
own African Personality and identity.”105 Moreover, it was on this occasion that he 
made his most famous commitment to the liberation struggles of other dominated 
nations when he pronounced: “We have done the battle and we again re-dedicate 
ourselves not only in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa - our 
independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the 
African continent.”106 These words signified Nkrumah’s intellectual commitment to
104 Ibid.
105 In later years Nkrumah enunciated his definition o f  the “African Personality.”
106 Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-14, Folder 21, Prime Minister’s Midnight Speech on the Eve o f
Independence 6 March 1957, MSRC, Howard University.
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liberation for the whole of Africa. He went on to thank those who had travelled from
abroad. He also made reference to some of his political heroes:
Here I wish I could quote Marcus Garvey. Once upon a 
time, he said, that he looked through the whole world to 
see if he could find a government of a black people. He 
looked around, he did not find one, and he said he was 
going to create one. Marcus Garvey did not succeed. 
But here today the work of Rousseau, the work of 
Marcus Garvey, the work of Aggrey, the work of 
Casely-Hayford, the work of our illustrious men who 
have gone before us has come to reality at this present 
moment.107
Conclusion
Nkrumah tenaciously sought to defeat the federalist argument of his political 
opponents. His centralising concept of political unity considered devolution of power 
an anathema. Yet he was initially prepared to compromise on the issue of regional 
councils with the NLM. Conciliation and attack were the twin methods Nkrumah 
adopted to deal with the NLM whilst focusing single-mindedly on his political 
objective of national independence. Indeed, as Kraus contends: “The high level of 
distrust between the CPP and opposition as well as the forced compromise nature of 
the 1957 constitution meant that the parliamentary structure and its CPP occupants 
were, in fact, regarded with relatively little legitimacy, despite the aura which 
surrounded the celebrations of the first black African colony to receive its
1 flSindependence,”
With the independence celebrations over, Nkrumah’s government confronted 
the huge challenge of welding together a nation-state. The euphoria of independence 
concealed a politically fragmented country. Three months after independence 
celebrations there was violence in the predominantly Ewe-speaking Togoland area
108 J. Kraus, ‘Political Change, Conflict, And Development’ in P. Foster and A. R. Zolberg (eds) Ghana 
and th e lv o iy  Coast Perspectives on Modernization  (Chicago and London, 1971), p. 41.
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and discontent in Accra. The government responded swiftly and broke up the camps 
that had been set up by small groups of supporters of the Togoland Congress that 
were fighting for a reunification with French Togoland. In Kpandu, three people 
were killed in disturbances.109 As Austin argues, whilst the disturbances were 
suppressed, they had long-term ramifications, as they were used by the CPP as a 
justification for further austere measures to confront political dissent. In June 1957 
the Ga people formed a new political party -  the Ga Adangme Shifimo Kpee (the Ga 
Standfast Association).110 Also, there were hints within the party of a controversy 
surrounding whether Nkrumah was to appoint a deputy prime minister, as suggested 
by a report in West Africa. 1U When Nkrumah was questioned by international 
journalists in Iris first press conference since independence on this issue which was 
“well known to be the subject of party controversy recently: with a smile Dr. 
Nkrumah leant forward and asked: “Do I look so old as to need a deputy?” 
Nkrumah’s charming response enabled him to sidestep a thorny political issue. He 
had avoided the question, which was never raised again.
With independence won, Nkrumah now confronted his electoral pledges of 
turning the country into a modern industrialised nation. His promises were indeed 
reflected in Nkrumah’s mantra: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things 
shall be added unto you.” The political objectives of the triumphant Nkrumah-led 
government were to transform the inherited colonial economy and forge a united 
nation and continent. This is the focus of the following chapter.
109 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 372.
110 Ibid, p. 373.




NKRUMAH’S POLITICS, 1958 -  1966
The objective of this chapter is to analyse Nkrumah’s politics from 
independence to the demise of the CPP government in early 1966. The question is: 
how did Nkrumah’s political thought inform the institutions he established between 
1958 and 1966? Significantly, during this period there was a marked change in 
emphasis in Nkrumah’s public announcements. As he himself claims: “With the 
achievement of Independence, the main theme of my speeches changed. I began to 
concentrate on the long-term objectives; economic freedom for Ghana, and African 
emancipation and unity.”1 It was also a period in which Nkrumah repeatedly spoke 
against what he saw as the absurdity of the nuclear arms race between the two great 
superpowers that threatened to engulf the world in thermonuclear war.
Hence for Nkrumah, the future of Ghana’s economic reconstruction was
inextricably linked to the creation of a peaceful world order. To this end, a number of
his speeches and publications were committed to forging better understanding
between nations and peoples regardless of creed, tribe, race or colour. In the year
1958, he expressed his aspirations for Ghana thus:
My first objective is to abolish from Ghana poverty,
ignorance and disease. We shall measure our progress 
by the improvement in the health of our people; by the 
number of children in school, and by the availability of 
water and electricity in our towns and villages, and by 
the happiness, which our people take in being able to 
manage their own affairs. The welfare of our people is 
our chief pride, and it is by this that my government will 
ask to be judged.2
1 Nkrumah, I  Speak o f  Freedom , p. 111.
2 Ibid, p. 123.
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Earlier in 1949 he had proclaimed: “If we get self-government we’ll transform the 
Gold Coast into a paradise in ten years.”3 By 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown 
he had failed to transform the country.
On a personal level, the year 1958 began with the news of NkrumalTs 
controversial marriage to an Egyptian woman. It was as much a political act as a 
private matter. In April of that same year a major conference brought together 
independent African states in Accra and enlarged NkrumalTs stature on the African 
stage. Another conference towards the end of the year brought African nationalists 
from all over the continent once again to Accra, which soon became a Mecca for 
radical Pan-Africanist politics. Other critical developments that affected Nkrumah 
personally during these years were two further assassination attempts on his life in 
1962 and 1964; his growing detachment from the people of Ghana, as he sought to 
mobilise Ghanaians in a second revolution from 1961 onwards. He also suffered the 
personal loss in the death of his political mentor, George Padmore, in 1959 and the 
minder of his ideological comrade, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, in 
January 1961.
A Political Marriage
The new year of 1958 saw Nkrumah at 49 years of age married to a young 22- 
year-old Egyptian woman by the name of Fathia Helen Rizk. In his Autobiography, 
there is a revealing disclosure of his feelings towards women. He wrote of an earlier 
“fear of women ... beyond all understanding.”4 His deep commitment to his political 
goals generated a “dread of being trapped” by the opposite sex and a belief that
3 Cited in Fitch and Oppenheimer, Ghana, p. 25.
4 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 10.
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women, alongside “money and organised and obligatory religion ... should play a 
very minor part in a man’s life, for once one of them gets the upper hand, man 
becomes a slave and his personality is crushed.”5 Perhaps there was more to 
Nkrumah5 s deep-seated fear of being trapped, for Kanu revealingly wrote, that 
Nkrumah disclosed to her: “Love blinds all reasons and confuses one’s judgement. 
There is too little time for it.”6 With such an uncompromising view, it is surprising 
that Nkrumah married at all, for his married life was decisively subordinated to his 
political goals.
Speculation abounds as to why Nkrumah married an Egyptian woman. As far
back as 1952 there had been rumours in the country that Nkrumah was to marry an
English woman, his former landlady, Mrs Florence Manley.7 One interpretation is
given by Douglas Rogers:
Nkrumah5 s marriage to Fathia was an arranged one and 
Nkrumah played no part in the arranging. There had 
been pressure on him to get married, but there was 
concern that if he married a Ghanaian woman it might 
cause tribal jealousies. It was decided by his close 
advisors that if he married an Egyptian this problem 
would be eliminated and at the same time the marriage 
would symbolise the unity of Arab Africa and sub- 
Saharan Africa. Ghana already had a constructive 
relationship and Nkrumah and Nasser shared a Pan- 
Africanist perspective. A small delegation visited Egypt 
and six possible wives were selected. When the 
delegation reported back to Accra with six photographs 
of the candidates Nkrumah told them that they should 
make the choice.8
5 Ibid, p. 10.
6 Kanu, Nkrumah the Man, p. 36.
7 TNA:C0967/175 ‘Possibility o f Dr Nkrumah Marrying an Englishwoman.’
8 Douglas Rogers met Nkrumah in early 1956. He was assistant editor o f  the New Leader, later 
renamed, Socialist Leader which was edited by Fenner Brockway, the British Labour MP. Rogers was 
also very close to George Padmore. He became secretary o f the London based Congress o f  Peoples 
Against Imperialism and was appointed general-secretary o f the Movement for Colonial Freedom. Due 
to deafness in his eighties he could not be formally interviewed but agreed to answer my interview 
questions by letter. It is extremely difficult to corroborate Douglass’ views expressed as the key 
individuals are deceased. His written interview responses are dated 12 February 1999. He died in 2002.
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There was considerable surprise and questions in various quarters after the 
marriage was announced to the public, Nkrumah*s secretary, Erica Powell, wrote in 
her memoir:
On the evening of 30 December 1957, it was announced 
on the local radio that the Prime Minister had married 
an Egyptian girl, Fathia Rfzk, at a quiet ceremony in 
Christianborg Castle. The news came as a bolt from the 
blue that shocked and astounded all but the half dozen 
or so people who were present. I found it particularly 
hard, as the Prime Minster’s private secretary, when I 
had to confess to diplomats and others who phoned to
verify the fact and to seek more details that I was as
ignorant as they were on the subject.9
The reaction of the Ghanaian public was according to Colonel Lupton of the 
British High Commission, a feeling that: “They had been done out of justifiable
reason for a national holiday and a jolly good party.”10 Powell remarks that: “The
Prime Minister did well to disappear on his wedding morn, for the people were 
decidedly upset. The market women marched angrily on the Castle in full sail, and 
less warlike women donned mourning and wept. The diplomatic corps rushed to 
convey the congratulations of their stunned governments.”11
Nkrumah did his best to explain to the market women that his wife was an 
African despite her fair skin. “But within 48 hours the party officials had done such a 
magnificent propaganda job, pointed out that among other things Fathia was an 
African like themselves in spite of her white skin, that the whole country had been 
solidly won over to the sincere belief that the marriage of their beloved Kwame
9 E. Powell was a British national and Nkrumah’s private secretaiy for 15 years (1951 to 1966), see 
Private Secretaiy (Female)/Gold Coast, p. 123
10 TNA:D035/6192.
11 Powell, Private Secretaiy, p. 125.
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1Nkrumah was a very good thing,” maintains Powell. The flurry of gossip and 
rumour mongering within the British and American diplomatic service continued.
As Gamal Abdel Nasser had challenged British imperial interests in the Suez 
crisis of 1956, it seems British government officials and ministers suspected Nasser’s 
motives. J. R. A. Bottomley wrote a letter to M. E. Allen, which reveals the bizarre 
speculations that circulated among British officials. The letter stated: “Both the State 
Dept and CIA have been asking us what we think about it [i.e. Nkrumah*s marriage] -  
they have got hold of a rumour that Dr. Nkrumah felt he was getting too tied up with
1 -5
Israel and as a balancing measure intended on Cairo for “one bride, sight unseen.” 
British officials failed to see that Nkrumah had his own motivations for marrying an 
outsider. In Nkrumah’s mind, the marriage was a political union between Arab North 
Africa and the rest of the African continent. It was a marriage undertaken to assist in 
the consolidation of Pan-Africanism. He had already contemplated and decided by 
the time he wrote his Autobiography in the mid 1950s to subordinate his private life -  
and particularly women - to his political ambitions for Ghana and Africa. Nkrumah 
needed a wife who would not challenge his dictates or interfere with his politics.
Domestic Political Developments, 1958-1961
After his marriage, Nkrumah swiftly returned to political life. Throughout 
1958, the CPP continued to undermine the chiefs in order to make them “junior
12 Ibid, p. 125. An indication o f  the success o f  the CPP propaganda machine in changing Ghanaian 
public opinion is reflected in how quickly the market women designed a traditional Kente cloth after 
Fathia, named “Fathia fata Nkrumah” (Fathia deserves Nkrumah), see G. Nkrumah, ‘Fathia Nkrumah’ 
in Al-Ahram Weekly, 14-20 September, 2000.
13 TNA-.D035/6192. This letter is dated 10 January 1958. J. R. A. Bottomley worked in the British 
Embassy in Washington, DC and M. E. Allen worked in the Commonwealth Relations Office in 
London.
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partners of the CPP” in the same way that the chiefs were subservient to the British 
colonial rulers under indirect rule.14
Among Nkrumah5 s measures to control the chiefs was de-recognition and
appointment of chiefs. For example, on October 16 1957 the CPP withdrew official
recognition of the Okyenhene of Akyem Abuakwa whilst the Jackson commission of
enquiry looked into the administration of the state's affairs. “There was no doubt
whatever that this dramatic move was intended to be seen as exemplary,” claims
Rathbone.15 Meanwhile as the Commission began its work the Joint Provincial
Council met on November 25 1957 and “fearful that they might be next in line for
derecognition by the government” clamoured to give their support to the CPP
government. 16 The impact of this was not lost on the chiefs of Ashanti, for the
minister of local government, Aaron Ofori Atta announced on February 8 1958 that
Mr Justice Sardokee Addo was to examine the affairs of the Kumase State Council.
Alongside this action, the Nkrumah government proposed the recognition of eight
11 *new states in the western part of the Ashanti region. In addition, the government 
gave recognition to a number of Paramount Chiefs of the Asanteman Council via 
publication in the Government Gazette on January 28 1958. The CPP “government 
had, in effect, deconstructed the Ashanti Confederacy at the stroke of a pen,” writes 
Rathbone.18 Following the Kumase municipal elections in February, which gave the 
CPP 17 out of 24 council seats, the Asantehene capitulated. The Asanteman council 
soon fell into line and announced they too supported the CPP government. The May 
1958 report by the Jackson Commission concluded that there was indeed a lack of
14 Mohan, ‘Nkrumah andNkrumaism,’ p.201.
15 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 113.
16 Ibid, p. 117.
17 These initial developments led to the creation o f  the Brong region in 1959.
18 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 119.
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impartial conduct and fiscal probity on the part of the Akyem Abuakwa state 
council.19
On August 8, Ofori Atta’s destoolment was formally published in the 
Government Gazette and soon-after the government introduced the Stools Land Act, 
which aggrieved the Ashanti chiefs. The Act placed the Kumase Stool Lands under 
the direct control of central government. The Asantehene told the Kumase State 
Council on October 2 1958 that with the introduction of this Act “a catastrophe has 
befallen the chiefs of the Ashanti.”20
The background against which these bitter struggles with the chiefs took place 
in the post-independence period “was one of a tottering system of local government
91 •which was seriously frustrating central government.” Increasing government 
intervention in local chieftaincy disputes occurred at the same time as the government 
was forced to suspend many local councils due to irregularities committed by councils 
and lack of co-operation from local ratepayers; personality differences and internal 
strife. This array of problems severely hampered the government’ s capacity to collect 
revenue and to promote rural development.
Another disputatious piece of legislation introduced by Nkrumah*s 
government was the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) on July 18
1958. The climate that facilitated the introduction of the Act had its origins in 
rumours and fears of an opposition plot to assassinate Nkrumah and several CPP 
ministers. Such rumours flourished in the latter months of 1957. Simultaneously, the 
CPP’s introduction of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act in 1957, which banned 
regional and ethnic political groupings, gave rise to a realignment of the opposition.
19 Ibid, p. 127. Meanwhile the government installed Nana Kwabena Kena II as Adontehene in the pro- 
CPP town o f Kukurantuini on 13 June 1958, until a new Okyehene could be enstooled.
20 Ibid, p. 128.
21 Ibid, p. 123.
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Its members included Dr. Busia, Dr. J. B. Danquah, R.R. Amponsalr and others. In the 
midst of allegations and counter-allegations, Dr. Busia declared to a large crowd in 
Kumasi, after announcing the creation of the United Party (UP) in early October 1957 
that “the opposition is not interested in assassination of CPP Ministers.”22 
Subsequently, amidst the climate of charges of assassination, in November 1957 the 
Ewe leaders, S. G. Antor and Kojo Ayeke were arrested and charged with complicity 
in the Alavanyo riots during the independence celebrations. In December 1957 Krobo 
Edusei first proposed the Preventive Detention bill to the National Assembly.23
Several months later, in June 1958, the government discovered a conspiracy of 
some members of the Opposition, led by R. R. Amponsah, General Secretaiy of the 
UP, to purchase military accoutrements.24 In addition to fears of an opposition plot, 
Austin observes “the readiness of the CPP leaders to introduce such measures [i.e. the 
PDA] was almost certainly due to their growing impatience with the ordinary 
machinery of law.”25 The route to the adoption of the Preventive Detention Bill was 
part of the CPP’s legalistic approach to its enemies. It sought to employ the law to 
neutralise its political opponents. Hence the PDA was a reactive measure against 
perceived political terror and the earlier bomb blast of 1955 directed against 
Nkrumah. It is in this context that the Cabinet met on June 20 1958 to discuss the 
Preventive Detention Bill. They were aware that the Bill would be negatively received 
abroad and were concerned with the timing of its announcement. 26 They agreed to 
wait for the return of the Prime Minister from his tour of independent African states 
before its publication. Two weeks later, at the Bill’s second reading Nkrumah
22 West Africa 12 October 1957.
23 Bing, Reap the Whirlwind, p. 270.
24 This later led to the arrest o f  43 UP suspects in November 1958. They were accused o f  seeking to 
overthrow the government.
25 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 381.
26 Cabinet Minutes, 20 June 1958, NAG:ADM/13/1.
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appealed to Parliament. A lengthy and fiery exchange over the efficacy of the Bill
* • 97took place between the government and the Opposition.
Towards the end of the year, the Nkrumah government used the PDA to arrest
* 9843 members of the UP, among them were Ashie Nikoi, Dzenkle Dzewu and others. 
In December, Captain Ahwaitey, the Commander of Giffard camp in Accra made it 
known that 011 December 18 he had been approached by R. R. Amponsah and Modesto
9QK. Apaloo to help depose the government. A Commission of Enquiry was
established, led by Mr Justice Granville Sharp. The evidence against the three was
slight. The government was forced to accept the Commission’s unanimous rejection
of the opposition’s involvement in the plot and similarly the case put forward by the
opposition that the entire conspiracy was a “frame-up” by the government to justify
Preventive Detention. According to the Attorney General, Geoffrey Bing, the entire
Ahwaitey case was “a world propaganda move” in an effort to explain why Ghana
had adopted the PDA.30 It sought to demonstrate that the Act was being deployed
according to Western judicial conventions. To this end the lengthy tribunal
proceedings were sent “to every jurist throughout the world who was known to have
criticised the use of preventive detention in Ghana or to have expressed concern about
Ghana’s denial of civil liberties.”31 However, despite this well publicised case,
Western opinion was not convinced of the necessity for the Act nor the legal
conventions through which it was enacted. Bing maintains:
Preventive detention had been established in India 
before it was introduced in Ghana without resulting in
27 Parliam entaty Debates 14 July 1958, p. 408.
28 West Africa 15 November 1958; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 381.
29 West Africa 15 November 1958; S. Baynham, The Military and Politic in Nkrumah’s Ghana 
(London, 1988), pp. 87-92.
30 Bing, Reap the Whirlwind, p. 268.
31 Ibid, p. 268.
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any denunciation of the type, which its establishment 
and use in Ghana had aroused.
Certainly, the affair marked the beginning of Nkrumah’s growing frustration with 
Western press criticism. It also heralded the beginnings of the Nkrumah 
government’s enforcement of the PDA and Deportation Act.34 The Deportation Act 
had been introduced in May 1957 to replace the colonial Alien’s Ordinance and the 
Immigrant British Subjects Ordinance. Deportations were to be authorised against an 
“alien” individual who was considered to be a threat to public order. According to 
Rathbone:
In tandem with these trends and events, die future of the 
regional assemblies was being sealed. On 23 October 
[1958] the results of the regional elections, which were 
to return members to the regional assemblies, were 
announced. CPP candidates had won 213 out of the 221 
seats. Almost without exception they had been returned 
without contest, as the UP had decided to boycott these 
elections as a protest. The constitution stipulated that 
any regional assembly could assent to the national 
government’s proposals to amend the constitution, 
including measures dissolving itself, if such a motion 
commanded a two-thirds majority. The way was now 
open for the government to dispose of what they 
regarded as the constitutional encumbrance of even so 
limited a degree of regional devolution.35
The importance of such developments is that they laid the way for the introduction for 
a republic in 1960 and permitted the government to abrogate its 1957 commitment to 
regional bodies.
32 Ibid, p. 269.
33 Ibid, pp.269-270.
34 Among those deported were: Idris Braimah, Sam Moshie, Adamu Dogo and many others; see 
Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 137. The government justified these deportations on the grounds 
that the individuals were criminal elements or non-Ghanaians who were jeopardising the security o f  the 
state. By the middle o f 1962 there were approximate 1200 political detainees in various prisons in 
Ghana; see B as/2/141/.
35 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 136,
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A New Ideological Direction: In Pursuit o f the Second Revolution
In terms of the party, the CPP underwent an extensive restructuring following 
Nkrumah’s address to the party on its tenth anniversary. As Austin observes, “the
first signs of [a] shift away from the established leaders could be detected in the
•j /■
anniversary speech.” Nkrumah commented thus:
Comrades, it seems to me that maybe from 
complacency or exhaustion, some of our older party 
members seem to have lost the early spirit of zeal and 
self-sacrifice, which once imbued our party. We, as an 
organised Party, need a central ideology to inspire our
actions. And unless we are so aimed and inspired we
shall find ourselves rudderless. From the lowest 
member to the highest we must arm ourselves 
ideologically.
Not only did Nkrumah officially steer the party in the new direction of socialism but 
he also declared a formal restructuring of the CPP to achieve the goal of creating an 
economic revolution to modernise the country. Five years earlier, in May 1954, 
Padmore had warned him of the growth in careerism amongst party members and 
their dearth of political understanding. It appears Nkrumah now heeded the advice. 
Why he waited so long to do this is difficult to know. We can only surmise that 
perhaps in 1954 Nkrumah was consumed with the political pressures of collaborating 
with the British and stamping his authority over undisciplined party elements in 
Kumasi.
On the occasion of the CPP’s tenth anniversary, Nkrumah made several 
important announcements to the party faithful. Firstly, Nkrumah informed them that 
the first revolution had been a political revolution of attaining the political kingdom. 
The corollary to this had yet to be embarked upon: a struggle to achieve the economic
36 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 405.
37 Ibid, p. 405.
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kingdom. Secondly, Nkrumah reinforced a commitment to the Leninist principle of 
democratic centralism. There would be internal discussion but thereafter decisions 
had to be respected and adhered to by all. Thirdly, he declared that “the Party is the 
State, and the State is the party.” Consequently from 1959 to his overthrow, the 
absorption of the state by the party took place. Simultaneously there was a 
consolidation of all the party’s wings as integral to the CPP. Finally, this new 
direction manifested itself in the ideology of Nkrumaism in 1961.
The significance of the 1959 address was: “For the first time, however, 
socialism began to be insisted upon with a sense of urgency as both the ideology and 
the ultimate aim of the CPP, the ideology with which the party would carry out its 
new role and the end to which all its efforts would be directed.” Fundamentally, the 
new ideology lacked detailed content. However, some general principles and 
tendencies could be discerned, such as: all people would receive according to their 
needs, regardless of race, colour', tribe or creed; a mixed national economy would be 
established in which the public, private and co-operative sectors would co-exist; 
“African socialist principles” would be “adopted to suit Ghanaian conditions;” and 
ideological education would be introduced via party vanguardists to spread the
39message of the party’s goals to all sectors of the party and the Ghanaian people. For 
Folson, these principles constituted “confused thinking” and “apparent unclarity.”40 
Moreover, he argues that they were beset with intellectual inconsistencies, for 
Nkrumah appeared to adhere to the view that socialism could co-exist with private
38 B.D.G.Folson, ‘The Development o f  Socialist Ideology in Ghana: II-The Period o f ‘African 
Socialism’ 1959-1962’, in Ghcma Social Science Journal, Vol. 1 No. 2, 1971.
39 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
40 Ibid, p. 2.
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enterprise. Also, the 1959 constitution promised to introduce socialism applicable to 
Ghanaian conditions and simultaneously advocated “African Socialism.”41
To spearhead this new ideological direction, Nkrumah decided to restructure 
the party. The National Association of Socialist Students (NASSO), which had been 
formed in London after NkrumalTs departure, acted as a theoretical discussion group 
under the guidance of its “ideological counsellors,” Padmore and Makonnen. NASSO 
was described by Nkrumah as “the ideological wing of the party” alongside the Party 
Vanguard Activists (PVAs).42 The precise role of these two organisations is difficult 
to delineate and in reality their roles overlapped.43 The PVAs constituted individuals 
who after acquiring ideological training were drafted into key positions in the party 
organisation, as well as the party press and civil service to explain the aims and 
objectives of the party to those who did not understand them.44
There was an increase in the numbers of “auxiliary and functional 
organisations” such as the creation of the Ghana Young Pioneer Movement (GYPM); 
the All African Trade Union Front (formed in May 1961), the National Council of 
Ghanaian Women (NCGW), and the Ghana Co-operative Movement. Nkrumah 
viewed these integral wings as the solution to the rise of localism in the constituency 
parties but they were also considered the basis for reorganising Ghanaian society 
along socialist lines,45 He had a longstanding belief that the youth of society 
constituted an asset in national reconstruction. To this endeavour he inaugurated the 
Young Pioneers in June 1960. The movement was the only officially recognised 
youth group in the country and was headed by Zubeiro Baba Shardow who had been
41 Ibid, pp.2-3.
42 Legum’s, ‘Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation’, pp.135-140.
43 Ibid, p. 139.
44 Ibid, pp. 138-139; Legum points out that there was little evidence that the PVAs functioned as 
organised units within the party structure.
45 Ibid, p. 293.
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trained in Europe and Israel in youth organisation. It was modelled on the Soviet 
komsomol schools aimed at “training the mind, body and soul of the youth of Ghana 
to be up to their civic responsibilities so as to fulfil their patriotic duties.”46
Similarly the NCGW that was set up on September 10 1960 became the only 
recognised body under which all Ghanaian women were to be organised and 
encouraged to visit Eastern bloc countries to learn organisational skills.47 Adamafio’s 
account of the formation of the Council illustrates how determined Nkrumah was to 
establish a centralised structure to co-opt the two existing women’s organisations. 
They were the non-political National Federation of Gold Coast Women and the 
politically orientated Ghana Women’s League. In short, if Adamafio’s account is to 
be believed, it was a top-down approach to organisation 48 Nkrumah even chose the 
name for the new organisation and appointed loyal female Secretary Generals of the 
Council49
The overall effects of Nkrumah’s restructuring of the CPP were many and 
profound. Significantly was “the increase in internal factionalism, in competition for 
influence, and in inner party intrigue,” which developed between 1957 to 1965.50 In 
the opinion of Apter, the inner party disputes caused Nkrumah to tighten his authority 
by establishing a Republican government. This was achieved by the introduction of a 
plebiscite in April 1960. Nkrumah announced the idea on the third anniversary of the 
country’s independence in a radio broadcast. Voters were asked if they accepted a
46 Cited in The Ghana Young Pioneers document in author’s possession.
47 Women had since the formation o f  the CPP played an instrumental role in the growth, financing, and 
organising o f  the Party. See T. Manuh, ‘Women and Their Organisations During the Convention 
Peoples Party Period’ in K Arhin (e d ) , The Life and Works ofKwam e Nkrumah (Trenton, 1993), pp. 
101-127.
48 T. Adamafio, By Nkrum ah’s Side: The Labour and the Wounds (Accra, 1982), pp. 113-120; see also 
T. Manuh, ‘ Women and their Organisations During the Convention People’s Party Period,’pp.101- 
129.
49 Manuh, ‘Women and then Organisations’, p. 119. From its inception Sophia Doku was the first 
Secretary General, followed by Stella Abeka and then Margaret Martei.
50 Apter, ‘Ghana,’ p. 293.
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Republican constitution contained in a government White Paper and to select their
Presidential candidate: Nkrumah or Danquah. Nkrumah was convinced that a
Republican form of government was the realisation of Ghana’s full sovereignty. The
country was to achieve complete independence from Britain, with Nkrumah, rather
than the Queen being the Head of State. At the opening of a new party headquarters
011 April 2 1960, Nkrumah announced to the CPP:
The Convention People’s Party is a powerful force; 
more powerful, indeed, than anything that has yet 
appeared in the history of Ghana. It is the uniting force 
that guides and pilots the nation and is the nerve centre 
of the positive operations in the struggle for African 
irredentism. Its supremacy cannot be challenged. The 
Convention People’ Party is Ghana, and Ghana is the 
Convention People’s Party.51
The results of the April plebiscite for Accra gave Nkrumah 16,804 votes and 
Danquah, 9,035 whilst those in support of the republican constitution numbered 16,
739 and those against 9, 207. The numbers of people who abstained were significant 
as was the low turnout; less than half the electorate voted.52 The poll showed 1,008,
740 in favour of the new constitution (88.5%) and 131, 425 against (11.5%). In the 
presidential contest Nkrumah received 1,016,076 votes (89.1%).53 Austin contends 
“that the CPP almost certainly manipulated the voting. Thus deceit was added to force 
where both were probably unnecessary.”54
Nkrumah believed he had endorsement for the establishment of a new 
republic. In essence, “The 1960 constitution provided for a highly centralised system 
of government with the president, the head both of state and of government, as its
51 Ibid, p. 209.
52 Austin, Politics in Ghana, pp. 390-391.
53 Ibid, p. 394.
54 Ibid, pp.394-395.
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linch-pin.”55 The President had the power of appointment and dismissal over all civil 
service, armed forces and judicial appointments. Furthermore, “the real point of the 
new constitution was to rid Nkrumah of checks on his authority from within the 
government machine, so that he could administer to the country as he saw best.”56 The 
inauguration of the republican constitution on July 1 1960 simply formalised the 
“highly personal maimer” Nkrumah had exercised power since 1957.57 The 
Republican constitution had transferred ultimate responsibility for the armed forces 
from the Queen’s representative in Accra, the British Governor General to the 
President. Nkrumah was not only head of state, but also commander in chief of the 
army. On October 1 1960 he set up the President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR) 
comprised of older soldiers unfit for field duty. Their role was to guard Flagstaff
c Q
House. Its commander was a northerner, Colonel David Zanlerigu. The perception 
of the POGR among the regular armed forces was to give rise to increasing friction 
and ultimately the 1966 coup.
Nkrumah’s Turning Point, 1961
In 1961, several actions taken by Nkrumah led to increasing political and economic 
disquiet in the country. First was Nkrumah* s “Dawn Broadcast” of April 8 1961, 
followed by his introduction of an austerity budget in July that became the catalyst to 
the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers strike in September. The year was also 
momentous in that it saw the rise in the formulation of the ideology of Nkrumaism 
and concomitantly the entrenchment of an “Nkrumaist cult” that lasted until 
Nkrumah’s overthrow. Finally, there was Nkrumah’s ideological move towards the
55 Mohan, ‘Nkrumah and Nkrumaism’, p. 209.
56 Ibid, p. 209.
57 Ibid, p. 209.
58 Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics , p. 137.
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Eastern bloc and Soviet Union. The coalescence of all these developments therefore 
makes 1961 pivotal in the record of Nkrumah’s government.59 Acts of terrorism and 
several conspiracies against the CPP government subsequently increased and 
impacted decisively on Nkrumah’s political conduct.
It was incontrovertibly “the year- in which Nkrumah broke definitely with the 
policies inherited from the British” and forged a new direction in order to attain the 
economic paradise he had promised the people of Ghana and to consolidate his 
political power and that of the CPP. 60 Significantly between February and June 1961 
Nkrumah made several speeches setting out his commitment to socialism, before 
departing for his extended tour of the Communist world in July. Consequently, it is 
essential to understand the thinking that underpinned the positions and actions 
undertaken by Nkrumah that brought about this new direction and the incongruity 
between his ideals and the reality.
Up until 1960 the party had an external opponent to confront, in the form of 
the NLM-NPP alliance and the UP after 1957. In 1960 with the opposition politically 
impotent as a result of Dr. J. B. Danquah’s defeat in the presidential contest, it 
appears the CPP turned in on itself.61 By the time of this famous broadcast, corruption 
within the CPP had heightened considerably. The rise in the levels of corruption lies 
partly in the nature of the party. From its birth it attracted diverse elements into its 
ranks in order to maintain its self-characterisation as a “mass party.” For many in the 
party, the party was a vehicle for material self-enrichment, and even more so now that 
the political kingdom had been attained. Some elements of the Ghanaian middle 
classes, such as lawyers, lecturers and businessmen, joined the party after
59 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana’, p. 143.
60 Killick, Developm ent Economics, p. 34.
61 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 402.
168
independence.62 Significantly, “Few CPP members took the party’s “socialism” 
seriously; they were “all socialist” so long as it merely served the party as a slogan,” 
argues Legiun.63 Furthermore, “it was only after Nkrumah embarked on his policy of 
“ideological education” that the gulf deepened between him and the middle class and 
the groupings within the CPP came into open confrontation.”64
Win 1st Nkrumah was in London attending the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers Conference in March 1961, the crisis between the old guard -  the older and 
more conservative elements of the party and the “Ideo Boys” came to the fore.65 On 
returning from London, Nkrumah delivered his broadcast66 in which he stated that the 
causes of the disputes between different factions of the party lay in parliamentarians
f t 1who had become “a new ruling class of self-seekers and careerists.” They were 
reminded that their commitment was to their constituency and that constituencies 
were not the private property of parliamentarians. He admonished party ministers, 
secretaries and MPs who used their party membership as a means of amassing wealth, 
to extract bribes from others or as a means of elevating family members to positions 
of influence and status.68 Nkrumah announced a new directive that would limit the 
material acquisitions party members could legitimately possess.69 The “young Turks” 
considered the Dawn Broadcast as a licence to attack figures such as Gbedemah, 
Botsio, Ayeh-Kumi, Krobo Edusei and others as “party capitalists.” They considered 
Gbedemah their strongest opponent and archconservative. To remind the party 
faithful of the party’s original ideal of “one man, one vote,” they abused the rightwing
62 Legum ‘Socialism in Ghana’, pp.143-144; see also Adamafio, By Nkrumah’s Side, p. 57.
63Ibid, p. 144.
64 Ibid, p. 144.
65 This is a disparaging term the CPP old guard used to refer to the left wingers inside the party; 
interview with Kojo Botsio, August 18 1999, Accra. Botsio was a member o f  the CPP old guard.
66 Adamafio was the inspiration behind the broadcast and Bing writes that he also drafted the speech; 
see Bing, Reap the Whirlwind, 1968, p. 407.
67 Legum ‘Socialism in Ghana,’ p. 403.
68 Ibid, pp.403-405.
69 Ibid, p. 405.
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with taunts of “one man, one house,” “one man, one car.” The conservatives hit back
• 70by attacking Marxist socialism as an ideology foreign to Ghana.
In Legum’s judgement, “The Dawn Broadcast made a tremendous impact on 
the public; people were keyed up, expecting drastic action against party leaders, or at 
least a thorough purge of the government. But little actually happened.”71 In short, the 
Dawn Broadcast was not translated into the immediate purge that many expected.72 
Instead, Nkrumah as Life Chairman of the party, took over as General Secretary of the 
party on May 1, relieving Adamafio of this position. The move was in no way a 
criticism of Adamafio’s ability nor performance. It simply consolidated Nkrumah’s 
power within the party as a basis for further action. In addition to this, Gbedemah was 
demoted from Minster of Finance to Health.73 This particular action, was as Austin
74observes, “the first open split between Nkrumah and the ablest of his lieutenants.” 
The reasons for Nkrumah5 s failure to act more decisively are for Legum attributable 
to the fact that “the crisis in the party had come sooner than Nkrumah expected and he 
was not ready to undertake major changes. Moreover, the crisis in the party left 
Nkrumah unsure of his own strength in the Party and the country.”75 He therefore 
acted cautiously whilst maintaining the appearance of dealing with the crisis at hand.
Re-defining the Political Kingdom, 1962-1966
From 1962 to 1966 Nkrumah reshaped Ghanaian politics by continuing the detention 
of his political opponents and establishing a one party state. The one party state was 
to become a trend in most of Africa from the mid 1960s. In Ghana, political life
70 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana,’ p. 147.
71 Ibid, p. 145.
72 Ibid, p. 146.
73 Ibid, p. 148; see also Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 405.
74 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 405.
75 Legum, ‘Socialism in Ghana,’ p. 146.
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during the 1962-1966 period was punctuated by a further two assassination attempts 
011 Nkrumah and increasing terrorist activity in the country. In addition, increasing 
corruption, the failure to democratise the political structures of Ghana and economic 
decline, profoundly affected Ghanaian society. The overall effects of these 
developments produced political cynicism, sycophancy and Nkrumah’s alienation 
from the electorate. Dining this period Young’s observation that “the most cynical 
whisper that Nkrumahism was merely the highest stage of opportunism” is a valid 
one, for several party officials espoused the party line in order to conceal the 
siphoning of state resources into their own pockets.76
Contributing to the increasing apathy among ordinary Ghanaians in 1962 was 
the storm of protest in the country when the wife of Krobo Edusei purchased a gold
77embossed bed from a London furniture store for three thousand pounds sterling. 
Critics considered the purchase an intolerable affront to Ghana’s austerity 
programme.78 The purchase highlighted the escalating corruption that existed among 
government officials and CPP ministers. In these circumstances Nkrumah was forced 
to act and shortly after this affair introduced new bills to tackle corruption. Any 
individual, including ministers, found guilty of corrupt practices would be liable to a
• * 79minimum of five years and maximum of ten years imprisonment with hard labour. 
Despite these intentions it appears these laws were never rigorously enforced.
Several months after this scandal, Nkrumah met President Yameogo of Upper 
Volta on August 1 at Tenkudugu, a small town on the Ghana-Upper Volta border, to
76 Young, Ideology and Development, p. 11.
77 West Africa  7 April 1962. Mrs Edusei, who was a trader, claimed that she bought the bed with her 
own money. This story was widely reported in the American and British press.
78 The National Council o f  Ghana Women made a resolution criticising the purchase, see West Africa 7 
April 1962.
79 West Africa 28 April 1962.
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conclude a trade agreement.80 On his return to Accra he passed through the village of 
Kulungugu where he was attracted to a party of school children waving the Ghanaian 
flag. Nkrumah had not expected to stop anywhere en route. However, on seeing the 
children, whom he had special affection for, he made his driver stop. As Nkrumah 
walked towards the crowd of children, there was a huge blast as a grenade landed 
yards from him. Nkrumah escaped this assassination attempt but an innocent
• • SIschoolboy among four others, were killed in this incident.
The ramifications of the Kulungugu incident were profound. Nkrumah was 
hospitalised for two weeks in the northern town of Bawku in order to remove 
shrapnel embedded in his back. He refused the anaesthetic when doctors operated to 
remove the shrapnel. His refusal was based on the fact that: “He thought under
• S'}sedation he might be killed.”
The immediate political effects on Accra were “two weeks of hysterical 
headlines which in turn, blamed every exiled opposition leader and Western power for
O'! 4
the bomb outrage” as well as wild rumours. Among the speculation in the country 
was the belief that the perpetrators were members of Nkrumah’s entourage: 
Adamafio, Coffie-Crabbe and Ako Adjei who were said to have instigated the 
assassination. Moreover, it seems “ [Nkrumah] was pleased with the opportunity to 
dismember the Ministry of Information in order to construct a duplicate ministry at 
Flagstaff House by enlarging his Publicity Secretariat so that it could handle all press 
and radio communications.”84 Alongside this dismemberment, Nkrumah also 
abandoned an effective cabinet system of administration and began to rely on
80 Adamafio, By Nkrumah’s Side, p. 125.
81 Ibid, p. 127.




numerous secretariats of which he maintained personal control.85 With the loss of 
Adamafio, Nkrumah began arranging his own appointments and interviews.86 It 
appeai-s one of the several consequences of Kulungugu was Nkrumah’s realisation 
that “he must create certain political machinery if he was ever to get things done, [he] 
began to withdraw from public life.”87
By the end of August the security police and intelligence service had cast 
suspicions on Tawia Adamafio; Ako Adjei, Minister of Foreign Affairs and H. H. 
Coffie-Crabbe, who was Executive Secretary of the CPP, as the perpetrators. The
* . Q Obasis of these suspicions were highly speculative and insubstantial. In Parliament a
private members motion was put forward by W. A. Amoro congratulating Nkrumah
on his escape from the attack and urged “all citizens to be alive to their
responsibilities for the security of the State.”89 The phenomenon of the deification of
Nkrumah, begun since his founding of the party continued. B. A. Konu, MP for South
Tongu, characterised the President as a “Saviour who has delivered us from the bonds
of imperialism and colonialism.”90 The effects on Nkrumah’s demeanour were
observable. Six weeks after the event Basner visited Nkrumah and wrote:
The physical shock of the bomb, the psychological 
shock of dead and wounded children around him, the 
political shock in the police reports that Adamafio 
headed the plot, had to pass before he could be himself 
again. On this day he was drawn, subdued and 
somewhat heavy in his movements and thoughts, 
whereas a sparkle in his physical presence and mind is 
the most obvious feature in his personality.91
85 Ibid, p. 30. There were already in existence a number o f  secretariats long before the Kulungugu 
assassination attempt. There were 12 at Flagstaff House around 1962-63.The attack gave him further 
justification to take direct personal control.
86 Ibid, Bas/2/128.
87 Kanu, Kwame Nkrumah: The Man, p. 122.
88 Parliamentary Debates, 6 September 1962, p. 62.




In the opinion of Basner, a second bomb thrown shortly after Kulungugu near 
the centre of Accra was to “to demoralise the people of Ghana so that they would 
keep away from meetings and demonstrations of the CPP.”92 In all, between 
September 1962 and January 1963 five bombings took place in the capital leading to a
Cj t
tightening of security measures throughout the country. A state of emergency was 
declared in Accra and Tenia on September 23 1962 following a huge bomb explosion 
and Emergency Powers were granted to the army.94 Another development following 
the assassination attempt was the expansion of the POGR. Overall the political 
significance of Kulungugu was a dangerous one.
Kulungugu did not deter Nkrumah from the ideological trajectory he had 
embarked on. To give publicity to the political principles and ideas of the party, which 
were to guide the state of Ghana and the struggle for African unity, Nkrumah founded 
The Spark in December 1962. Since the founding of the Evening News in 1948, 
Nkrumah needed a new propaganda tool to disseminate his social and political 
ideology as he considered the written word an essential component of political 
struggle. The co-editors of this new outfit were Kofi Batsa and S. G. Ikoku95 who 
considered Nkrumah the real “Editor in Chief.”96 Members of the editorial board 
comprised: Ikoku Habib Nyiang, and Prof. Kojo Abraham, who Batsa described as “a
onsilent worker in the group.” Others who contributed to the publication included the
92 Ibid, Bas/2/137.
93 Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 134.
94 Ibid, p. 134.
95 Kofi Batsa was one o f the 81 rebel candidates who were expelled from the CPP in 1954, see The 
Spark, p. 11. He was later rehabilitated and appointed Principal Research Officer at the Bureau o f  
African Affairs, He served briefly as editor o f  the monthly magazine, the Voice o f  Africa and became 
co-editor o f  The Spark. He was a vocal exponent o f the ideology o f Nkrumaism. In the post Nkrumah 
era he concluded that socialism was no longer the way forward for Africa but capitalism. S. G. Ikoku 
was a Nigerian academic who was appointed a member o f  the staff o f  the Winneba Ideological Institute 
set up in 1961 to provide ideological training for all party and government officials. The National 
Liberation Council that deposed Nkrumah later deported him.
96 Batsa The Spark, p. 16.
97 Ibid, p. 16.
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British writers Joan and Ron Bellamy and Denis Ogden.98 The Spark had a domestic 
and internationalist orientation. Nkrumah considered the purpose of the journal as a 
platform to propound a new socialist ideology for the whole of Africa in what he 
considered as the new phase of the African revolution.
On January 8 1963 the capital was rocked by another bomb explosion at the 
Accra Sports Stadium. Four people died and eighty-five others were wounded.99 
Nkrumah had been at the stadium earlier to address a mass rally of 25,000 members 
of the CPP and it is most likely he was the intended target. The government alleged 
that Obetsebi Lamptey100 had been involved in this attack and he was therefore 
imprisoned atNsawam security jail.101
On February 1 1963 the Aliens Act was brought into operation by legislative 
instrument. It consolidated the old Deportation Act (1957) and the Immigration Act 
with their amendments, into one piece of legislation.102 It imposed upon employers 
and employees the responsibility of notifying the Minister of Interior within seven 
days when an “alien” employee commenced or finished work.103 The Minister of 
Interior, Kwaku Boateng said: “In this way the immigration authorities can keep tag 
of all aliens who enter the country to take up work and ensure that they engage in only 
those activities for which their residence permits were granted.”104 It was noticeable 
that during the second reading of the Aliens Bill in December 1963, there were no 
voices of parliamentary opposition to this bill as there had been in 1957 when the
98 Ibid, p. 14.
99 New Ashanti Times 12 January 1963.
100 E. Obetsebi Lamptey was one o f  the “Big Six” UGCC leaders arrested in 1948. In 1961 he fled 
briefly to Lome where he continued his political opposition to Nkrumah. He returned to Ghana in 1962 
after Nkrumah declared an amnesty. By this time he was ill with lung cancer and tuberculosis.
101 Obetsebi Lamptey died in his cell on 29 January 1963 due to deterioration in his health. See 
NAG/ADM5/3/42 -  Detention and Death in Nsawam prison Mr. E. Obetsebi Lamptey: Extracts from  
Evident o f  Witnesses at the Commission o f  Enquiry into Ghana Prisons 1967.
102 Parliam entajy D ebates, 7 December 1962, pp. 101-109.
103 Parliamentary Debates 1 December 1962, p. 102.
104 Ibid, p. 103.
175
opposition voiced disquiet over both the Avoidance of Discrimination Act of 1957 
and the PDA of 1958.
It appears a climate of paranoia, suspicion and Nkrumah’s growing concern 
for his personal safety caused by the recent bombings and assassination attempt 
motivated the introduction of this bill as well as the introduction of the National 
Security Service Act of 1963. The Act brought several intelligence and special 
military services under Nkrumah’s direct control.105 The three main services 
established were: the Military Intelligence (MI) set up in 1961 and led by M. M. 
Hassan, an Nzima who was loathed by the army; the Special Intelligence Unit, 
established in early 1963 and directed by another Nzima, Ambrose Yankey; and the 
Presidential Detail Department (PDD) which was principally responsible for the 
personal safety of Nkrumah and headed by a civilian, Eric Otoo.106 The formation of 
these three services were totally independent from the regular aimed forces and 
police, which gave rise to a growing chasm between Nkrumah and the Ghana armed 
forces.
Alongside these bills were lengthy discussions on the timeliness of a one party 
system of government, which had begun in Parliament on September 11 1962. CPP 
parliamentarians presented various justifications. Among them was the belief that the 
Western concept of parliamentary government had been imposed upon Ghana by the 
imperial power; it was a duty to unite Ghana first before achieving total unity of 
Africa; that it would automatically “bring an end to the evil of social inequality in
107Ghana” and miraculously “separatism will disappear.”
105 Baynham, The M ilitaiy and Politics, p. 136.
106 Ibid, p. 137. Baynham claims that this complex civilian-military apparatus was advised by a number 
o f Eastern bloc advisors. The Presidential Guard for example was not only under the aegis o f  the PDD 
but Cuban specialists supervised it.
107 This argument was put forward by S. I. Iddrissu, CPP member for Dagomba North; see 
Parliamentary Debates 11 September 1962, pp. 171-173.
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The ideological antecedents of Nkrumah’s own rationalisation for a one party 
system are implied in his infamous words, expressed in the Preface of his 1957 
Autobiography: “But even a system based on social justice and a democratic 
constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by 
emergency measures of a totalitarian kind.”108 A year after this statement -  on 
December 26 1958 -  in a speech to the Indian Council on World Affairs, Nkrumah 
declared: “We in Africa will evolve forms of government rather different from the 
traditional Western pattern but no less democratic in their protection of the individual 
and his inalienable rights.”109 In Nkrumah’s thinking there was no paradox in this, for 
the CPP was the ultimate expression of the will of the people and protector of their 
interests.110
For Nkrumah, modern socialism required a centralised government to direct 
the operation and development of the economy, which was tantamount to a de facto 
one party system. In his view, multipartyism represented irreconcilable interests. He 
believed: “A people’s parliamentary democracy with a one-party system is better able 
to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multi­
party parliamentary system, which is in fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers 
up, the inherent struggle between the “haves” and the “have-nots.”111
Meanwhile, as heated parliamentary discussions on the desirability of a one 
party government continued, the trial before a special court of those arrested after the
Kulungugu attack took place. On December 9 1963, a new crisis confronted Nkrumah
when the court consisting of Chief Justice Sir Arku Korsah, W. B. Van Lare and 
Akufu-Addo, judges of the Supreme Court, acquitted all three men for insufficient
108 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. x.
109 K. Nkrumah, Axioms ofK w am e Nkrumah (London, 1966), p. 103.
110 K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London, 1963), p. 71.
111 K. Nkrumah, Consciencism  (London, 1964), p. 101.
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evidence.112 Two days later Nkrumah dismissed Korsah. The Ghanaian Times on 
December 12 1963 declared that the reason for the sacking was that the Chief Justice 
has “failed in his duty, let his leader down and betrayed his country” by failing to 
inform Nkrumah in advance the outcome of the verdict. The consequences of his 
action caused profound astonishment in various quarters. C. L. R. James wrote to 
Nkrumah expressing he was “concerned about the impact that Ghana and you are 
making on the world and on Africa.” 113 Nkrumah, who was normally an enthusiastic 
correspondent, did not reply to James’ letter.
On January 2 1964, as Nkrumah walked through the gardens of Flagstaff 
house towards his residence he was the target of a third assassination attempt by 
police constable Seth Ametewee. Two bullets killed Nkrumah’s bodyguard, Salifu 
Dagarti. Nkrumah and members of the security team overpowered the assassin 
leaving Nkrumah with a “huge wound in his cheek.” 114 The effect of this third 
assassination attempt led to Nkrumah* s increasing suspicion and mistrust towards 
those around him.115 Two days after the attack, E. R. T. Madjitey, the Police 
Commissioner was arrested and detained with nine other senior members of the police 
force who were suspected of masterminding the assassination. Evidence was 
produced that Ametewee was in the pay of senior police officers and in 1965 he was
• 1 1Ahanged for the murder of Dagarti.
Another repercussion of the 1964 assassination attempt was that it “convinced 
Nkrumah of the need for an even more powerful security force.”117 Therefore,
112 Instead the Special Court had found Messrs Joseph Yaw Manu and Benjamin Otchere guilty; see 
West Africa 2 1 May 1966.
113 The letter was dated 14 December 1963; see Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution by C. L. R. James 
(London, 1985), p. 179.
114 Interview with Gamal Nkrumah on 22 May 2004, London; see also Kanu, Nkrumah the Man, p.
127.
115 Kanu, Nkrumah the Man, p. 123.
116Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 134.
117 Ibid, p. 138.
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towards the end of the year an additional POGR battalion was created leading to a 
“simmering hostility between the PDD (especially the POGR) and the regular forces” 
on account of the better quality equipment heaped 011 the POGR in comparison to the 
shortages endured by the army.118 Significantly, J. W. K. Harlley replaced Madjitey 
and T. Delta also became Deputy Police Commissioner in a major reorganisation of 
the police force.119
With the arrests of Adamafio, Adjei and Coffie-Crabbe, there arose
speculation as to whether Nkrumah would allow the three to be executed 01* use his
presidential prerogative to commute the sentences to life imprisonment. Basner
observes: “I didn’t have the slightest doubt what Nkrumah*s decision would be.
Nkrumah has a horror of shedding blood which is neither sentimental nor moral, but
belongs to his mystical reference for the human personality, contradicting his
rationalistic philosophy and political theories.”120 At a re-trial before Chief Justice
Julius Sarkodee-Addo, the three were convicted and sentenced to death. However,
Nkrumah commuted their sentence to long-term imprisonment. Shaping Nkrumah’s
strong abhorrence of capital punishment was his earlier incarceration in James Foil
prison where he observed monthly executions. Perhaps it is this formative experience
121that underpinned his decision to commute the sentences.
Towards the end of 1963 Nkrumah passed a bill empowering him to quash 
any decisions of Ghana’s Special Courts if he considered the matter “in the interest of 
the security of the State.” 122 Following elections 011 the proposal for a one party state 
in January 1964, the “Yes vote” totalled 2,773,970 and the “No vote” 2,452 out of a
118 Ibid, pp. 138-139. .
119 These two men were Ewes and were later to play an instrumental role in the February 1966 coup 
d’etat; see Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 156.
120 Basn/2/123; Kanu also wrote that Nkrumah was opposed to the idea o f  capital punishment; see 
Nkrumah The Man, p. 127, p. 140.
121 Nkrumah, The Autobiography, pp. 108-109.
122 West Africa 4 January 1964; see also Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 413.
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registered 2,877,464. 123 Considerable political power was now concentrated in
Nkrumah’s hands.
Yet, without question “by 1965 Kwame Nkrumah often looked and acted
like a tired man. The worries and pressures of office were taking their toll and much
124of the distinctive vigour had gone out of some of his actions,” claims Batsa.
Economically, the country’s budget deficit had grievously expanded as the price of
125cocoa on the world market continued to decline. Dr. Jonathan Frimpong-Ansah
depicted the gravity of the economic situation:
By 1965 it had become very desperate and I remember 
we decided to write a memorandum to Nkrumah to tell 
him the true state of affairs of the economy, I had 
written that the reserves were only 500,000 pounds. He 
looked at me and said “All! You didn’t check your 
typing! You’ve left a few zeros!” I said “No Sir, there 
are no zeros left”. This is 500,000 pounds - all we have 
in the banks overseas. And he sat back. And what he 
did then was that he went round the table and went to 
everyone who was seated there at the meeting and asked 
them: “Frimpong says we’ve 500,000 pounds. Is he 
right? Do you agree with him?” And everyone said:
“Yes”. That was the first time the whole cabinet 
acknowledged to the President that Ghana was 
bankrupt. When Nkrumah heard this he actually shed 
tears. He left us in the office in the Cabinet room for 
half an hour. He broke down completely when he knew 
that Ghana was in fact poor.126
Nkrumah had been engaged in self-delusion as to the economic realities of 
Ghana. Contributing to his considerable distress and sadness was the death earlier in 
the year of his arch ideological opponent, Dr. J. B. Danquah who had died at 69 years 
of age in Nsawam maximum-security prison on February 4 1965, He had been 
arrested and detained in October 1961 for suspected involvement in the Sekondi-
123Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 414.
124 Batsa, The Spark, p. 41.
125 Dr. Frimpong was the Deputy Governor o f  the Bank o f Ghana from 1965-1968.
126 Cited in Pandora s Box: Black Power broadcast on BBC2, 1992.
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Takoradi strike and was released in June 1962, only to be arrested and detained again 
in early January 1964 on suspicion of being the mastermind behind the attempt on 
Nkrumah’s life. He suffered from chronic bronchial asthma and hypertension in 
unhygienic conditions in a cell of six by nine feet. His many petitions to the Ministry 
of the Interior for improved treatment and release were ignored.
Four months into his detention Danquah wrote a long personal letter to 
Nkrumah pleading for his release and challenging the grounds of this detention. He 
subtly lambasted the accusation that “his detention was necessary in order to prevent 
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the state.”127 According to 
Timothy “When the news of Dr. Danquah’s death was conveyed to Nkrumah, he was 
very sad and remorseful. His conscience troubled him greatly and he travelled to his 
hometown Nkroful where he stayed for a fortnight reflecting on his life, actions and 
political philosophy.”128 Whether Nkrumah had read Danquah’s letter is unknown but 
he had experienced prison life during 1949-1950 so he was aware of the conditions in 
Ghana’s prisons. Perhaps, it is on account of this knowledge that the death of a 
former colleague and political enemy may have left him with a deep sense of guilt.
It appears that during this time, Nkrumah also appears to have trusted the 
regular armed forces less and less, particularly after he established the National 
Security Services in 1963. On July 28 1965 he summarily dismissed his Chief of 
Defence Staff, Major-General Stephen Otu and his deputy, Major-General Joseph 
Ankrah. This action was not only hasty but also totally unforeseen.129 It was alleged 
both men were, as a result of detection by the Military Intelligence, to have been
127 NAG: ADM 5/3/143.
128 Timothy, Kwame Nkrumah From Cradle to Grave, p. 187.
129 There was however a precedent in the sudden removal o f  General H. T. Alexander in September 
1961; Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 143.
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involved in a conspiracy in April to overthrow the government.130 Another plan was 
hatched in June 1965 whilst Nkrumah was attending a Prime Ministers’ 
Commonwealth conference in London. As a result of the exposure of this conspiracy, 
Nkrumah decided to sack his generals and replace them with officers he considered 
loyal. Brigadier Aferi who had been Commander of the Second Brigade since its 
creation in October 1962 was promoted to Major General and Chief of Defence Staff. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Barwah, a northerner was appointed his deputy; Lieutenant- 
Colonel A. K. Ocran was put in charge of the first Brigade in Accra and Lieutenant- 
Colonel E. K. Kotoka, an Ewe, who had been appointed Director-General of 
Operations and Plans in April 1965, was appointed to the less prestigious Second 
Brigade in Kumasi.131
Nkrumah’s motivation for the reorganisation of the military was based on 
suspicions that the army and police were complied in attacks on his life. He therefore 
consciously sought to install a loyal security and military apparatus independent of the 
army and police via the MI, Special Intelligence Unit and PDD, all of which were 
personally controlled from the Presidential office in Flagstaff House.
Meanwhile, Nkrumah’s growing authoritarianism and his attempts to mobilise 
the CPP produced apathy, distrust, and cynicism among Ghanaians. Ironically the 
changes imposed from above, such as the creation of the PVAs, the GYPM, the KNII, 
the Builders’ and Workers’ Brigade, and the All African Trade Union Front -  barely 
involved the majority of the population. Nkrumah’s alienation was demonstrated in 
how he responded to the rise in the price of bread in late 1965. Bread had risen from 
half a crown to five shillings whilst the standard wage for workers in Accra was six
130 Ibid, p. 143.
131 Kotoka deeply resented this appointment as he felt as the most senior o f the two (Barwah and 
Ocran) he should have been appointed to the First Brigade.
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shillings a day.132 Basner claims there was “an orgy of profiteering in bread and 
other food products” and for lower wage earners this was devastating. 133 He later 
visited Nkrumah in October 1965 with a parcel of two loaves of bread. His parcel 
received a “startled and amused” reaction from Nkrumah, his staff and his security 
guards. When told that the loaves cost five shillings and were full of air, Nkrumah 
told Basner: “Your letter came as a shock.” Nkrumah swiftly called a cabinet meeting 
that same evening on the issue and asked Basner to print his letter to The Ghanaian 
Times.134
The explanation for the increase in the price of bread was attributable to 
corrupt forces in the Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC) who were selling 
flour to smaller bakeries at 14 pounds sterling instead of the normal price of 6 
pounds per bag. The state bakery, which supplied about 20% of the bread in Accra, 
could not get flour except by paying black market prices.135 In short, the bread racket 
was symptomatic of the scale of corruption, deeper hostilities and problems in trade 
with the Soviet Union. The switch from Canadian to Russian supplies of flour had 
been exploited by certain elements as the Russians could only make their delivery 
every four months. As Basner claims: “This was the great difficulty with the 
communist countries, as their timetable for deliveries were rigid, having to comply 
with their state planning system.”136
There was opposition in the GNTC as well as in the big foreign trading 
companies to dealing with goods coming from the communist countries. “The 
conspiracy was wide, taking in the highest ranking personnel in the Department of 







about the decision to change over to Russian flour; as well as the managers of the 
GNTC and the big bakers, who were tipped off,” writes Basner. Nkrumah was 
“furious” and ordered for investigations into the scandal, yet the price of bread 
remained the same. 137 Key ministers, officials and party men had vested interests in 
the continuation of the racket. This example illustrates the extent of government and 
state corruption; the political dishonesty of key ministers around Nkrumah and 
ultimately his inability to effectively arrest the decline in corruption. By mid 1965 
there was a food crisis in the country. Life had been made “unbearable for the wage 
and salary earner.”138 hi addition to this was Nkrumah’s fervent preoccupation with 
foreign policy decisions on the African and world stage. These involvements 
contributed to his neglect of domestic concerns.
Conclusion
During the period 1958 to 1966, it is evident that Nkrumah aimed to transform both 
Ghana and the African continent into a world power. In order to fulfil this aim he 
embarked on restructuring the CPP, declared socialism an objective, reneged on his 
promise of regional assemblies, integrated a number of independent organisations into 
the CPP including women and youth organisations, and set up a Republic in 1960. 
The year 1961 was a pivotal year in which a number of significant developments 
emerged. Among them were a showdown between the old guard of the CPP and 
leftwing tendencies. In addition, growing corruption forced Nkrumah to make the 
Dawn Broadcast; the reaction of Ghanaian workers to the July austerity budget was a 
strike in 1961; the rise of the ideology of Nkrumaism and Nkrumah’s declaration of
137 Ibid, Bas/2/157.
138 West Africa 17 July 1965.
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his commitment to socialism before he embarked on his tom- of the communist world 
created serious problems for Nkrumah.
After 1961 Nkrumah continued to reshape Ghanaian politics according to his 
belief in the necessity of economic development and African unity. A one party state 
was inaugurated in 1964. This was the expression of his belief that multi-party 
politics was dangerous to the inherent egalitarian nature of African society. As Africa 
did not possess the types of classes that existed in Western societies, the multi-party 
system was ill-suited to Ghana and Africa in general.
The two assassination attempts and the use of political terror via the bombings 
in Accra impacted negatively on Nkrumah. He increasingly withdrew from public life 
and strengthened the security and military apparatus around him in 1963. He 
dismissed Major-General Otu and Ankrah in July 1965, for fears that they were 
involved in a conspiracy to overthrow him. By the end of the year, Nkrumah’s 
attempts to revolutionise Ghana and transform the African continent into a showcase 
of economic and political strength was a failure. His attempts to reinvigorate the CPP 
via the PVAs, the Ideological School and integration of the trade unions, women’s 
groups and the youth, were unsuccessful. Increasing corruption, inflation, apathy, 
cynicism and hostility to Nkrumah’s authoritarianism existed. A gulf between 
Nkrumah’s political ideas and their implementation had emerged, for the CPP and 
Nkrumah failed to consult with Ghanaians as to whether socialism was desirable and 
if so how it could be achieved. This was largely because Nkrumah* s politics was 
founded on a distinct conception of centralised power and personal control. 
Subsequently, this conception of power informed the type of top-down institutions he 
established that failed to include the majority of ordinary Ghanaians.
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Genuine democratic participation was inconceivable to such a view because 
for Nkrumah the CPP and the state were one and the same. They embodied the 
common aspirations of the nation as a whole. If this was accepted, Nkrumah could not 
envisage the CPP acting against the interests of the people. Such a paternalistic notion 
of power and the people was inherent in his concept of the CPP as the commoner’s 




SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL POLICIES, 1958-1966
It is evident that on the eve of Ghana’s independence Nkrumah had a grand 
vision for the new country. He had seemed the “political kingdom” of self-rule. He 
now had to provide an “economic paradise” which he had promised Ghanaians prior 
to independence. We shall examine Nkrumah’s social, economic and cultural 
objectives and aspirations for Ghana during the period 1958-1966. The central 
question to be addressed is: how did Nkrumah’s socio-economic and cultural thought 
inform the institutions and policies he established between 1958-1966 to effect social, 
economic and cultural change in Ghana? How he attempted to realise this vision, the 
problems he encountered and institutions he established will be our central focus.
In Search of the Economic Kingdom, 1958-1966
Nkrumah’s trip to the USA and Canada in July and August 1958 was used to 
solicit economic aid for the newly independent Ghana. It was initiated as a result of a 
racial snub Minister of Finance, Komla Gbedemah had experienced in the American 
state of Delaware in November 1957. Attired in traditional Kente cloth, Gbedemah 
had been refused a glass of orange juice at a roadside Howard Johnson chain of 
restaurants. The incident caught world headline news especially as the American 
President Eisenhower proffered a personal apology and Gbedemah was invited to 
breakfast at the White House. The significance of this incidence is that it revived the 
Volta River Project (VRP). Dining breakfast, Gbedemah informed Eisenhower and 
his officials of Ghana’s plans to build the Volta dam in order to modernise Africa. Out
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of this exchange, Eisenhower extended an invitation to Nkrumah. Nkrumah accepted 
Eisenhower’s invitation to America and initial discussions with American private 
contractors began.1
Whilst in America, Nkrumah took the opportunity to explain the economic 
policies of his government. He “wanted to make clear at the outset” that he and his
'y #
delegation had not come to beg for financial assistance. He repeated to his various 
audiences: “What we want is for you to co-operate in the economic and profitable 
development of our resources. This means that if either your government or your 
investors put money into our country we want it to go into sound projects and
*3
schemes, which will ultimately lead to the repayment of the initial investment.” 
Nkrumah made use of every opportunity to explain to his American audience how 
important it was for the Ghanaian economy to diversify and reduce its over­
dependence on a single cash crop -  cocoa. For this to occur, he spelt out the 
importance of Ghana being able to obtain cheap electric power from the VRP as the 
basis for the expansion of industrial development in the country. Before Nkrumah left 
Washington for the next stage of his trip, a joint statement was made with President 
Eisenhower. The statement encouraged private interests to participate in the project 
and promised an update of the 1955 engineering reports. On his tour of America, 
Nkrumah’s lack of bitterness and humour was demonstrated when he was taken to the 
Hershey Chocolate Corporation in Harrisburg. Red caipet treatment and a reception 
committee brought a smile to his face. He told the American reception committee: 
“The last time I visited your factory I was looking for a job! Not only was there no red 
carpet then to smooth my way: there was no job either!” 4
1 New York Times, November 10 157 and New York H erald Tribune, October 11 1957,
2 Nkrumah, I  Speak o f  Freedom, p. 13 9.
3 Ibid, p. 139. Nkrumah spoke to students, the American press and the House o f  Representatives.
4 Ibid, p. 146.
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It is evident that “Nkrumah had come to office without any clear idea of the
economic strategy he might pursue in preference to that laid down in the ten year
plan. He therefore had no real alternative to going along with the policy of the
government as already laid down.”5 Yet, the balance sheet for the CPP at the end of
its first year of independence was,
a bewildering mixture of very positive achievements 
and heavy-handed policy. The second half of 1958 
witnessed the laying of the foundations of Ghana’s first 
and only deepwater port at Tema, a massive, ambitious 
and imaginative project. At much the same time the 
government gave notice to the world that even a small 
country like Ghana was to be a significant international 
player by the establishment of firstly a national airline,
Ghana Airways, and then a national shipping fleet, the 
Black Star Line.6
Ghana’s new shipping line, the “Black Star Line,” paid homage to Marcus Garvey’s 
shipping enterprise as a symbol of both national and Pan-African pride.
With these economic achievements behind him, Nkrumah presented to 
Parliament on March 4 1959 the CPP’s Second Five Year Development Plan. Whilst 
the plan was ambitious it was by no means a departure from the laissez faire 
economic policies of Professor Arthur Lewis nor what scholars have described as “the 
shopping list” approach of former colonial development plans.7 The essential thrust of 
earlier economic plans between 1951-1957 had been on heavy public investment, 
modernizing infrastructure and building new roads and clinics.8 The thrust of the 
Second Five Year plan was to improve the standard of living of Ghanaians, “abolish
5 A. Krassowski, Developm ent and the D ebt Trap Economic Planning and External Borrowing in 
Ghana (London, 1974), p. 18.
6 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 136.
7 D. Rimmer Staying Poor: G hana’s Political Economy, 1950-1990  (London, 1992), p. 86; Fitch & 
Oppenheimer, Ghana, p. 90.
8 Krassowski, Developm ent and the D ebt Trap, p. 27,
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disease, poverty and illiteracy;” expand the provision of education; “ensure the 
continued expansion and diversification of agriculture” and create an industrial base.9
Before parliament in 1959, Nkrumah spelt out that the execution of “the great 
Plan” was dependent on capital from two sources: internal domestic savings and 
foreign investment.10 He reiterated his invitation to foreign entrepreneurs to invest in 
Ghana. That Nkrumah had not departed from liberal market economics nor a sense of 
pragmatism was reflected in his following statement: “We want industry in Ghana, 
and we are always ready to make reasonable arrangements with any Government, 
institution or individual who can bring a sound proposition to us. In short, we intend, 
as in the past, to follow a common-sense and practical approach to industrial 
development.”11 Nkrumah did not expand on the details of the plan but gave a lengthy 
overview of examples of industrial projects the government intended to embark upon 
in fulfilment of the plans objectives.12 In short, the plan shared the “welfare state 
orientation” of the earlier colonial plans. According to Fitch and Oppenheimer, it gave 
the appearance of breaking with the colonial past when in reality it had not.13
The role of education was central to the success of Nkrumah* s economic 
policies. Not only did he consider it key to educating a competent and technically 
skilled workforce, but also Nkrumah believed that Ghanaian citizens had to 
understand and share the ideology of the CPP in order to affect a second economic 
and social revolution in the country. Consequently, Nkrumah’s vision of education 
was thoroughly ideological. Education had an instrumentalist function and 
motivational purpose. Its aims were not only to produce skilled workers but to also
9 Parliam entaiy D ebates 4 March 1959.
10 Ibid, pp. 192-193.
11 Parliamentary D ebates, 4 March 1959, p. 194.
12 Ibid, pp. 195-196. Nkrumah declared that among the new industrial projects there would be a new 
cement and flour factory; an oil processing plant; the development o f  communications, and the 
establishment o f a new broadcasting television station.
53 Fitch & Oppenheimer, Ghana, p. 90.
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forge a nationalist and socialist consciousness among all Ghanaians. As a result, there 
was the introduction of fee-free elementary education, teacher training and university 
education; free textbooks, the expansion of university facilities -  all were evidence of 
the high premium Nkrumah placed on education. In this endeavour, Nkrumah also 
focused on the education of women, whom he considered as the architects of the 
nation. Like his mentor Aggrey, he believed that educating women meant the 
education of a whole nation. The Accelerated Development Plan for Education, which 
had been introduced in 1952, reflected this ambition. From 1952 to 1961 there was a 
tremendous increase in the numbers of public primary and secondary schools. It was 
the 1961 Education Act that made education compulsory for school age children, and 
also girls, which consequently increased enrolment figures. The access of girls from 
poorer socio-economic backgrounds was increased under Nkrumah’s government. 
Around 1965-66 girls constituted 44% of total primary school enrolment, 35% in 
middle school and 25% at secondary school.14 More young women also entered 
higher institutions of learning and were sent abroad with men to train in the 
professions.
Furthermore, Nkrumah believed that the future of every nation depended on 
the education and training of its youth. Ghana had a plethora of youth groups 
extending to the pre-independence era.15 He therefore set up two important 
institutions to educate the youth and all Ghanaians into the nationalist and socialist 
ideology of the party: the Yoimg Pioneer Movement (YPM) and the Ideological 
Institute.
14 Manuh, ‘Women and Their Organisations,’ p. 109.
15 M. N. Tetteh, The Ghana Young Pioneer Movement A Youth Organisation in the Kwame Nkrumah 
Era  (Accra, 1999), pp. 49-52.
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The YPM was established in June 1960 and it is said to have been modelled 
on the lines of Israel’s Gadna youth training programme.16 Its role was to mobilise the 
youth into a disciplined, well-educated and civil body to defend the country from 
internal and external enemies. It was comprised of four groups of pupils and students
■ n
from 4-25 years of age.
The aims of the YPM were to give the yoimg generation a political education 
according to CPP ideology and in order to eradicate the colonial mentality of teachers 
and parents. To this end the pupils had to pledge at the beginning and end of the 
school: “To live by the ideals of the Osagyefo Kwarne Nkrumah, founder of the state 
of Ghana, initiator of the African personality; to safeguard by all means possible the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Ghana from internal 
and external aggression, and to be the first ranks of men fighting for the total 
liberation and unity of Africa, for these are the noble aims guiding the Ghana 
Pioneers.”18 As stated in one of the documents of the Movement: “Ghana, in her 
endeavour to build a first class socialist state cannot overlook the role of her youth.”19 
Scholarships were awarded to Young Pioneers to visit Israel, the German 
Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union to pursue studies in economics, 
linguistics, agriculture and medicine.20 Pobee contends: “In April 1962, there were
5,000 branches all over the country, with a total membership of 500,000 of which
,6 Z. Levey, ‘The Rise and Decline o f  a Special Relationship: Israel and Ghana, 1957-1966,’ African 
Studies Review, Vol. 46, N o .l, April 2003, p. 160.
17 Cited in ‘The Ghana Young Pioneers,’ Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) no. 437, 
George Padmore Library, Accra, p.2.
18 Cited in D. K. Agyeman, Ideological Education and Nationalism in Ghana under Nkrumah and  
Busia (Accra, 1988), p.9.
19 Cited in ‘The Ghana Young Pioneers,’ Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) no. 437, 
George Padmore Library, Accra, p. 4. This document is undated.
20 Parliamentary Debates 25 June 1963, p. 152; cited in ‘The Ghana Young Pioneers,’ Kwame 
Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) no. 437, George Padmore Library, Accra, p.3.
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190,00 were females.”21 By June 30 1963 the Movement claimed to have over one 
22million members.
Criticisms of the Movement came initially from the church. For example, the 
Anglican Bishop of Accra, Rev, Reginald Richard Roseveare condemned Nkrumah 
and the YPM for blasphemy and godlessness.23 Christian groups were concerned that 
Nkrumah was impersonating God and teaching the youth that there was no God.
The Ideological Institute at Winneba was established in February 1961 to train 
the cadre and the leadership of the CPP and ancillary wings of the parly. Soon 
members of the Ghana armed forces were forced to take regular courses of study in 
the ideology, organisation and objectives of the CPP. The director of the school was 
Kodjo Addison who “was no socialist.”24 According to Agyeman: “The Ideological 
Institute had less success than the YPM because the Institute was handicapped by the 
lack of the qualifred instructors -  both Africans and non-African” who fully 
understood Nkrumah’s political and social philosophy.25 Not only did the Institute 
provide internal courses of six weeks duration for CPP members and its integral 
wings but it also provided external courses for students from African nationalist 
organisations.26 In addition, lecturers of the Institute provided papers on topics such as 
the “Supremacy of the Party,” “Why a One Party State,” “Nkrumah* s Political 
Ideology,” and “African Unity.”27 Other additional major handicaps were the 
appointment to posts of individuals with little experience, poor organisation and 
infighting.28
21 Cited in J. S, Pobee, Kwame Nkrumah and the Church in Ghana: 1949-1966  (Accra, 1988), p. 129.
22 Parliamentary Debates 25 June 1963, p. 150.
23 Ibid. p. 128; see Tetteh, The Ghana Young Pioneer Movement, p. xvii.
24 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 253; Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 173.
25 Agyeman, Ideological Education, p. 11.
26 KNII, file no. 423 at the George Padmore Library, Accra.
27 Ibid.
28 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 253.
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After the establishment of the Ideological Institute, Nkrumah convened a CPP 
Study Group on the theme “Building a Socialist State.” Representatives from all 
sections of the party leadership and ancillary organisations were instructed to attend 
on April 22 1961 at Flagstaff House. Nkrumah declared that the goals of full 
employment, housing and industrial growth were “the tremendous task not of the CPP 
alone, but of the whole nation: civil servants, all types of workers, teachers, farmers, 
peasants -  indeed, all able-bodied Ghanaians standing together as one man under the 
leadership of the CPP.”29
Furthermore, Nkrumah asked: “How are we to achieve this goal within the 
shortest possible time?” He stated “socialism is the only pattern that can within the
1A
shortest possible time bring the good life to the people.” Yet, Nkrumah was of the 
opinion that “at this juncture, Ghana is not a socialist state.”31 In order to create 
socialism, he maintained that an industrial foundation had to be laid and 
mechanisation of agricultural production was necessary. In addition to this, “without 
energy -  without coal, oil or hydro-electricity -  it is idle to talk of industrialisation. 
Without energy we cannot lay the foundations of industrialisation. Industrialisation 
presupposes electricification... Hence my preoccupation with the Volta River Project 
and other schemes that will provide water power both for electricity and irrigation of 
regions that are starved of water at certain periods of the year.”32 Nkrumah remarked 
“our planning hitherto has been largely piecemeal and unpurposeful. It has not been 
linked in an organised maimer.”33 This had given rise not only to “an uncoordinated” 
national economy but “much wastage of precious funds and limited managerial and
29 See ‘Building a Socialist State An Address by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah President o f the 
Republic o f  Ghana to the CPP Study Group at Flagstaff House, Accra, April 22, 196 V, 
NAG:ADM16/14.
30 Ibid, p. 1.
31 Ibid, p,2.
32 Ibid, p.2.
33 Ibid, p. 3.
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technical staff.”34 He declared that there would be planning at all levels -  national, 
regional and local.
Ironically the decline of cocoa 011 the world market meant that from 1960 
onwards Nkrumah had less revenue from this golden goose for further reinvestment 
and consequently he had to increase personal taxes. He also announced that there was 
to be a change in the relationship between the party and the civil service. In future 
“the party must be the pivot of our economic planning.” Integral to this would be 
“consultation and participation of the people” which would “be the truest kind of 
democracy that has ever functioned.”36 How this was to operate, he did not illuminate.
Nkrumah was conscious that his administration had inherited a colonial 
apparatus. He said: “To attain this laudable end of socialist control we have from time 
to time to make a review of the administrative apparatus at our disposal, remembering 
that it was originally bequeathed to us by a colonial regime dedicated to a very 
different purpose.”37 As a result, Nkrumah said that this “uncharted path the country 
had embarked upon, required proceeding from trial and error. Changes which are 
made today may themselves call for further change tomorrow.”38 Hence, his lack of 
rigidity and commitment to dogma revealed the essential pragmatist in Nkrumah. 
Whilst he had 110 economic blueprint to follow, Nkrumah sought to tread prudently. 
Perhaps by adopting a flexible approach that encompassed “trial and error” enabled 
Nkrumah to conceal his own uncertainty as to what strategies would have been 
effective in achieving his economic objectives.
Lastly, Nkrumah issued the directive that on account of the lack of socialist 
understanding and orientation of many ministers, party officials, ministerial
34 Ibid, p. 3.
35 Ibid, p. 7.
36 Ibid, p. 7.
37 Ibid, p. 8,
38 Ibid, p. 8.
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secretaries, heads of boards and corporations, MPs and journalists, all would be 
required to obtain ideological education at the new party school at Winneba.
Another significant development in the tumultuous year of 1961 was 
Nkrumah’s visit to the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and 
Albania between July to September. The trip provided further pressure and impetus to 
Nkrumah’s search for a new economic direction, away from a laissez-faire mixed 
economy and to confronting Ghana’s economic dependency on Western trading 
partners. However, Nkrumah had already decided to restructure the Ghanaian 
economy well before his visit to the USSR, China and Eastern Europe.
Nkrumah was intellectually committed to economic independence as one of 
his many policy objectives. Yet, at the beginning of the 1960s, Ghana’s industry and 
commerce still remained largely in foreign control; the economy was dependent on 
imported consumer goods and Britain accounted for about one third of Ghana’s cocoa 
exports.39 Hence, the trip to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China galvanized 
Nkrumah’s decision to broaden Ghana’s trading partners. In addition, “civil servants 
and foreign service officers felt that Ghana’s non-alignment was not in balance until 
Nkrumah had been to the East,” maintains Thompson.40 Dei-Anang also maintains: 
“Ghana’s decision to draw closer to Eastern Europe was a means of expressing in 
concrete terms her freedom of action. Ghana found herself standing between two 
world giants, compelled to draw on both for technical and material aid.”41 The idea to 
visit the communist countries also came from the radical elements inside the CPP led 
by Tawia Adamafio.42
39 Killick, Development Economics, p. 125.
40 S. Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy: 1957-1966 Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State (New  
Jersey, 1969), p. 173.
41 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 52.
42 Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah, p. 174.
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It was Leonid Brezhnev’s visit to Accra in February 1961, which marked “the 
important symbolic turning point in this year of change” remarks Thompson.43 It 
galvanised the radicals within the CPP; it brought to the fore the internal divisions 
within the party and subsequently led to Nkrumah’s visit to the Soviet Union in the 
summer of that year. For the pro-Soviet radicals who surrounded Nkrumah, the trip 
was disappointing, for they had hoped to obtain a hundred million pound sterling loan 
from the Russians, which was not forthcoming.44 Apart from the Russian promise to 
import 60,000 tons of Ghana’s cocoa, the trip yielded little in terms of economic ties. 
Another impact of the trip was Nkrumah’s impetuous decision to establish embassies 
in every Eastern bloc state. Whilst “economically indefensible” it gave Nkrumah’s 
Ghana a wider world platform on which to project Nkrumah’s image and that of the 
country. Moreover, it stimulated Nkrumah who had an avid interest in the systematic 
collection of fact and figures to further his research on global current affairs 45
In China, Nkrumah signed a symbolic treaty of economic and cultural ties 
with the Chinese. Ghana was granted an interest free loan of 7 million pound 
sterling.46 Overall, Nkrumah had been impressed and encouraged by the immense 
industrial and technological achievements of China, the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe. Promises of assistance and formally signed agreements buoyed his hopes and 
led to greater economic and technical assistance,47
Killick considers that Nkrumah made considerable success in widening 
Ghana’s trading partners. He argues that there was a shift in trade relations as Ghana’s 
import and export trade with Eastern European countries rose from 6% in 1960 to
43 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 165.
44 Ibid, p. 173.
45 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 49.
46 West Africa August 26 1961; West Africa August 19 1961.
47 See West Africa October 21 1961; West Africa September 2 1961; West A frica  September 1961.
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24% in 196 5.48 However, Ghana’s economic links with the Eastern bloc countries 
proved to be disastrous. The giant silos built by a Romanian contractor in the early 
1960s were a waste of money as it was discovered after they were built that the 
combustion of cocoa kept in such silos in the tropical heat would have burst them
49open.
In addition to such attempts to widen economic co-operation with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, another country that maintained strong economic ties with 
Ghana was Israel. A special relationship between Ghana and Israel lasted for three 
years; from 1957-1960. However, economic ties between the two countries went back 
to the pre-independence period. In 1953 the value of Israel’s exports to the Gold 
Coast was around $6,000 of goods and in 1957 it rose to $135,000.50 In 1958 the 
value of Israel’s imports from Ghana amounted to $611,000, almost twice the total of 
the previous year, and the value of exports to Ghana was $517,000.51 During the 
honeymoon period, Israel provided economic assistance to Ghana in a number of 
areas. For example, in 1957 the Israeli water planning authority surveyed rural water 
development in Ghana; Soleh Boneh, the Israeli construction company jointly set up 
with the Ghana government the Ghana National Construction Company; by 1962 
there were 80 Israeli technical specialists in Ghana; in December 1958 the Israelis 
assisted in the training of the Ghana Merchant Marine Academy. Also in 1958, Israel 
loaned the Nkrumah government $20 million over a four and half year period.52 By 
1964 Israeli imports from Ghana totalled $1,000,000.53 Yet, three years earlier, 
Nkrumah’s signing of the Casablanca Accords on January 7 1961 brought about a
48 Killick, Development Economics, p. 128.
49 ‘Pandora’s B ox,’ broadcast by the BBC, London 1992.
50 Z. Levey, ‘ The Rise and Decline o f  A Special Relationship: Israel and Ghana, 1957-1966,’p. 159.
51 Ibid, p. 160.
52 NAG: ADM /13/2/50.
53 Levey, ‘The Rise and D ecline,’ p. 169.
198
setback to relations between the two countries. This resolution unanimously 
condemned “Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo­
colonialism, not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia.”54 Consequently 
Nkrumah began to loosen Ghana’s ties with Israel but trade with Israel was far from 
being severed. As Levey points out, in the following year of 1962 “Israeli exports to 
Ghana dropped to $1.4 million, but they rose to $3.3 million in 1964 and $5.3 million 
in 1965, tapering off only moderately ($4.9) in 1966.”55 It is evident that Nkrumah’s 
economic pragmatism remained alongside his commitment to the Casablanca 
Accords. In summary, whilst Israel was economically important to Ghana’s 
economy, Nkrumah had to reconcile this with the Casablanca position that Israel was 
deemed to be an imperialist country.
The industrial unrest of September 1961 led by the railway workers, prompted 
the UP to vociferously criticise the 1961 budget and the Second Development Plan. 
These attacks were made by Danquah and issued in a statement on September 15.56 
Danquah maintained that the strike was an indication of loss of confidence in the 
government and a contempt, which was reflected in Adamafio’s depiction of the 
strikers as “despicable rats,” More importantly Danquah said that the past ten years of 
the government’s economic plans “have been done without aid and advice of a 
Development Commission” and “clearer thinking.”57 On December 11 1961 the 
Nkrumah government abandoned the Second Development Plan in the belief that it 
duplicated the errors of the First Development Plan in its piecemeal “shopping list”
54 Cited in T. Adewale, Pan-Africanism and Zionism: Political Movements in Polarity (USA, 1995), p. 
134.
55 Levey, ‘The Rise and Decline,’ p. 169.
56 J. B. Danquah, The Ghanaian Establishment (Accra, 1997), pp. 66-71. This invaluable book is a 
collection o f  Danquah’s speeches, which contain his political thoughts.
57 Ibid, p. 70. In the wake o f  the September 1961 strike, the Nkrumah government imprisoned 
Danquah.
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approach.58 Being an amalgam of projects that concentrated on the provision of 
economic and social infrastructure rather than the growth of the productive sector, it 
seriously lacked a macro-economic framework. In addition to this, the private sector 
had been relegated to a very marginal role.59 It seems Nkrumah took a leaf out of the 
opposition’s book and established a Planning Commission in 1962.
Nkrumah* s belief in the historical necessity of socialism was expressed as far
back as in 1957, in the Preface of his Autobiography. He maintained:
The ideology of my Party may be formulated as 
follows: 110 race, no people, no nation can exist freely 
and be respected at home and abroad without political 
freedom. Once this freedom is gained, a greater task 
comes into view. All dependent territories are backward 
in education, in agriculture and industry. The economic 
independence that should follow and maintain political 
independence demands every effort from the people, a 
total mobilisation of brain and manpower resources.
What other countries have taken three hundred years or 
more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to 
accomplish in a generation if it is to survive. Unless it 
is, as it were, ‘jet-propelled’, it will lag behind and thus 
risk everything for which it has fought. Capitalism is 
too complicated a system for a newly independent 
nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society.6
Intellectually, Nkrumah rejected capitalism on several grounds. Firstly, as he 
expressed in Towards Colonial Freedom, the problems confronting ex-colonial 
territories had been engendered by capitalism and therefore could not be solved by 
this system. Secondly, Nkrumah had argued that capitalism was built on the 
exploitation of the majority by the minority and therefore it did not redistribute wealth 
fairly in society. Lastly, he argued that capitalist economic growth created an 
imbalanced economy, as it was dictated by high profit returns rather than by the logic
58 Rimmer, ‘The Crisis in the Ghana Economy’ in Journal o f  M odem  African Society, Vol.4, No. 1 
May 1966, p. 21; Staying Poor, p. 86.
59 Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 86
60 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p.vii.
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of a fair redistribution of growth in a society which was the objective of a socialist 
economy.61
There are Marxist scholars such as Mohan and Fitch and Oppenheimer who 
dismiss NkrumalTs economic developments in the post 1960 period as having little to 
do with socialism. They characterise the Nkrumah period as the epitomy of neo­
colonial engagement, whereas Genoud, a non-Marxist characterises Ghana under 
Nkrumah as a case study of “anti-colonial nationalism despite the fact that its leaders 
have made profuse use of the socialist terminology.”62 Killick’s position is one that 
takes Nkrumah’s socialist aspirations seriously and seeks to measure this against his 
political and economic practice. He contends: “To deny any serious content to 
Nkrumah’s socialism and to attribute all he did to nationalism is to overstate the case. 
Economic development, modernisation and socialism were so closely connected in his 
mind that there is little to be gained from trying to differentiate between them.” 63
Integral to Nkrumah’s political outlook was his theorisation of socialism, 
which contained several inherent tensions. Firstly, in his 1959 address on the party’s 
tenth anniversary, Nkrumah asserted that socialism in Ghana would not be an 
imitation of any other country.64 As a result the revised 1959 CPP constitution stated 
that a socialist pattern of society would be adapted to “suit Ghanaian conditions.”65 In 
the same breath, it was also claimed that the party advocated “African Socialism.” 
Contributing to this ideological obfuscation were CPP loyalists such as Kofi Baako 
who wrote a series of articles in 1961 and 1963 in which he made reference to 
“African Socialism” and socialism being adapted to Ghanaian conditions.
61 Afari-Gyan, Political Ideas o f  Kwame Nkrumah, p. 204; see Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, 
1945.
62 Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana, p. 85 and p. 74.
63 Killick, Development Economics in Action, p. 40.
64 Folson “The Development o f Socialist Ideology in Ghana: 11% p.3.
65 Ibid. p. 3.
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Subsequently, the 1962 party constitution called on the membership to adhere to 
“African Socialism.” According to Folson, “it is safe to say that by the end of 1962 
the outlines of the socialist ideology of the CPP could be dimly perceived.”
For Nkrumah, modern socialism required a centralised form of government to 
direct the operation and development of the economy. Hence, the central agency of 
the state in promoting economic reconstruction was a major pillar in his ideological 
orientation. The state would be fundamental in Ghana’s “big push” for 
industrialisation, economic growth and the creation of socialism. He envisaged a 
vigorous public and co-operative sector co-existing with a private sector. The paradox 
is that Nkrumah believed socialism in Ghana, and Africa for that matter, could be 
built with foreign investment. 67 On February 22 1962, Nkrumah announced to
* t 6 Rbusinessmen: “Our ideas of socialism can co-exist with private enterprise.” To 
attract foreign investors a Capital Investment Act was introduced in 1963, which 
offered favourable concessions to overseas companies but with certain 
conditionalities.69
Nkrumah insisted there was no discrepancy between socialism and private 
enterprise; yet, from 1965 onwards he also considered foreign aid a tool of 
dependency and exploitation.70 Nkrumah’s ambivalence towards foreign private 
investment from the mid 1960s onwards compares starkly with his strident appeals for 
Western financial assistance for the construction of his most treasured economic 
project, the VRP. This aside, his position on local private enterprise was more 
transparent. Killick observes that by 1958 Nkrumah had become disappointed with
66 B.D. G. Folson ‘The Development o f Socialism Ideology in Ghana’ p. 20.
67 It is evident in Nkrumah’s writings that he used “Ghana” and “Africa” interchangeably. In his mind 
they were indivisible.
68 The New Ashanti Times 2 March 1963.
69 Killick, Development Economics in Action , p. 38.
70 These views were later reflected in his book Neo-colonialism The Last Stage o f  Imperialism  
(London, 1965).
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“the prospect of fostering an indigenous entrepreneurial class capable of
7 1industrialising the country at the speed he wanted.” In 1960 Nkrumah announced 
that the government would encourage the development of Ghanaian co-operatives 
rather than Ghanaian business ventures. This idea had been strongly encouraged by 
his mentor, Padmore, in the mid 1950s and was now being vigorously implemented. 
On March 11 1964, Nkrumah declared before the National Assembly “we would be 
hampering our advance to socialism if we were to encourage the growth of Ghanaian 
private capitalism in our midst.” However, “there is evidence that he also feared the 
threat that a wealthy class of Ghanaian businessmen might pose to his own political 
power.”72
The second contradiction in Nkrumah’s economic philosophy centred on small 
traders and businessmen and women who had been in the forefront of supporting the 
CPP in its early days and continued to do so. Nkrumah could not afford to alienate 
them.73 In order to reconcile the contradiction between his advocacy of socialism and 
private enterprise he envisaged there would be five sectors of the Ghanaian economy: 
state enterprises, foreign private investors, jointly owned state and foreign private 
companies; co-operatives and small scale Ghanaian private enterprises. This 
“ingenious solution” enabled Nkrumah to ingest large and small Ghanaian private
* 7 Abusinessmen into his economic plans for a modernised and socialist Ghana. More 
importantly, Nkrumah had neutralised the political threat of the indigenous Ghanaian 
bourgeoisie. However, his attitude to small-scale farming was not exceptional. Cooper 
postulates: “Like Nkrumah, many rulers of the 1960s feared that such farmers would
71 Killick, Development Economics in Action, p. 37; see also Genoud, Nationalism and Economic 
Development, p. 69.
72 Killick, Development Economics in Action, p. 37; see also, J. Mohan ‘Nkrumah and Nkrumaism,’ p. 
200 .
73 Manuh, ‘Women and their Organisations’ in K. Arhin The Life and Work o f  Kwame Nkrumah, p.127.
74 Killick, Development Economics in Action, p. 37.
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be the nucleus of conservative opposition to their populist, state centred vision of the
future, and they wondered if small scale agriculture would really get the country over
the economic hump that decades of colonialism had created.”75 Other West African
leaders such as Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Leopold Senghor of
Senegal, in contrast, prioritised small and large-scale peasant farming.
The Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Moshe Dayan who visited the country in
October 1960, made an interesting report on Ghana’s agricultural development. On
meeting Nkrumah, the Minister observed a portrait of Lenin on Nkrumah’s office wall
and that “the smiling president wore a blue suit, Mao Tse-tung style.”76 Nkrumah
asked the Minister what he thought of the farms and was told in frank terms “that the
economic objectives had not been achieved, since costs were higher than expected,
yields lower and marketing difficult.” He was of the strong view that if Ghanaian
agriculture was to develop, emphasis needed to be given to peasant holdings.
Furthermore, he wrote:
Dr. Nkrumah was charming. He agreed with everything 
I said. But I am not sure that the problem of Ghana’s 
peasants and Israel’s part in improving their lot is of 
uppermost concern to him. The conversation took about 
a quarter of an hour, and as I was leaving I asked 
whether we could expect to see him in Israel some day.
His smile disappeared as he said: “Yes, I am thinking 
about it, but it is so difficult... too many friends.77”
Not only does Dayan’s observation reveal the charm of Nkrumah but the 
complexity of Nkrumah’s character. It demonstrated the inseparability between 
politics and economics. The political tightrope Nkrumah trod in his politics and 
economic policies meant he had to remain friendly with Egypt for his ambitions for 
continental Africa and yet he needed Israeli economic and technical expertise to assist
75 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, p. 93.
76 NAG:SC/BAA/474-Tel Aviv Political Reports to Osagyefo.
77 Ibid.
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achieve his economic objectives. Moreover, as the Israeli Minister observed, 
emphasizing peasant holdings was not a priority for Nkrumah who sought to avoid 
furthering the creation of an indigenous Ghanaian bourgeoisie.
The third contradiction inherent in Nkrumah’s ideological position lies in his 
denial of class conflict in his vision of a socialist Ghana. In the early 1960s, he 
appeared to subscribe to the belief that the values of collectivism pervaded traditional 
African society and there were no Marxian type classes. Up imtil 1966, Nkrumah 
recognised the myriad social groups such as women, youth, semi-skilled workers, 
chiefs, small businessmen, teachers, clerks and professionals who constituted 
Ghanaian society. NkrumalTs thinking on a classless African past was common belief 
even among less radical African leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta. Before the founding 
of the CPP he had consistently appealed to these various social groups for national 
unity within Ghana for the purpose of attaining political independence. Intellectually 
he conceived of no antagonistic cleavages between these groups, for in his view they 
were committed to the goal of building a modernised nation state of Ghana.
On account of this ideological premise, Nkrumah’s adoption of the 
Programme for Work and Happiness appealed to the support of all Ghanaians. 
According to Genoud, the programme saw socialism as having external enemies: 
imperialism and neo-colonialism but no internal enemies. He claims the CPP did not 
consider class enemies sabotaging their socialist objectives. In summary: “Although 
the ultimate objectives as stated in the Programme were to build a socialist society 
and to achieve the total liberation of the country’s economy from external domination, 
Ghana’s economy was to remain for an unspecified transitional period, but probably a
n o
long one, a mixed economy.”
78 Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana, p. 69.
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Underpinning the Seven Year Development Plan (1964-1970) was the 
Programme for Work and Happiness and a huge emphasis on education. There was 
also the stark reality of huge budgetary deficits that appeared in 1959-60. “By 1963 
the deficit was running at an annual rate of about 50 million pound sterling, 
equivalent to about one-third of total central government expenditure. The early 
deficits were financed largely out of external reserves of the Government and 
Marketing Board,” argues Rimmer.79
The principal authors of the Seven Year Plan were J. H. Mensah, Executive 
Secretary of the Planning Commission, and E. N. Omaboe. In addition, world-class 
economists such as Dudley Seers, Arthur Lewis, Nicholas Kaldor, Albert Hirshmann, 
Josef Bognar and Tony Killick contributed before its official launch in 1964. Hence, 
this input also served to increase Nkrumah® s confidence in his ambitious plans to 
industrialise the Ghanaian economy. Whilst party leaders had drawn up the 
Programme for Work and Happiness, the civil service drafted the Seven Year Plan. 
The Plan favoured productive investments such as the establishment of a smelter 
project at Tema, the setting up of a chemical factory and the mechanisation of 
agriculture. This was a change of emphasis from previous plans that had focused on 
infrastructural developments.
Overall, the flaws in the Plan were considerable. Little focus was given to 
specific sector projects. There was also unrealistic aspects of the Plan, such as the
manpower and educational projections; ambitious target setting; insufficient attention
80paid to agricultural production, particularly the mainstay of the economy - cocoa.
79 Rimmer, T h e  Crisis in the Ghana Economy,’ p. 23.
80 Killick, Development Economics in Action, pp. 137-139.
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“In practice ... these defects were of little consequence, for while the plan remained
o  1
officially in operation it was never actually implemented,5’ maintains Killick.
Among many of the problems in implementation was the failure to adhere to 
annual budgets in accordance with the Plan as well as the drastic fall in the country’s 
reserves during the 1964 and 1965 period. The task of the Planning Commission was 
to ensure the economic viability of all economic projects and contracts but “from the 
outset the Commission found it impossible to hold other ministries to these 
procedures.”82 An example was the failure to adhere to the cost of building the 1965 
OAU conference hall. In short, Nkrumah himself refused to adhere to the discipline of 
planning and as a result there was an apparent divergence between the Plan and 
reality.
Another instance of such discrepancies were the targets for industrial 
development as laid out in the Plan. The aim was to phase in industrial development, 
beginning with the production of simple manufactured goods such as building 
materials; followed by metals and chemicals and lastly the setting up of heavy 
industries such as electronic goods.83 Nkrumah was the nominal chairman of the 
P la n n in g  Commission and it was evident he did not agree with this sequence in 
principle or in practice. He favoured concentration on the building of heavy industries 
for he feared being economically dependent on outside sources. When Nkrumah was 
told that one of his decisions was contrary to the Plan, he is said to have retorted: 
“Who decides, Mensah or me?”84 In short, Nkrumah lacked the discipline to adhere 
consistently to his own plans. His planners acquiesced to his view “so that whereas
81 Ibid, p. 139.
82 Ibid, p. 140.
83 Ibid, pp. 141-142.
84 Ibid, p. 142.
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the industrialisation described in the Seven Year Plan was phased over twenty years,
« QCthe Annual Plan for 1965 shifted dramatically into higher gear.”
Furthermore, exacerbating the problems surrounding the implementation of 
the Plan was the rift between J. H. Mensah, who headed the Commission, and the 
radical elements of the party. In addition to this, a struggle ensued between the 
Commission and the Minister of Finance, Amoaka-Atta over which department 
should control the capital budget. Amoaka-Atta announced in his 1965 budget speech 
that the capital budget would be transferred to his Ministry.86 Undoubtedly, increasing 
the marginalisation of ministers was the fact that they were excluded from 
membership of the Planning Commission which was predominantly made up of civil
87servants.
Berg considers the fundamental flaws of Nkrumah’s economic policies to lie 
in his adoption of a "structural transformation” approach, which shaped specific 
economic options. He compares the economic performance of Ghana under Nkrumah 
with the leadership of Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast. He concludes that 
Nkrumah’s “structural transformation” approach was flawed. This approach adhered 
to the belief that the Ghanaian economy could be transformed through an emphasis on 
industry as a modernising force. The state would play the major role in mobilising 
industry and in establishing large-scale mechanised state farms; facilitate import- 
substitution and reduce dependence on foreign capital. Berg argues that this economic 
strategy failed for many reasons but largely on account of the lack of co-ordination of 
decision-making that overloaded the state far beyond its administrative capacity. 
Whereas in the Ivory Coast, “gradualist policies prevailed, involving a limited role for 
the state in directly productive activities, export orientation, continued reliance on
85 Ibid, p. 142.
86 Ibid, p. 142.
87 Ibid, p. 143.
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foreign capital and skill.” For Berg, the Ivorian model of gradualism provided 
“genuine economic transformation.”89
In summary, “the Seven Year Plan was a piece of paper, with an operational 
impact close to zero.”90 The explanation for this lie not only in its deficiencies, but in 
its failure of implementation. Staff who were needed to monitor the implementation 
were non-existent. There were also factors beyond Nkrumah*s control: the falling 
price of cocoa on the international market in the mid 1960s. The anticipated price of 
400 cedi per ton in reality amounted to 356 cedi in 1964 and dropped to 276 cedi in
1965. For Green “Ghana’s deteriorating performance and, to significant extent the 
“unsoundness” of her 1961-65 international economic and financial policy stemmed 
directly from world market conditions.”91
The economic reality was that the government departed radically from the
Q9strategy announced in the Seven Year Plan and the result was massive indebtedness. 
This was partly attributable to Nkrumah’s demotion in 1960 of Gbedemah, who was 
too economically conservative for Nkrumah. Hence, there was no longer any 
restraining leverage on Nkrumah. Significantly, before handing the portfolio of 
Minister of Finance to Amoaka-Atta, Nkrumah himself took over the preparation of 
the budget. From 1961 to 1965, it is noticeable that Ghana incurred large budget 
deficits.93 Nkrumah was aware of the escalating balance of payments crisis and in 
1964 announced that a disinflationary budget was required for 1965. Another 
escalating problem was growing unemployment. The Workers’ Brigade had by 1964
88 Berg, ‘Structural Transformation Versus Gradualism,’p. 228.
89 Ibid, p. 228.
90 Killick, Development Economics, p. 140.
91 Green, ‘Reflections on Economic Strategy, Structure, Implementation, and Necessity: Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast, 1957-1967,’ p. 233.
92 Killick, Development Economics, p. 152.
93 Ibid, p. 150 Table 6.2 provides a table o f  budgetary trends on capital and current items from 1957 to
1966.
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become increasingly converted into a para-military organisation under the direction of 
the Ministry of Defence.94
Culture and the Media in the Service of Nkrumah’s Objectives
Nkrumah’s views on African culture and the media were reflected as far back in his 
student days. He had helped found the journal, the African Interpreter as the organ of 
the African Students Association of America and Canada in 1942 and the Accra 
Evening News in September 1948. As a student in America, he wrote an article 
entitled ‘The Relationship Between Negro Art and African Art* and his doctoral 
dissertation entitled Mind and Thought in Primitive Society a Study in Ethno- 
Philosophy both enunciated his views on African culture. In the former article 
Nkrumah argued that not only was art a reflection of social conditions and norms of a 
people but that African American art descended from Africa; that African people 
whilst not recording their histories in written form, recorded it in songs, dances, folk 
tales, music and sculpture; that African American art had two functions -  firstly to 
reflect its surrounding environment and secondly to interpret the African American to 
himself.95
Botwe-Asamoah makes the important point that “the quest for cultural 
liberation predated Nkrumah’s cultural policies.” Kobina Sekyi, Casely-Hayford, 
Ephraim Amu, and Kwegyir Aggrey were Ghanaians who enthusiastically promoted 
Ghanaian culture and were forerunners to Nkrumah’s project of a cultural renaissance 
in Ghanaian society. As Botwe-Asamoah maintains: “Kwame Nkrumah’s thoughts on 
colonialism lay the foundation of his political and cultural philosophy.”96 Nkrumah 
considered the psychologically pernicious aspect of colonialism and imperialism to be
94 Agyeman, Ideological Education, p. 19.
95 NAG:SC21/1/118.
9S Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought, p. 5.
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its dehumanisation of African culture and the personality of the African alongside its 
economic exploitation of African people. Hence, Nkrumah*s antidote was the 
promotion and restoration of African humanity and indigenous forms of cultural 
expression in his ambition to create a new Africa and new African. Nkrumah pursued 
his promotion of culture via both “non-statutory cultural policies” and “statutory 
policies.”97 Material culture was for Nkrumah reflected in African dress. On a 
personal level, he wore both the Northern style dress, the traditional Kente cloth of the 
Ashanti chiefs and the “political suit” to reflect African culture and his political 
values. In his personal notebook dated 1950, Nkrumah wrote: “It is time to plan a 
daily dress or clothing for Ghana that will not require a maximum sweat and labour* in 
washing and ironing.”98 Nkrumah took pride and care in his own personal dress sense 
and was acutely aware of its symbolic and ideological importance.
In Hagan’s assessment of Nkrumah*s leadership style he argues that Nkrumah 
was adept at employing cultural symbols for political ends. The adoption of the 
colours of the CPP flag, the use of the white handkerchief, horsetail, walking stick 
and use of the dawn broadcast -  several of which were all practices associated with 
traditional Akan kings and queens are just a few examples of Nkrumah’s employment 
of non-statutory cultural practices that had an enormous impact on popularising the 
CPP and its leader.99
In terms of Nkrumah’s statutory policies, there were several. They 
complemented his non-statutory cultural policies and more importantly his political, 
economic and social objectives of a transformation of Ghanaian society. The elevation 
of women in the country via his expansion of the educational provision for girls and
97 Ibid, pp. 152 and 156.
98 NAG:SC21/10/1A.
99 G. P. Hagan, ‘Nkrumah’s Cultural Policy’ in K. Arhin (ed) Life and Work o f  Kwame Nkrumah, p. 
187.
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the introduction of a women’s column edited by Akua Asabea Ayisi on the front page 
of the Evening News were radical forms of action. Ayisi later became one of the few 
female judges in the country. Another important female journalist in her own right 
was the former wife of Dr. J. B. Danquah, Mabel Dove Danquah who worked on the
Evening News.100
Nkrumah’s centralising concept of power extended to the role of the mass
media in society. As Ansah claims: “There is no doubt that Nkrumah’s media
philosophy was informed by a large dose of authoritarianism, but perhaps it might be
more accurate to see it as a mixture of authoritarianism, paternalism, revolutionary
theory, developmental media theory and other varieties which are as all as far away as
possible from the classical libertarian theory of the press.”101 Having established a
number of publications and newspapers as a student activist and political organiser,
Nkrumah considered the press, television and radio as critical instruments for political
education and mobilisation. The Ghana News Agency (GNA) was set up in 1957 to
collect and disseminate information and project Ghana’s image abroad. Nkrumah was
aware of the prevalence of illiteracy among Ghanaians and considered radio the best
tool to reach Ghanaians who could neither read nor write. Ghana’s radio service also
* 102broadcast programmes in several languages including Hausa, Ewe, Twi and Fante. 
Ample funds were allocated to the GNA to expand its External Service, which was 
opened in 1961. Its purpose was to challenge the negative image of Africa and assist 
in the total liberation of the continent. Of deep concern to Nkrumah was the negative 
images and false foreign reports on Africa. As Ansah claims: “For all practical 
purposes, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation External Services became an
100 Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah‘s Politico-Cultural Thought, p. 153; Manuh, ‘Women and their 
Organisations,’ p. 106.
101 P. A. V. Ansah, ‘Kwame Nkrumah and the Mass Media’ in K. Arhin (ed) Life and Work o f  Kwame 
Nknunah, p .84.
102 Ibid, p. 86.
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instrument of foreign policy,”103 In 1963 he proposed the setting up of the Pan- 
African News Agency to disseminate news on the progress of liberation struggles in 
the African continent. As an inter-African news agency it would also promote a more 
positive image of Africa to counter that posited by the Western press.
In 1959 the Ghana Institute of Journalism was set up in Accra to train not only 
Ghanaian journalists but also other Africans. At the Second Conference of African 
journalists in Accra in 1963, Nkrumah said: “To the true African journalist, his 
newspaper is a collective organiser, a collective instrument of mobilization and a 
collective educator -  a weapon, first and foremost, to overthrow colonialism and 
imperialism and to assist total African independence and unity.”104 This address made 
clear NkrumalTs views of the press and the role of the journalist. In Nkrumah’s 
opinion, journalists had to be fully committed to the principles of the CPP.
For Nkrumah, the press, radio and television were not simply arenas of public 
discourse on national issues “but a closely guarded and tightly controlled propaganda 
machine for achieving the major objective of political education, the promotion of 
socialist ideals, national unity at home, the projection of Ghana’s image and foreign 
policy and for the liberation and unification of Africa.”105 Hence, when he 
inaugurated Ghana’s television service in July 1965, he made it clear that it was to be 
used as an ideological tool to assist in the socialist transformation of Ghana.106 It was 
to be a non-commercial public service station for Nkrumah believed that advertisers 
could seek undesirable influence on the content and direction of the service. For 
Nkrumah the role of the Ghana Television Service was to provide education,
103 Ibid, p. 87.
104 Ibid, p. 86.
105 Ibid, p. 91.
106 The director o f the Ghana Television Service was Shirley Du Bois, wife o f  Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois. 
Her appointment is another example o f  Nkrumah’s Pan-African commitment to embracing African 
Americans who were willing to work for Africa’s development.
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information and build the new nation he envisaged. As Ansah contends: “Nkrumah’s 
theory of the media was characterised by a certain eclecticism, containing elements of 
the authoritarian, paternal, communist, developmental and revolutionary theories of 
the press.”107 He consequently gained monopolistic control over the mass media in 
Ghana. By the time of his overthrow, the ten privately owned newspapers in the 
country that had existed at independence were non-existent. A state controlled media 
remained unchallenged. After continued press censorship, the only surviving 
opposition newspaper, the Ashanti Pioneer was closed down in October 1962.
Nkrumah’s monopolistic control emerged on account of Nkrumah’s concept 
of the press and ultimately his concept of power. He considered the press a 
subservient apparatus of the government whose objective was to endorse national 
objectives as defined by the party leadership. Hence, it is clear* that Nkrumah did not 
subscribe to the Weberian model of the press as a “market-place of ideas” or the 
objectivity of the press. The press did not exist as an impartial nor profit-making 
enterprise for the entertainment of readers or shareholders. Their role, first and 
foremost, was to professionally assist in the political emancipation of Ghanaians and 
African people.
On an institutional level, the arts did not have a dissimilar role to that of the 
mass media. The Arts Coimcil was established in June 1955, along the lines of the 
Arts Council of Britain, to promote the arts among the Ghanaian public. An Interim 
Committee was established and charged with organising the drumming and dancing 
performances of the independence celebrations. Thereafter, the Council set up eight 
regional committees throughout the country to support existing traditional artistic 
associations throughout the country. The committees gave rise to a number of
107 Ibid, p. 91.
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voluntary dance, music and drama groups across the country at all school levels, in 
teacher training colleges and in the various Young Christian Men and Women’s 
associations. However, the Arts Council did not live up to NkrumalTs expectations. 
He believed: “It has failed to give people any vision of the rich store of art and music 
which we possess.”108 Among its flaws was the fact that the role of the arts had not 
been reflected in the government’s socio-economic strategy. Secondly, the body and 
failed to link up with the Ministry of Education to reflect the arts in the school 
curriculum. Nkrumah therefore re-assessed the institutional framework through which 
to promote a cultural renaissance in Ghana and in early 1962 proposed the Council be 
replaced by an Institute of Arts and Culture to widen the scope of the work of the 
Council and give it clearer direction. Its director was Nana Kwabena Nketia. The 
activities of the Institute were exhibitions of arts and craft work; provision of drama, 
literature, drumming, dancing and singing. The Institute also gave an important 
platform to a number of Pan-African scholars who came to work in Ghana.109
Nkrumah’s cultural policies, sought to Africanise the content and focus of 
Ghana’s educational institutions. In short, what Nkrumah had embarked upon was an 
intellectual decolonization of Ghanaians. However, he confronted fierce resistance 
and opposition from the University of Ghana and Kumasi College of Technology. In 
his tenth anniversary address to the CPP in 1959 Nkrumah had expressed 
dissatisfaction in the lack of productivity of these two institutions. Moreover, he 
considered them as “a breeding ground for unpatriotic and anti-government 
elements.” He held the staff responsible for this state of affairs.110 The CPP and 
Nkrumah considered the University of Ghana as an outpost of colonial subversion and 
an appendage of the Ghanaian middle class. Along with the Ghanaian Bar Council
108 Cited in Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought, p. 168.
109 Ibid, p. 173.
110 Ibid, p. 188.
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and legal chambers, the University was “the most important strategic centre of the 
establishment in its fight against socialism, non-alignment and the one-party state.”111 
NkrumalTs speech was deeply resented by the University academic elite. Yet, 
Nkrumah was the Chancellor of the University and in 1962 he appointed as Vice- 
Chancellor a prestigious Irishman, Dr. Conor O’Brien, a writer and scholar* who had 
spoken out against the debacle in the Congo.
Basner wrote that it was evident in the early 1960s what kind of university
Nkrumah envisioned:
He wanted a socialist order in Ghana heading the 
African revolution to drive vestige of imperialism out of 
Africa and to liberate the colonially occupied portions 
of Africa. He wanted Legon to become the intellectual 
centre of the African revolution, of socialist Ghana, and 
of international study of Africa’s past and future as one 
of the world’s great continents and not as an appendage 
of western history, culture, economy and civilisation.112
According to Basner, O’Brien was frilly aware of Nkrumah’s ambition but “it 
isn’t easy to guess, in view of subsequent developments, what O’Brien expressed or 
hoped to accomplish in his new post.”113 Botwe-Asamoah contends Nkrumah’s 
attempts to sever the University from “its ecclesiastical tradition of medieval Europe” 
was considered as interference in academic freedom.114 For Basner, beneath the 
veneer of academic freedom was the contempt the Ghanaian middle class and 
particularly Ghanaian academics held towards Nkrumah and his CPP government. 
“To have cleared them all out would have needed 110 less than a revolution in the 




114 Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought, p. 189.
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claims Basner.115 Meanwhile, Nkrumah compromised by setting up the Institute of 
African Studies, which was inaugurated on October 25 1963. The role of the Institute 
was “to speed up the emergence of that Marxist socialist elite for his party and 
administration which could not come from Legon,” maintains Basner.116
The showdown with the University of Ghana and Dr. O’Brien came in early 
1964, soon after the second assassination attempt on Nkrumah’s life. Nkrumah had 
received intelligence reports that six members of the academic staff of the University
• 117had been “indulging in subversive activities prejudicial to the security of the state.” 
Among the six was a prominent American, Prof. William Burnett Harvey, Dean of the 
Faculty of Law who was accused of being a CIA agent. He was also close friends 
with O’Brien. The Ghanaian press quickly denounced the six men and deportation 
orders were served on all of them. Dr. O’Brien was asked by the security services to 
dismiss the six men or accept their resignations. Dr. O’Brien refused to do so when 
the security services failed to produce any concrete evidence to substantiate the 
allegations that the six were carrying out subversive activities.118 The six individuals 
were subsequently deported.
The incident had several damaging repercussions. Firstly, it came in the wake 
of anti-American demonstrations in Accra in early February 1964. The US 
Ambassador, William Mahoney complained to the Foreign Minister, Kojo Botsio. 
Washington displayed its displeasure by recalling its ambassador.119 Following this 
incident, on the day of the deportations of the six academics, a crowd of 2,000 people 
marched through the campus of the University of Ghana with placards bearing 
slogans such as: “CIA students” and "saboteur intellectuals.” Nathaniel Welbeck,
115 Bas/2/166.
116 Ibid.
117 West Africa February 15 1964.
118 Ibid.
119 West Africa  February 8 1964.
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Executive Secretary of the CPP, led the crowd. Hence, it was evident that the Ghana 
government had instigated and inspired the demonstration.
Secondly, the deportation of the six academics demonstrated the unreliability 
of the security police and the arbitrary manner in which foreigners were deported 
from Ghana without recourse to proper legal proceedings to establish their guilt or
I ^  A
innocence. It was an example of “administrative ruffianism.”
Lastly, the incident led to a stalemate between Nkrumah and O’Brien. The 
latter was not sufficiently outraged to resign and neither was Nkrumah as Chancellor 
sufficiently outraged to dismiss him. According to Basner: “There was no point in 
sacking O’Brien and creating an international academic scandal if the establishment 
remained untouched.”121 According to Basner, the real problem of the University was 
not the conservative and middle class background of the students but “academic 
inertia and mediocrity.”122 Nkrumah*s policy of Afficanising the staff at the 
University and seeking to create an intellectual centre that shared his ideological 
vision was far more complex. It was affected by the fact that the calibre and type of 
scholars Nkrumah wanted would not appeal* overnight nor did it guarantee they would 
share his ideological ambitions. Meanwhile the University was compelled to maintain 
high academic standards and the notion of academic freedom. The reality was that the 
University often had to accept mediocre scholars. Also, terms and conditions for aid 
and grants were generally imposed from London. According to Basner, this situation 
created “a further problem, that progressive expatriates would have to be delegated 
powers to dismiss or discipline inefficient, corrupt or rebellious members of the 
Ghanaian establishment, who could make powerful racial and nationalistic public 





problems.”123 Hence, Nkrumah’s impatience in creating an intellectual centre to 
decolonise and transform Africa met concrete obstacles.
Nkrumah was fully aware of what he considered to be the colonial mentality 
of the University Ghana and this recognition had led him to set up the Institute of 
African Studies, a year before. Its able director, Thomas Hodgkin, a British scholar, 
remained committed to Nkrumah’s goal of an intellectual decolonization of African 
studies. Yet, the Institute was almost an enclave within the University of Ghana. 
Consequently, the Institute battled with hostility it faced from the Ghanaian middle 
class. It sought to offer a model and practice of disengagement from colonialist 
practice and thought patterns.124
Conclusion
In 1958 Nkrumah clearly had a social, economic and cultural vision for Ghana. His 
desire was that all Ghanaians of all backgrounds would seek to modernise and 
industrialise Ghana in order to transform the coimtry into an economic powerhouse. 
Central to this goal of economic modernisation was his treasured ambition of creating 
electricity for Ghana in the VRP. The strategies adopted to realise this vision were 
fraught with difficulty and problems. Nkrumah entered office with no clear economic 
strategy for developing the Ghanaian economy and he appeared to accept those 
economic prescriptions he had inherited whilst making some cosmetic changes.
Though Nkrumah believed in the necessity of creating a socialist economy, it 
was not until 1964 that his government devised the Seven Year Plan whose goal was 
to create a socialist economy. However, within this plan, Nkrumah’s notion of 
socialism was inherently contradictory. That he believed socialism could co-exist with
123 Ibid.
124 Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame Nkrumah’s Politico-Cultural Thought, p. 200.
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private enterprise appears to be intellectually irreconcilable with Marxist economic 
planning. However, in reality Nkrumah’s Ghana was a mixed economy that allowed 
co-operatives, private business, foreign investment and state run industries to co-exist. 
Another example of the tensions in Nkrumah’s politics and intellectual thinking was 
reflected in Nkrumah’s economic relationship with Israel and his ideological 
friendship with Nasser of Egypt. His throw away comment to Moshe Dayan and the 
tone in which he made it demonstrates he was aware of the difficulties in having “too 
many friends.” Ultimately, this complicated Nkrumah’s foreign policies and his 
economic ties. However, he managed to maintain Israel’s much needed trade and 
remain ideologically committed to the Casablanca bloc.
The failure of Nkrumah’s economic policies was not only attributable to the 
decrease in cocoa prices 011 the world market, but also Nkrumah’s own financial 
indiscipline. In addition, the mismanagement of the economic plans and failure to 
adhere to them resulted in Ghana’s indebtedness and economic decline by the end of 
1965.
In terms of Nkrumah* s cultural policies for Ghana, it is evident that Nkrumah 
advocated a respect and celebration of Ghanaian culture through the adoption of both 
non-statutory and statutory policies. His cultural policies were an integral aspect of 
his economic and social objectives that sought to create African institutions. 
Moreover, Nkrumah sought to challenge negative representations of Africa. He 
envisaged a central role for the Ghanaian media in achieving these objectives. 
Consequently, 011 accormt of Nkrumah’s convictions the media had an ideological role 
in assisting in the creation of a socialist Ghana and a united Africa. Fundamentally, 
Nkrumah’s concept of the function and goals of the media emanated from his 
centralised notion of power. Similarly, all social groups in Ghanaian society -
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women, youth, trade unions and co-operatives had a role to play in creating a socialist 
and modernised Ghana. The Anglican Church and the University of Ghana were 
opposed to what they perceived as the imposition of an ideological straightjacket on 
them and the country. That Nkrumah’s economic and cultural policies failed to 
achieve their desired ends does not negate the fact that motivating Nkrumah’s policies 
was the desire to develop Ghana. We shall now turn our attention to a deeper 
exploration of the evolution of Nkrumah* s intellectual thinking during this period.
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CHAPTER 7
NKRUMAH’S POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1958-1966
The focus of this chapter is to critically analyse the evolution of Nkrumah’s 
ideas during the period 1958-1966. He had robust and bold views on a number of 
subjects including history, the “African Personality,” culture, peace, imperialism, 
colonialism, socialism, neo-colonialism and African unity. Together these comprised 
his overall ideological outlook. Therefore, Nkrumah’s political, social, economic and 
cultural views cannot be examined discretely for they are pail of a holistic nationalist 
and Pan-African perspective based on fundamental principles. Before examining his 
political writings, it is important to emphasize that a great deal of the 
misinterpretations of Nkrumah* s ideological orientation have been inadvertently 
perpetrated by some of his close associates such as Kofi Baako, Kofi Batsa and Rev. 
Stephen Dzirasa. The former were editors of The Spark and helped propagate the term 
“Nkrumaism” and the latter became a personal friend to Nkrumah and called 
Nkrumah’s ideology “the African Personality.”1
There is an ideological consistency to Nkrumah’s political and social thoughts 
in his written work. As head of state, it is surprising Nkrumah had time to read 
regularly and publish several books. However, Nkrumah required a minimum of 4 
hours sleep in order to engage in a gruelling work ethic. Dei-Anang maintains: “He 
was a most avid reader.” Nkrumah continued to read widely on a number of subjects 
including politics, history, philosophy, science, and economics and made extensive 
notes on what he read. He would often encourage his ministers to read by passing on
1 Agyeman, Ideological Education, p. 7; Killick, Development Economics, p. 33.
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the book he had completed.2 His voracious appetite for reading was observed bythis 
five-year old son, Gamal, who once complained to his father: “You are not talking to 
me but the book” when Nkrumah absentmindedly responded to his son’s query with a 
book in his hand.3
Between 1958 and 1966 Nkrumah published three major works: Africa Must 
Unite (1963), Consciencism (1964) and Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage o f 
Imperialism (1965). These form the focus of this chapter, along with some of 
Nkrumah* s speeches and personal viewpoints.4
Nkrumah, History and the African Personality
On assuming political office, Nkrumah confronted four paramount objectives: to 
consolidate political independence; to eradicate European racialism and colonialism 
on the African continent; to develop a national economy and to forge a foreign policy 
that would promote Ghana’s national and Pan-African interests. In addition to this, 
Nkrumah also consciously sought to project a new African on the world stage. In his 
independence speech he had declared “there is a new African in the world today.” 
During the Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) held in Accra in April 
1958, Nkrumah proclaimed: “For too long in our history, Africa has spoken through 
the voices of others. Now, what I have called an African Personality in international 
affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it 
through the voices of Africa’s own sons,”5 The term “African Personality” was coined 
by Edward Wilmot Blyden in one of his famous lectures on “Race and Study” given
2 Dei-Anang, The Administration p. 32.
3 Fathia Nkrumah, 16-18 February 2004 interview, Cairo, Egypt. Mrs Nkrumah revealed that 
Nkrumah laughed at his son’s indignant response; the reality was that Nkrumah had little time for his 
own children for he was consumed by politics.
4 Whilst Nkrumah published I Speak o f  Freedom  in 1961, it is not part o f the focus o f this chapter as it 
is a collection o f his speeches prior to and up to 1961.
5 Nkrumah, I  Speak o f  Freedom , p. 125.
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ill May 1893 to members of the Young Men’s Literary Association of Sierra Leone.6 
Blyden was a staunch believer in building African institutions; the cultivation of racial 
pride and unity among West Africans. Like James Afficanus Horton, J. E. Casely 
Hayford, S. R. B. Attoh Ahuma, John Mensah Sarbah, who were among the first early 
nationalists to celebrate African national identity, Blyden contributed to an existing 
rich intellectual heritage.7 Nkrumah adopted this Blydenesque notion of an African 
genius and similarly asserted dignity and celebration of African clothing, languages, 
ceremony, custom and history.
Yet, Nkrumah* s concept of the African Personality was distinct from
Senghor’s philosophical thesis of “Negritude.” In his opening address at the founding
of the Institute of African Studies on October 25 1963 Nkrumah claimed:
When I speak of the African genius, I mean something 
different from negritude, something not apologetical, 
but dynamic. Negritude consists in a more literary 
affectation and style which piles up word upon word 
and image upon image with occasional reference to 
Africa and things Africans. I do not mean a vague 
brotherhood based on a criterion of colour, or on the 
idea that Africans have no reasoning but only 
sensitivity. By the African genius I mean something 
positive, our socialist conception of society, the 
efficiency and validity of our traditional statecraft, our 
highly developed code of morals, our hospitality and 
our purposeful energy.8
Nkrumah* s concept of the African Personality challenged the emotional emphasis of 
Negritude. His definition envisaged a society of co-operation and equality. It was built 
on the morality and cordiality integral to African cultures. Later, in his book 
Consciencism, Nkrumah argued “the African Personality is defined by the cluster of
6 H. R. Lynch, Edw ard W. Blyden Pan Negro Patriot, 1832-1912 (Oxford, 1967), p. 216.
7 R. July, The Origins o f  Modern African Thought (London, 1968); S. R. B. Attoh Ahuma, The G old  
Nation and National Consciousness (London, 1971); J. E. Casely Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound Studies 
in Race Emancipation (London, 1969).
8 Nkrumah, Axioms o f  Kwame Nkrumah, pp.4-.5.
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humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society.”9 More 
importantly, his concept of the African Personality became part of the ideological lens 
through which his domestic and foreign policies were conceived. For Nkrumah, 
Ghana and Africa were indivisible. The task of all Africans was to reconstruct a 
socialist society based on the principles of equality, freedom, co-operation and a fairer 
distribution of wealth. He believed historical knowledge had a critical role to play in 
building this new society.
Nkrumah was committed to disseminating African history. As a student at 
Lincoln University, he had contributed articles on African history to The Lincolnian. 
He supported the creation of the Encyclopaedia Africana to document the rich cultural 
heritage of Africa. W. E. B. Dubois and Alphaeus Hunton, two African Americans, 
set up this intellectual project. Nkrumah believed that the documentation of African 
history was imperative to ascertain Africa’s contribution to world knowledge and to 
explain and guide the African political, social and economic experience. To this end 
Nkrumah established the Institute of African Studies and gave an inaugural address in 
October 1963. His speech is important for many reasons. Firstly, it gives an insight 
into Nkrumah’s vision of the type of Institute he wanted for Ghana and he therefore 
enunciated several “guiding principles” for this new establishment. Among them was 
an abandonment of a Eurocentric paradigm that had historically pervaded the centres 
of learning in the West and in Africa. This called “for a reinterpretation and a new 
assessment” of African history in which “new African centered ways” would 
predominate “which were free from the propositions and pre-suppositions of the 
colonial epoch.”10 For Nkrumah, history must inspire a better future and African 
Studies had to access new source material in the tradition of Ghanaian contributors
9 Nkrumah, Consciencism, p. 79.
10 K. Nkrumah ‘The African Genius Speech Delivered by Kwame Nkrumah at the Opening o f  the 
Institute o f African Studies’ 25 October 1963, Institute o f  African Studies, Accra.
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such as Attoh Ahuma, John Mensah Sarbah and the British ethnographer Captain 
Rattray.
Secondly, Nkrumah\s vision of the African Personality was intrinsically linked 
to his socialist conception of African society and he considered that both the Institute 
and the University of Ghana had a role in inspiring Ghanaians to look positively to the 
future. Thirdly, it reflected Nkrumah* s opinion on education. He considered it not 
only as “a means to personal economic security and social privilege” but in his view 
“a man’s education must also be measured in terms of the soundness of his judgement 
of people and things, and in his power to understand and appreciate the needs of his 
fellow men, and to be of service to them. The educated man should be so sensitive to 
the conditions around him that he makes it his chief endeavour to improve those 
conditions for the good of all.”11 Hence, for Nkrumah there was also a moral purpose 
to education and a sense of responsibility for the good of the whole society. 
Individuals thrived on the basis of the flourishing of the collective.
Fourth, Nkrumah laid out the specific role of the University and did not 
compromise his words. He stated that it was “to responsibly use public funds and set 
an example in loyalty to the government and the people, in good citizenship, public 
morality and behaviour;” as well as “to be in touch with students, the citizens.” In 
what could be considered as an adept sound bite, he stated: “The time has come for 
the gown to come to town.” He insisted that the Institute and the University had to be 
“outward looking.” Moreover, both were inextricably “committed to the construction 
of a socialist society” and therefore the Institute was obliged “to work closely with the 
people” in developing the aits.12 Fifth, explicit in Nkrumah’s address was a 
thoroughly Pan-African concept of African studies. The goal of African unity
11 Ibid, p.6.
12 Ibid, p. 7.
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pervades Nkrumah’s vision of the role and function of the Institute of African Studies. 
He urged scholars of the University and Institute to make Ghana their starting point of 
historical enquiry yet their research should not confine itself to Ghana alone. 
Nkrumah thought in Pan-African continental terms and cited the case of ancient 
Ghana’s trading links extending to North Africa in providing gold for North African 
merchants and medieval Europe, as an example of outward global connections with 
Pan-African dimensions. He considered the African past, the study of African 
languages and the arts as in the service of the African revolution. Furthermore, he 
considered the unfolding national liberation struggles in Guinea-Bissau and southern
1 TAfrica as “aspects of a single revolution.”
African Union Government
Nkrumah’s understanding of the African past was fused with his desires and 
ambitions for continental Africa. Central to that ambition was his belief in African 
Union Government for Africa. Long before the publication of Africa Must Unite, 
extending to his student activism in the US and London, Nkrumah had been a staunch 
champion of African unity. In the opening of the ‘Conference of Women of Africa’ in 
July 1960, Nkrumah addressed the role of African women and women of African 
descent in the struggle for African emancipation. The gathering was organised by the 
Ghana Women’s Movement, which was later inaugurated that same year.
Nkrumah began his speech by posing “What is woman’s part in the great 
struggle for African liberation?”14 He condemned the Sharpeville massacre of March 
21 1960 in which women and children were victims of the state violence by the
13 Ibid, p. 12.
14 Press Release no.558/60 Opening o f  Conference o f  Women o f Africa by the President R. The R.
Hon. Kwame Nkrumah at the Baden Powell Memorial Hall, Accra, 18 July 1960, Kwame Nkrumah 
Papers, Box 154-15, Folder 39, Moorland-Spingam Centre, Howard University.
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apartheid regime. The main thrust of Nkrumah’s speech was to encourage women to 
participate in preserving the “hard-won independence and sovereignty” of Africa. He 
stated: “We have the choice of three things: to unite, to stand separately and 
disintegrate, or to sell ourselves to foreign powers.” He argued that the emerging 
political conflict in the Congo “is a grim reminder of what could so easily be repeated 
in any African territory, whether independent or not.” Nkrumah asked: “If the United 
States of America and the Soviet Union, China and India can achieve political and 
economic union why can’t we?” He spoke directly and in a personal manner to the 
women. He said: “Your role in this direction is of great importance. Not only can you 
carry back this message to the men of your respective countries, but, if you are 
convinced that unity is the right answer, you can also bring your feminine influence to 
bear in persuading your brothers, husbands and friends of the importance of African 
unity as the only salvation for Africa.”15 He urged them to “hoist high the nationalist 
banner of redemption” and project the African personality throughout the world. 
Three years after this conference, Nkrumah wrote his major treatise on African unity.
The writing and publication of Africa Must Unite in 1963 needs to be 
understood within the context of the formation of the OAU in Addis Ababa on May 
23 1963 by the then 31 independent states of Africa. Shortly before the Addis meeting 
Nkrumah sent his ambassadors to African capitals to distribute this book and gain 
support for his proposal of a political union of African states. They were to lobby 
African heads of state and foreign ministers for a common foreign policy, continental 
planning for economic and industrial growth; a common currency and defence 
system. The book therefore is an impassioned call for Union Government for Africa. 
It is dedicated to George Padmore “and to the African Nation that must be.”
‘5 Ibid.
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Nkrumah considered political union would secure economic and technical 
transformation of the African continent, which was necessary to support Africa’s 
increasing population to standards of living comparable with those in the most 
advanced countries. He also considered Pan-Africanism or African Union 
Government as a bulwark against neo-colonial domination. In his own words: “We 
need the strength of our combined numbers and resources to protect ourselves from 
the very positive dangers of returning colonialism hi disguised forms. We need it to 
combat the entrenched forces dividing our continent and still holding back millions of 
our brothers. We need it to secure total African liberation.”16 He warned that: “At 
present most of the independent states are moving in directions which expose us to the
• ■ ■ 1 7dangers of imperialism and neo-colonialism.”
For Nkrumah, continental economic planning would maximise Africa’s 
industrial and economic power in a co-ordinated manner. It would counteract what he 
considered “the dubious advantages of association with the so-called European 
Common market.”18 Similarly, the establishment of a unified military and defence 
strategy would render unnecessary “separate efforts to build or maintain vast military 
forces for self-defence which would be ineffective in any major attack upon our 
separate states.”19 Nkrumah considered the consequences of failure to combine 
military resources for common defence as likely to give rise to insecurity and the 
opportunities for entering into defence pacts with foreign powers, which would 
endanger the security of all African states. Lastly, a common foreign policy would 
enable Africa “to speak with one voice in the councils of the world” such as the UN
16 Nkrumah, Africa M ast Unite, p. 217.
17 Ibid, p. 218.
18 Ibid, p. 219.
19 Ibid, p. 219.
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and other international bodies.20 He envisaged a continental parliament composed of 
a lower house to discuss problems facing Africa and an upper house to ensure equality 
of the associated states, regardless of size and population. He urged that the process 
towards continental government should begin with a nucleus of a few states 
committed to the objectives of political and economic unity and “leave the door open 
for the attachment of others as they desire to join or reach the freedom which would 
allow them to do so.”21 For Nkrumah, the USA, USSR, Europe and Canada were 
models of the positive benefits of union. However, he was prudent in emphasizing 
that any supranational structure for Africa did not mean an abrogation of national 
sovereignty. He emphasized that African states “would continue to exercise 
independent authority except in the fields defined and reserved for common action in
9 9the interests of the security and orderly development of the whole continent.” He 
expressed confidence that a continental structure could be devised to enable these 
objectives to be achieved and yet preserve to some extent the sovereignty of each state 
within a supranational framework of African unity.
Overall, Nkrumah upheld “that the continental union of Africa is an 
inescapable desideratum if we are determined to move forward to a realisation of our 
hopes and plans for creating a modern society.” He ended the book with a sense of the 
historical opportunities African unity presented the leaders and people of Africa. He 
appealed to African leaders thus: “Here is a challenge which destiny has thrown out to 
the leaders of Africa. It is for us to grasp what is a golden opportunity to prove that 
the genius of the African people can surmount the separatist tendencies in sovereign 
nationhood by coming together speedily, for the sake of Africa’s greater glory and
20 Ibid, p. 220.
21 Ibid, pp. 220-221.
22 Ibid, p. 218.
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9"^ •infinite well-being, into a Union of African states.” Whether his contemporaries 
read Africa Must Unite is uncertain, but it prepared the political ground for him to 
further enunciate his Pan-African ambitions at the founding of the OAU. He had 
appealed to history, the necessity for African states to harness their human, technical 
and economic resources in order to secure greater material and technological progress. 
Whilst Nkrumah made many speeches addressing African unity, this publication 
remains his foremost documented intellectual appeal for continental unification. 
Without question, underlying Nkrumah’s demand for African unity was a conception 
of African society and the need for Africa to evolve its own ideology and philosophy, 
which he characterised as “Consciencism.”
Consciencism as an African Ideology
Consciencism was published in 1964. Whilst the book is “the most intellectual of all 
Nkrumah* s works”24 there is considerable speculation that Nkrumah was not the
25writer of this book and rather Prof. William Abrahams was instead the author. 
Nkrumah dedicated the book “to members of my Philosophy Club without whose
9 Cencouragement and assistance the book would not have been written,” and therefore 
it is indeed plausible that other individuals wrote the book. Basner claims that both 
Consciencism and the book Neo-colonialism: The Highest Stage o f Imperialism were 
written by Nkrumah and he has “no reason to doubt that the intellection is entirely his 
own.” In his opinion, Nkrumah “would never be satisfied with someone else’s phrases
23 Ibid, pp.221-222.
24 A. Mazrui, ‘Ancient Greece in African Political Thought’ in R. Laremont and F. Kalouche (eds), 
Africa and Other Civilisations Conquest and Counter Conquest: Collected Essays o f  AIL A. Mazrui,
Vol. //(Trenton, 2002), p. 353.
25 Nkrumah’s supervisor, Prof. A. J. Ayer was o f  the opinion that Abrahams wrote parts o f the book 
and Nkrumah penned the political aspects. The impenetrable style o f  writing is unlike that o f  
Nkrumah’s other more accessible works, see Dabu Gizenga Collection on Kwame Nkrumah, Taped 
Interview with Prof. J. A. Ayer, Tape T-10, Box 127-128, June 30 1973, Moorland-Spingam Center, 
Howard University.
26 Nkrumah, Consciencism  (London, 1964).
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and cadence.” In addition to this, he claims Nkrumah discussed the contents of both
* 01books with him long before they were published.
As Nkrumah updated Consciencism in 1970, it is reasonable to believe that he 
did indeed subscribe to the thoughts contained in the book, even if the original work 
was a collaborative endeavour. The two editions contain different emphases and 
thereby reveal a change in NkrumalTs political thinking.
Consciencism is “the least Africa-orientated of all NkrumalTs books.”28 It is 
an analytical sketch of Western philosophical thought. However, the central thesis is 
that Africa needs to evolve its own ideology and philosophy to solve “the crisis of the 
African conscience” afflicting African society. 29 For Africa’s loss of identity had 
emerged due to the fact that it was afflicted with three rival cultural currents; 
traditional Africa, the Euro-Christian and the Islamic. The crisis would be resolved 
with the synthesis of these three cultural patterns into a new philosophy of 
consciousness that Nkrumah terms “Consciencism.” He considered the synthesis of 
these three legacies on Africa as a major challenge for Africans in the post-colonial 
period.
Prior to Nkrumah, Blyden had articulated similar thoughts on Africa’s 
cultural strains in his work Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race. Blyden advocated 
that African civilisation had its own validity and was a universal part of civilisation. It 
was characterised by communal African life; a community characterised by co- 
operation and mutual aid; and a communion with nature and God.
27 Bas/2/182. Basner believes the symbolic and theoretical formulations at the end o f  Consciencism  are 
attributable to a Cameroonian exiled professor o f  mathematics.
28 Mazrui, Africa and Other Civilisations, p. 353.
29 Nkrumah, Consciencism Philosophy and Ideology fo r  Decolonization (London, 1970) p. 70.
30 July, The Origins o f  Modern African Thought, pp.215-217; E. W. Blyden, ‘Ethiopia Stretching Out 
Her Hands Unto God; or Africa’s Service to the World,’ in G. Mutsio and S. W. Rohio (eds) Readings 
in African Political Thought (London, 1975), pp.3-18.
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The 1964 edition of Consciencism reinforced Blyden’s views on African
culture. It also upheld many of the ideological assumptions hitherto held by Nkrumah,
particularly his denial of class conflict in pre-colonial Africa. The book emphasized
that traditional African society was an egalitarian and communal society in which the
means of production including land were held in common and individual ownership
did not exist. Nkrumah termed the ideology of such a society “communalism.” In the
1964 edition Nkrumah claims:
From the ancestral line of communalism, the passage to 
socialism lies in reform, because the underlying 
principles are the same. But when this passage carries 
one through colonialism the reform is revolutionary 
since the passage from colonialism to genuine 
independence is an act of revolution. But because of the 
continuity of communalism with socialism, in 
communalistic society, socialism is not a revolutionary 
creed, but a restatement in contemporary idiom of the 
principles underlying communalism,31
Hountondji comments that “this thesis enables him to argue that in Africa the
transition to socialism can be effected without revolution and in perfect continuity
with traditional African ideology.”32 In the 1970 edition, Nkrumah appears to have
altered his position on what Basner terms the “political marriage between revolution
and reform” or to put it differently that reform was a vehicle through which socialism
could be achieved. However, Nkrumah continued to maintain the view that
communalism is characteristic of African society. He referred to “the spirit of
communalism” pervading African society. In his own words:
Socialism, therefore, can be and is the defence of the 
principles of communalism in a modern setting.
Socialism is a form of social organisation, which, 
guided by the principles underlying communism, adopts 
procedures and measures made necessary by 
demographic and technological developments. These
31 Nkrumah, Consciencism, p. 74.
32 P. Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (London, 1983), p. 136.
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considerations throw light on the bearing of revolution 
and reform on socialism. The passage from the ancestral 
line of slavery via feudalism and capitalism to socialism 
can only lie through revolution: it cannot lie through 
reform. For in reform, fundamental principles are held 
constant and the details of their expression modified. In 
the words of Marx, it leaves the pillars of the building 
intact. Indeed, sometimes, reform itself may be initiated 
by the necessities of preserving identical fundamental
*3 ■'2
principles.
In 1970 -  four year's after the coup d’etat that overthrew his government - Nkrumah 
no longer believed that socialism could be achieved via reform but through 
revolution. Yet, his conception of socialism was more flexible than the rigid Soviet 
conception that was averse to a mixed economy and a role for the private sector, 
which Nkrumah espoused as part of his domestic economic policies.
It appears a “conceptual revolution”34 had taken place in Nkrumah’s thought 
in 1965 as “from that year* on, and more precisely after the appearance of the work 
entitled Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage o f Imperialism Nkrumah explicitly rejected 
his earlier view that there was no real class struggle in Africa.”
In comparing the two editions, “despite the important changes made in the 
1970 edition, it remains largely dependent upon many pre-1965 ideological 
assumptions.”36 Secondly, according to Hountondji “ the subtitle of the book is even 
more obscure than the title.”37 The full title of the 1964 edition is: Consciencism: 
Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation and Development with Particular 
Reference to the African Revolution. Yet, Nkrumah did not clearly differentiate 
between philosophy and ideology, nor enunciate the relationship between the two 
terms. The begimiing of chapter three makes an attempt to draw a connection between
33 Nkrumah, Consciencism  (London, 1970), pp. 73-74.
34 Hountondji, African Philosophy, p. 142.
35 Ibid, pp. 142-143.
36 Ibid, p. 147.
37 Ibid, p. 147.
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the two. Nkrumah referred to the Italian patriot, Mazzini who linked the necessity for 
a revolution with an ideology to imbue and guide society.38 He obscurely argued, 
“Philosophy admits of being an instrument of ideology," yet he did not develop the 
argument.39 Other inherent weaknesses of the work lie in the homogenous 
presentation of pre-colonial African society. It is a society that appeal's to subscribe to 
a single ideology, thereby dismissing the plurality of African cultures. Nkrumah also 
over-simplified Western and Arab-Muslim culture and argued that whilst 
Consciencism was a form of materialism it did not exclude the existence of God. The 
work seeks to fuse historical materialism with the spirituality of African communities. 
The 1964 edition represents Nkrumah at a particular' juncture of ideological 
development.40 Consciencism was “a philosophy in the image of the CPP” whereby 
for Nkrumah the CPP belonged to all: fanners, labourers, civil servants, traders, 
verandah boys, chiefs and Ghanaian businessmen. 41 In Consciencism he recognised 
the role the European colonial administration made of African clerks. They carried 
out essential economic and political roles. Yet, Nkrumah was not concerned with 
these functions but to prove that this social group operated as vehicles of European 
culture. According to Hountondji; “Thus Nkrumah conjured away the practical 
problem of class struggle and ducked the theoretical problem of the internal 
composition of colonial and post-colonial African societies.”42 Moreover, “the three 
competing ideologies ... are in fact cultural substitutes for economic class conflict 
[and] are seen by Nkrumah as easily reconcilable. The aim of Consciencism is 
precisely to effect such a reconciliation, to fuse the three hitherto juxtaposed systems
38 Nkrumah, Consciencism, p. 56.
39 Ibid.
40 Hountondji, African Philosophy, p. 142.
41 Ibid, p. 150.
42 Ibid, p. 150.
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into a single system.”43 In essence, the ideology of Consciencism was mirrored in the 
monolithic mass organisation of the CPP and the various wings of the party i.e. the 
Ghana TUC, the National Cooperative Council, the United Farmers’ Council, the 
National Council of Ghana Women and the Ghana Young Pioneers Movement -  all 
were amalgamated into Nkrumah’s nation-building strategy. A synthesising ideology 
was required to harmonise class interests in a party inclined towards fragmentation in 
the post-independence phase. But in reality such a perspective was premised on 
idealism and a negation of class conflicts. In other words, the restructuring of the CPP 
and the ideology of Consciencism were founded on the premise that there had to be a
monolithic party and ideology towards achieving a unified nation state and a unified
African continent.
In Towards Colonial Freedom Nkrumah was sensitive to the linkage of modern 
capitalism with imperialism. In Consciencism he emphasized this alliance and 
considered socialism as an ally of African nationalism and unity. Mazrui maintains 
that such a paradigm of intellectual and ideological convergence has been found 
attractive in many African leaders such as Sekou Toure in Guinea, Habib Bourguiba 
in Tunisia, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Modibo Keita in Mali.44 According to 
Nkrumah:
The evil of capitalism consists in its alienation of the 
fruits of labour from those who with the toil of their 
body and sweat of the their brow produce this fruit. This 
aspect of capitalism makes it irreconcilable with those 
basic principles, which animate the traditional African 
society. Capitalism is unjust; in our newly independent 
countries it is not only too complicated to be workable, 
it is alien. Under socialism, however the study and 
mastery of nature has a humanist impulse, and is 
directed not towards a profiteering accomplishment, but
43 Ibid, p. 151.
44A. Mazrui, 'Ideology and African Political Culture,’ in T. Kiros (ed), Explorations in African 
Political Thought, Identity, Community Ethics (London, 2001), pp.l 18-119.
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the affording of ever-increasing satisfaction for the 
material and spiritual needs of the greatest numbers.45
Nkrumah considered that the communalism of traditional African society was 
reconcilable with socialism. “In sum,” he wrote “the restitution of Africa’s humanist 
and egalitarian principles of society requires socialism.”46
Another major theoretical stand that underwent revision was his view on class 
struggle. An article entitled ‘African Socialism Re-visited’, which was published in 
1966, recognised the existence of class struggle in Africa.47 This is therefore an 
important shift of emphasis made by Nkrumah. He felt the need to revise the original 
text of Consciencism and in the ‘Author’s Note’ of 1969 he explained that “since the 
publication of the first edition of Consciencism, the African revolution has decisively 
entered a new phase, the phase of armed struggle” and that “the succession of military 
coups which have in recent years taken place in Africa, have exposed the close links
4Rbetween the interests of neo-colonialism and the indigenous bourgeoisie.”
The article ‘African Socialism Revisited’ explicitly demonstrates that 
Nkrumah had outgrown African socialism, which had been an ideology that had been 
popularised at the 1962 Dakar Colloquium. Nevertheless it appeal’s several writers 
continued to subscribe Nkrumah* s ideology to the categorisation of “African 
Socialism.”49 In this critical and almost forgotten article Nkrumah had clearly 
abandoned African socialism and had adopted “scientific socialism.” He questioned: 
“What real meaning does the term [African Socialism] retain in the context of
45 Nkrumah, Consciencism  (USA, 1964), p. 76.
46 Ibid, p. 77.
47 It was first published in African Forum, Vol. I, No.3, 1966 and again in London, 1973.
48 Ibid, 1970 edition.
49 Among them are: C. Young, Ideology and Development', S. Metz, ‘In Lieu o f  Orthodoxy: The 
Socialist Theories o f  Nkrumah and Nyerere’ in JMAS, 20, 3, 1982, pp.377-392; B. D. G. Folson, ‘The 
Development o f Socialist Ideology in Ghana.’
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contemporary African politics?”50 He distinguished himself from African leaders 
whom he considered employed the term socialism “in a charismatic effort to rally 
support for the policies that do not really promote economic and social 
development.”51 It is likely Nkrumah was referring to leaders like Leopold Senghor 
who had been a staunch advocate of African socialism and had given a lecture at 
Oxford University in late 1961 on the theme of African socialism.52 For Nkrumah the 
term “tends to obscure our fundamental socialist commitment.” It was also a concept 
that “makes a fetish of communal African society.” It served to resurrect “an African 
Golden Age or paradise” prior to European colonialism. Yet, for Nkrumah “ a return 
to the pre-colonial African society is evidently not worthy of the ingenuity and efforts 
of our people.”53
Furthermore, Nkrumah contends that pre-colonial African society “was neither 
classless nor devoid of a social hierarchy” for feudalist social relations existed in 
some parts of pre-colonial Africa.54 Despite this Nkrumah believed that pre-colonial 
African society “manifested a certain communalism and that the philosophy and 
humanist purpose behind that organisation are worthy of recapture.”55 However, 
Nkrumah was far from advocating a restoration of a village mode of production as his 
contemporary Julius Nyerere espoused in his concept of ujamaa. Nkrumah stressed: 
“what socialist thought in Africa must recapture is not the structure of the “traditional 
African society” but its spirit, for the spirit of communalism is crystallised in its 
humanism and its reconciliation of individual advancement with group welfare.”56
50 K. Nkrumah, ‘African Socialism’ Revisited in Kwame Nkrumah The Struggle Continues Six 
Pamphlets (London, 1973), p. 78. It was first published in African Forum , Vol. I. N o.3, 1966.
51 Ibid, p.78.
52 West Africa November 11, 1961.
53 Nkrumah, ‘African Socialism’ Revisited, p. 80.
54 Ibid, p. 79.
55 Ibid, p .  80.
56 Ibid, p. 80.
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Metz points out that whilst there were similarities in the socialist premises of
both Nkrumah and Nyerere, based upon their interpretation of the African traditional
and communal past, there were fundamental divergences based on their “differing
foci” of emphases.57 Nkrumah came under Marxist orthodoxy to a greater extent than
Nyerere. A fundamental difference, among many, lay in their opposing assessments of
the format of economic production of society. For Nyerere it lay with the village unit
and for Nkrumah production had to be based on industrialisation and large-scale
mechanisation of agricultural. Secondly, Nyerere considered “socialism -like
democracy -  is essentially an attitude of mind.”58 For Nkrumah, socialism was more
than an attitudinal predisposition. He utilised the Marxist dialectical method of social
development and believed that conflict between social groups in society produced
progress. For example, to cite Nkrumah at some length:
When one society meets another, the observed historical 
trend is that acculturation results in a balance of forward 
movement, a movement in which each society 
assimilates certain useful attributes of the other. Social 
evolution is a dialectical process; it has ups and downs, 
but, 011 balance, it always represents an upward trend.
The way out is certainly not to regurgitate all Islamic or 
Euro-colonial influences in a futile attempt to recreate a 
past that cannot be resurrected. The way out is only 
forward, forward to a higher and reconciled form of 
society, in which the quintessence of the human 
purposes of traditional African society reasserts itself in 
a modern context -  forward in short, to socialism, 
through policies that are scientifically devised and 
correctly applied.59
Hence Nkrumah saw African society in tension as a result of a combination of 
social and educational backwardness and a host of contemporary problems with roots 
in colonial exploitation but he believed these problems had to be solved through the 
methods of rationality, technology, industrialisation and modern agricultural
57 Metz, ‘In Lieu o f  Orthodoxy,’ p. 380.
58 Ibid.
59 Nkrumah, ‘African Socialism’ Revisited, pp,81-82.
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techniques of “scientific socialism.” For Nkrumah: “Socialism, therefore, can be, and
it is, the defence of the principles of communalism in a modern setting; it is a form of 
social organisation that, guided by the principles underlying communalism, adopts 
procedures and measures made necessary by demographic and technological 
developments.”60
As Nkrumah continued with his political writing, there were some beliefs he did
not compromise nor alter. For example, in November 1964 he refused a television
team to film him and his family in the gardens of Flagstaff House. An exceipt from
the letter to the television team merits extensive reproduction here because it conveys
his inflexible convictions on deeply private matters:
People in general seem to be insatiably curious about 
the family and private lives of those who are in the 
public eye. It has always been my strong convictions 
that my domestic affairs -  my home and my family — 
are purely private matters, which should not be ‘mixed 
up’ with my official and public life. I see no reason why 
I should exhibit my wife and children in order to satisfy 
public curiosity.
My view -  and this may jolt you a little! -  is that 
marriage does not exist in nature and does not warrant 
the importance that has come to be attached to it. It is a 
bourgeois imposition, a mere contrivance set up as a 
matter of human convenience for the protection of 
inheritance rights, capitalist and property-owners.
To sum up -  I am most anxious that no one should 
tamper with my own liberty within my family.
Irrespective of my present position, I still look upon my 
family as a private concern and not as an instrument of 
projecting a personality of myself as an individual or as 
Head of State.61
Nkrumah’s response is forthright and revealed his irritation at public scrutiny on his 
private life. His attack on marriage as a bourgeois institution is typically Marxian and
60 Ibid, p. 81.
61 Cited in Private Secretary by E. Powell, pp. 125-126.
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averse to Akan norms which consider marriage to be of cultural importance in a
society based on notions of strong family bonds.
As Nkrumah concentrated personal control of the security intelligence and
PDD into his own hands during this period, he became further isolated. In August
1965 he wrote a candid and rather melodramatic letter to his secretary who was in
England at the time:
Have you noticed over the years I have known you that 
I am a very lonely man? Can you say that this and that 
person is a friend to me? I am friendless and 
companionless. [...] I suffer from intense loneliness, 
which makes me sometimes burst into tears. I am an 
isolated man -  isolated from life itself. You only know 
and understand that, Erica -  few people know this. They 
see me in public smiling and laughing, not knowing the 
burden of loneliness and isolation that I carry. Marriage 
did not solve it -  it has rather intensified and 
complicated it.[...] You know I didn’t want to get 
married. You know my views on the subject. Did I ever 
tell you that I married not for myself but for the 
presidency?62
In this glimpse of emotion, it appears Nkrumah endured loneliness and regretted his 
marriage. However, it is likely “he would have regretted marriage with any 
woman.”63 This insightful comment from Powell demonstrates that it was Nkrumah’s 
personality and perspective on the institution of marriage as ensnaring that was 
problematic. Clearly, he had married for political reasons rather than any romantic 
sentiments.
Nkrumah and Neo-colonialism
Long before the publication of his contentious book Neo-colonialism The Last 
Stage o f Imperialism in 1965, Nkrumah had made reference to the term neo­
62 Ibid, p. 126.
63 Ibid, p. 127.
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colonialism in his public address at the opening session of the Conference of 
Independent States on April 15 1958. He spoke of “the new forms of Colonialism 
[that] are now appearing in the world with their potential threat to our precious 
independence.”64 He warned that imperialism would seek to achieve its ends “not 
merely by military means, but by economic penetration, cultural assimilation, 
ideological domination, psychological infiltration, and subversive activities.”65 
Nkrumah repeated this belief in Neo-colonialism: The Highest Stage o f Imperialism 
that neo-colonialism did not confine itself to the economic sphere but deployed 
religious, educational and cultural methods to achieve its interests.
In Africa Must Unite, Nkrumah devoted a whole chapter to the operation and 
nature of these new forms of domination of the African continent. He wrote: “The 
greatest danger at present facing Africa is neo-colonialism and its major instrument, 
balkanisation.”66 For Nkrumah neo-colonialism in Africa had similar features to the 
definition given by Lenin. “It acts covertly, manoeuvring men and governments, free 
of the stigma attached to political rule. It creates client states, independent in name but 
in point of fact pawns of the very colonial power which is supposed to have given 
them independence.” They are formally independent “but in reality enmeshed in the 
net of financial and diplomatic dependence.”67 Nkrumah critiqued the economic 
relationship of overseas aid and investment from the former metropolitan coimtry as 
one that drained Africa of its wealth. For Nkrumah, the political and cultural 
influences of the former colonial powers remained strong despite formal 
independence. The appearance of nationhood existed but token aid was donated by 
the metropolitan countries to create the illusion of development and progress. “The
64 Conference o f  Independent States Speeches D elivered at the Inaugural Session, 15 April 1958, 
Second Edition, Parliament House, Accra.
65 Ibid,
ee Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 173.
67 Ibid, p. 174.
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creation of several weak and unstable states of this kind in Africa, it is hoped, will 
ensure the continued dependence on the former colonial powers for economic aid, and 
impede African unity. This policy of balkanisation is the new imperialism, the new 
danger to Africa,” he wrote.68 Nkrumah ended the chapter with the contention that 
only African unity could circumvent the neo-colonialist and imperialist agenda of 
outside powers. He believed a union of African states would not only raise the dignity 
of Africa and strengthen its impact on world affairs but “it will make possible the full 
expression of the African personality.”69
In his 1965 publication, Nkrumah continued to articulate these political 
thoughts. The book engaged in a systematic theoretical expansion and clarification of 
the concept with an attempt to provide empirical evidence of the operations of neo­
colonialism in its African context and within a global perspective. Nkrumah defined 
the term thus: “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it 
is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international 
sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed 
from outside.”70 The basis of such a system rests 011 “the principle of breaking up 
former larger united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable States 
which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former 
imperial power for defence and even internal security. Their economic and financial
•  71systems are linked, as in colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler.”
For Nkrumah, even “aid” is a neo-colonial tool that fails to benefit the 
recipient state by raising the standards of living of Africans. Rather, it served to 
depress the economies of developing countries and keep them subjugated by imposing
68 Ibid, p. 179.
69 Ibid, p. 193.
70 Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism, p. ix.
71 Ibid, p. xiii.
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trade agreements with the donor country. Nkrumah believed no individual African 
nation state competing on the world economic stage stood a chance of being in 
command of its agricultural exports as long as “balkanisation” continued. “A 
continent like Africa, however much it increases its agricultural output, will not 
benefit unless it is sufficiently politically and economically united to force the 
developed world to pay it a fair price for its cash crops,” he wrote.72 Furthermore, “so 
long as Africa remains divided it will therefore be the wealthy consumer countries 
who will dictate the price of African cash crops.”73
He was of the opinion that time was against the African continent to 
industrialise in “the haphazard, laissez-faire manner of Europe”74 and as a result “the 
challenge cannot be met on any piece-meal scale, but only by the total mobilisation of 
the continent’s resources within the framework of comprehensive socialist planning 
and deployment.”75 Such a strategy would not dispense with national planning bodies 
but such bodies would co-ordinate economic planning on a continental level.
For Nkrumah, independent Africa confronted a global economic environment 
which was dominated by “the empire of finance capital ... a vast sprawling network 
of inter-continental activity on a highly diversified scale that controls the lives of 
millions of people in the most widely separated parts of the world, manipulating 
whole industries and exploiting the labour and riches of nations for the greedy 
satisfaction of a few.” The ramifications of this neo-colonial system were that it 
operated on a pan-African scale and for Nkrumah “they can only be challenged on a
72 Ibid, p. 9.
73 Ibid, p. 11.
74 Ibid, p. 11.
75 Ibid, p. 11.
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pan-African basis. Only a united Africa through an All African Union Government 
can defeat them.”76
Nkrumah argued that the benefits of continental economic and political 
integration would be of enormous advantage to each state by raising the living 
standards of each African and ending the domination of Africa’s economy by foreign 
multi-national companies. 77 But for Nkrumah the prerequisites for these advantages 
were the development of large-scale industry, power and transport networks; the 
removal of barriers to inter-African trade; the creation of a central bank, the formation 
of a unified policy on all aspects of export control, tariff and quota arrangements on 
the premise that Africa was to be conceived as a viable, single, economic and political 
unit.
Following his theoretical exposition, much of the book provides detailed 
evidence and illustrations of the operations of Western finance capital (Canadian, 
American, British, Belgian and French) in the exploitation of Africa’s mineral 
resources such as diamonds, tin, nickel, gold and the debilitating role of Union
• 70Miniere in the establishment of Congolese independence.
Neo-colonialism is a polemical and trenchant critique of Western imperialism 
and it is therefore not surprising that it furthered the existing strain in Ghana-US 
relations.79 Overall, whilst the book emphasised the importance of external factors in 
African affairs, its major weakness is precisely “its tendency to explain Africa’s lack 
of development almost exclusively in terms of external factors.”80 Nkrumah appears
76 Ibid, p. 36.
77 Ibid, pp.26-27.
78 Ibid, pp. 197-212. June Milne informed me that herself and Dorothy Padmore, w ife o f  George 
Padmore, assisted Nkrumah in collating research material for the book; interview with author on 18 
July 1998, London.
79 The causes o f  the strain were not only the anti-American demonstrations in early 1964 but Ghana’s 
opposition to America’s role in the Congo; Nkrumah’s desire for a thousand million pounds from the 
IMF, which was blocked by America; Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy , p. 396.
80 Afari-Gyan, The Political Ideas ofKwam e Nkrumah, p. 216.
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to have given insufficient focus to the critical role of indigenous African classes in 
this neo-colonial system. It is only after the coup d’etat of February 1966 that he 
developed a more critical analysis of class conflict in Africa. For Nkrumah, neo­
colonialism was the principal enemy of Africa’s development. It was a major and 
consistent theme in his theoretical and ideological vision of Africa in a global context.
However, the book did not deter the large contingent from Kaiser Industries 
Corporation, nor Edgar Kaiser from attending the inauguration of the Akosombo dam 
in early January 1966. In the light of the publication of the book, Nkrumah’s speech at 
the opening of the dam was peculiar. He said: “Like Britain in the heyday of her 
imperial power, the US, is, and rightly so, adopting a conception of a dual mandate in 
its relations with the developing world.”81 Nkrumah went on to say: “This could 
enable the US to increase its own prosperity and at the same time assist in the 
increasing prosperity of the developing world.”82 One observer remarked that: “It was 
a speech designed to better relations between Ghana and the US, which have been 
strained in recent months, without in any way apologising for the much criticised 
book.”83 As an astute politician Nkrumah appeared in his address to appeal to African 
and US mutual economic interests. Moreover, after four years of construction, the 
dam, was the fulfilment of Nkrumah*s long-cherished aspiration. Electricity 
represented the basis upon which an industrial and modernised economy could be 
built. Nkrumah envisioned the dam supplying electricity to other parts of West Africa. 
Nkrumah considered the financial terms of the agreement with Kaiser Industries 
worth the realisation of this ambition.





Overall, 1958-1966 saw a further consolidation of Nkrumah’s political, 
economic and social ideas on colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, African 
unity and culture. Though there is an ideological consistency in his political and social 
thought during this period, Nkrumah altered some views. For example, he abandoned 
association with the “African Socialism” school of thought and conceived of class 
struggle in African society around 1966. Whereas the 1964 edition of Consciencism 
appeared to endorse the idea that socialism could be achieve via reform, the 1970 
edition clearly rejected such a notion and Nkrumah considered revolution as the only 
solution. Unlike Nyerere, Nkrumah did not seek to return to an idyllic African 
communal past. He sought to recapture the humanist spirit of communal African 
society and its egalitarian principles in a modem and rational re-distribution of 
Africa’s economic resources. Consciencism was for Nkrumah the cultural synthesis of 
Africa’s three cultural currents: traditional Africa, Euro - Christianity and Islam in the 
creation of a modern “scientific socialist” Africa. It was the amalgamation of Africa’s 
three important cultural legacies. Moreover, it was an ideology that mirrored the 
monolithic hegemony of the CPP for the party itself was a fusion of disparate social 
groups.
Nkrumah’s uncompromising convictions in unity, anti-imperialism, anti-neo­
colonialism, freedom and equality underpinned the various institutions he set up to 
achieve his ambitions for Ghana and Africa. History was also important to Nkrumah. 
He wanted to erase the colonial history of Africa with a history that was Pan-African 
in nature and perspective. To this end he endorsed the creation of the Encyclopaedia 
Africana and the setting up of the Institute of African Studies. They were to assist in 
forging an African revolution. For Nkrumah this revolution consisted of transforming
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the economic resources of the continent to meet the material needs of its people. He 
considered Africa as a single entity and “the liberation movements which have 
emerged in Africa have clearly all been aspects of a single African revolution.”
Finally, Nkrumah consistently argued that neo-colonialism was Africa’s 
powerful enemy that sought to maintain the continent’s economic and political 
subjugation via a myriad of methods. The solution to neo-colonialism was Continental 
Union Government for Africa. He envisaged a strong economically and politically 
unified continent not only able to command respect in the world but “a continent like 
Africa, however much it increased its agricultural output, will not benefit unless it is 
sufficiently politically and economically united to force the developed world to pay it
oc
a fair price for its cash crops.”
In some ways Nkrumah’s views enshrined in Neo-Colonialism were a 
forerunner of the 1970s dependency school of thought. In many ways they parallel 
this paradigm that critiqued new forms of Western initiatives that only served to 
perpetuate the vulnerability of developing nations. Nkrumah considered new forms of 
dependency on the West via aid, loan conditionalities and military bases a 
perpetuation of economic, cultural and political domination that could only be 
challenged through the implementation and practice of African unity.
In Consciencism Nkrumah wrote: “Practice without thought is blind; thought 
without practice is empty.”86 For Nkrumah, theory and practice were inextricably 
linked. He thought in terms of not only Ghana but the entire African continent within 
the context of world development, for he considered Africa was pari of a global 
humanity. However, the implementation of Nkrumah’s domestic policies was subject
84 Nkrumah, Axioms, p. 6.
85 Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism, p. 9.
86 Nkrumah, Consciencism  (USA, 1964), p. 78.
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to flagrant errors and a divorce between theory and reality. We now turn to the 
execution of his foreign policies.
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CHAPTER 8
NKRUMAH’ S FOREIGN POLICY, 1958-1966
Nkrumah earnestly believed in a central role for Ghana in international affairs. 
Undoubtedly, “From the beginning his personality dominated Ghana’s external 
relations, because he felt that he had a specific mission for Africa which could be 
fully realised only under his control at the helm.”1 Nkrumah’s vision of African unity 
together with the strategies he employed to fulfil his foreign policy objectives caused 
conflict and bitterness among some of his contemporaries such as Felix Houphouet- 
Boigny of Ivory Coast, Sylvanus Olympio of Togo and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. 
The motivations underpinning his foreign policy, their impact, perceptions and the 
machinery through which his political decisions were enacted is the focus of this 
chapter.
In his independence speech, Nkrumah gave a glimpse of the future of Ghana’s 
foreign policy with his famous words that “the independence of Ghana is meaningless 
unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” He 
immediately assumed the portfolio of Minister of Defence and External Affairs in the 
newly established Ministry of Foreign Affairs.2 Whilst Nkrumah was driven by the 
ideological vision of Pan-Africanism, he was aware of heightening Cold War 
tensions. He advocated “non-alignment” and “positive neutralism” during a time 
when newly independent states of Africa and Asia sought to distance themselves from 
Cold War entanglements of the West and the East by seeking to define their own 
interests independent of any political bloc. These principles were enunciated at the
1 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 1.
2 Ibid, p. 1. See also, S. E. Quarm, Diplomatic Servant: Reflections o f  a Pioneer in G hana’s 
DiplomaticSei'vice (Accra, 1995), p. 13.
250
1955 African-Asian conference in Bandung.3 Nkrumah vigorously campaigned for 
world peace, encouraged the dismantling of powerful nuclear weapons and was 
particularly opposed to French nuclear tests in the Sahara in February I960.4 He also 
sought to end the war between America and Vietnam.
But on the whole, as Nkrumah himself acknowledged: “It is in Africa that 
Ghana’s foreign policy really lies.”5 However, domestic turmoil in the emergence of 
the Ga Shifimo Kpee movement in the summer of 1957 gave Nkrumah little 
opportunity to pursue foreign policy initiatives that year. 6 Earlier in the year he had 
decided to withdraw from the West African Air Transport Authority and subsequently 
other West African boards such as the Royal West African Frontier Force, the 
Currency Board and the Cocoa Research Institute. His justification was that Ghana 
needed to be in direct control of her independence as these agencies were considered 
as serving the old colonial administration.7 In the national assembly, S. D. Dombo of
» ■ • • • • Rthe parliamentary opposition criticised the government’s decision.
With his “master planner,” George Padmore, as his official Advisor on 
African Affairs, Nkrumah commenced preparations for the First Conference of 
Independent African States (ClAS) in April 1958.9
3 See ‘Extracts from the Bandung Declaration’ in C. Legum, Pan-Africanism  (London, 1965), p. 156.
4 NAG:ADM /16/9 ‘Positive Action Conference For Peace and Security Opening Speech by Kwame 
Nkrumah’.
5 Parliamentary D ebates, 15 July 1958, p. 472.
6 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 30.
7 Ibid, p.45; see also Batsa, The Spark, p. 33; NAG:ADM13/2/36.
8 Pariiam entaty Debates, 10 July 1959, p. 385.
9 Abrahams, The Coyaba Chronicles, p. 45. Padmore was appointed to this role in 1957 and in late 
1958 his office was moved from the Ministry o f  Defence and External Affairs to direct control o f  the 
Prime Minister with adequate funds. See ‘Notes o f  an informal meeting o f  the Cabinet held on Sunday 
29 June 1958 -  marked Confidential,’ NAG:ADM/13/1.
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Implementing Pan-Africanism, 1958-1960
The methodical preparation for the Cl AS laid the basis for its huge success.10 It was a 
continuation of the radical tradition of Pan-African congresses, particularly the 1945 
Pan-African Congress in Manchester.11 On account of his “deep uneasiness about the 
Foreign Service’s competence to organise the First Conference of Independent 
African States because of his belief that the Service was not timed in to the African 
movement,” Nkrumah allocated the preparations to his trusted mentor. 12 The small 
preparatory team led by Padmore’s office drafted a memorandum on the aims of the 
conference which “was the most clearly articulated foreign policy statement ever 
produced in Ghana.”13 It called for the co-ordination of foreign policies in Africa; that 
Africa should view the international situation in the light of her own interests and the 
setting up of a permanent institutional framework for co-operation among African 
states.14 Even before the conference, differences and suspicions emerged between 
Liberia and Ghana. President Tubman demanded that the draft proposal condemn 
subversive ideologies and coups designed to overthrow legitimate governments. The 
small team visited all seven participating states to reassure them that Ghana “was not 
seeking leadership of Africa.”
Representatives from Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and 
the United Arab Republic (UAR), which was the short-lived union between Egypt and 
Syria) attended the Accra conference. It opened on April 15. “It is,” Nkrumah
10 The documentation on the agenda and Nkrumah’s correspondence to various Heads o f  State, 
lobbying for their participation and presence at the conference was painstaking and demonstrated 
considerable planning had been undertaken, see NAG:SC/BAA/136.
11 Thompson, Africa and Unity, p. 130.
12 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 13.
13 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 32.
14 Ibid, p. 32.
15 Ibid, p. 35.
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declared, “the first time in history that representatives of independent sovereign States 
in Africa are meeting together with the aim of forging closer links of friendship, 
brotherhood, co-operation and solidarity between them.”16 He referred to the 
problems of “Colonialism and Racialism” prevailing on the African continent and it 
was on this platform that he spoke publicly for the first time of “new forms of 
Colonialism which are now appealing in the world, with their potential threat to our 
precious independence.”17 The resolutions of the conference were a reaffirmation of 
the 1945 Pan-African conference objectives; namely to accelerate the struggles in 
dependent territories and to combat racialism on the African continent through 
economic and social development and co-operation.
The impact of the conference was immense. Firstly, “Pan-Africanism moved
from the realm of idealism and romanticism to that of practical politics.”18 Ghana’s
independence and role as “a base in Africa from which propaganda and ideas could be
disseminated” put an end to Pan-Africanism as a purely intellectual movement. 19
Secondly, immediately after the conference Nkrumah embarked on a tour of the seven
participating states in order to sustain the momentum of the conference resolutions
and to exchange views on the international situation with various heads of states.
Accompanying him were George Padmore, Tachie Menson, and Krobo Edusei.20
Thirdly, the conference influenced the participating states to pledge assistance to anti- 
91colonial struggles.
16 Conference o f  Independent African States Speeches Delivered at the Inaugural Session, 15 April 
1958, Second Edition, Accra, p. 1.
17 Ibid, p. 2. This theme o f a new form o f  colonialism later developed into Nkrumah’s theory o f  neo­
colonialism.
18 Thompson, Africa and Unity, p. 126-127.
19 Ibid, p. 126.
20 Ibid.
21 Thompson , G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 57; see Thompson, Africa and Unity, p. 130.
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On the African stage the year 1958 saw the formation of the Ghana-Guinea 
Union on November 23. An impetus to the founding of the Union was the abrupt 
circumstances under which Guinea obtained its independence from the French in the 
same year. Sekou Tome’s “No” vote to Charles de Gaulle’s proposal of devolved 
power to Francophone countries within a broader framework of a French Union led to 
the immediate departure of French aid, technicians and bureaucrats from Conakry.22 
Hence, the motives behind the Ghana-Guinea Union were pragmatic. Guinea was on 
the verge of bankruptcy as the country had been heavily subsidised by the French but 
Nkrumah believed the embryo union would be the first step in the creation of a
* * 9Tcontinental union.
Nkrumah considered the accord part of the wider historical current towards 
union, which was taking place in the organisation of the European Common Market in 
Western Europe. As part of the Ghana-Guinea agreement, resident ministers were 
exchanged and the coordination of defence, foreign and economic policies were to be 
developed. As Guinea was facing economic collapse, Ghana also agreed to grant a 
loan of 10 million British pounds sterling to the sister nation.24
Meanwhile, Nkrumah had delegated to Padmore the organisation of the 
forthcoming All African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC), It was held between 
December 5 and 8 1958. This gathering was different from the CIAS in that it brought 
together at non-governmental level political parties, movements, trade unions, co­
operative associations, youth and women’s organisations from dependent territories 
under colonial rule. Altogether almost 200 delegates sponsored by 36 nationalist
22 Cooper, Africa Since 1940, p. 79.
23 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy , p. 67. In 1961 Mali under Modibo Keita joined the Union.
24 Dr. Busia visited London in December 1958 and declared the loan beyond Ghana’s capacity, see 
West Africa 6 December 1958.
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organisations were invited to Accra.25 The agenda of the conference was “to 
formulate concrete plans and work out the Gandhian tactics and strategy of the 
African Non-violent Revolution to colonialism and imperialism; racialism; tribalism
9 f\and the position of chiefs in a free and independent society.”
Some tensions, which surfaced during the organisation of the AAPC, occurred 
between civil servants and the conference organisers. It “symbolised a conflict that 
was to persist throughout the Nkrumah period,” argues Thompson.27 Fundamentally, 
little co-ordination existed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
conference organisers. Another source of friction was the civil service questioning of 
the Cabinet decision that the Minister of Finance need not check monthly accounts of 
the conference committee.28 Despite these impediments, the conference went 
smoothly and was another major success.
Nkrumah dominated the event through his consultation, reconciliation and
advising of delegates. Inter-racial co-operation was one of many issues he spoke on.
He confidently proclaimed:
We are not racialists or chauvinists. We welcome into 
our midst peoples of all other races, other nations, other 
communities, who desire to live among us in peace and 
equality. But they must respect us and our rights, out­
right as the majority to rule. That, as our Western 
friends have taught us to understand it, is the essence of 
democracy.29
The impact of the conference was profound. Its significance lay in its ability to 
bring together numerous revolutionary individuals and progressive forces from most
25 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy , p. 60; see also ‘A Call to Independence’ in Revolutionary Path, 
p. 133-134.
26 Cited in Revolutionary Path, pp. 132-133.
27 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy , p. 59.
28 Ibid, p. 59. Nkrumah’s indisciplined and ad hoc manner to financial checks was demonstrated at this 
early stage in 1958.
29 Legum, Pan-Africanism, p.43-44.
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of the African continent.30 After centuries of being nurtured in the Diaspora, Pan- 
Africanism had returned home to Africa.
The following year Nkrumah met President Tubman of Liberia and President 
Sekou Toure of Guinea in Sanniquellie, a small Liberian village to discuss the 
question of African liberation and unity. On July 19 1959, the three leaders issued a 
Declaration of Principles in which “each state and Federation, which is a member of 
the Community, shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional 
structure.”31 They agreed to form a Community of Independent African States. 
According to Legum “the Sanniquellie Declaration marked a new phase in the 
argument between Pan-Africanists about the best way of developing African unity.” 
Tubman considered a loose association of African states based on economic co- 
operation preferable to what he considered Nkrumah’s inflexible political union. 
These two Pan-Africanist stances were to continue to divide the Pan-African 
movement.
A tragic event in 1959 was the sudden death of Nkrumah’s mentor, Padmore, 
on September 25. It impacted severely and personally on Nkrumah. Mrs Nkrumah 
observed that “Nkrumah was crying in the house.” 33 Consumed by a relentless 
political commitment, Padmore had “forgot to attend a check-up” and “ignored the 
symptoms of his disease.”34 His “close comrade,” as Nkrumah referred to Padmore, 
had died of cirrhosis of the liver following his admission to a London hospital on
30 There was no representative from Egypt, Nigeria and only one representative from French West 
Africa (Senghor) and only the Muslim League of The Gambia were present; see S. Thompson, Ghana’s 
Foreign Policy, p. 62.
31 Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 180.
32 Ibid, p. 45. For the remainder of the 1960s the Pan-Africanist movement was bedevilled by 
antagonist views as to whether African unity could be best achieved via economic integration or 
political union.
Interview with author, 16-18 February 2004, Egypt.




September 18. He fell into a coma and did not recover. Nkrumah deeply mourned 
what he referred to as “a loyal comrade in arms.”36
The impact of Padmore’s death was considerable. Institutionally, his office
o 7
was temporarily taken over by Kofi Baako and on a permanent basis by Padmore’s
o o
stenographer, the West Indian A. K. Barden. Above all, Nkrumah did not allow the 
personal tragedy of his mentor’s death to interrupt the work on African affairs.39 A 
major and negative consequence was the fact that many of the BAA’s board members 
had other full time responsibilities and therefore did not devote undivided energies 
and time to the affairs of the Bureau as Padmore had done.40 A final consequence was 
the deterioration in links between the Foreign Ministry and the BAA.41
The year 1960 opened with the Second All African Peoples’ Conference 
(AAPC) held in Tunis on January 25. There was greater emphasis given to African
AOunity at this conference than at the Accra gathering. Efforts were made to set up an 
All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) disaffiliated from other non-African 
trade union organisations 43 Some African countries such as Tunisia and Kenya 
sought to retain their links with the Western International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) whilst others, like Ghana vociferously campaigned for complete
35 Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-41, Folder 17: Writings by Nkrumah -  Speeches and Statements, 
Manuscript Division, MSRC, Howard University,
36 Ibid.
37 Daily Graphic 26 September 1959.
38 A K. Barden was an ex policeman and his growing incompetence and misappropriation of monies 
allocated to the BAA and political dissidents seriously damaged the work o f the Bureau; see Pan- 
Africanism from  Within by R. Makonnen, p.217-219.
39 It was a year later, on 4 May 1960 that Padmore’s office was officially established by statutory 
instrument. As an independent body it had a board of directors comprised of: T. Adamafio, A. Djin, 
Peter Koinange, J. Tettegah, R. Makonnen and A. K. Barden; see The Administration by Dei-Anang, p. 
26. Also, Nkrumah opened the George Padmore Memorial Library in 1961 in honour of Padmore.
40 Dei-Anang, The Administration , p. 27.
41 Ibid, p. 27.
42 Thompson, Africa and Unity, p. 135.
43 A “strictly confidential report” on the conference written by A. K . Barden and submitted to 
Nkrumah who did not attend the Second AAPC noted the “lack of co-ordination and the tendency o f  
forming several splinter groups” among political parties and union organisations in East and Central 
Africa, see NAG:SC/BAA/251, p. 3.
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disaffiliation in accordance with the principles of non-alignment. The proposal for 
establishing a permanent secretariat was realised and Guinean Resident Minister in 
Ghana, Abdoullaye Diallo was appointed the AATUF’s first Secretary-General.
As the year 1960 unfolded, Nkrumah made known his condemnation of what 
he termed “nuclear imperialism” carried out by the French government’s second 
explosion of an atomic bomb in the Sahara in February.44 At the ‘Positive Action 
Conference for Peace and Security in Africa,’ held in Accra horn April 7 to 10 1960, 
Nkrumah not only condemned the “atomic arrogance” of the French but also the 
brutalities committed by the French in Algeria and the recent Sharpeville massacre in 
South Africa.45 Nkrumah enunciated that “the cardinal principles upon which the 
peace and security of this continent depends, is the firm insistence that Africa is not 
an extension of Europe or any other continent. A corollary of this principle is the 
resolution that Africa is not going to become a cockpit of the Cold War', or a 
marshalling ground for attack on either West or East, nor is it going to be an arena for 
fighting out the East-West conflict.”46 The views expressed at the conference by 
Nkrumah, demonstrated his strong anti-nuclear* position, his opposition towards 
Africa becoming manipulated in Cold War quarrels as well as his concern for peace 
and security on the African continent. As a practical measure, his government seized 
French assets in the country and recalled the Ghanaian Ambassador to France.
The second Conference of Independent African States (CIAS), which was held 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1960, gave rise to an open conflict of views on Pan-
44 NAG:ADM/16/9 -  ‘Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security,’ it contains the opening and 
closing speeches o f Nkrumah, the resolutions adopted by the conference and manifesto submitted by 
the international Sahara protest team.
45 The conference was attended by over a 100 delegates and a significant number o f African countries 
and political organisations. Among them were: the Algerian FLN, the Afro Shirazi Party of Zanzibar, 
the Japan Council against A and H Bombs, the FRG, the American Friends Service Committee, the 
World Peace Council, and the Movement for Colonial Freedom. In June 1962 Accra hosted a similar 
gathering ‘The World Without the Bomb Conference’ which was organised by Geoffrey Bing and 
Nkrumah through their contacts with disarmament activists.
46 NAG:ADM/16/ 9, pp.7-8.
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Africanism and some hints of personal animosity towards Nkrumah. Ako Adjei, as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs represented Ghana. In attendance were 12 African 
countries.47 Ako Adjei “was at great pains to spell out in detail the ideas which Dr. 
Nkrumah had been advocating with increasing urgency in the latter part of 1959 and 
early I960.”48 After praising the Sanniquellie Declaration he said, “political union 
would provide the framework within which any plans for economic, social and 
cultural co-operation can, in fact, operate to the best advantage of all. To us in Ghana 
the concept of African unity is an article of faith. It is a cardinal objective in our 
policy.”49 Guinea was the only nation to support such a view.
Opposition to Ghana’s approach to Pan-African unity came from the leader of 
the Nigerian delegation, Mr Yusuf Maitima Sule. He remarked that whilst “no one in 
Africa doubts the need to promote Pan-Africanism,” the idea of forming a Union of 
African States was “premature” and “too radical -  perhaps too ambitious -  to be of 
lasting benefit.” According to Sule: “Gradual development of ideas and thought is 
more lasting,” for Pan-Africanism would not occur “if we stall building from the top 
downward.” He concurred with President Tubman’s vague idea of an association of 
states as being “more acceptable.” It was in his much publicised caution that he made 
a veiled rebuff towards Nkrumah. He said: “if anybody makes the mistake of feeling 
that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa the whole purpose of Pan- 
Africanism will, I fear, be defeated.”50 A collision of attitudes and approaches to Pan- 
African unity came to the fore at this meeting and gradually hardened into 
antagonistic positions.
47 They were: the Algerian Provisional Government, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, 
Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia and the UAR.
48 Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 46.
49 Ibid, pp.188-189, for an Extract of Ako AdjePs statement.
50 Ibid, p. 47.
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Nkrumah and the Congo, 1960-1961
Between August 7-8 1960, Patrice Lumumba flew to Accra at the invitation of 
Nkrumah, A secret Ghana-Congo agreement for the establishment of a Union of 
African States was concluded. They condemned the refusal of the Belgian 
government to withdraw troops from the Congo, contrary to the decision of the 
Security Council of the UN. They also enlisted the support of other nations prepared 
to assist in the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga province, which had 
seceded, in order to secure the territorial sovereignty of the Republic.51 The Congo 
debacle “was important because Nkrumah envisaged it as the first tangible result of 
his grand strategy for Africa which would bring about the continental unity he had 
long sought,” writes Baynham.52 It gave Nkrumah an occasion to display international 
statesmanship and to win attention on the African stage. But fundamentally, “it was 
in the Congo that the contradictions of Ghana’s prescription for internal security and 
Nkrumah’s policy of non-alignment came into conflict.”54 Nkrumah’s single- 
mindedness in defending the government of Lumumba was to end in tragic disaster 
and disillusionment.
The crisis in the Congo was a complex one and is considered here only in the 
context of its meaning for Nkrumah and the dilemmas and contradictions it threw up 
for him in the framework of his plans for Pan-African unity. 55 Some context is 
necessary here in order to situate Nkrumah’s decisions and thinking. Less than a week 
after the proclamation of independence from Belgium on June 30 1960, the Force 
Publique, the colonial army, mutinied against its Belgian officers. Belgium intervened
51 For extracts of the Ghana-Congo agreement see Revolntionaiy Path by K. Nkrumah, pp. 145-150.
52 Baynham, The M ilitaiy and Politics, p. 93.
53 Ibid, p.93.
54 Ibid, p. 94.
55 Some important works on the Congo debacle are: The Congo Since Independence by  C. Hoskyns 
(Oxford, 19699; Africa The Politics o f  Unity by I. Wallerstein (New York 1967), chapters 4 and 6; The 
Congo From Leopold to Kabila A P eop le’s H istoiy  by G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, (London 2002).
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militarily on July 10 under the pretext of protecting its citizens. The following day the 
province of Katanga seceded in a move supported by white settlers and Belgian 
mining interests. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed 
to the UN for assistance on July 12. They requested the dispatch of UN troops to 
protect the country from external aggression and to restore territorial integrity.
To consider Nkrumah’s role in the crisis it is essential to understand that his 
actions were shaped by his outlook towards Lumumba, the UN and the involvement 
of what he considered to be imperialist Western powers. Firstly, Nkrumah saw an 
affinity between the CPP and the Mouvement national congolais (MNC) led by 
Lumumba. Both, he believed, were struggling against tribalism and were in support of 
a unitary, as opposed to a federal system of government.56 In essence, he equated the 
secessionist Katanga, with the NLM in Ashanti and the myriad rival groups in the 
Congo such as the ABAKO (initially a cultural group of the Bakongo peoples), with 
the plethora of tribalist and regional parties that had sought to threaten Ghana’s 
independence between 1954 and 1957. Nkrumah wrote in Challenge o f the Congo, 
“As in Ghana, I was convinced that the Congo needed a strong unitary form of 
government.”57
Secondly, he fervently believed that as an African nation, Ghana should aid 
another troubled African country and bring about the total collapse of colonialism. 
Thirdly, in his lengthy address to the Ghanaian national assembly on August 8 1960, 
Nkrumah stated: “the greatest danger that Africa faces today is balkanisation” and that
56 ‘Ghana, The Congo and the United Nations’ by J. Mohan, in the Journal o f  M odem  African Studies 
(JMAS) Vol. 17, no. 3, 1969, p. 373; see also Challenge o f  the Congo by K. Nkrumah (London 1967), 
where Nkrumah identifies the similarities between the two movements, p. 16.
57 Nkrumah, Challenge o f  the Congo, p. 17. This book elucidates Nkrumah’s position on the entire 
crisis.
58 Mohan, ‘Ghana, the Congo and the United Nations,’ p. 37; H. T. Alexander, Nkrumah’s British 
Chief of Defence also maintains that Nkrumah’s actions in the Congo were motivated by Pan- 
Africanism and anti-colonialism, see African Tightrope (London 1965), p. 33.
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the crisis in the Congo represented a “turning point in the history of Africa.”59 The 
principle of the indivisibility of Ghana and the Congo was sacrosanct and Nkrumah 
was prepared to defend it.
Lastly, based on the principle of non-alignment, Nkrumah was acutely aware 
of the inherent dangers of the great powers becoming entangled in the crisis and he 
did his utmost to restrain the increasingly desperate Lumumba from accepting Soviet 
military aid. In Challenge o f the Congo, Nkrumah considered the entire episode a 
“conspiracy” against Lumumba and against the Congo as having been “carried on 
under the banner of anti-communism.”60
The first of several problems for Nkrumah was the despatch of several high 
level British officers, including General Alexander. According to Baynham: “the 
prominence of expatriates embarrassed him as it clashed with his projection of Ghana 
as a progressive independent state.”61 In addition to this, it appeal's “Alexander made 
himself particularly obnoxious to Congolese politicians and soldiers alike, soon after 
the Ghanaians first arrived, by his unilateral decision to disarm the soldiers of the 
Force Publique” which was soon halted by the UN after vociferous appeals by 
Lumumba.62 The entire episode fed the suspicions of the Lumumba government that 
Alexander was acting on behalf of the Belgians.
Another factor fuelling tensions in the country was the predominance of 
British officers in the higher echelons of the Ghanaian contingent in Leopoldville who 
were pro-Belgian in their outlook and the intermediate and lower ranks staffed by
59 African Affairs Supplement with Ghana Today o f 31 August 1960.
60 Nkrumah used these words in his letter to the UN Secretary-General, Hammarskjold; dated 16 
December 1963, see Challenge o f  the Congo, p. 238.
61 Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 94.
62 Ibid, p. 388.
63 Ibid, p. 388.
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Ghanaians who were sympathetic to the Congolese nationalists.64 To restore Ghana’s 
credibility, Nkrumah promoted his most senior Ghanaian officers on July 30 1960 and 
sent them to the Congo.65
Nkrumah’s strategy during the crisis created problems. Among them was the 
hostility between General Alexander and Ambassador Djin in Leopoldville, which 
made them compete for influence with Nkrumah.66 Nkrumah had given Djin a brief 
to assist Lumumba in every possible way in order to maintain influence over the 
Congolese prime minister. The major source of conflict was the failure on the part of 
the Ghanaian Ambassador to accept that Ghanaian troops were not under his personal 
control but were part of the ONUC troops and therefore under the UN command.67 In 
essence, whilst Nkrumah was committed to a UN framework to resolve the conflict 
not only did he on occasions flout the UN command but so did his men on the 
ground.68
In another instance, Nkrumah’s commitment to the UN approach to resolve 
the crisis led him into what he considered an “embarrassing and invidious position.”69 
On September 6 1960, Ghanaian troops, as part of the ONUC, prevented Lumumba 
from using the radio station at Leopoldville when his political opponents were free to 
broadcast on Brazzaville radio.70 Lumumba sent a message to Nkrumah expressing
* * •  * 71his “indignation regarding the aggressive and hostile attitude of Ghanaian soldiers.”
64 Mohan, ‘Ghana, the Congo and the U N ’, p. 390.
65 They were S. J. A. Otu and Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Ankrah and others.
66 Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 129; see also Alexander’s account in African Tightrope, 
pp.34 -  84.
67 Alexander, African Tightrope, p. 34; Mohan, ‘Ghana, the Congo and the United Nations’, p. 389.
68 Ibid, p. 50. Alexander claims that Nkrumah sent specialists to the Congo outside the auspices o f the 
UN.
69 Nkrumah, Challenge o f  the Congo, p. 41.
70 This ONUC order was issued by Andrew Cordier, the acting representative o f  the UN Secretary- 
General in the Congo, on the basis o f preventing inflammatory speeches by all involved.
71 Nkrumah, Challenge o f  the Congo, p. 39.
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Nkrumah was caught in a fragile balancing act: he was committed to the UN, 
but Lumumba had lost all confidence in the international body. Moreover, the Ghana- 
Congo agreement signed on August 8, stated that “in conjunction with other 
Independent African states, that in the event of the UN failing to effect a total and 
unconditional withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo as a whole, [Ghana and 
the Congo] will establish a Combined High Command of military forces to bring 
about a speedy withdrawal of these foreign troops from the Congo.”72 Meanwhile, on 
August 17, Nkrumah instructed Djin to encourage Lumumba and Kasavubu to co­
operate with the UN in seeming their objectives in the Congo. At the same time, in 
mid August, Nkrumah and Nasser corresponded on plans for an African High 
Command.73 Nkrumah intended to discuss the plan at the Leopoldville Conference 
between August 25-31. Lumumba who had convened the meeting, was hopeful the 
conference would champion his cause. However, the achievements of the conference 
were negligible.74 Since the conference was held at ministerial level, Nkrumah’s plans
*7 ^were not even permitted on the agenda.
When some African countries threatened to pull out their troops from the 
ONUC in early January 1961 as a result of Lumumba’s capture by Mobutu’s forces in 
December 1960, Nkrumah refused to join them and his action caused a rift in the 
ranks of the militant Pan-Africanists.76 Nkrumah stood alone at the January 1961 
Casablanca conference when his colleagues proposed they should unilaterally 
withdraw their troops from ONUC. He interceded with other radical states to refrain 
from such an endeavour. He believed such a course of action would simply give 
imperialists an opportunity for direct military intervention on the side of their
72 Ibid, p. 30.
73 Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, p. 137.
74 Ibid, p. 149.
75 Ibid, p. 138.
76 Thompson, Africa and Unity, p. 154.
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proteges.77 For Nkrumah, the participation of Ghanaian troops within the ONUC gave 
him a position of influence in the councils of the ONUC and was an integral arm of 
his Congo strategy. To remove them would entail a loss of influence and also remove 
any prospect of aiding the Lumumbists in Stanleyville.
As developments unfolded in the Congo, Nkrumah*s Congo policy came 
under enormous pressures. Firstly, he had been forced to remove the white officers in 
the Ghanaian contingent.78 Secondly, not only did Ghanaian troops become unpopular 
in the Congo with their blocking of the radio station from Lumumba, but when 
Nathaniel Welbeck replaced A. Djin, he too was also declared persona non grata by 
the Kasavubu government on October 4 1960. Finally, Nkrumah’s Congo policy
* 70failed, fundamentally because the “the crisis was deeper than he had envisaged.”
There were limits to Nkrumah’s ability to influence developments in the Congo.
However, he did not acknowledge nor recognise these limitations. Moreover, he
“entrusted his most delicate assignments to men unequal to their tasks” observes
Thompson.80 For example, Djin did not speak French, which made communications
with Lumumba and other Congolese politicians difficult. More crucially, Djin
considered the Ghanaian troops present in the Congo as being under his jurisdiction.
Whilst his successor, Nathaniel Welbeck, spoke fluent French, Djin lacked
* 82diplomacy, which made him very unpopular with moderate Congolese politicians.
With the murder of Lumumba on January 17 1961, Nkrumah was personally 
devastated.83 He presented to the UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold, on February
77 Mohan, ‘Ghana, the Congo, and the U N ’, p. 398.
78 Alexander, African Tightrope, pp.91-94. Nkrumah did not dismiss General Alexander until 
September 1961 when pressures for Afficanisation closed in on him.
79 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 126.
80 Ibid, p. 123.
8lAlexander, African Tightrope, p. 34; Mohan, ‘Ghana, the Congo and the United Nations’, p. 389,
82 Ibid, p.50.
83 Interview with Mrs Nkrumah, 16-18 February 2004, Cairo, Egypt.
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18, a radical proposal on the Congo operation. In essence, the Ghana government
proposed a UN trusteeship over the Congo, administered by independent African
states with the assistance of Asian states unfettered by Western control. The proposals
were ignored but were “of real significance as the ideological key to Ghana's African
and international policies during the 1960s, right up to the Ghana coup in February
0/1
1966,” for Nkrumah advocated a critical African role in solving African problems.
The impact of the crisis on Nkrumah’s foreign policy was an increasing 
revolutionary zeal; an active pursuit of the objective of African political union; 
implacable opposition to regional forms of African unity; as well as increasing 
assistance to radical nationalist forces in other African states. In addition, Nkrumah 
sought to establish permanent machinery that would realise his vision of African 
unity. This gave birth to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963.
Institutionalising Pan-Africanism, 1961-1963
Following the murder of Lumumba, Nkrumah was galvanized in his ambitions for the 
establishment of a Union Government for Africa. Domestically and continentally he 
contributed to the setting up of permanent machinery to achieve such an objective. 
Another significant development during this period was the ideological rift that 
emerged on the African continent between the moderate, so-called Brazzaville group 
(formed in December 1960), which later became the Monrovia group in May 1961 
and the more radical Casablanca group formed in January 1961. Ghana was a vocal
* * 85member of this radical camp.
84 Mohan, ‘Ghana, the Congo, the U N ,’p. 400.
85Thompson, Africa and Unity, pp. 141-192; Legum, Pan-Africanism , pp.131-147.
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Meanwhile, Nkrumah’s distrust of civil servants trained under the colonial
« * Rfiadministration influenced his attitude towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It 
led him to adopt an unorthodox style of diplomacy.87 In the course of 1960, Nkrumah 
felt the need for a “new style secretariat” to deal with Ghana’s increasing 
responsibilities in Africa.88 This led Nkrumah to set up the Bureau of African Affairs 
(BAA), the African Affairs Centre (AAC) and the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS) 
as institutions parallel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 89 They were considered 
appropriate agencies for fulfilling his foreign policy objectives. At the same time, 
there was a rapid expansion in the setting up of overseas diplomatic missions. The 
cost of such endeavours were criticised by Nkrumah* s detractors and critics as a 
squandering of Ghana’s wealth. Omari maintains that Ghana’s prosperity was 
“sacrificed on the altar of Pan-Africanism.”90 Dei-Anang who was sympathetic to 
Nkrumah’s foreign policy objectives also considered “the scale of expenditure in the 
Foreign Service as excessive.”91
The ramifications of the First Cl AS was Nkrumah’s subsequent support for 
African liberation movements across the African continent through the apparatus of 
the BAA, the AAC and the AAS. The functions of the BAA were to provide practical 
assistance to freedom fighters in colonial territories; to offer training and to provide 
accommodation via the AAC.92 The Bureau acted as an information-gathering
86 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 13; S. E. Quarm, Diplomatic S ervan t, p. 32.
87 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 12.
88 Ibid, p. 24.
89 The BAA came into official existence on 4 May 1960 but prior to this existed under the office o f  
George Padmore in his capacity as Advisor on African Affairs. The AAC came into existence during 
the preparations for the All African Peoples Conference.
90 Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy o f  an African Dictatorship, p. 2.
91 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 22. He gives the example o f  the cost o f  four hundred pounds 
sterling a month for the rent for the Ghanaian residence and office in Sudan as costly; see also 
Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 223.
92 Dei-Anang The Administration , p. 271; Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, pp.211-225.
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agency, collating information on all aspects of political, economic and social 
development from all parts of Africa and also published a number of publications. 93 
The role of the AAS, headed by Michael Dei-Anang was to deal with relations 
with independent African nation-states. It was formed from a small division in the 
Foreign Office, which had previously dealt with all matters relating to Africa. The 
Secretariat became a separate imit under the control of Nkrumah.94
Within the field of diplomacy and foreign affairs these myriad agencies often 
operated as “wheels within wheels.”95 Inevitably, a number of problems emerged with 
grave consequences. The most serious was the friction that developed between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AAS Staff in the Ministry soon began to feel 
undermined. For example, the Secretariat often recorded the minutes of meetings with 
African ambassadors rather than the Ministry. Hence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
would often be one step behind the despatch of official business; he and others felt 
excluded 96 Another instance of tension was the duplication of effort and resources as 
both the Ministry and the Secretariat had separate accounts, personnel and protocol 
sections.
A more grievous source of friction was the perception among some 
neighbouring countries that Ghana was instigating subversion against their 
governments. “A stage was even reached where certain diplomatic representatives 
were selected by the President from the ‘activists’ operating within the Bureau,”
. 9 7maintains Dei-Anang.
93 Many o f  these materials i.e. newspaper cuttings and letters, reports are available at the George 
Padmore Memorial Library in Accra, Ghana.
94 Dei-Anang, The Administration , p. 24,
95 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 220.
96 Dei-Anang, The Administration , p. 28,
97 Ibid, p. 29. Dei-Anang does not specify who these individuals were. One such individual that the 
Nigerians complained about was Sam Ikoku who was a political activist who wrote articles for The 
Spark and was a loyal Nkrumahist.
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As mentioned earlier, the sudden death of George Padmore in September 1959 
brought a change in the direction and focus of the BAA’s work. The day to day 
running of the Bureau was left to A. K. Barden. Nkrumah had considerable 
confidence in Barden for he was “willing to respond at all times to the many demands
OSthat were made on his courage and loyalty in the liberation cause.” Basner also 
maintains that Barden was keen to impress on his boss “that the Bureau was the 
dynamic centre of the African Revolution.”99 However, Barden and the BAA did not 
co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and consequently links between the 
two “were completely dissolved,” observes Dei-Anang.100
The repercussions of these frictions led to a crisis of confidence among staff in 
the Ministry. Many diplomats within the Ministry wanted the Secretariat abolished 
and expressed this view at a conference of diplomats and the Secretariat in January 
1962.101 But in Nkrumah’s mind the Ministry was “incapable of reacting effectively 
to his needs. Nkrumah was a man in a hurry, and, in his view, the business of Africa 
could not wait.”102
In regards to Nkrumah’s African policy, some African countries resented and 
suspected Nkrumah’s actions. At the beginning of 1962, the Nigerian Prime Minister 
Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa convened a meeting in Lagos to bring the two 
rival ideological groups, the Casablanca and Monrovia groups together. The question 
of who was to be invited to the conference became a dispute as Balewa had 
unilaterally decided not to invite a representative of the Algerian Provisional 
Government, as it was not a fully independent state. Yet, Algeria had participated 
frilly in the last Cl AS in June 1960. Another issue that gave rise to disgruntled
98 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 29-30.
99 Bas/2/187.
100 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 29.
101 Ibid, p. 29.
102 Ibid, p. 29.
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feelings was the belief that the Casablanca states had not been consulted in the 
arrangements of the conference. It was at a meeting of foreign ministers of the 
Casablanca powers held in Accra on January 20 that the radical states decided not to 
attend the Lagos conference on the principle of the non-participation of Algeria.103 
Their decision caused deep resentment in the Monrovia group.104
The Head of the AAS, Michael Dei-Anang submitted a draft proposing the 
Lagos Conference be postponed until after the Tunis conference of Foreign 
Ministers.105 However, the Nigerians and other African leaders considered the boycott 
as an effort to sabotage the conference orchestrated by Nkrumah.106
The Lagos conference took place on January 25 - 3 0  1962 and was attended 
by 20 African countries. Its most important achievement was that all participants 
were in agreement on the need for the establishment of a General Secretariat to act as 
an administrative organ and a Council of Ministers to work out areas of co-operation
1 Q7
between states.
After the Lagos conference, Nkrumah increased his efforts to create a unified 
outlook among his contemporaries and more importantly a continental institution for 
achieving African unity. His role in the formation of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) was reflected in his personal communication to all heads of state and 
“the clever use of propaganda” entailing detailed memorandum.108 He was supported 
by Sekou Toure and Emperor Haile Selassie in mobilising African heads of state for 
the first summit meeting of the OAU held in May 1963.
103 Ibid.
104 Legum, Pan-Africanism, pp.131-137; Thompson, Africa and Unity, pp.173-175.
105 NAG/SC/BAA/439. The report was entitled ‘The Lagos Conference and African Unity’ and was 
dated 22 February 1962.
106 Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 133.
107 Thompson, Africa and Unity, p. 174; Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 133.
108 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 49.
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At the historic first summit meeting of the OAU, Nkrumah gave a lengthy
address in which he reiterated his political convictions.109 He stated:
African Unity is above all, a political kingdom, which 
can only be gained by political means. The social and 
economic development of Africa will come only within 
the political kingdom, not the other way round. The 
United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, were the political decisions of revolutionary 
peoples before they became mighty realities of social 
power and material wealth.110
He attacked piecemeal and gradualist approaches to unity. Nkrumah pushed his 
contemporaries to pledge themselves to an All Africa Committee of Foreign Ministers 
to be set up to work out a machinery for Union Government and to work out a 
continent wide plan for economic and industrial development for Africa together with
a common foreign, monetary and defence system.111 In regards to a location for this
* * * 112new institution, Nkrumah proposed Bangui in the Central African Republic.
Kofi Batsa gives us an interesting insight into the impact Nkrumah’s address
made on other African heads of state. He maintains:
I sat behind Nkrumah when he spoke to the OAU 
conference in Addis Ababa in 1963 and I watched the 
face of the leaders as he left his prepared script and 
pointing at each in turn, at Haile Selassie, at Tafewa 
Balewa, at Modibo Keita, at Maga; he said: ‘If we do 
not come together, if we do not unite, we shall all be 
thrown out, all of us one by one -  and I also will go.’
He said ‘The OAU must face a choice now -  we can 
either move forward to progress through our effective 
African Union or step backward into stagnation, 
instability and confusion -  an easy prey for foreign 
intervention, interference and subversion.’ He got a 
standing ovation for that speech and although we felt he 
should have been calmer and that perhaps he had gone
109 Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path , pp.233-248 for a copy ofNkrumah’s address to the 1963 OAU 
summit.
110 Ibid, p. 235.
111 Ibid, p. 246.
112 Ibid, p. 232. In regards to the question o f  the headquarters o f the OAU Secretariat, on 9 August 
1963 Addis Ababa was chosen by secret vote.
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too far, his reaction was, ‘Let me tell them, let me tell 
them.’113
Nkrumah’s zeal was inexorable and he did not agree with his ministers that he should 
have been more restrained in his address. His sense of optimism at the OAU 
conference was not borne out by later events. The founding of the OAU masked the 
desire for regional unity and ideological differences that continued to exist on the 
African continent. The OAU’s charter signed on the May 25 1963 by the 31 
independent African states was a compromise between the aspirations of the 
Casablanca powers and the Monrovia group.114 In essence the Charter espoused 
support for the liberation struggles in the Portuguese territories and Southern 
Rhodesia and armed struggle as a means to achieve national independence. It upheld 
the principle of “non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member state.”
The exclusion of Ghana from the OAU Committee for National Liberation 
with its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam was an indication of tensions between Ghana 
and some of the national liberation movements. Ghana was excluded largely on 
account of the lobbying of freedom fighters organisations from different parts of 
Africa who did not want Barden to interfere in their affairs.115 A committee of nine 
nations was responsible for creating and administering a “Fighting Fund” to help fund 
the liberation movements.116
However, despite its existence, the OAU was far from being the embodiment 
of African unity that Nkrumah had envisioned. Nkrumah was in fact ideologically 
isolated at the founding of the OAU. His radical appeal for greater unity was ignored 
and within Ghana, his appeals for African unity rang hollow in the ears of ordinary
113 Batsa, The Spark, p.30.
114 The formation o f  the OAU brought to an end the existence o f  the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, 
the Sanniquellie accord as well as the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union,
115 Bas/2/192.
116 Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 137.
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Ghanaians who faced declining living standards. Subsequently his actions were to 
contribute to many of the impediments that prevented continental unity.
Obstacles to Building African Unity, 1964 — 1965
The most significant obstacle to African unity during these years stemmed 
from Ghana’s harbouring of political refugees in the country. It became a disputatious
• 117matter, which threatened to damage the convening of the 1965 OAU summit.
There is a wealth of evidence documenting the conflict between Nkrumah and 
his neighbours over his harbouring of political refugees from Ivory Coast, Niger, 
Nigeria, Upper Volta and Togo who were accommodated by the BAA.118 Nkrumah’s 
West African neighbours accused him of perpetrating subversion against them. At the 
1963 OAU conference, informal discussions between President Houphouet Boigny 
and Nkrumah took place over the Sanwi dissidents.
The Sanwi were an ethnic group which straddled the Ghana-Ivory Coast 
border. Some sought political asylum in Ghana. They had formed a fourteen member 
Provisional Government on May 14 1959. Prior to a meeting between the 
government and the Sanwi on June 29, Padmore had written to Nkrumah expressing 
his view “that no support should be given to the Provisional Government of the Sanwi 
Kingdom” and he urged the Sanwi to “address a petition on that line to the UN 
General Secretary to bring the matter before the General Assembly.”119
Padmore’s sudden death three months later meant that Nkrumah lacked a 
restraining voice of counsel on the Sanwi affair and he continued to allow the Sanwi
117 Botsio also confirmed that several African countries were uncomfortable with Nkrumah’s support 
for dissident groups, interview 18 August 1999, Accra.
118 SC /B A A /14-T he Sanwi Affair; SC/BAA/434 -Special Committee Togoland Affairs; SC/BAA/142 
-  The Sanwi Affair; SC/BAA/438 Letters between Osageyfo & Liberia Head o f  State; SC/BAA/408 -  
Lagos Political Reports to Osageyfo; SC/BAA/500 -  Mixed up Letter -  in author’s possession.
119 Padmore’s letter is dated 23 June 1959, Dabu Gizenga Collection, Moorland-Spingarn Research 
Center, Howard University.
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to stay in Ghana. This caused considerable friction between President Houphouet 
Boigny and Nkrumah for “[the Sanwi] were not silent or politically discreet guests: 
they often embarrassed the government by making fantastic claims for their 
sovereignty in published documents to which they gave extensive publicity in and out 
of Ghana. Everything possible was done officially to restrain them but with 
indifferent success,” maintains Dei-Anang.120
The reasons Nkrumah allowed the Sanwi and other dissident groups and 
individuals to stay in Ghana were political. Firstly, as he explained to Houphouet 
Boigny, “the existence of refugees in nearly all the Independent African States is a 
manifestation of the artificial barriers imposed by the imperialists and colonialists 
upon Africa, thereby creating disunity.”121 Secondly, “there is no doubt, however, that 
Nkrumah used the presence of political refugees for bargaining purposes with other 
African leaders.”122 In short, “it must be said however, that the presence of these 
political refugees in Ghana did much to destroy harmonious relations between Ghana
* * 123and other African states,” maintains Dei-Anang.
Similarly, the case of the three Nigerian fugitives: Sam Ikoku, Ayo Adebanjo 
and James Aluko, who had been in Ghana since 1960, gave rise to conflict between 
Ghana and Nigeria. Nigeria accused Ghana of subversive activities designed to 
midermine the government of Sir Tafewa Balewa.124 Ghana’s High Commissioner to 
Nigeria, J. Owusu-Ansah was considered to have flouted “the customary practice of 
ethics of diplomats accredited to a friendly country.”125 This incident arose when the 
High Commissioner vociferously denied Ghana’s involvement in the abortive attempt
120 Dei-Anang, The Administration , p. 37.
121 Nkrumah5s letter to President Boigny, dated 14 January 1965, NAG/SC/BAA/430.
122 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 27.
123 Ibid, p. 27.
124 NAG/SC/BAA/503 -  Mixed Up Letters on Various subjects.
125 NAG/SC/BAA/408 -  Lagos Political Reports to Osagyefo.
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on the life of President Hamani Diori of Niger. His statements were widely reported 
in the Nigerian press and caused a stir in the country.
Nkrumah*s troubled relations with Togo originated in the 1950s over the 
question of unification with the Gold Coast. In addition Nkrumah’s support for the 
pro-CPP Togolese opposition party, Juvento, which had split from the Togoland 
Congress Party led by Olympio, contributed to hostile relations. Exacerbating this 
state of affairs was the allegation that military equipment had been stored on the 
Togolese side of the border during the Ahwaitey scandal in 1958. From 1962 onwards 
Ghanaian political dissidents such as Busia sought refuge in the Togolese capital, 
where according to Thompson, they received presidential treatment. This contributed 
to the friction between the two countries.126 However, the real source of conflict was 
President Olympio’s resistance to Nkrumah’s overtures of political unification with 
Ghana during the post-independence period. Olympio preferred closer union with the 
French community and a West African federation with his neighbours Nigeria and 
Dahomey. The two leaders met on June 11 1960 in Accra. However, nothing concrete
* 127came out of their meeting. Olympio was keen to secure a customs union. According 
to Nugent, the Nkrumah government sought to put pressure on Olympio to accept a
1 9R •union of some kind by enforcing stricter currency controls. The calculation was that 
Togo’s dependence on Ghana for manufactured goods would force Togo to recognise 
the unviability of artificial borders. But “the reality was that the border was altogether
* 190too porous” for Ghana’s attempted economic blockade.
Apart from hostilities in bilateral relations, exacerbating Nkrumah’s relations 
with his West African neighbours there was also the trust he placed in Barden.
126 Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy , p. 308.
127 Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens, p. 203.
128 Ibid, p. 204.
129 Ibid, p. 205.
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Delegation of power to individuals who were not entirely men of integrity produced 
enormous problems for Nkrumah. “Because [Barden] was an ignorant adventurer and 
not [a] politically-conscious Pan-Africanist, he filled the Bureau with venal and 
dangerous adventurers who constituted a menace to freedom fighters in particular and
ito Nkrumah’s Pan-African policies in general,” claims Basner, He would often play 
off one political group against another as a result of the considerable patronage he 
wielded as Director of the Bureau. He was accountable to no one, except Nkrumah. 
In the view of Makonnen, Nkrumah was not only indifferent to Barden’s adventurism 
but “There was a Machiavellian feel to government. Literally. The Prince would be 
there on Kwame’s office table, and he was versed in it like the Bible. It meant that he 
played one group off against another.”131 It seems Barden merely imitated his boss. 
Moreover, Barden’s reputation was well known in CPP and diplomatic circles. He 
escaped criticism for it was assumed that he acted with the authorisation of the 
President and to criticise would be to undermine the prestige and question the
* 1 ’39judgement of the President.
Another source of conflict appeared dining the July 1964 second summit 
conference of the OAU hosted by Cairo. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania entered 
into a political duel with Nkrumah over their opposing views on how African unity 
could be attained. The speeches of Nkrumah and Nyerere at the OAU summit 
reflected the polemical political discourse on Pan-Africanism over the most viable 
approach towards the attainment of African unity.133 Whilst Nkrumah was clearly the 
leading advocate of African Union Government, Nyerere was “the most eloquent
130 Bas/2/191.
131 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 234.
132 Bas/2/191.
133 J. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: Uhnru na Umoja: A Selection From Writings and Speeches 1952 -  
65, (London, 1967), pp. 300-304; for Nkrumah’s address see Revolutionary Path, pp. 276-298.
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exponent of the gradualist approach.”134 Mwalimu (“teacher”), as Nyerere was 
popularly referred to, believed that a United States of Africa could not be achieved in
I o c
one step and could not happen overnight. He argued it was a process for “it has not 
been given to us human mortals to simply will things into existence. Between our 
willing of an end and the achievement of that end there is a process. This process is 
sometimes long and sometimes short, and indeed the greater the objective the longer 
may be the process,” he argued.136
Nyerere made a stinging attack on Nkrumah when he accused him of 
employing the notion of Union Government for propaganda purposes. He declared: 
“I am becoming increasingly convinced that we are divided between those who 
genuinely want a continental Government and will patiently work for its realization, 
removing obstacles, one by one; and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union 
Government’ for the purpose of propaganda.”137 Moreover, he went on to question
100
Nkrumah’s repudiation of the East African Federation as contrary to African unity. 
For Nyerere, “To rule out a step by step progress towards African Unity is to hope 
that the Almighty will one day say, ‘Let there be unity in Africa,’ and there shall be 
unity.’139 Furthermore, “to say that the step by step method was invented by the 
imperialists is to reach the limits of absurdity.”140 Nkrumah had met his intellectual 
equal at the OAU summit of 1964. “It was, in all” claims Agyeman “a spirited 
performance that left the objective of a Union Government bleeding to death on the
134 O. Agyeman, Nkram ah’s Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Interstate Relations 
(London, New Jersey, Canada, 1992), p. 79.
135 Ahmed Ben Bella, the leader o f  the FLN in Algeria, confirmed that Nkrumah was the ardent 
exponent o f  an immediate approach to African unity at this OAU summit meeting; interview with 
author, 23 January 1999, Conway Hall, London.
136 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 302.
137 Ibid, p. 301.
138 A declaration o f  intention to set up the East African Federation between Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda had been made on 5 June 1963. It emphasized greater economic co-operation between the 
three states.
139 Ibid, p. 302.
140 Ibid, p. 302.
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floor of the Cairo conference hall, speared, as it were, by Nyerere’s flashing 
verbalism.”141
The root cause of the polemic derived from Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s 
conflicting perspectives on national independence. When Nyerere founded the 
Tanganyika National Union (TANU) in 1954, he foresaw a fifty year struggle for 
independence (which was attained in 1961); whilst Nkrumah’s position on the 
nationalist struggle was radically antithetical. Nkrumah had advocated “Self- 
Government Now!” For Nyerere, each nation state had to develop its own economy, 
institutions and nationalism whilst for Nkrumah there were limits to nationalism.
Nkrumah’s address emphasised the urgent necessity for the acceptance, at 
least in principle, of the idea of setting up Union Government for Africa. In his speech 
he lamented “the economic subservience of many African countries.” He insisted he 
did not “spurn foreign trade” but rather implored his contemporaries to “organise 
[the] African economy as a unit.”142 He reviewed the myriad problems African had 
experienced during the last year such as: clashes between Algeria and Morocco, 
between Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya and military upheavals and 
mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya -  along with the tragedy in the Congo. 
He therefore cautioned: “The Balkan States of Europe are a lesson for us.” 143 In his 
customary passionate and uncompromising language, Nkrumah declared: “To say that 
a Union Government for Africa is premature is to sacrifice Africa on the altar of neo­
colonialism.”144 Furthermore, he considered that a Union Government for Africa 
“does not mean the abrogation of any sovereignty” but common action in the fields of 
defence, foreign policy and economic development that would empower Africa and
141 Agyeman, Nknnnah's G han a , +p, 83.
142 Nkrumah , Revolutionary Path, p. 288.
143 Ibid,, p. 282.
144 Ibid, p. 286.
278
African peoples as a whole. He upheld that “the appeal for a Union Government of 
Africa is therefore not being made merely to satisfy a political end. It is absolutely 
indispensable for our economic survival in this modern world of ours.”145
The consensus of opinion at the meeting was that Nkrumah’s proposal was 
not only premature but, in the opinion of Ahmed Ben Bella, it was considered “pie in 
the sky.”146 There was also a consensus of opinion that favoured economic co­
operation as opposed to Nkrumah’s political union. It was decided by the majority to 
refer Nkrumah’s radical proposal for the establishment of Union Government for 
Africa to the OAU’s specialised commission for study. But this decision was an
14 7obvious attempt at “tactical side-stepping.”
It was members of the Ghanaian delegation who proposed the next summit be 
hosted in Accra without considering whether Ghana possessed the necessary facilities 
to convene such a meeting. 148 However, to resolve this problem, Nkrumah approved 
the building of a brand new OAU complex with accommodation and conference 
facilities, known as “Job 600.” The entire project cost the country eight million 
poimds sterling and was completed at break neck speed. It was yet another example of 
Nkrumah’s financial indiscipline and extravagance, particularly when “there was no 
foreign exchange to import flour or sugar, when internal inflation had robbed workers 
and wage earners of most of their earnings.”149 According to Basner, it was a sign 
that “Nkrumah was losing his grip on political realities.”150 Furthermore, it was 
evidence of the immense tension between Nkrumah’s neglect of domestic issues and 
his grand foreign policy objectives for Africa.
145 Ibid, p. 292.
146 Interview 23 January 1999, Conway Hall, London.
147 Legum, Pan-Africanism, p. 141.




Nkrumah “had been gravely disturbed by the failure of the conference to 
endorse his union government proposals for Africa. He was glad of the opportunity 
for yet another attempt at the Conference in Accra.”151 Yet, the issue of political 
refugees in Ghana became an obstacle to Ghana’s convening of the 1965 OAU 
summit. A number of African leaders, from the thirteen member Organisation 
Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) states, threatened to boycott the Accra 
summit unless Nkrumah deported the political refugees residing in Ghana.152
As the success of the OAU summit was paramount, Nkrumah did not wish for 
his treasured agenda of Union Government for Africa to be jeopardised. Nkrumah 
therefore agreed on the eve of the OAU summit to deport the refugees in a joint 
communique on October 13 1965.153 Nkrumah, Presidents Houphouet Boigny, 
Yameogo, and Diori signed the communique under the chairmanship of President 
Modibo Keita of Mali. The document settled the differences between them in the 
spirit of the principles affirmed by the OAU charter, in particular those relating to 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and friendship among states. 
Independent OAU observers confirmed the deportations.154 Nevertheless, the OCAM 
group remained dissatisfied and decided to absent themselves. However, the summit 
went ahead and opened on October 21.155
The underlying thrust of Nkrumah’s opening speech at the 1965 OAU 
conference was predictable. Despite the unfolding problems on the African continent, 
specifically, the escalating rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and the issue of political
151 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 83.
152 The OCAM was set up in February 1965 and comprised: Cameroun, the Central African Republic, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and 
Upper Volta. The Entente states were Ivory Coast, Togo, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger.
153 NAG/SC/BAA/430 -  Letters Between Osagyefo and Ivory Coast Head o f  State, Nkrumah’s letter is 
dated 14 January 1965.
154 Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, p. 298.
155 Ibid, p.298.
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refugees in Africa, both were simply a confirmation for Nkrumah of the necessity for 
a Union Government for Africa.156 Nkrumah spoke in his usual emphatic tone and 
stated it was “necessary to strengthen the Charter of the OAU by providing an 
effective machinery” in the form of an Executive Council of the OAU to act as an arm 
of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. The Council’s 
responsibilities would be to implement the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government. He ended on the note that: “A United Africa is destined to
I C Q
be a great force in world affairs.” Unfortunately for Nkrumah, the two-third vote 
needed to establish a Council was never obtained.159 Overall, the Ghanaian press 
reported the summit as a success. However, in hindsight “it was a failure” claims 
Julius Nyerere.160 For Nyerere the failure lay in the inability to “even discuss a 
mechanism for pursuing the objective of a politically united Africa.”161
On a more positive note, the summit discussed the crisis in Rhodesia and 
called 011 the British government to suspend the 1961 constitution and take over the 
administration of the country. The deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia 
seriously damaged Ghana’s relations with Britain. It is to these relations we now turn.
Nkrumah, the Western world and the Soviet Union
Nkrumah’s policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality in the context of 
superpower rivalry and conflict was a delicate balancing act to maintain. Since the 
Bandung conference of 1955, Nkrumah had committed himself to non-alignment and 
what he termed “positive neutrality.” Non-alignment presupposed the existence of
156 Ibid, pp.302 -  309, is the text o f Nkrumah’s address to the Accra OAU summit.
157 Ibid, pp.308-309.
158 Ibid, p. 309.
159 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 385; see K. Nkrumah, Rhodesia File (London, 1976), p. 65.
160 Public Lecture to mark Ghana’s 40th Independence Anniversary Celebrations in Accra, in Africa at 
40 News No. 1997.
161 Ibid.
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opposing power blocs, separated by antagonistic ideological perspectives and 
interests. The non-aligned position advocated participation in world affairs with a 
view to influencing the two power blocs in the Cold Wat' to modify their outlooks. It 
also upheld non-partisanship in conflicts between the superpowers. Positive neutrality 
upheld the principle that small and weaker nation states could contract out of world 
affairs to safeguard their own national interests and existence.
Ghana’s non-aligned stance enabled Nkrumah to express freedom of action in 
its foreign policy and to draw on both world powers for technical and material aid. 
Nkrumah believed he could maintain relations with both the Western powers and the 
Soviet Union and keep the ideological conflicts of the Great Powers out of Ghana and 
Africa. Prior to the escalation in the Southern Rhodesia crisis between 1963 and 1965, 
Nkrumah’s relations with Britain were amicable. “Nkrumah shared great interest in 
Commonwealth meetings, which he usually attended in person,” maintains Dei- 
Anang.162 Nkrumah thought highly of the Commonwealth as “an association of free 
and independent sovereign states, equal in all respects and bound together by a 
common drive to work together for the good and well being of its members.”163 He 
also considered it a valuable and important platform in which to advance African 
interests and project an African perspective on global issues such as peace and 
security. His interventions at Commonwealth meetings “were always vigorous, and 
calculated to elicit support for the African cause within the Commonwealth,” claims 
Dei-Anang.164 He also had a highly competent Ambassador at the UN, Alex Quaison- 
Sackey, who contributed significantly to the increase in Ghana’s prestige and
162 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 52.
163 Nkrumah, I Speak o f  Freedom, p. 224. This is part o f Nkrumah’s address to the Conference o f  
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, held in London, May 1960.
164 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 52.
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influence at the UN, particularly when Quaison-Sackey was elected President of the 
General Assembly,
S. E, Quann, one of Nkrumah’s diplomats observes: “In spite of his anti­
colonialist diatribe even Nkrumah did not find it possible to rid himself of sentimental 
attachment to Britain the archetype of colonialism, for how else could one explain the 
avidity and alacrity with which he accepted to be Privy Councillor to the Queen?”165 
Such was the ambiguity of Nkrumah’s character.
It was after his trip to the Eastern bloc that a number of embassies were 
opened in Eastern European capitals.166 Sensitive to East-West tensions and Ghana’s 
national interests, it appeal's Nkrumah never visited East Germany during his 1961 
tour. This was because “the Western German representative in Ghana had made it 
clear that this would be regarded by his government as a hostile act.”167 Nkrumah
duly complied with the Federal Republic of Germany’s wishes in order to obtain a
* 168two million pound sterling loan to build a second bridge over the Volta River.
Ghana’s relations with the Soviet Union were formally developed in May 
1960 when Kojo Botsio led a high-ranking delegation to Moscow. According to 
Thompson there was a convergence of interests, which brought Russia and Ghana 
together. For the Russians, deterioration in relations with Guinea led them to seek a 
new friend in Africa, whilst for Ghana “potential pressure groups”169 particularly 
within the foreign service (and later within the CPP) “wished to balance links with the
* * 170West with new ones in the East, out of a genuine commitment to non-alignment.”
165 Quarm, Diplomatic Servant, pp.33-34.
166 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 49.
167 Ibid, p. 52.
168 Ibid, p. 52; Quarm, Diplomatic Servant, pp.40-41.
169 Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, p. 100.
170 Ibid, p. 173; see also Adamafio, By Nkrumah’s Side in which the author criticizes Nkrumah’s 
overseas missions, pp. 89-90.
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Another reason for establishing links with the USSR was an insurance against 
Nkrumah’s apprehension if negotiations with the USA over the VRP failed; he hoped 
to find an alternative source of capital in Moscow.171 His tour of the Soviet Union in 
the summer of 1961 made a profound impression on him. Politically, the USSR stood 
as a successful example of the amalgamation of many different nationalities despite 
uneven levels of economic and social development. The ideological influence of the 
USSR also bore heavily on Nkrumah, as well as the notion of state planning, which he 
had adopted in his July 1961 budget and integrated in the Seven Year Plan before his 
trip. The self-confidence of the left wing within the CPP also increased as a result of 
this visit. For Western diplomats, however, Nkrumah’s visit to the East did little to 
reassure them that Ghana remained non-aligned. In Western diplomatic circles, the 
world was viewed via a Cold War prism and many Westerners “overacted” to
* 1 n*\
Nkrumah’s visit to the Eastern bloc.
Relations with the USA were initially also amicable from the time of 
independence to the unfolding of the Congo crisis in 1960. During this period, 
Nkrumah had courted American foreign capital for his most ambitious economic 
project, the VRP. With the assassination of Lumumba in January 1961, Nkrumah 
viewed the Americans and Belgians as complicit in the murder of his ideological 
colleague. Subsequently, American support for the Katanga government of Moise 
Tshombe was among the many issues that divided Accra and Washington in the early 
1960s. Other issues, according to Thompson, included Nkrumah’s belief that the 
Americans were deliberately seeking to undermine his plans for the 1965 OAU
171 Thompson, G hana’s Foreign Policy, p. 102.
172 Ibid, p. 174.
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summit. According to Batsa, a senior Mauritanian minister informed him that the 
Americans sought to isolate Nkrumah 011 the African stage.173
The publication of Nkrumah’s book Neo-colonialism in 1965 marked the 
deterioration in relations between the two countries. The US State Department reacted 
with hostility to the book and considered the book “anti-American in tone.”174 The 
exchange between US ambassador, Mermen Williams and Ghana’s Ambassador to the 
USA, Miguel Augustus Ribeiro marked an all time low in Ghana-US relations. 
Williams sent a telegram to Ribeiro in November 1965, condemning the book. He did 
not accept the argument that Nkrumah was attacking a system and not the American 
President and government.175
An issue, which led to deterioration in relations between Nkrumah and Britain, 
was political developments in Southern Africa. For some time Nkrumah had followed 
political developments in the Southern region of the continent. He viewed the 
Rhodesian problem in the context of the wider African revolutionary struggle to 
eliminate all forms of oppression and exploitation, and particularly the question of racist 
and minority governments in central and southern Africa.176 He upheld that the 
Commonwealth could not avoid the racialist situation in Southern Rhodesia, South 
West Africa or South Africa.177
Nkrumah sought to put pressure on the British government of Harold Wilson 
and 011 the OAU to bring majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The means he used to
173 Batsa, The Spark, pp.35-36.
174 Cited in Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path , p. 311.
175 For a copy o f Ribeiro’s telegram to the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs dated 18 November 1965; see 
Revolutionaiy Path , p. 312.
176 This close attention to the political problems in Southern Rhodesia was reflected in Nkrumah’s 
collection o f  material for a book on Rhodesia soon after Smith’s declaration o f  independence. He 
collated materials, documents and writings in a file marked ‘Rhodesia File’, which were posthumously 
published into a book o f  the same name in 1976. The book, entitled Rhodesia File, summarizes 
Nkrumah’s views and the principles and policies his government advocated on Southern Rhodesia from 
1963 onwards and his personal opinions on Rhodesia post 1966.
177 Nkrumah, 1 Speak o f  Freedom, p. 226.
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achieve this were largely through diplomacy. At the 1965 Accra OAU summit, the 
Heads of State and Government had unanimously resolved that the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia constituted a serious threat to world peace. They called upon the 
UN “to regard any such declaration of unilateral independence as a threat to 
international peace and to take steps ... in accordance with the [UN] charter to help to 
establish a majority government in Southern Rhodesia.” In addition, the United 
Kingdom government was encouraged “to suspend the 1961 constitution of Southern 
Rhodesia;” to release the political leaders of the nationalist movements and “to hold a 
constitutional conference with the participation of the representatives of the entire 
population of Southern Rhodesia with a view to adopting a new Constitution 
guaranteeing universal adult suffrage, free elections and independence.”178 Nkrumah 
adhered to the position of the OAU and on October 31 -  six days after the ending of 
the Accra OAU summit, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, met with 
Nkrumah at Accra airport.
Nkrumah made it known to Wilson that he was opposed to the British 
government’s proposal of a Royal Commission to elicit the views of all Rhodesians, 
and considered it a delaying tactic. 179 At the meeting, Wilson made it clear that the 
British government would not use military power to achieve a solution to Rhodesia’s 
constitutional problems; and considered that Rhodesian Africans should unite to work 
out a constitutional settlement. He proposed economic sanctions as a means of 
helping to resolve the political crisis.
The crisis in the country reached a climax when the Smith regime proclaimed 
Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11 1965. Following this, 
Nkrumah sent a memorandum, dated November 19 to the Heads of States of Congo
178 Nkrumah, Rhodesia File, pp.74-75.
179 See ‘Views expressed by Nkrumah in discussion with the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson in 
Accra on 31 October 1965 in Rhodesia File,’ pp. 78-83.
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Brazzaville, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Guinea calling for the urgent 
formation of an African High Command to remove the illegal minority regime of 
Southern Rhodesia. He also called for the African states to agree to a ‘Treaty of 
Mutual Defence and Security.’ On November 25 Nkrumah called for the UN to 
authorise the use of force to end the rebellion. He proposed that as in the Congo crisis 
of 1960 African states contribute troops for such a mission. Guinea was the only 
country that supported Ghana and was equally willing to place troops at the disposal 
of the UN or OAU. This development also demonstrated that by 1965 Nki'umah’s 
influence on his contemporaries had waned. His radical proposals had been spurned.
The UDI brought about a showdown between Ghana and Britain for on 
December 11 1965, Nkrumah presented the British Prime Minister with an ultimatum: 
“if by the 15 December 1965, Britain has not taken any positive and effective action 
to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, then member states [of the OAU] should 
sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.”180 “Ghana’s position,” wrote 
Nkrumah “is that sanctions alone are not adequate unless they are backed by Britain’s 
military intervention.”181 Consequently Nkrumah broke diplomatic relations with 
Britain in December 1965.182
At the same time Nkrumah made efforts to help liberate the peoples of 
Southern Rhodesia, he was also committed to help end the conflict in Vietnam. The 
Vietnam War had been discussed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference 
in June 1965. At this meeting it was agreed to send a mission to Vietnam comprised 
of Heads of Government of the United Kingdom, Ghana, Nigeria, Trinidad and 
Tobago to explore the prospects of peace.183 Nkrumah’s desire to intervene was also
180 Nkrumah, Rhodesia File, p. 119.
181 Ibid, p. 123.
182 Ibid, pp. 133-134.
183 Dei-Anang, The Administration, p. 53.
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driven by a personal invitation from President Ho Chi Minli to visit Hanoi.184 The 
invitation arrived in July 1965. It was whilst on this mission in February 1966 that 
Nkrumah was deposed from power.
Conclusion
From 1958 to 1963 Nkrumah dominated the Pan-African stage with his 
personality and bold vision for Africa. He achieved this through his continuation of 
the radical tradition of Pan-African congresses in the holding of the Cl AS and AAPC. 
These gatherings mobilised African nationalists and particularly Pan-Africanists from 
all over the continent. Not only did Nkrumah relentlessly pursue his Pan-African 
commitments but he also made his vehement opposition to “nuclear imperialism” 
known. The Cold War and the arms race it generated were for Nkrumah not only 
obstacles to peaceful economic and social development for developing countries but a 
squandering of economic and techno logical resources needed for universal human 
progress.
Positive neutrality and non-alignment were intellectual positions that enabled 
Nkrumah to navigate his way in a Cold War world and maintain friendships with both 
the USSR and the West whilst maintaining Ghana’s and Africa’s national interests. 
By 1961, with the ignominy of the Congo, Nkrumah’s attacks on what he considered 
to be imperialist and neo-colonial machinations on the continent intensified. Also, by 
this time, he had set up alternative institutions to pursue his foreign policy objectives. 
The rationale for the existence of the AAS and the BAA was his deep-seated distrust 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out his external policies with the 
commitment he believed was fundamental. The problems this Byzantine institutional
184 Ibid, p. 53.
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apparatus engendered undermined the very objectives Nkrumah sought to fulfil. His 
establishment of these bodies gave rise to friction between these “wheels within 
wheels” which in turn caused tension between Nkrumah and neighbouring African 
states.185
It is also interesting that in regards to the Sanwi and other dissident groups that 
jeopardised Nkrumah’s hosting of the 1965 OAU conference in Accra, Nkrumah 
argued that a Pan-Africanist approach had to be found to resolve this problem. Yet he 
did not apply the same Pan-Africanist understanding to the deportation of illegal 
aliens from Ghana under the Deportation and Aliens Act of 1958 and 1962 
respectively. His motives for accepting political dissidents may well have been 
ideological but this was not mutually exclusive in preventing Nkrumah from using 
them as bargaining instruments in achieving political ends.
Essentially it was Nkrumah's uncompromising concept of Pan-Africanism that 
raised objections from his intellectual match, Nyerere at the 1964 OAU conference 
and which underlay much of these problems. Nkrumah consistently advocated that 
African unity could only be achieved through political unity which would in turn 
generate economic and social development and not the other way round. Hence, 
Nkrumah had a distinct intellectual conception of continental economic and political 
integration that was inflexible to his contemporaries. Consequently, by the end of 
1965, Nkrumah was ideologically isolated on the African continent; his proposal for 
an African High Command submitted to the 1964 OAU conference was shunned by 
his contemporaries. Relations with Britain and the US were at an all time low. 
Domestically, the mounting economic problems of inflation, unemployment, 
corruption among CPP members and state officials, newspaper reports on Ghana's
185 Makonnen, Pan-Africanism From Within, p. 220.
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assistance to liberation movements in other African countries, deeply frustrated a 
Ghanaian population that was far removed from the CPP’s decision-making 
structures. These factors provided the rationale for the army and police to take over 




NKRUMAH IN EXILE, 1966 -1972
The focus of this chapter is to examine the evolution of Nkrumah’s political 
thought during the last years of his life. There is a discernible radicalisation and 
advancement in Nkrumah’s intellectual thought between 1966-1972. Labelling 
himself as both a “Marxist” and “scientific socialist” he began to connect what he 
defined as an African revolution to a world revolutionary socialist struggle. He 
abandoned the constitutional path to independence and began to adopt revolutionary 
armed struggle as the only solution to Africa’s myriad problems. The unfolding social 
and political struggles in Vietnam, Latin America and the social unrest in America’s 
black cities impacted profoundly on his thinking. Nkrumah increasingly advocated the 
necessity for oppressed peoples around the world to operate in international solidarity 
to eliminate capitalism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Also, during this period, 
Nkrumah deepened his understanding of the class contradictions of African society 
and wrote several books and articles. Towards the end of his life he rejected the 
concepts of “the Third World” and “non-alignment.” Gradually he became 
disillusioned with both the OAU and the Commonwealth -  institutions he had once 
been keenly associated with. However, Nkrumah continued to misjudge individuals 
and reality which led him to erroneously believe he would return to Ghana via a 
counter-coup.
The 1966 Coup (V etat
The leading conspirators in the overthrow of Nkrumah were the top echelons of the 
Ghanaian police and army. Among some of the key figures were, J. W. K. Hartley,
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Commissioner of Police; B. A. Yakubu, Deputy Commissioner; A. K. Deku, member 
of the police; General J. A. Ankrah; Lieutenant Colonel E. K. Kotoka and Capt A. A. 
Afrifa.1 The decision to carry out the coup, known as “Operation Cold Chop,” was 
made during the period from September 1965 to February 1966 by Harlley, Deku, 
Ocran and Kotoka.2 On February 15 the police chiefs met to fix the date.3 Harlley 
was the most important single figure in the execution of the plan. As Baynham 
observes, he was in a position of trust and was “an expert in the protection of the 
regime.”4 He had at his disposal intimate knowledge of Nkrumah’s security apparatus 
and he had developed a skilful communications system between himself and the 
army.
The coup plotters had several motives. Primarily, the regular army considered 
the establishment of the Presidential Own Guard Regiment (POGR) and the 
Presidential Detail Department (PDD) with its alternative security apparatus, all run 
from the President’s office, as a direct threat to their existence.5 The army also 
resented the reorganisation of the police force following the January 1964 
assassination attempt on Nkrumah and the dismissal of senior officers. Added to this 
was the introduction of the Police Service Act in April 1965, which gave Nkrumah 
the sole authority to appoint and dismiss staff within the police force.6
In addition to this deep-seated disenchantment with Nkrumah, in December 
1965 Nkrumah had ordered an enquiry into diamond smuggling operations involving 
a European diamond dealer and a number of Ghanaians. Both Harlley and Deku were
1 For a detailed discussion o f  the close relationship between the army and the police in executing the 
coup; see Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, pp. 153-176.
2 Baynham, The Military and Politics, p. 199; see J. W. K. Harlley, ‘The Decisive Role o f  the Police,’ 
NAG/ADM 5/4/3 81.
3 Baynham, The M ilitary and Politics, p. 199.
4 Ibid, p. 201.
5 Ibid, p. 198; see J. W. K. Harlley ‘The Decisive Role o f  the Police,’ NAG/ADM 5/4/381.
6 Ibid, p. 198.
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implicated in the scandal.7 It was rumoured -  days before the coup -  that on 
Nkrumah’s return from Vietnam, he would have arrested his police chiefs for 
complicity in the scandal. The execution of the coup enabled Harlley and Deku to
Q
evade exposure and possible incarceration.
Nkrumah’s own personal and political analysis of the coup was presented in 
his book Dark Days in Ghana, published in 1968. He contextualised the coup in what 
he considered as the disturbing emergence of 15 armed mutinies and military 
takeovers that had taken place in the African continent between 1962 and March 
1967. He saw the coup d’etat in Ghana as an alliance between neo-colonial forces in 
the army and police force in collusion with imperialist interests.9 Nkrumah believed 
that the higher echelons of the police service and the army were politically hostile to 
the new Ghana and in these circumstances he had considered it necessary to establish 
a new security service, which would be independent of the police force.10 He 
acknowledged awareness of the personal hostility towards him with the sacking of 
Police Chief Madjitey in 1964 and the dismissals of Generals Otu and Ankrali in July 
1965.11
Baynham argues that Nkrumah had made a number of fundamental mistakes. 
Firstly, whilst in power “he failed to penetrate the army significantly;” secondly, “he 
underestimated the alienation from the regime of his regular officers” and “most 
important, he failed to develop the Presidential Guard rapidly enough to neutralise the 
army.”12 These miscalculations on the part of Nkrumah stemmed not only from the 
trust and loyalty he demanded from those within his new security apparatus and from
7 K. Nkrumah, Dark D ays in Ghana (London, 1968) pp. 42-43.
8 Baynham, The M ilitaiy and Politics, p. 199.
9 Nkrumah, Dark Days In Ghana, p. 36.
10 Ibid, p. 38.
11 Ibid, p. 40.
12 Baynham, The M ilitaiy and Politics, p. 148.
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the POGR, which flawed his thinking, but his overconfidence in their capacity. Also, 
by the end of 1965 he had become far removed from political and economic realities 
in the country. He had grievously underestimated the alienation of the police and 
army. He was also convinced of the necessity to visit Ho Chi Minli. These two issues 
profoundly clouded his judgement and determined his course of action. Furthermore, 
Nkrumah’s most serious misjudgement was his belief that “in a larger sense the coup 
d’etat has made it plain that the CPP can no longer follow the path of the old line. It 
must develop a new and reformed revolutionary leadership which must come from the 
broad mass of the Party.”13 He went on to write: “There is now a genuinely 
revolutionary situation in Ghana.” He was of the opinion that “while the present is 
dark, the future is bright.”14 Nkrumah’s optimism and analysis were fundamentally 
imprudent and were to continue to mislead him.
He believed Western imperialist interests were responsible for the “economic 
squeeze” imposed on Ghana by the artificial forcing down of the price of cocoa.15 The 
IMF refusal to grant credit guarantees in 1965 was also part of a strategy to destroy 
his government. He concluded that if Africa was to survive, the waging of a socialist 
revolution in Africa and the establishment of an All African Union government in 
Africa was paramount.
Dark Days in Ghana is an insufficiently critical self-reflection by Nkrumah. In 
short, Nkrumah failed to engage in a searching self-analysis, or to examine the 
policies and actions he pursued whilst in power and the consequences they unleashed. 
His analysis lacks a self-critique of the contribution of internal conditions and factors 
that generated the coup. Nkrumah’s only regret is that he did not abolish the Special 
Branch at independence for he considered it a typically British creation. Nevertheless,
13 Nkrumah, Dark D ays in Ghana, p. 74.
14 Ibid, p. 74.
15 Ibid, p. 94.
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it is difficult to see how the abolition of the Special Branch would have prevented the 
February coup. In sum there is no doubt that the causes of the coup d’etat lie in the 
balance of internal and external causes. The indiscriminate use of the PDA by CPP 
members; the imposition of single party rule; hurried planning and overspending on 
projects often led to the government resorting to heavy borrowing from abroad whilst 
unscrupulous individuals engaged in malpractice and corruption; crippling internal 
taxation; Nkrumah’s alienation from a disenfranchised electorate; the neglect of the 
army, as well Nkrumah*s sporadic interference with the army’s internal affairs, 
including sacking of senior police officials and promotions -  were the salient 
constellation of factors that brought about Nkrumah’s demise.
The critical external factor was the involvement of several Western powers in 
the overthrow.16 In 2001 newly released US government files reveal that the US, 
Britain and France were complied in the overthrow. According to Paul Lee, “formerly 
classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC) and 
State Department documents confirm long-held suspicions of US involvement in the
1 *7coup d'etat that overthrew Nkrumah’s government on February 24 1966.” The 
memoranda reveal that the plans between the three Western countries went back to 
February 1964 when the State Department proposed to their British counterpart a plan
1 R“to induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah’s downfall.”
In the wake of the coup the police and the army immediately set up the 
National Liberation Council (NLC) and quickly destroyed the old CPP. Major 
General Ankrah who had been forced into retirement by Nkrumah was reinstated and
16 S. Hersh, ‘CIA Said to Have Aided Plotters Who Overthrew Nkrumah in Ghana’ in E. R. W.
Schaap, K. Van Meter and L. W olf (eds), Dirty Work: The CIA in Africa (London, 1980), pp. 133-136; 
see also J. Stockwell, In Search o f  Enemies (London, 1978).
17 West Africa 19-25 November 2001.
18 Cited in West Africa 19-25 November 2001. British M16 files have yet to be released which may 
shed further light on British involvement on the coup d’etat.
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promoted to Lieutenant General,19 An economic and political committee were set up 
to reverse the politics and economic direction of the Nkrumah-led government.
Life in Guinea
The coup d’etat immediately aborted Nkrumah’s plans to visit Hanoi. He decided to
go to Guinea-Conakry. His decision was based on three reasons. Firstly, there were
strong bonds of unity between the two countries based on the Union of 1958.
Secondly, its geographical proximity -  some 40 minutes by plane to Accra, made it
highly desirable. Lastly, Nkrumah wrote, “from Guinea I knew I would be in a good
position to carry on the African revolutionary struggle.”20 However, he did not
consider himself to be in exile. For he later wrote: “Every country and town in Africa 
01is my home.”
Nkrumah arrived in Guinea on 2 March 1966 and was given a welcoming 
reception in the capital22 President Sekou Toure made a lengthy welcoming speech, 
but as Nkrumah’s understanding of French was poor, he was not aware that Tome had 
appointed him co-president of Guinea.23 It was not until the end of the address that a 
shocked Nkrumah was told the full import of Sekou Tome’s action via translation.
Nkrumah and his entourage were accommodated at a large villa called Villa 
Syli.24 It was to become Nkrumah’s residence for the remainder of his life. Close to
19 R. Dowse, ‘Military and Police Rule5 in D. Austin and R. Luckham (eds) Politicians and Soldiers in 
Ghana (London, 1975), p. 17.
20 Nkrumah, Dark D ays in Ghana, p. 16.
21 Nkrumah made this statement in his ‘Message to the Black People o f Britain,’ written in 1968; see 
K. Nkrumah, The Struggle Continues (London, 1973), p. 14.
22 Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, pp. 18-19.
23 Milne, The C o n a b y  Years, p. 6. Whilst Nkrumah was in Guinea he never sought to use his co­
presidency to interfere in the domestic policies o f  the PDG government. It was therefore largely a 
symbolic title. It reflected the profound respect President Toure held for Nkrumah and the ideological 
affinity that was shared between the two men.
24 Nkrumah’s entourage in Guinea numbered 89 in total; see Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154-1, 
Folder 2, containing a full list o f  Nkrumah’s entourage in Guinea-Conakry as o f  20 November 1966; 
Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University.
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the airport and the sea, it was an old style two storey colonial building. Nkrumah used 
the first floor of the house as a private dwelling area and the top part as an office and 
accommodation for his security personnel. He quickly established a daily schedule 
with the practical assistance of President Sekou Toure, who arranged for the 
equipping of his office, transportation and his domestic needs. Sana Camara, an 
experienced Guinean diplomat who had served in Ghana and had a good command of 
English, was appointed as Nkrumah’s protocol officer and interpreter. He liased with 
Nkrumah’s security and the Guinean security personnel. He also attended to the 
general administration of the villa. Camara was a dedicated individual who worked 
long hours and was instrumental in ensuring resources to fulfil Nkrumah’s plans. For 
example, it was Camara who organised the setting up of an efficient radio station at 
the Villa and for an electric generator to be installed.
There was simplicity to Nkrumah’s daily schedule. As was customary, he 
only needed a mere four hours sleep after which he would awake to perform yoga 
exercises for 45 minutes.26 He ate a light breakfast of grapefruit and a little cereal. 
Nyamikeh, a relative of Nkrumah was his personal assistant, whilst Amoah, his cook 
for sixteen year's prepared Nkrumah’s meals. “He was not a big eater at all. He ate 
sparingly,” remarks Lamine Janha.27 He would be at his desk in his office by the early 
hours of the morning -  his preferred time to work - whilst sipping a fruit drink to 
sustain him 28 Before lunch, he enjoyed a game of chess, which he played with his
25 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 7.
26 Ibid, p. 30.
27 Lamine Janha was a young man o f 22-23 years o f  age when he stayed with Nkrumah from 1968 to 
1970 at Villa Syli. He had been in Ghana from 1960 to the time o f  the coup as part o f  a Gambian youth 
group that visited Ghana for youth training at the YPI. He was ideologically committed to Nkrumah 
and made the decision to serve Nkrumah despite his own father’s deep objections. Janha informed me 
that the “Old Man” as he referred to Nkrumah, treated him as a son; telephone interview, 21 September 
2003. He currently lives in Washington DC.
28 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 16.
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*70secretary, Sarfo, or at times with the young Lamme Janha. He would then eat his 
favourite meal: palm nut soup, snails, fish and fufu.30
After lunch he would sometimes have a siesta or he would read. He was an 
avid reader and made requests for many of the books he read. 31 Individuals from 
around the world and particularly his research assistant, June Milne, loyally supplied 
his book requests. After his siesta he would often be preoccupied with responding to 
cables, messages and receiving visitors. In the evening he usually ate a very light 
snack. He enjoyed the occasional Cadbury chocolate biscuit.32 He would fast every 
Friday for purely health reasons and for mental discipline. The day would end in 
discussions with his entourage, ambassadors of socialist embassies in Conakry or 
individuals from the African liberation movements.33 He regularly listened to the 
BBC world service, or sat on the verandah by the sea.34 At times the Korean, Chinese, 
and Cuban embassy officials based in Conakry would come and show movies. 
Before he slept, Nkrumah would “power walk” around the compound as a form of 
exercise in the company of Lamine Janha.36 As a nightcap he would eat a few raisins, 
nuts, a wholemeal biscuit with a cup of powered skimmed milk.
Sometimes, he pursued one of his very few hobbies, and planted his favourite 
flowers, roses, in pots around the villa. On some occasions Nkrumah would pass the 
time listening to speeches on vinyl records by Stokely Carmichael, the radical African 
American, formerly leader of the Black Power Movement in the USA or to the late 
Malcolm X, the charismatic spokesman of the Nation of Islam.37 Also, soon after his
29 Interview with Lamine Janha, 21 September 2003.
30 Madam Fathia to author, 14-16 February 2004, Cairo, Egypt.
31 Lamine Janha, telephone interview, 21 September 2003.
32 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 93.
33 Ibid, p. 16.
34 Telephone interview with Lamine Janha, 21 September 2003.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 123.
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arrival in Conakry, Nkrumah took up French lessons with a tutor and became 
proficient in the language.38 He also made use of Julia Wright’s translation skills as 
she spoke fluent French and came to stay in Conakry. She would often translate 
letters, messages and newspaper articles for Nkrumah.40
Nkrumah established a well run and self-sufficient base at the villa. “It was a 
Spartan, disciplined, all-male environment,” maintains Milne.41 Even his entourage 
were organised into committees to administer to activities within the Villa. There 
were political meetings known as “work-study.”42 His few female visitors were 
Madam Andree Tome, wife of President Toure, June Milne and Hanna Reitsch whose 
unexpected April 1966 visit caused uproar. 43 She was initially considered to be a 
security threat to Nkrumah. Being a German who had acquired notoriety during the 
Second World War, there were suspicions among the Guinean intelligence service 
that she was a Nazi. However, she had established a flying school at Afienya in 
Ghana for Nkrumah and when her motives were discovered to be genuine she was 
allowed to see Nkrumah. 44 One woman Nkrumah refused to see was his former 
mistress, Genoveva Kanu, who also made an unannounced arrival. She was friend of 
the famous South African singer, Miriam Makeba. Makeba had married Stokely 
Carmichael and the couple had moved to Guinea in 1968. Shortly after, Kanu visited 
the couple and tried to see Nkrumah. However, Nkrumah refused to see her. His 
reasons are unknown.45
38 Ibid, p. 17.
39 She was daughter o f  the famous African American novelist Richard Wright.
40 Milne The Conakiy Years, p. 17.
41 Ibid, p. 15.
42 Ibid, p. 15.
43 Milne visited Nkrumah 16 times during 1966 to 1972 in her capacity as his research assistant and to 
ensure the galleys o f  his books were proof-read and edited for publication, The C on ah y Years, p. ix.
44 Milne, The Conakiy Years, pp. 13-14.
45 Interview with Lamine Janha, 21 September 2003.
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During the five years Nkrumah spent in Conakry he refused to allow his wife 
and family to visit him. He was initially fervently optimistic that he would return to 
Ghana where the family would eventually be reunited.46 Yet, Nkrumah’s stoical 
qualities perhaps concealed a profound pride. He was powerless and no longer head of 
state. He maintained correspondence with Fathia and enquired about the children’s 
progress and health. He also sent photographs and expressed to Fathia that the family 
would soon be reunited in Ghana 47
Other visitors to Villa Syli included the leader of the African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), Amilcar Cabral, John 
Marshment and Roland Randall, who were the printers of the magazine Africa and the 
World,48 Nkrumah also spent a great deal of time responding to the hundreds of letters 
he received from sympathetic individuals around the world.49 He refused to receive 
newspaper, radio or television reporters who constantly approached him during his
• CA „ ,first few years in Conakry, particularly from Western media outlets. His position 
was that he was not prepared to help them sell their newspapers when they had 
celebrated his downfall.51
46 Madam Fathia informed me she was desperate to visit Nkrumah in Conakry but he constantly told 
her to wait until they returned to Ghana; interview 14-16 February 2004, Cairo, Egypt.
47 Ibid.
48 The magazine was set up in 1964 and funded by the CPP government. The idea originated with 
Nkrumah who wished it to be published in London to disseminate the concept o f  African unity. It gave 
publicity to economic, political news from all over the African continent. Its circulation numbered 
some 30- 40,000 copies; interview with Douglas Rogers, 12 February 1999.
49 Milne The Conakry Years, contains a sample o f some o f the letters sent to Nkrumah. However, the 
Kwame Nkrumah Files at the Moorland-Spingarn Centre at Howard University contain many more.
50 Nkrumah refused to be interviewed by the British Africanist historian, Basil Davidson, see his letters 
to Nkrumah dated 2 December and 13 December 1966 Moorland-Spingarn Center, Kwame Nkrumah 
Papers Box 154, Folder 32, Howard University. Nkrumah response was dated 21 December 1966. 
However, during his “exile” in Conakry, he only gave one interview with Douglas Rogers, editor o f  
Africa and the World, which was published in the May 1966 issue.
51 See cables to editor o f the British Sunday Express and BBC TV dated 13 October 1966 and 9 
February 1967, respectively, in which Nkrumah refused interviews; Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 
154-11, Folder 1; Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn Center, Howard University. Nkrumah also 
refused a request from Thomas Hodgkin, head o f the Institute o f  African Studies, who had been 
sympathetic to his government in the 1950s.
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Security around Nkrumah from the Ghanaian and Guinean security forces was 
tight. There were naval patrols on the shore near to the Villa and armed Guinean 
soldiers guarded the gates.52 Though Nkrumah attempted to learn to drive whilst he 
stayed in Conakry he was never successful and was driven on his rare visits outside 
the Villa in a Mercedes Benz provided by President Sekou Toure. His major 
preoccupation was attending to plans to return to Ghana. This project became known 
as “Operation Positive Action.” Hence, he gave his utmost attention to groups and 
individuals who would assist him in executing this operation.
Operation *Positive Action ’
From the moment of NkrumalTs arrival in Conakry in 1966 to August 1970, he 
closely monitored events in Ghana via newspaper reports and particularly from 
individuals who claimed to be organising a counter-coup to restore him to power. As 
Milne observes; “Nkrumah’s firm belief that he would return to Ghana was 
strengthened by the flow of mail and messages of support he received.”54
On the ninth anniversary of Ghana’s independence Nkrumah made a broadcast 
to the Ghanaian people on Radio Guinea’s ‘Voice of the Revolution’. He made 15 
further broadcasts between March and December 1966 in which he denounced the 
NLC and encouraged Ghanaians to resist the military junta. It was not until 1968 that 
he openly called for “Positive Action” to overthrow the NLC. Meanwhile, from the 
moment of his arrival in Guinea he actively supported a number of clandestine 
operations to return him to office. These activities involved a number of individuals. 
Many of them were considered “braggarts”55 and alleged “opportunists.”56 Among
52 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 13.
53 Ibid, p. 7.
54 Ibid, p. 9.
55 Ibid p. 9.
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them were businessmen Baidoo-Ansah and Arthur Nzeribe, respectively of Ghanaian 
and Nigerian nationality. When Nkrumah first arrived in Conakiy he received limited 
funds from friendly socialist governments and African governments.57 But these soon 
diminished and he relied on the small financial resources accrued from the royalties 
he earned from the publication of his books from his London based account to finance 
such missions. Both Lamine Janha and Stokely Carmichael were witnesses to the 
several individuals who visited Nkrumah and proposed missions to depose the NLC.
In his autobiography, Carmichael castigates some of the individuals who 
approached Nkrumah as “hustlers, taking money for missions that never happened.”59 
Carmichael was nominated to lead one such mission by a small youth group that had 
formed around Nkrumah. The “Old Man,” as the youth referred to Nkrumah, “looked 
surprised” when Carmichael informed him of the plan to attack the Ghanaian 
Parliament.60 He maintains the youth group received logistical and practical support in 
the form of passports and equipment from President Sekou Tome.61 The execution of 
the plan was not made known to Nkrumah until after it was carried out. Overall the 
impact of the bombing was insignificant. The exuberant youth had merely proved to 
the Old Man they were capable of such a small-scale operation. However, Carmichael 
noted that “[Nkrumah] then completely froze all activity after that.”62 In hindsight, 
Carmichael believed that Nkrumah’s brake on such operations was on accoimt of the
56 Interview with Lamine Janha, 21 September 2003.
57 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 10.
58 Janha spoke disparagingly o f  individuals who misled Nkrumah; interview with author, 21 September 
2003.
59 S. Carmichael, Ready fo r  the Revolution: The Life and Struggle o f  Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) 
(New York, 2003), p. 692.
60 Ibid, p. 693.
61 Ibid, p. 693.
62 Ibid, p. 694.
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fact that Nkrumah had been aware, long before the diagnosis of his illness was 
discovered around 1970-71 that it would prevent him from returning to Ghana.63
In early December 1966, Nkrumah expressed his irritation at the NLC’s 
bounty of ten thousand pounds sterling to any individual who returned him to Ghana 
dead or alive,64 He wrote in a letter to Milne: “What fools they are! They are at their 
wits end.”65 In another letter he wrote: “It is wishful thinking for anyone to think that 
there can be restoration of party politics leading to a general election in which our 
Party could win, and on the strength of that, ask me to go back. It is the height of 
hypocrisy and betrayal, at this moment of Ghana’s suffering, for anyone to think that 
the restoration of party politics and the winning of a general election would redress 
the present debacle.”66 Nkrumah made this comment in the light of the experience in 
neighbouring Sierra Leone, where after a general election on March 24 1967, a young 
coup leader by the name of Juxon-Smith overthrew the government of Siaka Stevens. 
For Nkrumah, in the context of Ghana “a counter-coup within the army supported by
f t lthe masses is the only solution.”
Meanwhile, in Conakry there was an attempt to kidnap Nkrumah on March 16 
1967. The Guinean navy intercepted a shipping trawler sailing close to the villa. 
Interrogation revealed that the crew aboard the ship had detailed knowledge of the 
layout of the Villa, which strongly suggested that a member of the entourage could 
only have leaked such information.68
Within Ghana, an unsuccessful counter-coup attempt against the NLC was 
carried out by Major General Barwah and and Lieutenants M. Yeboah and S. Arthur
63 Ibid, p. 694.
64 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 19.
65 Ibid, p. 93.
66 Ibid, p. 137. This is Nkrumah’s letter to ICwesi Armah, his former High Commissioner to London; 
dated 14 April 1967.
67 Ibid, p. 137.
68 Ibid, p. 106.
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on April 17 1967.69 The counter-coup was earned out without Nkrumah’s 
involvement and gave grounds for his misplaced optimism. In mid August 1967, 
Nkrumah wrote to Milne stating: “My mind is being preoccupied with efforts to get 
back to Ghana as soon as possible. This is uppermost in my mind now, and all else is 
secondary.”70
Two years later, Nkrumah called on “the workers of Ghana” along with 
peasant farmers to stage a general strike “with a military counter-coup to overthrow 
the NLC and liberate Ghana from the clutches of neo-colonialism.”71 He was of the
* » • 79opinion that “the only language which is understood is force and action.” He 
reminded Ghanaians of the role they played in freeing the country from British 
colonialism. He wrote: “Your goal is historic -  it is the building of a society in Ghana 
within a united socialist Africa.”73 Via his broadcasts and through the pages of Africa 
and the World, Nkrumah waged a virulent campaign against the NLC. When the NLC 
handed over power in freely contested elections in August 1969, Dr Busia, Nkrumah’s 
former ideological adversary, won the vote and took office in October of the same 
year*.74 Busia’s Progress Party continued the neo-liberal economic policies of its 
predecessors. Nkrumah attacked the economic policies of the Busia government, 
which had replaced free education at all levels of the educational system with the 
introduction of fees. In short, the Progress Party represented the triumph of 
Nkrumah’s old political enemies going back as far as the 1940s.
69 Nkrumah dedicated Dark Days in Ghana to these men who were executed for their action.
70 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 171.
71 Nkrumah, The Struggle Continues, p. 9. This short booklet contains some o f  Nkrumah’s articles 
written in exile.
72 Ibid, p. 11.
73 Ibid, p. 12.
74 However, the CPP were proscribed from participating in the elections; see Y. Twumasi ‘The 1969 
Election’ in D. Austin and R. Luckham (eds) Politicians and Soldiers, pp. 140-164.
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Another major preoccupation was Nkrumah’s articulation of his political 
thoughts in writing. We shall now examine the advancement and radicalisation of 
Nkrumah’s ideological vision.
From (Positive Action ’ to Revolutionary Action
During the four years Nkrumah spent in Conakiy, through his letters to various
individuals, his thinking on many social, political and economic issues can be
delineated. When his research assistant, June Milne expressed an interest in writing a
book on Nkrumaism, Nkrumah wrote:
The most tantalising part of it will be my Marxist or 
socialist ideology. You know I am a Marxist and 
scientific socialist. But I don’t consider myself in this 
particular sense a Leninist. Leninism is an application 
of Marxism to the Russian milieu. But the Russian 
milieu is not the same as the African milieu. And here 
the question of communism comes in -  whether I am a 
communist or not. I am a scientific socialist and a 
Marxist and if that is tantamount to being a communist 
then I am. But not a communist of the Marxist-Leninist 
type.75
Here Nkrumah openly acknowledged his Marxist beliefs. He considered Marxism to 
be a non-dogmatic tool applied to different social and economic conditions. 
However, he did not define what type of communist he was and therefore ambiguity 
remains as to his definition. In short, Nkrumah was undoctrinaire in his application of 
Marxist analysis to African realities.
He had ample time to reflect on his political convictions and he would often 
contemplate alone 011 his balcony.76 In his vision Pan-Africanism and socialism were 
inextricably integral to the African Revolution in which the forces of imperialism,
75 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 94, letter dated 4 December 1966.
76 Interview with Lamine Janha, 21 September 2003.
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colonialism and neo-colonialism are destroyed in order to construct a radically 
transformed society on the principles of socialist economic development, freedom, 
and equality of all people. Nkrumah increasingly began to believe that the new phase 
of Africa’s development, which was characterised by armed struggle in various parts 
of the African continent was linked to a world revolutionary socialist struggle. He 
advocated revolutionary warfare as the only solution to the complete liberation of the 
African continent and the eradication of the partnership between the neo-colonial 
indigenous African elite and outside forces. Therefore Nkrumah’s advocacy of 
violent armed struggle shares some affinity with the views of Frantz Fanon who 
believed in the psychological necessity of violence for the oppressed to attain self­
liberation. Nkrumah* s politics also increasingly moved towards an internationalist 
revolutionary position during this period.
A month after his arrival in Conakry, he expressed in a letter to June Milne 
that “the only solution to the Vietnam war is for the US to clear out its presence in 
Vietnam, north and south.”77 He went on to write:
I am interested in the Vietnamese war because I am 
opposed to imperialism and neo-colonialism: and I 
believe that world socialism can end war and usher in 
permanent peace for the world. I believe in 
internationalism, but internationalism must presuppose 
Asia for Asians, Africa for Africans, and Europe for 
Europeans. These peoples in their various areas must 
see to their own problems. This does not do away with 
international co-operation and friendship. Nor does it
» * • 78smack of racism or racialism.
Hence, Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism was based on a strong principle of anti­
imperialism and the belief in self-determination for all peoples. Such a position did 
not preclude mutual exchange and solidarity for he considered “the African
77 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 29, dated 28 March 1966.
78 Ibid, pp. 29-30.
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Revolution is an integral pail of the world socialist revolution.”79 In a letter to Milne,
dated August 26 1967, Nkrumah. wrote:
I think and hold the view that the fulfilment of the 
African Revolution only implies two basic principles:
(1) the principle of basic equality of all peoples and 
races, and that all men and women, irrespective of race, 
colour, or religion, have an equal right to dignity and 
respect, to freedom and national independence; and (2) 
the solidarity between the oppressed peoples of all 
countries.80
In another letter, he expressed a wish for the socialist and communist world to unite 
for “a coming together of Russia and China would put the fear of God into 
America.”81 He believed “Cassius Clay has taken a good stand” in refusing to serve
t * S9in Vietnam and he condemned his treatment by the American authorities. 
Nkrumah lamented the death of Che Guevara in 1967 as “a blow to the guerrilla 
freedom fighter in Latin America.”S3 Moreover, he believed “a man like Guevara 
cannot be obliterated by death alone. He lives wherever guerrillas fight.” In 
essence, Nkrumah identified with the struggles of oppressed people around the world.
Significantly, during this time, Nkrumah’s voracious appetite for reading and 
discussions with the Guinea Bissau national liberation leader, Amilcar Cabral, appears 
to have shaped his ideas on armed struggle and national liberation movements. 
Cabral who had been given a house in Conakiy by President Sekou Tome was one of 
his few visitors. The two would be engaged in political discussions and on one 
occasion in June 1967, Cabral presented a film on ‘Portuguese Guinea’ to Nkrumah
79 Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa, p. 10.
80 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 176.
81 Ibid; letter dated 18 December 1967.
82 Ibid; letter dated 14 May 1967, written to Milne.
83 Ibid; letter dated 24 October 1967, written to Milne.
84 Ibid, p. 190.
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and thirty of his entourage.85 It seems the theory of armed struggle significantly 
shaped Nkrumah’s outlook on global struggles, in which he considered Africa had a 
crucial role to play. These ideas were expressed in Handbook o f Revolutionary 
Warfare, published in 1968. The particular timing of this book was crucial. Major 
violent struggles for national independence were being waged in various parts of the 
African continent. The Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, 
as well as South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were sites of revolutionary upheavals 
against settler colonialism, often aided and abetted by Western powers. On a global 
level, there were similar emerging struggles in Latin America and the war in Vietnam. 
The strident demands for Black Power in the United States and strong anti-Vietnam 
war protests led by young students in Western capitals shook the prevailing liberal 
democratic capitalist order. The political and social ferment occurring in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America during this period, initiated demands for justice and freedom, also 
gave inspiration to demonstrators in the West. In short, the late 1960s was an era of 
protest, defiance and demands for an alternative to the liberal market order. It is in 
this specific political and ideological climate that the Handbook emerged.
In 1968 it appears Nkrumah no longer considered the efficacy in non-violent 
constitutional methods to achieve independence. He now embraced aimed 
revolutionary struggle as the only means of achieving political independence and 
eradicating neo-colonialism and imperialism from the African continent. In the 
Handbook, Nkrumah expressed the view that: “Revolutionary warfare is the logical, 
inevitable answer to the political, economic and social situation in Africa today. We 
do not have the luxury of an alternative.”86
85 Ibid, p. 157.
86 K. Nkrumah, Handbook o f  Revolutionary Warfare (London, 1968), p. 42.
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It appears Nkrumah had been influenced by the writings of Mao Tse-tung, 
Fanon’s Wretched o f the Earth as well such as book such as Tzu’s Art o f War, The 
War o f the Flea by Robert Taber, Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare by W. J. 
Pomeroy, Philosophy o f World Revolution by F. Marek, and Peoples5 War, Peoples ’ 
Army by the North Vietnamese general, N. Giap. This led him to conclude that “what 
is urgently needed now is co-ordination and centralised political and militaiy direction 
of the struggle” on a continental level.87 Hence, he considered his Handbook o f 
Revolutionary Warfare as a manual for guerrilla warfare. He called for an All African 
People’s Revolutionary Party (AAPRP) to unify liberation forces and an All African
CJO
People’s Revolutionary Army (AAPRA) to wage such a war. To co-ordinate 
strategy between the various parties he envisaged the creation of an All African 
Committee for Political Co-ordination (AACPC). The function of this body would be
OQ
to harmonise policies among the central committees of the various ruling parties.
Amilcar Cabral’s influence on Nkrumah is most likely to have shaped his 
political analysis of national liberation struggles. Both political leaders shared many 
similarities such as an undoctrinaire belief in Marxist method as a tool for political 
analysis; both were pragmatists, anti-imperialist and anti-neo-colonialism. They also 
demonstrated politically independent thought and believed in the necessity for a 
vanguard revolutionary party led by a conscious political elite to transform African 
society. Yet, whereas Cabral’s political analysis came from practical experience, 
Nkrumah had 110 direct experience of revolutionary warfare. Hence Nkrumah’s 
manual for guerrilla warfare was based 011 armchair theorising, whilst Cabral’s views 
were closely forged through revolutionary praxis.
87 Milne The Conakry Years, p. 326.
88 Nkrumah, Handbook o f  Revolutionary Warfare, pp. 55-62.
89 Ibid, pp.57-58.
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Another significant development in Nkrumah’s thought during his time in 
Conakry was his embrace of a class analysis of Africa, which he set out in his book 
entitled Class Struggle in Africa published in 1970. Hountondji contends that in the 
1964 edition of Consciencism, Nkrumah “ducked the theoretical problem of the 
internal composition of colonial and post-colonial African societies” whereas in Class 
Struggle in Africa, Nkrumah confronts the problem of the nature of class conflict in 
Africa head on.90 Also, whereas in the 1964 edition he championed the position that 
“the passage to socialism lies in reform,” he now rejected this view.91 In Class 
Stt'uggle, he advocated that it is via the waging of a violent aimed struggle that the 
total liberation of Africa under scientific socialism can come about in order to destroy 
imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Nkrumah espoused socialist revolution 
for Africa. He was of the opinion that “there is no hard and fast dogma for socialist 
revolution, because no two sets of historical conditions and circumstances are exactly 
alike, experience has shown that under conditions of class struggle, socialist 
revolution is impossible without the use of force.”92 He believed that “revolutionary 
violence is a fundamental law in revolutionary struggles” and moreover, “those who 
argue that the transition from capitalism to socialism can be accomplished without the
go
use of force are under a delusion.”
For Nkrumah, colonialist penetration and the era of colonial conquest brought 
about European type classes of proletariat and bourgeoisie to Africa. These class 
divisions in modem African society became blurred to some extent during the pre­
independence period. The emergence of independence struggles united all classes
90 Hountondji, African Philosophy, p. 150.
91 Nkrumah, Consciencism, p. 74.
92 Nkrumah, Class Struggle, p. 80.
93 Ibid, p. 80.
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together to eject the colonial power.94 In short, class distinctions were submerged in 
the national struggle in order to win political freedom but re-emerged in all post­
independent states into five main classes: the peasants; the rural and industrial 
proletariat; the urban and rural petit bourgeoisie; traditional rulers; and the 
bourgeoisie.95 The African middle class constituted “the class ally of the bourgeoisie 
of the capitalist world.”96 They were a “subordinate partner to foreign capitalism”-  
for international monopoly finance capital would not allow this class to become a
07  •genuine business competitor to threaten its very existence. Nkrumah’s position drew 
affinity with that of Fanon who had argued earlier in his seminal work, The Wretched 
o f the Earth, that on independence “the national middle class discovers its historic 
mission: that of intermediary.”98 Furthermore, this class fails to transform the nation 
but considers its task as that of “being the transmission link between the nation and 
capitalism.”99 Undoubtedly, Nkrumah was shaped by Fanon’s theoretical analysis of 
the contradictions and limitations of the African bourgeoisie. Nkrumah concurred 
with Fanon that “the African bourgeoisie remains therefore largely a comprador class, 
sharing in some of the profits which imperialism drains from Africa.”100
It appears that Nkrumah’s ideological stance on the world had also been 
affected by what he considered to be the disturbing phenomenon of coup d’etats that 
had occurred on the African continent between January 1963 and December 1969. He 
observed that dming this period 25 militaiy takeovers had taken place. He attributed 
imperialism and neo-colonial links between Western and African intelligence
94 Ibid, p. 10.
95 Ibid, pp. 17-22.
96 Ibid, p. 33.
97 Ibid, p. 57.
98 F. Fanon, The Wretched o f  the Earth (London 1961), p. 122.
99 Ibid, p. 122.
100 Nkrumah, Class Struggle, p. 56. Fanon , The Wretched o f  the Earth, pp. 119-165.
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networks as the cause of these takeovers.101 In addition, the very fragmented nature 
of the African continent made it vulnerable to imperialist penetration. To counter the 
rise in military coups, Nkrumah urged “ the need for the founding of an all-African 
vanguard working class party, and for the creation of an all-African people’s army 
and militia.”102 He lamented the vast sums of money spent on the armies of Africa, 
whose interests were to repress the revolutionary potential of the African masses.
Lastly, Nkrumah emphasized that the African revolutionary struggle was not 
an isolated one, but an integral part of the wider “Black Revolution.”103 He argued 
that the struggle for civil rights in the United States and struggles in the Caribbean 
were part of the struggles for the liberation of people of African descent for social, 
political and economic justice. He claimed: “All peoples of African descent, whether 
they live in North or South America, the Caribbean or in any other part of the world 
are African and belong to the African nation.”104 For Nkrumah, despite Africa’s 
arbitrarily erected colonial borders and myriad ethnic groups, the continent 
fundamentally constituted a single nation. With strong Garveyite tones, Nkrumah 
continued: “The core of the Black Revolution is in Africa, and until Africa is united 
under a socialist government, the Black man throughout the world lacks a national 
home. Africa is one continent, one people, and one nation.”105 In 1922 Garvey had 
similarly spoken of the need for black people to “redeem our Motherland Africa from 
the hands of alien exploiters and found there a government, a nation of our own, 
strong enough to lend protection to the members of our race scattered all over the
101 Nkrumah, Class Struggle, pp.48-49.
102 Ibid, p. 54.
103 Ibid, p. 87.
104 Ibid, p. 87.
105 Ibid, pp.87-88.
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world.”106 It was Garvey who coined the slogan: “One God, One Nation, One 
Destiny!”
Nkrumah’s ambivalence towards communism was demonstrated in his closing 
paragraph in the book. He argued that the creation of a unified socialist African 
continent would “advance the triumph of the international socialist revolution, and the 
onward progress towards world communism, under which, every society is ordered on
107the principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” 
Yet, theoretically Nkrumah did not advocate communism for Africa, for in 
Consciencism he acknowledged the spiritual dimension of African societies. He saw 
no conflict between socialism as a value system and set of rational economic methods 
of redistributing wealth in society and spiritual values and practices of a society. 
Communism’s denial of a spiritual realm made it irreconcilable with an African 
spiritual worldview. Consciencism was therefore, according to Nkrumah, a synthesis 
of Africa’s spiritual character and materialist philosophy. He did not believe in “the 
organised religions of the world” for they “have done so much to bring pain and 
misery to man.”108 Nkrumah wrote: “ I called myself a Marxist Christian. I think that 
was wrong. I am now simply a Marxist, with historical materialism as my philosophy 
of life.”109
Class Struggle in Afi'ica ends on a tone of idealism: with the emergence of 
world revolution, capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism would be eliminated, 
giving birth to a socialist and unified Africa. Continental Union government of Africa 
would co-exist with world communism in a global humanity created in the genuine 
interests of all workers and peasants of the world.
106 M. Garvey cited in The Philosophy & Opinions o f  Marcus Garvey by A. J. Garvey (Massachusetts, 
1986), p. 52.
107 Nkrumah, Class Struggle, p. 88.
108 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 161, letter dated 1 July 1967.
109 Ibid, p. 161.
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Nkrumah’s position on the question of race and class were also briefly 
articulated in Class Struggle in Africa, He argued “a noil-racial society can only be 
achieved by socialist revolutionary action of the masses.”110 He claimed that the roots 
of racism were born out of capitalist class relationships. Nkrumah pointed to the 
example of apartheid South Africa, where he maintained it was capitalist economic 
penetration that created the master-servant relationship, which gave birth to racist 
apartheid ideology. For Nkrumah “it is only the ending of capitalism, colonialism, 
imperialism and neo-colonialism and the attainment of world communism that can 
provide the conditions under which the race question can finally be abolished and 
eliminated.”111
While Class Struggle in Africa did not focus extensively on the dynamics of 
race and class in revolutionary struggle, it is clear* that alongside this book, Nkrumah 
was also forging his position on the race question emerging in the United States. He 
was influenced in his assessments through his extensive correspondence with the 
African American political activists, Grace and James Boggs, Stokely Carmichael and 
Julia Wright. Nkrumah had written the first draft of the pamphlet The Spectre o f 
Black Power by February 1967 after discussing the contents with Carmichael who had 
attended the Twentieth Congress of the Guinean Democratic Party (PDG) around the 
same time.112 During 1967 when social disturbances afflicted America’s black inner 
cities, Nkrumah wrote to Milne in which he expressed his rejection of the term “race 
riot” used in the Western press to characterise the conflicts.113 He wrote: “It is not 
racial. Those who think it is racial are fundamentally wrong. It is the rotten economic
110 Nkrumah, Class Struggle, p. 28.
111 Ibid, p. 28.
112 The pamphlet was first published in Africa and the World in January 1968; for a copy o f  the draft 
see the Kwame Nkrumah Papers, Box 154 -  31, Folders 13,14, 15; Manuscript Division, Moorland- 
Spingarn Center, Howard University.
113 Milne, The Conakiy Years, p. 170; dated 10 August 1967.
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system there that has brought about Black Power. Black Power is nothing but a
violent protest of the have-nots against the haves. It is the poor against the rich.”114 In
another letter, he expressed criticism of the Black Power leaders. In his judgement,
they “don’t seem aware of Africa. They are more taken up with the struggle in the
United States.”115 Furthermore, “The concept of Black Power will be fulfilled only
when Africa is free and united.”116 He ended the letter stating: “I am trying to make
Black Power not a racist issue. It is political and economic, and only socialism can
make Black Power fulfil its destiny.”117
Nkrumah’s opinions on the Black Power struggle were articulated in two short
pamphlets he wrote in 1968 entitled: The Spectre o f Black Power and Message to the
Black People o f Britain.118 Nkrumah posed:
What is Black Power? I see it in the United States as 
part of the vanguard of world revolution against 
capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism which have 
enslaved, exploited and oppressed peoples everywhere, 
and against which the masses of the world are now 
revolting. Black power is paid of the world rebellion of 
the oppressed against the oppressor, of the exploited 
against the exploiter. It operates throughout the African 
continent, in North and South America, the Caribbean, 
wherever Africans and people of African descent live. It 
is linked with the Pan-African struggle for unity on the 
African continent, and with all those who strive to 
establish a socialist society.119
Nkrumah acknowledged that he had learnt a great deal from his intellectual 
exchanges with the Boggs.120 He considered that their maturity of political thought on 
the African American struggle enabled them to correctly “link the Black Power
114 Ibid, p. 170.
115 Ibid, p. 186, letter to J. Milne, dated 6 October 1967.
116 Ibid, p. 186.
117 Ibid, p 187,
118 K. Nkrumah, The Struggle Continues (London, 1973), pp. 13-15 and 36-45.
119 K. Nkrumah, ‘The Spectre o f  Black Power5 in The Struggle Continues, pp.39-40.
120 Ibid, p. 247. Nkrumah expressed this in a letter to Milne dated 13 July 1968.
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revolution in America with the African Revolution.”121 In a letter to Christine 
Johnson, who Nkrumah befriended whilst he was studying in America, Nkrumah 
remarked: “Unless Afro-Americans think of themselves as black men and as people of 
African descent, they will never come up to their own. I am glad that they are now 
becoming conscious of their roots.”122
In Nkrumah’s worldview, the struggle for Black Power in the United States 
was inextricably linked to the African revolution, yet he recognised that “it opens the 
way for all oppressed masses” even “potentially revolutionary white masses in the 
United States” who are “dispossessed” and “often are without hope.”123
Overall, Nkrumah’s evolving revolutionary socialist perspective on the world 
led him to reject the concept of “the Third World.” He reflected his views on this 
concept in a short article entitled The Myth o f the Third World, first published in 
Labour Monthly in October 1968.124 Nkrumah called for the abandonment of such a 
misleading political term for its meaning was vague and lacking in clarity. For 
different audiences the term “Third World” referred to developing nations, or 
specifically to non-European coloured peoples of the world. For Nkrumah the most 
dangerous meaning of the term was its association with “a kind of passivity, a non­
participation, an opting out of the conflict between the two worlds of capitalism and 
socialism.”125 The phrase became popularised with the convening of the Conference 
of Non-aligned States in 1961 and 1964.126 He also considered “non-alignment is an 
anachronism .” 127 It was “a form of political escapism - reluctance to face the stark
121 Ibid, p. 247.
122 Ibid, p. 253, letter dated 27 August 1968.
123 Nkrumah, The Spectre o f  Black Power, p. 41.
124 Ibid, pp.74-78.
125 Ibid, p. 74.
126 Ibid, p. 76.
127 Ibid, p. 76.
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19R + *realities of the present situation.” Fundamentally, Nkrumah emphasized that: 
“There are two worlds only, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary world -  
the socialist world trend towards communism, and the capitalist world with its 
extensions of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.”129 He was of the 
opinion that the concept of the “Third World” is “neither a practical political concept 
nor a reality.”130 Yet, it continued to be used by elements committed to revolutionary 
struggle and those opposed to revolution. For Nkrumah, its continued usage served to 
marginalize the so-called “Third World” from “being identified openly and decisively 
as part of the socialist world.”131
During this time, Nkrumah commented on political developments in other 
African countries. For example, in July 1966 he commiserated with the low electoral 
turn out for the Kenyan opposition leader, Oginga Odinga. He believed Jomo 
Kenyatta and Tom Mboya had “submitted Kenya to neo-colonialist subjugation” and 
armed struggle was the only solution to imperialism.132 A year later he lamented the 
decline into civil war in Nigeria after a new military president, General Yakubu 
Gowon took power in May 1967. The Ibo peoples of the Eastern region of Nigeria 
seceded, in a move, which triggered a bitter three-year conflict. In the same year 
Nkrumah also became depressed with internal strife emerging among the Somali 
people who continued to be divided by boundaries inherited from the colonial era. He 
wrote:
Yes, indeed, the African Revolution should recognise 
none of the colonial frontiers between African 
territories or states. They are indeed artificial 
boundaries having no meaning in the context of African 
unity. And so there can no question of revolutionary
128 ibid, p. 76.
129 Ibid, p. 76.
130 Ibid, p. 76.
131 Ibid, p. 76.
132 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 53, letter dated 8 July 1966.
317
forces (e.g. AAPRA) violating a country’s sovereignty 
by entering it for the purpose of the political unification 
of the continent. The whole of Africa is one, and every
1 7 7part of it belongs to Africa as a whole.
Here Nkrumah simply reiterated his deepest convictions that had been articulated in 
his earlier book Africa Mast Unite. He rejected any kind of partition of Africa and 
considered “Africa with its islands is just one Africa.”134
It also appears that Nkrumah lost confidence in the OAU and the 
Commonwealth in mid 1966. He wrote in a letter to June Milne: “I am not interested 
in the Commonwealth, any more than I am interested in the OAU. As for the 
Commonwealth, I am out of it for all time. It can serve no useful purpose. It is 
becoming a tool of neo-colonialism. Its concept is no more relevant to the African 
struggle.”135 He considered the OAU conference of 1966 to have been “a real flop” 
and that the institution was “collapsing.”136 After his return to Ghana, Nkrumah hoped
1 77to revive the institution with “militant and revolutionary states.” Yet his
disillusionment with the OAU grew.138 Towards the end of his life, he characterised 
the institution as “a puppet organisation” and he scorned what he viewed as the 
“grudging efforts” of the Liberation Committee of the OAU compared to the huge 
efforts put into a Pan-African cultural festival in Algiers in mid 1969.139 Nkrumah 
envisaged that an All African Peoples’ Revolutionary Army (AAPRA) and an All- 
African Peoples’ Socialist Party (AAPSP) planned on a Pan-African basis would be 
created to supplant the OAU.140
S33 Ibid, p. 136, letter dated 9 April 1967.
134 Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp.217-218.
135 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 53, letter dated 8 July 1966.
136 Ibid, p. 76, letter dated 10 October 1966.
137 Ibid, p. 76.
138 Ibid, p. 77.
139 Ibid, p. 326. Nkrumah expressed his frustration over the OAU in a letter to the British Communist 
writer, Idris Cox, dated 16 August 1969.
140 Ibid, pp.72-73, letter dated 27 September 1966.
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Another conviction Nkrumah upheld to his death was his strong belief in the 
separation between the private and the political aspects of an individual’s life. There 
were tensions in his views on women and a man’s personal life. On the one hand, he 
also believed that “a man’s private life is his own in so far as he does not allow it to 
destroy the objective of his socialist revolutionary life.”141 On the other hand, he also 
recognised that “it is impossible for a revolutionary to dissociate his private life from
1 AOhis public life if he wants to be a true revolutionary.” Whilst he recognised the 
complexity of such a dichotomy, he demonstrated a patronising attitude towards the 
treatment of women. He wrote: “ I agree one must love a person who is also in 
agreement with one’s socialist revolutionary objectives; if not, the revolutionary 
should leave women alone. Women, money and alcohol are hindrances to the 
revolutionary cause if not sensibly handled.”143 Prior to his marriage, Nkrumah 
considered involvement with women a dangerous diversion from politics. However, 
on an intellectual level, he accepted that some women were committed to the cause of 
revolution. He admired the German revolutionary, Rosa Luxemburg and referred to 
her as “one of the greatest, if not the greatest, socialist woman of our century. She was 
one of the few who could stand up against Lenin in those days.”144 Yet, Nkrumah’s 
conception of political struggle was on the whole male dominated and male led. 
Women who proved themselves to be leaders and competent were much admired and 
respected by Nkrumah. Nevertheless, this did not influence his overall belief that 
women were a distraction to the greater cause of the African revolution.
Whilst Nkrumah had ample time to reflect whilst he was in Conakry, his self- 
criticism and self-evaluation reveal a man who had become divorced from reality. He
14t Ibid, p. 331, letter dated 6 September 1969 to an African African woman by the name o f  Reba 
Lewis,
142 Ibid, p. 335.
143 Ibid, p. 335.
144 Ibid, p. 291, letter to Reba Lewis dated 3 February 1969.
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believed he had made two mistakes: firstly he was “not tough enough” and secondly 
he “did not pursue socialism fast enough.”145 Yet, it was Nkrumah’s authoritarian 
style of rule that had alienated him from many ordinary Ghanaians. Also, it is hard to 
accept that in pursuing socialism at a greater speed Nkrumah would have succeeded. 
In short, if we are to engage in historical conjecture, these strategies are guaranteed to 
have provoked a coup d’etat and are thoughts of deeply misguided thinking.
Towards the end of 1966 he wrote in a letter to June Milne: “I don’t deny I 
have made mistakes. Many a time I have taken people for granted and trusted them 
and many a time they betrayed that trust or took advantage of it, and me. They took 
advantage of my kindness to them, when my kindness was a genuine effort to help 
them. In this wise I admit I have made mistakes, and have sometimes miscalculated 
human beings.”146 Unfortunately, Nkrumah does not expand 011 what he considers to 
have been his mistakes. However, he frequently repeated that once he returned to 
power in Ghana he would do things differently. He did not discuss the details of what 
he planned to do differently. Nevertheless, he recognised his colossal misjudgement 
of individuals. However, this misjudgement continued in Conakry. In July 1969, the 
small youth group banned Ambrose Yankey Snr, who Nkrumah had appointed as 
head of his security at the villa.147 J. B. Buah was appointed to replace him. 
According to Lamine Janha, “Yankey was corrupt and misinforming the Old Man.” 
The banning of Yankey appeared to have received Nkrumah’s “tacit approval,” for he 
did not utter a word when he was told by the youth the reasons for their actions.148
During 1968 there were small signs of a deterioration in Nkrumah9s health. 
Outwardly, he maintained an optimistic disposition and his daily routine.
145 Ibid, p. 45.J. Milne noted these criticisms in her notebook dated 10-23 June 1966.
146 Ibid, pp.97-98.
147 Ibid, p. 324. Interview with Lamine Janha 21 September 2003.
148 Telephone interview with Lamine Janha, 21 September 2003.
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Increasingly, however, a low morale dominated the atmosphere of the villa. Milne
observes that in addition to the slackening in the pace of day-to-day activities at the
villa “doubts were beginning to be expressed as to whether in fact Nkrumah would
ever be restored to power.”149
His ill health was initially attributed to digestive trouble and back pains. Prior
to the coup he had regular medical check ups in Ghana. In Guinea, Nkrumah’s
attitude in 1968 was that he would have a thorough medical examination once he
returned to Ghana. The following year did not bring about his restoration, but instead
a downward decline in spite of several hopeful indications that a counter-coup would
occur. In Ghana, General Ankrah was forced to resign as Chairman of the NLC when
it was discovered in 1969 that he was involved in corruption. Whilst this gave
Nkrumah hope, his Ghanaian contacts proved to be a disappointment and by the end
of the year he refused all contact with them.150 Meanwhile, as Milne observes:
It was pressure from Ghanaians on Nkrumah to be 
ready for an ‘imminent’ counter-coup which led him to 
postpone plans to go to the Soviet Union for a much- 
needed rest and medical check-up. He had intended to 
go if nothing had happened by April 1969. By then he 
was steadily losing weight, and weighed barely ten 
stone. He had weighed well over eleven stone when he 
arrived in Conakry three years before.151
Nkrumah5 s physical decline was mirrored in the economic decline in Guinea. 
Lack of spare parts could not repair the failing generator at the villa. Similarly the air 
conditioner in his bedroom was broken and his ceiling leaked.152 Exacerbating the 
economic difficulties in the country was the attempted assassination of President
149 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 214.
150 Ibid, p. 279.
151 Ibid, p. 280.
152 Ibid, p. 280.
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Sekou Toure in March 1969. The impact of this led to a tightening of security both 
inside the country and in the villa.
With his failing health and concern over the future of his books Nkrumah 
drew up his will in the last months of 1969. The will entrusted Milne to become his 
literary executrix and was signed and witnessed in Villa Syli on 21 January 1970. 
Around this time, Nkrumah could no longer conceal the fact that his health was 
deteriorating. It became worse with the rainy season when he suffered what, was 
diagnosed by a Russian doctor as acute lumbago. Whilst Nkrumah and members of 
this entourage were sceptical about this diagnosis, the medication, a course of 
injections, was accepted. It was later discovered he had prostate cancer.
NkrumahJs correspondence during 1970 lessened considerably due to his ill 
health. During this year Madam Fathia received typed letters from Nkrumah with his 
handwritten signature. This worried her greatly as Nkrumah had always handwritten 
letters to her.153 Nevertheless, another reason for the scarcity of letters was the 
discovery of interception in the mail by persons unknown. Consequently, Nkrumah 
reduced his letters and resorted to cable as a more reliable form of communication. 
Also during this year, a stubborn Nkrumah would not be persuaded by pleas horn 
those around him, including Sekou Tome and his wife, to seek medical treatment 
overseas. In August 1971 his condition became very severe and he finally agreed to 
seek medical treatment in Bucharest. He was taken to Conakry airport in a stretcher 
and accompanied by Sana Camara and two devoted members of his entourage, B. E. 
Quarm and Nyamilceh.
153 Mrs Nkrumah recalled that during their marriage Nkrumah was frequently visited by doctors who 
gave him injections. She suspects that the cancer had begun soon after their marriage. When she asked 
Nkrumah about his health, he would tell her not to worry herself. She believes he shielded her from his 
illness, interview with author 14-16 February 2004.
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At the Sanatorial de Geriatrie in Bucharest, Nkrumah spent his days sitting in 
a large armchair, for up to six weeks at time, unable to move his eight and half stone 
frame. He had lost his energy and was suffering a great deal of pain. He permitted 
only selected visitors to visit. Among them were: Milne, Madam Sekou Tome, and 
the wife of Sana Camara.154 The Guinean Ambassador in Rome, Seydou Keita once 
visited Nkrumah in late October 1971 and during the visit Keita lambasted the 
seditious activities of Guinean ministers. The ambassador was angry and said that 
corruption was an ingrained trait of Africans. Nkrumah’s reaction was observed. 
Milne wrote: “[Nkrumah] sat back in his chair, tapped Keita’s left hand and said 
slowly and quietly: ‘It is not the colour of the skin. The solution is the political 
unification of Africa. When Africa is a united strong power everyone will respect 
Africa, and Africans will respect themselves.”155 It is apparent that his political vision 
remained intact despite his illness. As Nkrumah wasted away, the powerful pain- 
killing drug, Fortral, sustained him.156 He was unable to eat and therefore had to be 
fed by a drip. Nkrumah died at 8.45 am on April 27 1972 from prostate cancer at the 
age of sixty-three.
Conclusion
There was a high degree of consistency in Nkrumah’s writings over time. This 
consistency is reflected in his commitment to anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti- 
neo-colonialism, African unity, socialism, freedom and equality of all peoples. It 
seems out of power Nkrumah became even more radical in his political views. His 
writings continued to be grounded in a commitment to the oppressed and to radically
154 Milne, The Conakry Years, p. 410.
155 Ibid, p. 406.
156 Ibid, p.412 - 413. As this drug was unavailable in Romania, Milne managed to get her own doctor to 
prescribe it.
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transforming society in the interests of the marginalized and disenfranchised. The 
distinct development in Nkrumah*s intellectual thought during this period is his total 
abandonment of non-violent means to political power via the constitutional route he 
had followed from 1949-1957. He now championed revolutionary armed struggle. It 
is likely that Nkrumah was particularly influenced by a number of factors: the 
ongoing war in Vietnam, upheavals in Latin America, Angola and Mozambique and 
by Amilcar Cabral in his analysis and understanding of national liberation struggles. 
There is a distinct Fanonesque tone to Nkrumah’s writings in both the Handbook and 
Class Struggle In Africa. He appears to concur with Fanon that violent aimed struggle 
is the only way forward to total liberation and the African “comprador class” together 
with imperialist forces were a parasitic drain on Africa’s wealth and obstacle to 
African unity.
In the final years of his life Nkrumah advocated an African revolution to 
eliminate the dangerous strangleholds of capitalism, neo-colonial control and 
imperialism. He considered “Black Power” an integral part of this struggle for 
freedom and economic and social justice. The African revolution was a vital 
contribution to the movement of oppressed people around the world for greater social 
justice, equality and freedom.
Nkrumah died firm in his conviction “that the African revolutionary struggle 
for total continental liberation and the establishment of an All-African Union 
Government must now enter a phase of planned, unified and centrally-directed armed 
struggle.”157 His loneliness and isolation are apparent in the pages of The Conakry 
Years. Also perceptible is his boundless optimism. However, there is an acute sense 
of Nkrumah being in a political wilderness despite the many letters of encouragement
157 Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana, p. 157.
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he received from individuals around the world. These no doubt buoyed his spirits and 
clouded his judgement.
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CONCLUSION: NKRUMAH IN RETROSPECT
Soon after his overthrow in 1966, West Africa magazine published a hostile 
article on Nkrumah. Yet it was acknowledged that “impotent and foolish though his 
present posturings are, he has had a profound effect on the continent, an effect which 
in some ways may be permanent.”1 Furthermore, the writer claimed, “ 110 independent 
African state has been unaffected by the cause to which [Nkrumah] dedicated Ghana, 
African Unity. So assiduously has he propagated the cause that no African leader 
today dare express indifference to it.”
Indeed, on the continental level, the institutional transformation of the OAU 
into an African Union in July 2002, is one of the enduring legacies of Nkrumah’s 
political thinking 34 years since his death. According to Mazrui, “positive 
Nkrumahism,” bequeathed by Nkrumah provides inspiration and motivation for a 
better future for Africa and African people.3 However, what Mazrui terms “negative 
Nkrumahism,” is also an integral aspect of Nkrumah’s heritage.4 In order to preserve 
national unity which was fundamental to Nkrumah’s vision of society, Nkrumah 
resorted to political repression of the opposition. This is one of the principal 
contradictions in his political practice and political thought. A second tension lies in 
Nkrumah’s alleged commitment to the oneness of African people i.e. Pan-Africanism. 
Yet, in reality, Nkrumah’s government expelled from Ghana several Africans under 
the Deportation and Aliens Acts of 1957 and the 1963 respectively, on the grounds 
that such individuals were considered a threat to public order. The intimidatory use of 
these Acts was in conflict with Nkrumah’s alleged commitment to freedom and 
democracy as well as his Pan-Africanist convictions. As Rathbone points out, “Many
1 West Africa, 19 March 1966.
2 Ibid.
3 A. Mazrui, Nkrumah's Legacy, p. 22.
4 Ibid, p. 22.
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of those who were deported in the three years following independence had not only 
lived in Ghana for many years but in many cases had been born in Ghana,”5
Nkrumah’s impact can be examined 011 three levels: first: the extent to which 
he provided the template for the authoritarian single party state in Africa; second, his 
continuing contribution to the Nkrumah-Danquah/Busia tradition within 
contemporary Ghanaian politics and lastly, Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist ideology which 
has transformed the institution of the OAU in to the African Union (AU). These 
influences will be briefly explored.
The consensus in the literature on the post-colonial African state is that 
Nkrumah’s legacy for African political practice was largely a negative one. As 
Zolberg writes: “When the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, the event was 
greeted in much of the American press as a triumph of ancient Wilsonian ideals. 
Ghana was now the exemplar.”6 However, “even the most sympathetic observers, 
however, soon began to discern political patterns which indicated that liberation from 
foreign rule might not coincide with the birth of democracy.”7 Yet, to what extent is 
it fair to charge Nkrumah with establishing the model of an autocratic state? Was it 
expecting too much of Ghana and Nkrumah to act as an exemplar in unchartered 
political waters? We can now objectively re-assess and answer these questions with 
the benefit of time and a brief comparative analysis of political developments in the 
West African region.
5 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs, p. 104.
6 A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order The Party-States o f  West Africa (Chicago, 1985), pp. 1-2.
7 Ibid, p. 2.
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Nkrumah and the Single Party State in Africa
Ali Mazrui is among those critics who have attributed the emergence of the 
single party phenomenon to Nkrumah. 8 Mazrui argues that Nkrumah reconstructed 
himself into a “Leninist Czar”9 -  merging both the monarchical tendency, which was 
reflected in his use of the title “Osagyefo” and the Leninist vanguard tradition. Mazrui 
contends that three factors led Nkrumah towards the one-party state. Firstly, his 
fundamental belief that Ghana was unsuited for a multi-party system on account of its 
regional and ethnic cleavages. For Nkrumah, the one-party state was the only remedy 
to political tribalism and the problem of integrating the Asante kingdom into Ghana. 
Secondly, Nkrumah believed that African communities were guided by the cultural 
principles of harmony, co-operation, collectivism and consensus. This vision of 
“traditional” Africa was presented in Nkrumah’s book Consciencism. Hence, 
intellectually, for Nkrumah, manipulated consent was desirable rather than dissent and 
disunity.10 Lastly, his adoption of “democratic centralism” in Central Committee and 
Cabinet decision-making was borrowed from Lenin and, in the view of Mazrui, this 
precipitated his descent into authoritarian rule.
The criticism that Nkrumah instituted a one-party state in the face of the 
challenge of building a nation-state is a valid one. Yet, Nkrumah reached the same 
conclusion as his contemporaries Sekou Toure, Houphouet-Boigny, Leopold Senghor, 
Modibo Keita, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta. Whilst the Ivory Coast and Senegal 
purported to be multi-party states, they were de facto one party states in which other 
parlies had no chance of winning state power. In other words they were one-party
8 A. Mazrui, Nkrumah 's Legacy. Other critics are: J. S. Pobee, Kwame Nkrumah and the Church in 
Ghana: 1949-1966\ H. L. Bretton The Rise and Fall o f  Kwame Nkrumah; P. Omari, Kwame Nkrumah: 
The Anatomy o f  An African Dictatorship.
9 Ibid, p. 4.
10 Ibid, p. 5. Mazrui makes the point that both Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, who were 
contemporaries o f  Nkrumah and Robert Mugabe and Yoweri Museveni, also employed this cultural 
argument.
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states by another name. In short, these various African states were all attempting to 
grapple with the same issues as Nkrumah: how does a nation-state prevent descent 
into a religious and ethnic fragmentation of society? Setting aside ideology, 
Houphouet-Boigny (probably the most right wing of African leaders), Jomo Kenyatta 
(who paid lip service to socialist rhetoric but promoted a capitalist orientation of the 
Kenyan economy), and Nkrumah who professed a commitment to scientific socialism 
from 1962 onwards -  all resorted to similar political methods to deal with the societal 
problems of building a united nation. Nigeria and Uganda, which also faced acute 
problems of regional and ethnic divisions, had myriad political parties and groups that 
favoured both a centralised and decentralised political system as a means of welding 
the country together and of creating autonomy for minority groups.
In the context of nation-building in post-independent Africa, there was a rush 
for the spoils of political office and the state by some “big men” (and big women) 
who made promises to their followers, which they failed to fulfil in the challenge of 
building a nation-state via a single party. Instead, politics became a zero sum game in 
which the redistribution of wealth was replaced by a looting of the state’s coffers. 
Models of the allocation of goods, benefits, contracts, licences, salaries, appointments 
and various other spoils in the post-colonial states have been presented in the 
discourse by Bayarl's thesis of the “politics of the belly” by Mbembe’s concept of the 
“post-colony” also by Young’s model of “Buia Matari” and “the integral state,”11 
These models demonstrate the acquisitive and authoritarian nature of the post-colonial 
African state. Characteristics of such a state have been the failure to redistribute 
wealth; the systematic use of compulsion and violence by African rulers to maintain 
power, in a manner not dissimilar from their colonial predecessors; and the emergence
11 Bayart, The State in Africa\ Mbembe, On the Postcolony; C. Young The African Colonial State in 
Comparative Perspective (Yale University Press, 1994).
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of new conflicts between the poor and the powerful. In short, “as to eat has become a 
matter of life and death,” the failure of the African state to provide for its citizens has 
tinned the dominated and the dominant into hustlers for economic and political 
power.12 The consequences of such failed states has been a “disengagement from the 
area of the state” and or “evasion,” if not lip service being paid to the state on the part 
of ordinary Africans.1J
In addressing the question: to what extent did Nkrumah establish the template 
of authoritarian rule in post-independent Africa? Our starting point in addressing such 
a question must be Nkrumah’s own concept of social unity, conflict and cleavage 
which was similar to that of his West African counterparts in the Ivory Coast, 
Senegal, Mali and Guinea and elsewhere, in spite of ideological differences. 14 
Nkrumah believed that the formation of groups based on ethnic affiliation, religion, 
and region were illegitimate bases for the organisation of political groups as they 
threatened the unity of the nation. They were an impediment towards progress, 
modernity and nation building.15 As Zolberg contends, the one party ideology was 
evident in several West African states, including Ghana in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. However, there were distinct nuances in political practice amongst the various 
West African countries.
The first country to make visible its ideological leanings was Guinea.16 It was 
under Sekou Toure who declared “No!” to membership in De Gaulle’s French 
community in 1958. that were the beginnings of radical pronouncements. The new 
government led by President Sekou Toure produced copious programmes, speeches 
and congress papers on the need to eliminate colonialism, which gave rise to the
12 Bayart, The State in A frica  p. 241.
13 Ibid, p. 254 and 257.
14 Zolberg, Creating Political Order, p. 54.
15 Ibid, p. 55.
16 Ibid. p. 44.
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perception that the Parti Democrat!que de Guinea (PDG), had a radical ideological 
outlook. Zolberg argues: “The major themes of the one-party ideology of Guinea were 
rapidly echoed elsewhere with local variations. It is difficult to determine whether 
there were genuine inter-country influences at work or whether the concepts were 
reinvented autonomously in each case because they corresponded to a common 
situation.5’17 Hence, it is the argument of this thesis that whilst Ghana is considered 
the exemplar, other African countries mapped out their own developmentalist path 
that shared strong parallels with the former “model colony.”
Similarly, in July 1959, President Senghor of Senegal, proclaimed at the first 
congress of the Parti de la Federation Africaine (PFA), that a united party was also 
inclusive. He declared “the opposition ... must pursue the same goal as the majority 
party.” Yet, at the same time, he viewed the opposition as being subordinate to 
foreign manipulation and therefore it was the responsibility of the PFA to forestall 
internal subversion. This ambiguity 011 the part of Senghor leads Zolberg to question: 
“How, then, does Senghor5s “unified” party differ from the “single55 party?”18 
Clearly, there is little difference. In the Ivory Coast the Parti Democratique de Cote 
d’Ivoire (PDCI) led by Houphouet Boigny did not “self-consciously discuss ideology” 
though the emphasis 011 a united nation was made as far back as 1946.19 Zolberg 
points out “not only is the absence of opposition [in Ivory Coast] an indication of 
unity, but because unity has been achieved, there is no reason for opposition to 
exist.”20 Whilst a populist character to the dominant political parties existed in 
Guinea, Mali and Ghana, this was absent in Ivory Coast. Also, in the Ivory Coast “the
17 Ibid, p. 4 7 -4 8 .
18 Ibid, p. 51.
19 Ibid, p. 55.
20 Ibid, p. 53.
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state owes its legitimacy to the party, the party owes its own increasingly to the 
leader,” which was similarly the case in Ghana.
In the realm of ideology in West Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, there
were also parallels and differences. Between 1949 and 1959 the CPP’s ideology was
in an embryonic state. This changed when Nkrumah addressed the tenth anniversary
congress of the CP If He proclaimed the indistinguishability of the party and the
people; the party with the nation; and that the CPP was supreme over all other
institutions. Zolberg contends that:
Although the Ghanaians completed the construction of 
their one party ideology later than most other countries, 
they not only caught up with but eventually extended 
the theory two steps beyond their neighbours: they 
transformed the one party concept into a legal rule by 
making of it a constitutional amendment; and 
furthermore, in a display of blunt honesty, they gave it a 
meaningful name, Nkrumahism.21
Zolberg concludes that Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Ivory Coast were all
22concerned with the avoidance of conflict and the establishment of a rational order. 
The one-party ideology even permeated government economic thinking in the notion 
of the “plan.” The idea of the plan was an instrument to ensure control and order over 
the economy. Integral to this thinking was the belief that any arrest or obstruction in 
the implementation of the plan was the result of sabotage, imperialism or neo-colonial 
forces at work seeking to overthrow the government. Consequently several West 
African states during the 1960s, including Ghana, adopted “techniques of 
suppression” to achieve not only unanimity but the dominance of the government over 
the opposition and the state over the entire society.23 Yet, in Ghana the 
implementation of the one-party ideology was a more complex process. However,
21 Ibid, p. 59.
22 Ibid, p. 63.
23 Ibid, p. 77.
o o o
j j Z
“the fact of greater publicity [in Ghana]” meant that “there is much more evidence of 
authoritarianism in Ghana than in any other West African country. But this does not 
necessarily mean that if regimes are compared in toto, Ghana is in fact more 
authoritarian; paradoxically the opposite may well be the case.”24
For Zolberg, what was unique about the single party experiment in Ghana was 
that it was the only country to have written the one-party state into law, “yet most 
others, while preserving freedom to organise parties in their constitutions, have 
multiplied effective legal measures to prevent their appearance.” In short,
particularistic ethnic and political groups opposing the dominant political party were
26similarly made illegal in countries such as Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mali.
Another significant difference remains between Ghana under Nkrumah and 
her West African neighbours in regards to the use of capital punishment as an 
instrument of maintaining one party rule and eliminating the opposition. Nkrumah’s 
government began as early as 1957 to deport what it perceived as non-Ghanaian 
citizens from the country, many of whom were charged as being a threat to the 
security of the state. It is difficult to compare the deportation records for the late 
1950s and 1960s of a number of West African countries, on account of the fact that 
many did not publish them. However, “much more is known about Ghana in this 
because in spite of all, Ghana has retained a greater sense of the rule of law,” contends 
Zolberg.27 During the 1960s both Houphouet-Boigny’s and Nkrumah’s government 
arrested large numbers of political dissidents. Such arrests, were not made public in 
Ivory Coast. “If coercion can be evaluated in terms of the total number of death
24 Ibid, p. 79.
25 Ibid, p. 82.
26 Other African governments such as that of Milton Obote in Uganda, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and 
Julius Nyerere in Tanzania also resorted to legal mechanisms to prevent the emergence of competing 
political parties.
27 Zolberg, Creating Political Ordet\ p. 82.
sentences imposed by a government 011 its opponents, the Ivory Coast is probably the 
harshest country in Africa.”28 In comparison, no state executions for political 
activities took place under Nkrumah’s government. It is known that Houphouet- 
Boigny and Nkrumah took a bet in the late 1950 as to which country would be the 
economic star of West Africa in a decade or two. In regards to political executions, it 
is apparent that Houphouet-Boigny won on this political front, for in May 1963 he 
sentenced 13 young members of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) to 
death.29
The 1960s was a decade of “developmentalist authoritarianism”30 whereby 
countries such as Ghana under Nkrumah attempted to modernise the inherited 
colonial state and failed. The colonial state of the 1950s was “the era of the activist 
state” which intervened in the affairs of colonial subjects in order to attempt to control 
for example their labour and health via technical expertise.31 “The 1960s African 
state sought to take over the interventionist aspect of the colonial state, and indeed to 
intensify it, in the name of the national interest and (for a time) to demonstrate to 
voters that the state was improving their lives,” maintains Cooper.32 It seems that 
Nkrumah’s own brand of “developmentalism authoritarianism” had the added imprint 
of Soviet central planning, which he adopted from 1962 onwards.33 This impacted on 
the restructuring of 1 lie Ghanaian economy with negative results. Nevertheless, Ghana
28 Ibid, p. 86. In April 1663 eighty-six alleged conspirators were arrested and tried before the 
Secretary-General of the PDCI who was the prosecutor, and other party officials serving on the bench. 
O f the total, 22 were acquitted; some were sentenced to long-term imprisonment and 13 received the 
death penalty.
29 See ‘Elite Ideologies the Politics of the Media A Critical History o f Ivorien Ideologies & their 
Press from the Brazzaville Conference to the December 24th 1999 Military Coup5 by M. J. Ahipeaud 
(PhD, University of London, 2003), p. 155. According to H. M. Basner, the only state execution that 
took place during Mkrumuh's period in power was the execution of the policeman who shot Nkrumah 
in 1964 and killed his security guard; see Bas/2/91.
30 Cooper, Africa Since I {H0, p. 89.
31 Ibid, p. 88.
32 Ibid, p. 88.
33 Ibid, p. 88.
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was not alone in such political and economic experimentation. In the political sphere 
as Cooper observes: "Closing down of political space was truly in essentially all of 
the new African stales, but the degree of closure varied greatly, from dictatorships to 
guided democracy." ' 1
African Unity post-Nkrumah
Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist vision has also survived into the twenty-first
century and shaped lire thinking of a new generation of what Ali Mazrui refers to as
“Africans of the soil” (i.e. those Africans born on the African continent) and
“Africans of the blood” (those of African descent).35 As one of Nkrumah’s greatest
critics, Mazrui acknowledges:
Nkrumah’s greatest bequest to Africa was the agenda of 
continental unification. No one else has made the case 
for continental integration more forcefully, or with 
greater sense of drama than Nkrumah. Although most 
African leaders regard the whole idea of a United States 
of Africa as wholly unattainable in the foreseeable 
future. Nkrumah even after death has kept the debate 
alive through his books and through the continuing 
influence of his ideas.36
As Nkrumah was one of the founding fathers of the OAU, it appears that the 
most visible impact of his ideas on African unity, has been the institutional 
transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in July 2002. After 
Nkrumah’s death the 6th and 7th Pan-African Congress (PAC) took place in 1974 and 
1994 respectively. 7 These gatherings were a continuation of the tradition of
34 Ibid, p. 88.
35 A. Mazrui, ‘Nkrumahi mu & the Triple Heritage: Out o f the Shadows’ in F. Falola (ed) Ghana in 
Africa & the World: Essays in Honor of Adii Boahen (Trenton, 2003), p.769.
36 Mazrui, Nkrumah's Legacy, p. 3.
37 For literature on these two congresses, see T. Abdul-Raheem, Pan-Africanism: Politics, Economy 
and Social Change in the Twenty First Century (London, 1996); B. Sutherland & M. Meyer, Guns & 
Gandhi in Africa Pan-African Insights on Non-Violence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa
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previous congresses that brought Pan-Africanists from the African continent and the 
Diaspora together. Ai the 7th PAC there was a range of conflicting ideological and 
viewpoints expressed. In the final resolution statement congress participants 
unanimously agreed to resist what was perceived as the recolonisation of Africa by 
global capitalism .Such a unanimous statement was considered against the prevalent 
IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes adopted by many African 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s as a means of economic survival. Many post­
colonial states had become burdened with debt, civil wars, a continued brain drain, 
and the crisis of African refugees. It was in this context that the neo-liberal agenda of 
the Bretton Woods institutions was attacked. The tone, themes and condemnation of 
re-colonisation of Africa echoed the emphases, thinking and positions expressed by 
Nkrumah in his infamous book Ne o - Co Ion i a I ism: The Last Stage o f Imperialism.
Three years after the 7th PAC, in 1997 President Nyerere made an important 
speech in Accra to mark the 40lh anniversary of Ghana's independence. Nyerere 
confessed that:
Kwame Nkrumah was the state crusader for African 
unity. He wanted the Accra summit of 1965 to establish 
Union Government for the whole of independent Africa.
But we failed. The one minor reason is that Kwame, 
like all great believers, underestimated the degree of 
suspicion and animosity, which his crusading passion 
had created among a substantial number of his fellow 
Heads of State. The major reason was linked to the first: 
already too many of us had a vested interest in keeping 
Africa divided.39
Nyerere was quite clear that in 1965 the idea of working out Union 
Government for Africa “was an unrealistic objective for a single summit.” More
(New Jersey, 2000), pp.2 i 6-223; Resolutions & Selected Speeches: The Sixth Pan-African Congress 
(Dar es Salaam, 1976)
38 Abdul-Raheem, Pan-Africanism: Politics, p. 14.
39 Africa at 40. Vol. 1.No.3 April 1997, p. 4.
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importantly, the faiiure lay in the lost opportunity to “discuss a mechanism for 
pursuing the objective of a politically united Africa” via establishing a “Unity 
Committee or undertaking to establish one. We did not. And after Kwame Nkrumah 
was removed from the African political scene nobody took up the challenge again.”40 
In a forthright admission, the Tanzanian leader concluded: “We of the first generation 
leaders of independent Africa have not pursued the objective of African Unity with 
vigour, commitment and sincerity that it deserves. Yet that does not mean that unity is 
now irrelevant."41
Two years al ter Nyerere’s speech, at the OAU summit in Algeria in M y 1999, 
Nkrumah’s dream of continental union government for Africa became relevant to a 
number of African leaders who sought to transform the OAU into the African Union 
(AU). The prime movers for the reform of the OAU into the AU were President 
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Libyan leader, 
Colonel Gaddafi, later presented different motives for overhauling the continental 
body. However, prior to 1999, there had been a longstanding consensus that the OAU 
had severe shortcomings 42 Nkrumah had lambasted the organisation in 1968.43 In the 
thirty years after his death, lack of strong constitutional structures, the adherence to 
the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of member states, the inability 
to deal effectively with regional conflicts and the characterisation of the OAU as a 
“dictators club” contributed to the weaknesses of this continental body.44
According to one academic interpretation, the foreign policy interests of 
Mbeki, Obasanjo and Gaddafi initiated the rapid transformation of the OAU into the
40 Ibid, p. 4.
41 Ibid, p. 4.
42 Abdul-Raheem, Pan-Africanism, pp. 229-237.
43 Nkrumah, Handbook, p. 36.
441. Tieku, ‘Explaining the Clash & Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the 
African Union,’ African Affairs 103 (2004), p. 252.
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AU between 1999 to dOOl.4^  For the South African government “the very idea of the 
AU is at the core o f  ihe attempts of South Africa’s ruling ANC to improve the image 
of Africa in order to attract foreign investment and make the new South Africa an 
important global trading nation.”46 Hence South Africa’s motives were to some 
extent economically driven.
In addition to South Africa’s foreign policy goals, Mbeki was also motivated 
to promote the new democratic climate appearing on the continent as well as to 
transform the image of the OAU. His desire to do so was reinforced by President 
Obasanjo’s own regional interests. Obasanjo urged the 1999 summit to reorient the 
organisation towards the issues of security, stability, development and co-operation on 
a continental l evel .4' There was growing domestic disquiet over Nigeria’s 
peacekeeping involvement in ECOMOG in neighbouring Sierra Leone and Liberia at 
which there were claims that Nigeria was spending one million US dollars a day on 
the upkeep of Nigerian forces. The question for Obasanjo’s government was: how to 
alleviate the financial and logistical burdens of regional peacekeeping on Nigeria on a 
long term basis whilst promoting the country’s vanguard role in West Africa and at a 
continental level? The answer to this question lay in sharing the costs of future 
African peacekeeping missions with other relatively prosperous African countries via 
the OAU.
At the extraordinary summit meeting held in Libya in September 1999 the 
members discussed methods of increasing the effectiveness of the OAU. Both Mbeki 
and Obasanjo accepied the invitation to attend the meeting as they considered it an 
opportunity to a d v a n c e  their foreign policy objectives. However, Gaddafi’s motives 
for hosting the summit soon became apparent. As Tieku argues: “It came as a surprise
45 Ibid, pp.249-267.
46 Ibid, p. 253.
47Ibid, p. 258.
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to the 33 African leaders attending the Sirte summit when Gaddafi opened the summit 
with a presentation of the ‘United States of Africa’ plan. Equally shocking was his 
insistence that the plan, which entailed the creation of a continental presidency with a 
five-year term of office, a single military force, a common African currency, be 
approved “then and (here.”48 Thus, there were now three rival policy interests to 
consider: those of Nigeria, South Africa and Libya. A compromise was reached by 
the thirty-three African leaders to overhaul the OAU completely. A constitutive legal 
document outlining a new continental body for Africa was prepared by the Council of 
Ministers who submitted it to the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the OAU in Lome in 
2000. Fundamentally, it appears that of all the African leaders, Gaddafi, has taken up 
the Pan-African mantle of Nkrumah.
The motives of the Libyan leader for convening the extraordinary summit are 
perceived to be tied not only to political vanity in seeking to take “the credit for the 
relaunch of continental integration initiative in Africa” but his revived interest in 
Africa is also linked to wider strategic and geo-political considerations linked to 
sanctions, and a consistent policy of guarding his personal political survival.49
In short, it was Gaddafi who resurrected the ideals and vision of Nkrumah in 
his call for a “United States of Africa” at Sirte. However, the declaration made by the 
heads of state favoured South Africa’s and Nigeria’s position of a continental body 
pushing for economic integration and greater democracy, without calling for a ‘United 
States of Africa/ Reminiscent of Nkrumah’s calls for continental union government 
at the OAU summits of 1964 and 1965, many at this juncture, as in Sirte, considered 
Gaddafi’s proposal as too radical and over ambitious. 50 The constitutive text of June 
2002, which was approved at the Lome summit, signalled that the African heads of
48 Ibid, p. 261.
49 Ibid. p. 261.
50 Tieku, ‘Explaining the Clash,’ p. 262.
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state desired a replacement o f  the OAU by the AU. None of Gaddafi’s ideas were 
contained in the document. Nevertheless, the decision to replace the OAU was a 
historic one that eventually led to the inauguration of the AU in Durban on July 9 
2002.
At Durban, the Libyan leader was unrelenting and he attended aimed with a 
number of proposed amendments to the Constitutive Act (CA) including a single 
army for Africa, an AU chairman and greater powers of intervention in member 
states. Amara Essy was appointed interim Chairman of the AU Commission and in his 
address he said: “When we mention Kwame Nkrumah, we have summed up in one 
name the appeal of all our heroes and precursors who, from the embryonic stage of 
Pan-Africanism to the doors of our present situation, have embodied our thirst for 
justice and dignity." 1 Hence, an integral motivating factor in the creation of the AU 
was as Essy alluded to, the historical Pan-Africanist quest for justice, dignity and 
greater equality in the world.
In order to create an environment of peace, it seems the leaders of the AU 
have approved Nkrumah's brainchild in the initiative of an “African Standby Force.” 
This plan bears striking resemblance to Nkrumah’s call during the 1960 Congo crisis 
for an African High Command, which was rejected then and subsequently. Since 
Nkrumah’s death, the idea of a regional versus continental armed force, whose 
objective would be to enforce peace in various war-torn regions was revived in the 
early 1970s by the ( >AU after the November 1970 Portuguese-led attempted invasion 
of Guinea. It was re\ ived by Nigeria in 1972 at the OAU Ministerial Council meeting 
and again in 1977 and 1978.^2 In subsequent decades the proposal has undergone 
various permutations as civil wars raged in several African countries. As the AU is
51 P. Commey ‘African I n ion What Next?’ New African September 1992, pp.12-15.
52 T. A. Imobighc, 'African High Command: The Search for a Feasible Strategy o f Continental 
Defence’ African Affairs • 1980), No.315. 79, pp.241-254.
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still in its infancy, the proposal for an African Standby Force has been scheduled to be 
set up in a phased manner by 2010.
At the Fifth Summit of the AU held in Libya in July 2005, Gaddafi once again 
resurrected the ghost of Nkrumah. He called for a mechanism of defence to oversee 
the defence and security of the continent that was realistic as opposed to being a paper 
exercise. He proposed there be a Minister of Defence to implement the AU’s joint 
security and defence charter as stated in Article 3 of the AU’s Constitutive Assembly. 
Gaddafi called for allocating responsibility and accountability for decisions made. He 
warned against laudable objectives that remained unfulfilled on account of “no 
official who assumes the job of implementing these polices at the Union level” and at 
the national level.''1 lie criticised die OAU for achieving little during its forty-year 
life span and cited Nkrumah’s address at the founding of the OAU in 1963. Gaddafi 
said that in 1963 Nkrumah had predicted that artificial borders would create conflicts 
and that ordinary Africans desired an improvement in their daily standards of living. 
He remarked that Nkrumah’s words “were brushed aside and Africa paid the price. 
The average African has paid the price in the form of subjugation to disease, 
exploitation, backwardness and blackmail.”54 Gaddafi criticized those who considered 
the idea of a “United States of Africa” as too premature. He claimed: “We have been 
moving gradually for 100 years.”35 To his fellow heads of states, he proclaimed: “Had 
we heeded [Nkrumalfrs] advice at that time, Africa would now be like the United 
States of America or at least close to it. But we did not heed his advice, and even
53 See abridged version of Gaddafi’s address to the AU summit, 4-6 July 2005 in New African 
August/September 2005. pp. 30-33.
54 Ibid. p. 32.
55 Ibid. p. 33.
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worse we ridiculed those predictions.’06 It seems Gaddafi has invoked the spirit, 
ideals and convictions of Nkrumah.
It is far too early to assess the effectiveness of the AU. Nevertheless, the 
radical transformation of the OAU into the AU appears to have re-ignited Nkrumah’s 
vision of a long-term transformation of the inter-African system into a confederated 
supranational unit able to reposition itself within an unfolding world context.
The Nkrumah Factor in Ghanaian Politics
Since Nkrumah’s death there has arisen in Ghana a plethora of political parties 
and movements identifying themselves as “Nkrumahist” alongside a growing 
rehabilitation of NT mm ah’s stature. It seems Nkrumah continued to shadow 
subsequent regimes in Ghana, particularly that of General Acheampong and Flight 
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings.57 Immediately after his death the CPP was officially 
banned but this did not prevent CPP activists and politicians from regrouping and 
operating under different political labels. From 1969 to 1972 the Progress Party led 
by Dr Busia. Nkrumah’s old opponent ruled the country, yet, Busia’s efforts did not 
completely destroy the pro-Nkrumah elements in Ghanaian society. Busia’s civilian 
government was soon deposed by the military led by General Acheampong in 1972. It 
was the Acheampong National Redemption Council (NRC) government which 
permitted Nkrumah to be laid to rest in Ghana after a bitter political quarrel with 
President Sekou Tom e. Tome demanded that Nkrumah be posthumously proclaimed
56 Ibid, p. 32.
57 General Acheampong carried out a coup in 1972 against the civilian government (1969-1972) o f Dr. 
Busia and ruled Ghana until 1978 when he was forced to hand power to General K. A. Akuffo. Flight 
Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings also toppled the civilian government o f  Dr. Limann (1979-1981) in 
December 1981 and ruled until 1996. Both leaders had to deal with the re-interment o f  Nkrumah during 
their incumbency.
58 Y. Twumasi ‘The 196•' Flection’ in D. Austin & R. Luckham (eds) Politicians and Soldiers in 
Ghana (London, 1975). pp. 140-161.
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head of state of Ghana and that all CPP officials be released from detention.59 The
reaction to Nkrumah's death from Ghanaians, African countries, Africans in the
Diaspora and the Western press was unsurprisingly polarised. The NRC military
government, hardly pro-Nkrumah, was forced to act in retrieving the body in order to
conform to Akun burial customs. A national day of mourning was declared on May 19
1972 and a public holiday for the funeral was announced. According to West Africa:
The lirst reactions of the [Ghanaian] public were quiet, 
but it was the quiet of stunned shock, although there
have been spontaneous student parades and countless
wake-keepings. The military government has been 
feeling its way and in some cases almost taking its cue 
from popular sentiment. Most Ghanaians considered the 
return of Nkrumah5 s body for burial to be of paramount 
importance, in accordance with Akan beliefs. 0
On balance, the Acheampong regime considered it was necessary to return 
Nkrumah to Ghana in order to appease popular demands and lay the ghost of 
Nkrumah to rest. As one of Ghana’s leading journalists wrote: “To prevent 
Nkrmnah’s funeral from becoming a political rallying point, the Government rushed 
to bury him. With Nkrumah dead, the new regime felt safe but they didn’t anticipate 
the public pressure to rehabilitate their former leader’s image. Acheampong 
acquiesced and named a 15 mile long road and a conference centre in Accra after 
him.”61
As Nkrumah had died in Romania, this had induced guilt on the part of some 
Ghanaians who felt he should have at least been allowed to have died in his country.
It was reported that while there was disappointment at the two-week delay in
59 C, Legum, ‘The Death o f Kwame Nkrumah’ in Africa Contemporary Record  Annual Survey and 
Documents, (London, 1D72-] 973), A39-A46. The conflict was resolved when General Gowon used 
diplomacy to persuade President Toure to return the body to Ghana; see West Africa, 12 May 1972.
60 West Africa, 12 May 1972.
61 K. Blay-Amihere, ‘T h e  Man Who Never D ies,’ African Concord, 9 October 1986.
62 Ibid.
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returning the body to Ghana, “other Ghanaians admit that President Sekou Tome was 
right to react in the way he has done as he had been the only one to stand by Dr. 
Nkrumah when everyone else was against him.”63 Another reporter conveyed that 
“Nkrumah’s death evoked mixed feelings of grief, remorse, or indifference, 
depending on whether one’s sentiments had lain with or against the ex-President.”64 
The reaction to NkrumalTs death in Ghana was mixed; those in support of Nkrumah 
grieved, whilst those opposed to him still demonstrated their respects in line with 
Akan tradition.
Others throughout Africa also mourned the loss of Nkrumah. Two hundred 
students from the University of Sierra Leone marched through Freetown carrying a 
coffin draped in black.63 In Zambia, the Daily Mail carried a story entitled “Goodbye 
Mr Africa.”66 The response from African heads of state, however, was “surprisingly 
low keyed” compared to the general adulation and open expressions of grief 
expressed by the Ghanaian and African public.67 According to an American journalist: 
“If most African leaders reacted in a decidedly restrained fashion to Nkrumah’s 
demise, it is because to many of them he was not so much a statesman as a 
demagogue who behoved only in his own brand of pan-Africanism and who sought to 
foment trouble in the lands of those who differed with him or dared to oppose him.” 
There were however some glowing obituaries in Ghanaian newspapers as well as in 
the African press throughout the continent and in the African Diaspora. The
63 Ibid.
64 See ‘The Death o f K\\ ame Nkrumah’ in West Africa Series Vol. XIX, No. 4, June 1972, in the Dabu 
Gizenga Collection, Box 128-2, Folder 28; Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, 
Howard University.
65 West Africa, 12 May 1972.
66 Dabu Gizenga Collection, Box 128-2, Folder 28; Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn Research 
Center, Howard University.
67 See ‘The Death o f Kvam e Nkrumah’ by V. Du Bois in West Africa Series Vol. XIX, No. 4, June 
1972, in the Dabu Gizenga Collection, Box 128-2, Folder 28; Manuscript Division, Moorland-Spingarn 
Research Center, 1 lovvard University.
68 Ibid.
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Spokesman, edited by Kofi Badu, a former leading Nkrumahist published a front-page 
tribute to Nkrumah. The state-owned Daily Graphic was more sober in its reappraisal 
of Nkrumah and focused on Nkrumah’s achievements in awakening the political 
consciousness of Ghanaians whilst castigating the repressive legislation he introduced 
to eliminate his political enemies.
In the Ugandan Daily Nation, May 3 1972, a letter by Dr. R. St. Barbe Baker, 
Director of the Sahara Reclamation Programme, wrote that the death of Nkrumah was 
“a grievous loss to Africa.”69 In an earlier edition of the Daily Nation, a front-page 
headline declared: "Nkrumah A Redeemer Who Fell From Grace.”70 This extensive 
article argued, “Nkrumah’s suppression of opposition viewpoints was a bitter 
disappointment to his friends in the West who had once regarded him as Black 
Africa’s brightest hope.”
The West A frican Pilot, the newspaper set up by the Nigerian leader, Nnamdi 
Azikiwe stated in its editorial: “We of this newspaper join fighting Africa and the 
progressive world in mourning the death of one of the big figures of the African 
continent.”71 Another Nigerian newspaper was not as flattering. Whilst the editorial 
of the New Nigerian accepted that “Kwame Nkrumah will be remembered as the most 
internationally known African leader of modern times” it recognised that “relations 
with other African governments, especially neighbours, were frequently strained: 
Nkrumah could be i inpatient with dilettantes and although a man of vision he ignored 
the imperatives of practical politics.”72 Yet, in the same edition Sidi H. Ali wrote an 
adulatory article entitled “Osagyefo -  The Top Redeemer.” The Daily News o f 
Tanzania published a poem on May 20 1972 by Joseph H. B. Bagira in which
69 Nkrumah supported llie Sahara Reclamation Programme for he believed that the Sahara was bridge 
linking Arabs o f North Africa to sub-Sahara Africa.
70 Daily Nation April 28 1972.
71 West African Pilot, April 29 1972.
72 New Nigerian, April 29 1972.
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Nkrumah was referred to as “the evangelist of continental government, the voice of 
African unity.'’
The reaction of the Western press was predictable. Legum noted that: “The 
Western press mostly adopted a tone strongly in discord with what was said and felt 
by Africa. The obituary in the Times, London, was headlined ‘Ghanaian leader who 
became a detested dictator.’73 This led to a caustic rejoinder from Thomas Hodgkin, 
which was printed in the Times on May 10 1972. Hodgkin wrote that “ [Nkrumah] 
wanted to develop Ghana as an effective modem state, but at the same time he wished 
to make it the base of the Pan-African political union in which he passionately 
believed.”
Meanwhile, between 1974 and 1979, a number of mass social movements had 
emerged in the country. Among them were a new generation of Nkrumahists who 
were to be found in the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS) such as Explo 
Nani Kofi. Kwesi Adu (secretary from 1976-1977) and Nicholas Atampugre 
(Coordinating Secretary from 1979-81). Other political groups included the Pan- 
African Youth Movement (PANYMO), the African Youth Command (AYC) the 
Socialist Revolutionary Youth League of Ghana, the University Teachers Association 
and other organisations lent their support to the NRC.
Acheampong’s ambiguities towards Nkrumah enabled him to skilfully 
manipulate the appeal of Nkrumah to mobilise popular support for his own political 
self-interest. His pro-Nkrumah sentiments extended to an invitation to Madam Fathia 
and her children to return to Ghana.74 The AYC, PANYMO, NUGS, all of which 
courted the regime, saw Acheampong’s defiance towards devaluation of the cedi as
73 C. Legum, ‘The Death ol'Kwame 'Nkrumah’ in Africa Contemporary Record, p. A43. The Times 
article was printed on 2K April 1972.
74 Madam Fathia informed the author that General Acheampong was “very good to me.” She returned 
to Ghana in 1972 with her three children, 14-16 February 2004, Cairo.
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vaguely anti-imperialist. The regime won further support from workers when 
Acheampong restored union rights to workers and lifted the ban on the TUC, an 
organisation that had strong Nkrumahist elements within its membership. Various 
civil society groups began to demand a handover to civilian government. 
Acheampong's answer was UniGov -  a power sharing arrangement comprising the 
army, police, and selected civilians in the country. Those on the left, however, soon 
became critical of the Acheampong regime. A disenchanted population was opposed 
to UniGov, and particularly the government’s attempt to rig the referendum on the 
new power-sharing arrangement.75 Protests by the NUGS in May 1977 escalated 
alongside important political developments within the army itself. Acheampong’s 
military government could best be described as “a boy-scoutish CPP in army 
uniforms”76 yet gave hope to Nkrumahist forces in the country.
In the 1980s, Pan-Africanist interest began to re-assess Nkrumah’s role in 
Ghana and on the broader African stage. For example, in October 1980 African 
Concord produced an edition that was devoted to exploring Nkrumah’s impact and 
ideas.77 In addition to this revival of interest in Nkrumah, in 1986 the radical 
Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega visited Ghana. It was reported “there was confusion 
over where Nkrumah’s portrait in the Kwame Nkrumah Conference Centre should be 
placed, above or below that of Rawlings and Ortega. A member of the audience 
solved the problem by placing Nkrumah on top, he was loudly cheered for his bold 
action.”78 Such a small but politically symbolic action on the part of this member of 
the audience and the reaction to it reflected the extent of growing popular support for
75 R. Jeffries, ‘Ghana: the Political Economy o f  Personal Rule’ in D. Cruise O’Brien et al, 
Contemporary West African States (Cambridge, 1989), pp.81-82.
76 R. Rathbone cited in R. Jeffries, ‘Ghana: the Political Economy o f Personal Rule’ in D. O’Brien and 
R. Rathbone (eds) Contemporary West African States (London, 1989), p. 77.
77 See African Concord. 9 O ctober 1980.
78 K. Blay-Amihere, ’The Man Who Never D ies’. African Concord, 9 October 1986.
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Nkrumah. U way support that Rawlings also sought to tap into when he publicly 
endorsed what was to become the second re-interment of Nkrumah six years later.
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Rawlings granted 
commissioning of the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park in Accra on July 1 1992. A 
seven-metre statute of Nkrumah was erected in front of a marble tree mausoleum in 
the middle of the site of the old polo ground where Nkrumah made the historic 
proclamation of Ghana's independence.79 The idea for the re-interment came from 
various Nkrumahist groups in the country who on account of the 1982 ban on political 
parties enforced by the Rawlings government were forced to function as social and 
literary clubs and societies. The group closest to the government was the Kwame 
Nkrumah Welfare Society (KMWS), formed around 1986 ostensibly as a social club 
to provide welfare for proscribed CPP and the People’s National Party (PNP).80 The 
latter was led by hnoru Egala and was set up in the mid 1980s. According to Kofi 
Batsa it "aimed to continue the good things of Kwame Nkrumah.”81 The then 74- 
year-old Kojo Boisio and the former leader of the TUC under Nkrumah, John 
Tettegah, led the KNWS. Its hidden political agenda was to revive the CPP. Botsio 
was known to have close relations with Kojo Tsilcata, Rawlings’s head of Military 
Intelligence. Tsikata had been a soldier during Nkrumah’s period in power and had 
pro-Nkrumah sympathies and appeared to be the critical link in persuading Rawlings 
to accept demands lor the re-interment.82 Apart from the KNWS there was also the 
Kwame Nkrumah Youngsters Club, which was led by Roland Atta-Kesson, a lawyer 
and former parliamentarian in the Second Republic. He was appointed by the PNDC
79 Ghanaian Times, 2 July 1992 and P eople’s Daily Graphic, 2 July 1992.
80 Africa Confidential, 13 S eptem ber 1991, Vol. 32. no. 18.
81 Batsa, The Spark, p. 30.
82K. P. S. Juaniuah confirmed that there were pressures from Nkrumahist groups and Pan-Africanists to 
accord N krum ah  recognition lor his contribution to Ghana’s independence and role in African affairs 
via a public re- in termenu interviewed on 23 December 2004, Accra.
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as an Assembly member and therefore there were widespread suspicions that the 
government funded the club.
Another group was Our Heritage, which was a conglomeration of individuals 
from the KNWS youth section who attacked the elders in the Welfare Society for 
being stooges of the PNDC. Its leadership included Alhaji Farl, a former MP; Johnny 
Hansen and John Nedugire both ex-PNDC members; K. P. S. Juantuali, a first 
Republic cabinet minister, Dr. Ililla Limann and Francis Nkrumah, son of the late 
Kwame Nkrumah. Alongside these groups were smaller ones such as the AYC, the 
KNRG and the New Democratic Movement. The various Nkrumahist groups in the 
country exerted pressure 011 Tsikata to force Rawlings to concede to the building of 
the mausoleum. They began to distrust Tsikata and consequently he was forced to 
prove he was Nkrumahist. Tsikata delivered and managed to convince Rawlings of
S3the importance of the monument.1
Nkrumah's remains were re-interred on the occasion of the 32nd Republic on 
July 1 1992 in the presence of distinguished visitors such as Oliver Tambo, then 
Chairman of the African National Congress (ANC), President SamNujoma of newly 
independent Namibia. Betty Shabazz, widow of the slain African American leader, 
Malcolm X, Dr. David Dubois, the son of the late Dr. W.E.B Dubois, and many other 
diplomats. The occasion was not open to the Ghanaian public. However, the measure 
of public interest in Nkrumah was reflected in the fact that the People’s Daily 
Graphic reported on July 2 1992 that the security forces were kept very busy for “as 
early as 7am many ordinary Ghanaians from all walks of life began assembling at the 
rejuvenated polo grounds.” A West Africa correspondent remarked: “One thing the re­
interment ceremom demonstrates was the deep emotions that Nkrumah continues to
83 Kwesi Scheck was a (CPP activist who was active in the CPP Overseas from 1966-1972; interview 
with author, 18 August 2005, London.
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evoke in Africans and people of African descent and the continuing relevance of his 
visions for many even today.”84
The People 's Daily Graphic reported that Rawlings “paid glowing tribute to 
the late President saying that he struggled for peace in the world and was one of the 
initiators of the non-aligned movement.” Furthermore, Rawlings claimed that he 
might be one of die people most critical about certain aspects of Nkrumah’s 
government but "1 will never deny him or any man the praise for outstanding 
achievements, and for Dr Nkrumah in particular, the things that make him a great 
figure in history.”'0 Undoubtedly, Nkrumah’s place in Ghana’s history remains 
assured.
However, the political fortunes of the Nkrumahist parties have steadily 
worsened in the subsequent elections of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004.86 After a 13- 
year absence of electoral politics -  the last being in 1979 -  the CPP failed miserably 
in the elections of 1992. Jeffries, Thomas and Oquaye have analysed the electoral 
failure of the Nkrumahist parties in the 1992 elections. Foremost among the 
shortcomings arc the disunity and weak organisation of the Nkumahist fold together 
with the egotism and complacency of the veteran CPP politicians. These factors 
enabled Rawlings io transform the PNDC into the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) to capture potential Nkrumahist votes.87 In addition was “the NDC’s adoption
84 West Africa, 20-26 July 1992.
85 P eop les’ Daily Graphic, 2 July 1992.
86 For a discussion on the factors that led the PNDC to embark on a program o f  transition to multi-party 
politics, see K. Panford. ‘Elections & Democratic Transition in Ghana: 1991-1996’ in J. Gros, (ed), 
Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping With Uncertainty (USA, 1998), pp.l 13- 
127; see R. Jeffries & C  Thomas ‘The Ghanaian Elections o f 1992’ African Affairs, 92 (1993), 
pp.334- 335; Oquaye. ' I he Ghanaian Elections o f 1992 -  A Dissenting V iew ’, p.269.
87 R. Jeffries & C. Thomas 1 The Ghanaian Elections o f  1992’, African Affairs, 92 (1993), pp. 343-345, 
pp.357-358.
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of Nkrumahist chants and slogans at its rallies, together with Rawlings cultivation of
• 88 an image of (not altogether sincere, it must be said) reverence for Nkrumah.”
However, it is erroneous to measure Nkrumah’s impact purely by the fortunes 
of political parlies calling themselves Nkrumahist. The inability of the CPP and its 
myriad offshoois to define themselves in terms of programme, vision and principles, 
which are meaningful and relevant to the Ghanaian electorate, is a major factor 
attributable to the party’s continued poor electoral performance. Simply by chanting 
Nkrumahist slogans and reminiscing the “golden age” of Nkrumahism is insufficient 
to win over a new generation of Ghanaians who have attained voting age but critically 
have no memory of Nkrumah.
Nonetheless. Nkrumah continues to remain a potent national metaphor in 
Ghanaian politics today. He serves as a powerful symbol that many lay claim to for 
their own political and cultural purposes of mobilisation even as a talisman to win 
national elections. 1 le is part of the historical collective memory that right and left can 
draw upon to gain political kudos and appeal. For example, some politicians and 
activists have drawn upon Nkrumah’s pragmatism; some have emphasized that 
Nkrumah favoured a mixed economy; some have sought to revive the mass and 
national nature of the political party he created that sought to transcend ethnic 
divisions; others have emphasized his socialist orientation of society; whilst some 
have adopted Nkrumah’s political style of leadership. Both Rawlings and Nkrumah 
shared a similarity of spontaneity, style, charisma, an ability to empathise with the 
common man and political skill that enabled them to wield a system of personal 
domination.89 Like most African leaders who have sought to show a commitment to 
African unity. Rawlings also supported the idea of a cultural celebration of African
88 Ibid, p. 358.
89 Jeffries & Thomas. '1 he Ghanaian Elections,’ p.358.
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identity and his government supported the hosting of Panafest in Accra. This biennial 
Pan-African celebration has been institutionalised under the auspices of the Ghana 
government and the African Union. Its thrust is to provide a forum of debate, 
exchange and unit) between Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora. It brings 
together a host of diverse business concerns, tourists, political activists, artists and 
musicians within a Pan-African forum.
Nkrumah’s Continuing Relevance
Kofi Had j or maintains that: “It is Nkrumah the theoretician and practitioner of 
Pan-Africanism who continues to provide interest and respect.”90 Indeed, Nkrumah’s 
enduring contribution has been in relation to his intellectual conception of Africa as a 
product of three cultural influences: traditional Africa, Islamic and Western from 
which he coined the term “Consciencism” or the “philosophy of the African 
revolution.” This paradigm was to influence Ali Mazrui who later coined the term 
“triple heritage" in his 1986 film series ‘The Africans: A Triple Heritage.’ Mazrui, 
one of Africa's leading intellectuals has frequently sought to examine the cultural 
impact of the synthesis of Christianity, Islam and Westernisation on contemporary 
African societies in culture, politics, sociology and history. The other important 
intellectual influence of Nkrumah indisputably remains in respect to his concept and 
vision of Pan-African unity and identity within the intellectual tradition bequeathed 
by Africans and notable individuals of African descent such as Africanus Horton, 
Edward Blyden. Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. DuBois, Paul Cuffee, Alexander 
Crummell, James Kwegyir Aggrey. Nkrumah is unquestionably among the architects 
of Pan-Africanist thought within this intellectual canon.
90 K. Hadjor, African Concord, 9 October 1986.
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By examining the trajectory of Nkrumah’s life, the political, social and 
cultural views he held can be delineated. Nkrumah remained staunchly committed to 
anti-colonial and anti-imperialist principles. He was implacably opposed to racial and 
social injustice. I le advocated freedom and equality of all peoples regardless of tribe, 
colour or class. .African unity was not simply a mantra but a goal that he considered 
imperative and realisable. It had to translate into economic, social, cultural political 
development in the lives of African people. Yet, it was in implementing his vision that 
Nkrumah had limited success.
In examining Nkrumah’s life, one detects an impatient man fundamentally 
driven by his ideals, convictions and ambitions for Africa. He was a man with huge 
self-confidence and self-belief in his mission to develop Ghana and Africa. Yet, he 
became increasingly authoritarian in his desire to hold on to power. Trade unions, 
women’s groups, youth organisations were absorbed into the CPP. Political dissidence 
was perceived as a threat to national unity. Yet, in this Nkrumah did not differ from 
his contemporaries who were similarly authoritarian in political thought and practice. 
Nkrumah’s rule was by no means the political template for authoritarian rule. He was 
among many of his era and generation who had a distinct conception of power and 
how power was to be wielded.
From its initial inception to 1957, the CPP was not distracted from its goal of 
national independence, despite periods of internal dissent within the party’s ranks and 
virulent political opposition in the form of the NLM in 1954. In addition to this, 
Nkrumah managed to forge positive relations with the British Governor, Sir Charles 
Arden-Clarke during the diarchic period. This relationship demonstrated that the CPP 
was a responsible party of government capable of governing the “model colony,” but 
only after reassuring the British colonial administration that they had a reasonable
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electoral majority to rule. With political independence seemed, Nkrumah continued to 
dominate the African stage with his hosting of the Conference of Independent African 
States and the All African Peoples Conference in 1958. This important platform 
demonstrated his commitment to the total liberation of the continent as well as 
symbolically returning Pan-Africanism to the African continent. A year later, 
Nkrumah made it clear to his party and Ghanaians that creating a socialist economic 
kingdom was the priority of his government. From 1959 to 1966 the CPP failed to 
renew itself and maintain the support of the Ghanaian people whilst seeking to create 
an economic paradise. Instead, corruption, authoritarian rule, and misguided socio­
economic policies emerged. These problems emerged as a consequence of Nkrumah’s 
own misjudgement of individuals around him; his indiscipline towards economic 
planning; and his concept of power which was highly personal and undemocratic.
After 1959. Nkrumah appeared to abandon the idea of a mass party as he 
sought to create a vanguard party. This Leninist conception, based on an elite leading 
the people distanced Nkrumah from a mass constituency required to legitimate his 
power. However, ii was also the malpractices and corruption of ministers and party 
officials that created deep-seated cynicism among ordinary Ghanaians, particularly as 
there was no concerted implementation by Nkrumah after the Dawn Broadcast to 
arrest the growing corruption and economic decline experienced by ordinary people. 
Whilst Nkrumah sought to instil his ideas within the CPP; among ordinary Ghanaians 
and within state officials, via the establishment of the Young Pioneers in 1960 and the 
Ideological Institute in 1962, he was largely unsuccessful. Fundamentally, it was his 
concept of power that was elitist and highly personalized that prevented the CPP from 
renewing itself.
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On the African stage, in 1963, he made strenuous diplomatic efforts to 
mobilise African heads of state to accept his concept of Continental Union 
government for Africa. The OAU failed to live up to his aspiration of greater 
economic and poliiieal integration as it respected the notion of the non-inviolability of 
the colonially inherited borders. In 1964 his contemporaries also rejected his proposal 
for an African High Command to combat what he considered as instability in the 
continent and neo-colonial Balkanisation. Underpinning these rejections were not 
only Nkrumah’s support for dissident political groups from neighbouring West 
African countries, but the belief among some African heads of state that Nkrumah’s 
objectives were grandiose, impracticable and concealed his own desire for self- 
aggrandisement. Moreover, it is evident that many African leaders during this era 
considered African unity as a loss of territorial sovereignty and that it would give rise 
to unwelcome interference in the affairs of their state. As Nyerere revealed in his 
1997 address on Ghana’s 40th anniversary, “one head of State expressed with relief 
that he was happy u> be returning home to his country still Head of State.” In essence , 
Nyerere said of Nkrumah that he underestimated “the degree of suspicion and 
animosity which his crusading passion had created among a substantial number of his 
fellow Heads of Slate.”91 It is clear that Nkrumah’s vision of a politically and 
economically unified African continent was on the wane by the time of the 1965 
Accra OAU conference. Thereafter it died.
In short, from his student days to the end of his life, Nkrumah was totally 
committed to his ambitions for greater economic and political unification for Africa. 
For him, African unity was the only means by which Africa could develop by 
harnessing its resources for the betterment of its people. As balkanised economic
91 Africa at 40 , Vol. I. No. 3, April 1997, p. 4.
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units, it was inconceivable to him how each African nation-state could make 
economic progress without co-ordinating economic strategies on a continent-wide 
basis. Similarly. Nkrumah remained committed to a fairer redistribution of the 
economic resources of society. However, in the early days of the CPP and up to 
independence, socialism was never officially proclaimed nor reflected in the party’s 
constitution until Nkrumah’s important tenth anniversary speech in 1959.
However. Nkrumah was a self-proclaimed Marxist as far back as 1957 when 
he wrote his Autobiography. Nevertheless, it is questionable how many of his 
ministers were. Yet. Nkrumah was aware since the early days of the CPP that the 
party was comprised of diverse social elements with conflicting ideological interests. 
Padmore had observed, as far back as May 1954 the lack of discipline in the party was 
“a reflection of the low political and ideological level of the membership” and “the
* Q?degree to which careerism has grown in the party since its 1949 days.” Hence, 
Nkrumah’s attempt to instil socialist doctrine and values by his establishment of the 
Ideological Institute in 1962, his numerous speeches to civil servants and the 
Ghanaian public w as perhaps too late to deal with this problem. The question how far 
could Nkrumah’s downfall be linked to his own mishandling of the economy, power, 
his devotion to Pan-African unity and the policies he put in place to achieve Ghana’s 
economic growth and Africa’s unity are highly debateable. Nkrumah’s domineering 
charismatic character and vision played a role in shaping Ghana’s history during this 
period. It is the argument of this thesis that Nkrumah had a clear intellectual vision of 
the type of African continent he wanted to emerge and Ghana was a microcosm of 
that ambition.
92 Kwame Nkrumah Papers Box 154-41, Folder 14, Moorland Spingam-Center, Howard University; 
Padmore’s letter to Nkrumah dated 10 May 1954.
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With his overthrow, Nkrumah’s self-analysis of the causes of the coup was far 
from being a penetrative scrutiny. He considered the causes to lie entirely with 
imperialist and neo-colonial forces. However, Nkrumah did not consider his 
authoritarian style of political leadership, impatience and his economic and political 
miscalculations as having contributed to his demise. Rather, Nkrumah believed he did 
not pursue socialism fast enough. In Conakry, Nkrumah remained out of touch with 
political reality and essentially self-deluded. He planned to return to Ghana and 
became increasing]} convinced that armed struggle was the only path open to African 
freedom fighters seeking to remove the last colonial vestiges from the African 
continent. His discussions with Amilcar Cabral and his avid attention to developments 
in other dependent territories such as Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, are likely 
to have reinforced his growing belief in more revolutionary solutions for the liberation 
of African peoples. Nkrumah went to his deathbed a committed socialist, Pan- 
Afficanist and self proclaimed Marxist.
As a new generation of African people have emerged on the African continent 
and the Cold War has ended, Nkrumah’s social, political and cultural thoughts need to 
be re-assessed and understood in the context of the time in which he emerged and the 
goals and vision he sought to realise. Why he did or did not achieve these goals need 
also to be appreciated. Whilst he continues to be revered as a founder of modern 
Ghana to Ghanaians across the ideological spectrum and beyond, it is necessary to 
place him in proper historical perspective. With a more sober understanding of both 
his positive and negative contributions, it is evident Nkrumah continues to have a 
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